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ABSTRACT 
 
Interest group activity in Scotland has been subject to relatively little academic research.  
This thesis, begun the same year that the Scottish Parliament opened, looks at the effects of 
this new political institution (with particular emphasis on the legislature) upon the behaviour 
and beliefs of six interest groups in Scotland.  The effect of the different parliamentary 
components (the Scottish Parliament as a whole, the Scottish Executive, the committees, the 
committee clerks and MSPs) on the groups is looked at in detail.   
 
Two of the groups chose not to adopt insider strategies, believing that the parliamentary 
committees were the best venue for their organisations to target.  During the early years of 
the Scottish Parliament the six groups regarded the legislature (namely the committees) as a 
target to change policy and not just as a channel to the Scottish Executive. 
 
New institutionalist theory was applicable in explaining the responses of the groups, although 
one of the three approaches - rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalism – is 
more applicable than the other two in certain circumstances.  Sociological institutionalism is 
the most applicable new institutionalist approach in explaining behaviour during the bringing 
about of change; historical institutionalism is most applicable when change is being 
established as new institutions and rules are set up and rational choice institutionalism is the 
most applicable approach during times of stability, allowing groups to look to their own self 
interests.  It is possible to predict which approach is most applicable at any one time, 
depending on the circumstances and whether the group works in isolation or if it interacts 
with others in the political system. 
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CHAPTER ONE  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Setting the scene 
On the 12th May 1999, Dr Winnie Ewing as the oldest Member of the Scottish Parliament, 
had the pleasure of opening the first meeting of the Scottish Parliament with the words: 
‘…the Scottish Parliament, which adjourned on 25th March 1707, is hereby convened’.  For 
nearly three centuries Scotland did not have its own parliament but that changed in 1999 
when the Scottish electorate voted for members of the new devolved Scottish Parliament (for 
more details on the background to devolution see Appendix 1).   
 
1.2  Prospect of devolution 
The successful devolution campaign was due in some measure to the contribution of interest 
groups when a ‘remarkably broad coalition of civic society’ (including the churches, trades 
unions, local authorities and academics) launched the Scottish Constitutional Convention in 
January 1989 (Hutchinson; 2001, p.147).  The Convention kept the issue of devolution alive 
and it also set itself the task of making plans for a future Scottish Parliament (this included 
designing the proportional representation electoral system that was subsequently chosen for 
the Scottish Parliament).  The goal of the Scottish Parliament was finally realised when the 
Labour Party won the 1997 UK general election after the Conservative Party had been in 
power for eighteen years.  Labour quickly acted on its manifesto promise to hold a 
referendum in Scotland on the issue of devolution and following the positive referendum 
result on 11th September 1997 (of the 44.9% of the Scottish electorate that voted 74.3% were 
in favour) the then Secretary of State for Scotland, Donald Dewar, appointed a Consultative 
Steering Group (CSG) to look at what Scots wanted from their Scottish Parliament.  Again, 
in the manner of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, the CSG was made up of civic 
society.   
 
The CSG summed up their findings in a report which concluded that the Scottish Parliament 
should be founded on the four key principles of: power sharing, accountability, accessibility 
and equal opportunities (Consultative Steering Group, 1998).  The vision was for: ‘an open, 
accessible Parliament; a Parliament where power is shared with the people; where people are 
encouraged to participate in the policy making process which affects all our lives’ 
(Consultative Steering Group; 1998, p.v).  This is because for some time civic Scotland had 
been dissatisfied with what they viewed as the increasingly closed system of consultation in 
Scotland: 
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‘the character of the relationship between the Scottish Office and Scottish civil 
society was subjected to unprecedented strain…  The allegation that Scottish 
government paid inadequate attention to civic Scotland was much more cogent when 
that government was increasingly at odds with the social democratic ethos of civic 
life’ (Paterson; 1999, p.37).   
Interest groups had made a significant contribution into making devolution a reality and they 
were keen to claim a reward - a Scottish Parliament partly shaped by their expectations.  
Those expectations included a new kind of politics where power sharing, openness and 
consensus were to mark the new system of politics in Scotland.  McCrone writes that the 
CSG: 
‘reflects the role which ‘civil society’ has played in establishing the Parliament in 
1999, its twenty-year history campaigning and agitation, and it helps to convey a 
sense, most obviously carried by its premier principle, ‘power-sharing’, that 
Parliament is a creature of society rather than the other way round.  It is the 
autonomous and longstanding history of civil society, beyond the control of the state, 
which has been the platform on which the new institutions of Parliament and 
Executive have been built' (McCrone; 2003, p.45).  
 
The CSG Report invited the Scottish Parliament to endorse the four key principles as a 
symbol of what the people of Scotland could expect from their MSPs (Members of the 
Scottish Parliament) and on the 9th June 1999, the Parliament debated and agreed that ‘its 
operations should continue to embody the spirit of the CSG key principles’ (Scottish 
Parliament (a); 1999, p.13).  These principles were designed to achieve ‘an open, accessible 
and, above all, participative Parliament’ to engage those that were cynical and disillusioned 
with the democratic process (Consultative Steering Group; 1998, p.3). 
 
With MSPs like George Reid arguing in the parliamentary debate that ‘participation is the 
star by which to steer this Parliament’ it was no wonder that interest groups were excited and 
preparing to be part of this new political world (Scottish Parliament (b), col 372).  But the 
CSG principles were centred on the Parliament, not on the Scottish Executive.  A lot of the 
focus at the run up to devolution was on the new parliamentary dimension and not on 
Ministers and civil servants.  This was in part because the power to initiate legislation was 
conferred not only on the Scottish Executive - Ministers and civil servants (chapter 6) but 
also on the seventeen parliamentary committees (chapter 7) and on individual MSPs 
(chapter 8).  The legislature was not just going to be relegated to a deliberative function, 
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instead the whole system was purposely designed to counter executive dominance (Lynch; 
2001, p.69).  The Parliament (the legislature), particularly its committees, was seen by some 
enthusiastic supporters as the primary arena in which interest groups could feed into:  
‘The parliamentary committees are to be the conduit for inserting civic ideas into the 
legislative debates…  The parliamentarians will rely on advice from civic 
organisations for the very practical reason that these organisations are well-informed, 
and provide a counter-weight to the civil service’ (Paterson; 1999, p.38).    
 
1.3  The aim: impact of the Parliament 
Despite the contribution of interest groups in bringing about the Scottish Parliament and all 
the new opportunities that it offered, interest group activity in Scotland has been an area of 
little study (Lynch; 2001, p.111).  It is an aspect of the new political system that remains to 
be investigated and requiring original research (although Lynch included a chapter on interest 
groups in his own book).  Because of the shortage of material on interest groups in Scotland 
and because the Scottish Parliament only opened in 1999 when this research began, an ideal 
opportunity existed to examine the Scottish Parliament’s effect on the activity of six specific 
interest groups from 1999 to 2001 (see chapter 2 for details about the groups).  It has been 
noted by others how interest groups played a significant role in introducing the Scottish 
Parliament but there is less material on how the Scottish Parliament subsequently affected 
Scottish interest groups.  Therefore, the overall aim of this research is to investigate the 
impact of a new political institution – the Scottish Parliament – upon the way in which 
outside interests in civil society engage with it.  This aim is relatively unusual in two ways.  
Firstly, most work on interest groups is concerned with how much influence interest groups 
have on policy, whereas this research looks at the effects political institution on interest 
groups.  Connected to that, studies on interest group interaction at other levels of governance 
(such as the UK and European Union) are prolific, but most of the literature focuses on 
interest group relationships with governments.  The relationship between parliaments and 
interest groups ‘is not one that has been the focus of much literature’ (Norton; 1999, p.2), 
although the notable exception to this is work done by Norton (1999), Rush (1990) and Judge 
(1993).  Norton concluded that interest groups see parliaments as a channel to government, 
rather than targets in their own right (1999, p.175) but because the ‘committees of the 
Scottish Parliament have wider powers than those of any national legislature in Western 
Europe apart from some Scandinavian democracies’ (George Reid as quoted in Scottish 
Parliament (c)), this may result in the Scottish legislature becoming a target for interest 
groups because of its potential to be more powerful in the policy process than parliaments are 
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generally perceived to be.  The Scottish Parliament presents an excellent opportunity to 
examine whether legislatures can in fact be as attractive to interest groups as governments are 
if they are given more wide ranging powers. 
 
1.4  Objective one: behaviour and beliefs  
To assess the impact of the Scottish Parliament on interest group activity, a necessary 
objective was to analyse in particular, whether the behaviour and/or belief systems of 
organised interests are affected by a new parliamentary institution.  The major benefit of 
analysing a new institution is that it allows a ‘before and after’ comparison and an 
examination of how interest groups responded to the new political system, not just in terms of 
their behaviour but also in terms of their attitudes.  The situation is made even more 
interesting in Scotland where the new political system was made up of old and new 
institutions: the Parliament with its committees was brand new but the government, Ministers 
and the administration, was derived from Westminster structures.  Could a new kind of 
politics be introduced into a system where some of the institutions were rooted in a different 
culture?  Comparison is drawn in the thesis between the reactions of the groups to different 
components of the legislature: chapter 5 reports on how the Scottish Parliament as a whole 
affected the groups, chapter 6 looks at the relationship between the interest groups and civil 
servants and Ministers (the Scottish Executive), chapter 7 analyses their responses to the 
parliamentary committees and chapter 8 examines the effect of MSPs on the groups.  The 
concluding chapter 9 looks at how successful the Scottish Parliament was in achieving its 
ambition of introducing a ‘new politics’ based on the CSG principles and whether as a result 
the Parliament was seen as a target for interest groups, as well as a channel to the Scottish 
Executive. 
 
1.5  Objective two: new institutionalism 
To explain why the groups responded in the way that they did to the new Scottish Parliament, 
a theoretical approach was required to explain how political institutions affect the behaviour 
of individuals.  Such a theory already exists – new institutionalism - and it is a well 
developed body of work.  As yet, however, empirical studies building on it are not so 
common (Powell and DiMaggio; 1991, p.7).  New institutionalism is a broad heading that 
encompasses several approaches.  The three most common identified in the literature are 
rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism.  
All three share the basic premise that institutions affect behaviour but differ in their 
explanations as to how that occurs.  Therefore, the second objective of the thesis is to 
examine the extent to which different types of institutionalist accounts established in the 
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literature are applicable in explaining the responses of organised interests.  Chapter 3 
outlines the three approaches in detail and in chapters 5 – 8 each of the three approaches is 
applied to the chapter findings in order to establish if they are capable of explaining why the 
groups responded in the way that they did to the Scottish Parliament.  The three approaches 
have competed against each other in the established literature or authors have said that there 
needs to be more give and take between them, but they have generally failed to explain how 
this would happen.  The concluding chapter (chapter 9) will explain how new institutionalism 
can predict how groups will react in particular circumstances. 
 
To summarise then, this research will provide original work on interest group activity in 
Scotland, advance new insights into the established works on new institutional theory and 
will add to the relatively small body of work on the relationship between interest groups and 
parliaments.  However, in order to become familiar with the six groups and to know how the 
evidence for this research was collected, it is necessary to explain the research methods that 
were undertaken, which follows in chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER TWO  RESEARCH METHODS 
 
2.1  Case Study 
When it came to considering what research methods to use for this thesis, the case study 
presented itself as being the optimal choice because: 
‘In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions 
are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the 
focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.  Such 
“explanatory” case studies also can be complemented by two other types - 
“exploratory” and “descriptive” case studies’ (Yin; 1994, p.1). 
 
This particular research topic is suited to the case study based on Yin’s recommendations 
above.  The purpose of this PhD is to look at how the Scottish Parliament has affected interest 
groups and why this has been the case.  Answering the “how” question could just as easily be 
done by employing a survey technique (and perhaps be more representative) but the “why” 
part of the equation requires a methodology that can dig deep enough to study motivation.  It 
is highly doubtful that a survey technique would have answered the “why” question 
satisfactorily, whereas this is one of the strengths of the case study.  The case study allows 
the possibility of looking at motivation, attitudes and how they affect behaviour, while people 
‘who routinely work with large datasets and official statistics often make unproven 
assumptions about behaviour’ (Hakim; 2000, p.36).  Secondly, the focus of this research was 
on a contemporary event (over which the investigator has very little control) - the Scottish 
Parliament and its effect on interest groups in Scotland since it opened in 1999.  Lincoln and 
Guba (2000; p.31) state that it ‘is difficult to imagine a human activity that is context-free’.  
For this particular research the Scottish context is highly important which is why case studies 
were chosen  because they ‘stress the holistic examination of a phenomenon, and they seek to 
avoid the separation of components from the larger context to which these matters may be 
related' (Jorgensen; 1989, p.19).   
 
Looking back at Yin’s prescription, the third match is that this research aims to be 
explanatory by demonstrating how a political institution, the Scottish Parliament, has become 
the ‘central component of political life’ (Peters; 1999, p.150) in Scotland since 1999 and why 
it has affected the behaviour of interest groups.  The research will also be exploratory for the 
simple reason that there is a shortage of material on interest groups in Scotland.  And because 
this research involves interest groups, the case study is particularly appropriate according to 
Hakim, who states that ‘case studies have advantages for research on social groups’, 
 17
including ‘larger groups with a shared identity, common activities or interests (such as 
occupational groups or national pressure groups)’ (2000, p.66). 
 
The case study also allows the opportunity to study normative values which a survey could 
not reveal because ‘surveys provide only limited information and are often best for telling us 
what people do rather than why they do it’ (Harrison; 2001, p.78).  Knowing “why” is an 
essential requirement for this research as new institutionalism is the theoretical framework, 
which as chapter three explains involves looking at how the Scottish Parliament has affected 
the behaviour and attitudes of interest groups in Scotland.  Although Hakim is referring to 
qualitative research in general, what she says is equally applicable to the case study in that it 
allows the study of ‘perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, views and feelings, the meanings and 
interpretations given to events and things, as well as their behaviour’ (Hakim; 2000, p.34).  
Kane and O’Reilly-de Brun also add that attitudes and behaviours should be looked at in ‘a 
natural setting’, which is obviously very important in order to get a truer picture (2001, 
p.215).  Again this demonstrates why the case study is the best methodological choice. 
 
2.1.1  Theoretical generalisations 
May claims that ‘our findings on the social world are devoid of meaning until situated within 
a theoretical framework’ (2001; p.33).  So armed with the knowledge that ‘the ultimate goal 
is theoretical insight’ (Gerson and Horowitz; 2002, p.220) it was decided to follow Yin’s 
recommendation that the case study should use a ‘previously developed theory...as a template 
with which to compare the empirical results of the case study’ (1994; p.31).  This research 
lends itself to probing the applicability of new institutionalist theory, which (as described in 
chapter three) dictates that political institutions affect the behaviour of those around it.  New 
institutionalism while well developed, still requires further empirical testing.  Eckstein also 
agrees that the case study is:  
‘valuable at all stages of the theory-building process, but most valuable at that stage 
of theory building where least value is generally attached to them: the stage at which 
candidate theories are ‘tested’’ (2000; p.119).  
However Babbie disagrees with this.  He acknowledges that field research may be deductive, 
but he adds that ‘you seldom if ever merely test a theory and let it go at that.  Rather, you 
develop theories...’ (1995, p.296).  But although developing theories is highly important 
work, it would be worth little until they had been proven to work.  Baker states, the ‘aim of 
science is to establish theories and then to prove (or disprove) them’ and it is the work of 
science to ‘test existing theories with new evidence’ (1994, p.300, original emphasis).  
Therefore each case will be what Stake terms ‘instrumental case study’, by which he means 
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‘a particular case is examined to provide insight into an issue or refinement of theory’ (1998, 
p.88).   
 
A criticism frequently levelled at the case study is that it does not allow for statistical 
generalisation in a way that surveys do because a case study cannot claim to be 
representative.  However, Yin counteracts this criticism by stating that case studies are 
‘generalizable to theoretical propositions’ (1994; p.10).  Hammersley and Gomm explain this 
by saying that where the case study ‘is designed to test or illustrate a theoretical point, then it 
will deal with the case as an instance of a type, describing it in terms of a particular 
theoretical framework’ (2000; p.4).  The case studies can make generalisations about the 
theory (rather than about interest groups in Scotland) and if the results of ‘two or more cases 
are shown to support the same theory, replication can be claimed’ (Yin; 1994, p.31).  Baker 
(1994; p.300) talks about ‘external validity’ which ‘addresses whether the findings of a study 
can be generalized to another sample’ and she agrees with Yin that this can only be done 
through replication.  The focus therefore is not (as with surveys based on a representative 
sample) to seek a statistical generalisation.  So this research will not be making claims that 
75% of interest groups in Scotland say…  Instead the focus of this research is to make a 
generalisation about the theory (if new institutionalism survives the empirical evidence from 
the case studies), rather than to make claims of representativeness of the interest groups.  Yin 
terms this ‘analytic generalization’ (1994; p.10).  Although that is not to dismiss the fact that 
‘[c]ertain activities or problems or responses will come up again and again’ amongst the case 
study interest groups (Stake; 1995, p.7). 
 
2.1.2  Selection of cases 
Multiple case studies were deemed necessary to allow for replication.  That was an easy 
decision unlike the process of actually selecting the multiple case studies. 
 
Originally, at the start of the design process a misplaced emphasis was put on the interest 
groups rather than the Scottish Parliament.  (Work was done on studying the different 
categories that exist for interest groups and time was spent on drawing up definitions for each 
different type of interest group).  The realisation soon dawned that this was an inappropriate 
way of selecting the cases.  New institutionalism focuses on the institution so it became 
apparent that the cases should be selected from criteria based on the Scottish Parliament.  
 
The selection was still not straightforward at that point either.  After looking at options that 
included choosing the groups based on Bills going through the Parliament, one important 
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factor soon emerged: the need to include several parliamentary committees because this 
thesis is looking at the legislature’s effect on interest groups and the main way it does this is 
through its committee system.  Chapter 7 describes how the Scottish Parliament has 
seventeen committees which are a focal point for interest groups endeavouring to have their 
input into legislation.  However, most interest groups do not deal with all seventeen 
committees as the committees have clearly demarcated subject areas that fall under their 
competency.  So, for example, a group representing the homeless may have very little to do 
with the Audit Committee but monitor the Social Justice Committee closely.  This is 
important because the committees can have very different cultures depending on the 
convener, the individual members and the remit of the committee.  Therefore in order to 
establish how the Scottish Parliament has affected interest groups it is necessary to look at 
more than one group in case that group deals primarily with just one committee.  By looking 
at more than one committee it will be possible to see if the different committee cultures have 
a bearing on how the interest groups behave or if indeed all the groups are affected in the 
same way. 
 
It then became obvious that the best way of selecting the interest groups was by 
parliamentary committee.  This firmly put the emphasis back on the Scottish Parliament and 
it would allow a deliberate consideration of the different committees.  The next issue was 
deciding on the number of case studies.  Again Yin offers advice for this dilemma:  
‘the selection of the number of replications depends upon the certainty you want to 
have about your multiple-case results (as with the higher criterion for establishing 
statistical significance, the greater certainty lies with the larger number of cases)’ 
(1994; p.50, see also Hakim; 2000, p.62). 
The goal is obviously to achieve as much certainty as possible but on the other hand 
‘[r]esearch is the art of the feasible’ (Blaxter et al; 1996, p.145).  A balance had to be struck, 
especially as it had been established early on that there was a need to conduct participant 
observation due to the qualitative material required to satisfy the normative demands of new 
institutionalism.  As participant observation is time consuming small samples were 
necessary.  One idea was to look at all of the committees (there were sixteen committees 
when the Scottish Parliament first opened, this increased to seventeen in 2001) and the 
groups that interacted with them but that idea fell into the unfeasible category.  It was then 
thought that this could be whittled down to a group for each committee but given the 
timescales even that was deemed impractical.  So having already established that it is 
necessary to look at more than one committee, requiring certainty but also undertaking the 
achievable it was decided that six parliamentary committees would be picked for the 
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selection process.  The case studies would then be made up of six interest groups - one group 
for one committee as this would allow for a month of participant observation with each group 
within the timescales given but also cover a wide range of the committees.  A criticism of this 
approach could be that the committees could have a different effect on different groups.  This 
is countered by the fact that although groups tend to focus primarily on the most relevant 
committee, they all had dealings with at least one other committee.  
 
2.1.3  Non-probability sampling 
The next obstacle was how to select a sample of just six parliamentary committees and six 
interest groups.  (A sample is ‘when you study the characteristics of only some of the people, 
situations, or items within the group’ (Kane and O’Reilly-de Brun; 2001, p.95)).  It was 
decided to opt for non-probability sampling because it is ‘less strict and makes no claim for 
representativeness’ (Sarantakos; 1993, p.126).  Unlike probability sampling there are no rules 
for selecting a sample size which means the researcher can choose the sample unit based on 
his or her own judgement.  Kane and O’Reilly-de Brun explain that there are no rules 
because if there are no claims to representativeness then statistical rules applied to probability 
sampling to calculate sample size are irrelevant (2001; p.102).  Non-probability sampling is 
more appropriate in research looking at cultural patterns or rules:  
‘Because some ideas and patterns are culturally shared, you can reach the point of 
diminishing returns, in terms of information, fairly quickly: 10 people may be able to 
tell you what 10,000 would’ (Kane and O’Reilly-de Brun; 2001, p.102).   
 
The non-probability sampling method can be narrowed down further to “purposive 
sampling”.  According to Babbie, anyone carrying out field research if they are going to 
‘consciously sample at all’ are most likely to use purposive sampling and this research is no 
different (1995, p.287).  Purposive sampling is where: 
‘you select a sample of observations you believe will yield the most comprehensive 
understanding of your subject of study, based on the intuitive feel for the subject that 
comes from extended observation and reflection’ (Babbie; 1995, p.287).  
 
The committees were chosen on the basis of their convenership.  Chapter 7 describes how 
influential a convener can be in determining how a committee operates because of their 
personal style and possibly because of their political party.  Out of the seventeen 
parliamentary committees Labour had nine convenerships, the SNP had four and the Liberal 
Democrats and the Conservatives had two each.  The aim was to choose six committees that 
had a mix of conveners from the different parties. Keeping in mind that there had to be this 
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balance in selecting the committees, the emphasis then fell on the groups themselves.  
Because this research was not seeking to make generalisations about interest groups in 
Scotland as a whole, the selection was not based on the impossible task of choosing six 
“representative” groups.  (‘Case study research is not sampling research’ anyway (Stake; 
1995, p.4)).  Instead, the selection was based on criteria that would test new institutionalism.  
Therefore questions were asked such as would the Parliament affect a UK wide group 
differently from a Scottish based group?  Would the Parliament have a different effect on 
groups that had been established long before 1999, compared to those who were only 
established as a result of the Parliament’s creation?  Would the size and type of group have 
any bearing?  These questions and the committee that the groups primarily dealt with were all 
taken into consideration and as a result the following six groups were chosen ‘because it is 
believed that understanding them will lead to better understanding, perhaps better theorizing, 
about a still larger collection of cases' (Stake; 1998, p.8). 
 
 
THE FEDERATION OF SMALL BUSINESSES 
 
Referred to as: The FSB 
Primary parliamentary committee: Enterprise and Lifelong Learning (SNP convener) 
Represents: small businesses 
Membership: 13, 500 small businesses in Scotland accounting for 106,000 employees 
Structure: UK wide with national offices in Blackpool, London (UK Press Office), 
Glasgow, Cardiff and Belfast (they also have a further eight regional offices). 
Office personnel in Scotland: 5 
Established in Scotland: 1974 
About the Federation of Small Businesses:  ‘The Federation of Small Businesses is “a 
non-party political campaigning pressure group which exists to promote and protect the 
interests of all who are either self-employed or who run their own business”. 
 
The Federation is now Scotland’s (and the UK’s) largest business organisation.  It is run 
by business people for business people and funded by member subscriptions. 
 
The Federation in Scotland campaigns to create a political and economic environment 
that will allow small businesses to prosper and foster the creation of wealth. 
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The Federation is a member-led organisation with two complementary sides – a strong 
volunteer base of members, all of who own and run businesses, and Press and 
Parliamentary officials with supporting staff. 
 
The Federation has a branch, regional and national structure which ensures that the 
Federation fully consults and represents the views of FSB members. 
 
The Federation Scottish Press and Parliamentary office in Glasgow works closely with 
members of the FSB Scottish Policy Committee and Regional Organisers, in the 
promotion of agreed policy. 
 
The Federation is in contact with and provides input to the policy development process of 
all political parties in Scotland, the Scottish Office, government agencies and a wide 
range of organisations that impact on the small business sector in Scotland.’ 
 
Taken from the FSB’s Think First Think Business manifesto, 1999. 
 
 
 
THE SCOTTISH CHURCHES PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE 
 
Referred to as: The SCPO 
Primary parliamentary committee: Social Justice Committee (Labour Convener) 
Represents: churches 
Membership: twelve denominations 
Structure: Scottish wide, based in Edinburgh 
Office personnel in Scotland: 2 full-time and 1 one part-time 
Established in Scotland: 1999 
About the Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office:  ‘The churches have created the 
Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office to build a fruitful relationship with the new 
Parliament.  It will enable them to:  
- engage effectively in the new political process,  
- translate their commitment to the welfare of Scotland into Parliamentary debate, and 
- contribute the range and depth of their experience, and their faith reflection on that, 
to the decision-making process. 
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Churches are active in every kind of community in Scotland, in ways ranging from 
personal caring and support, to a wide variety of local and national projects.  As churches 
care and listen, they learn.  And they have a strong record of building on that, through 
tough thinking and faithful reflection.  At times, they have a prophetic word of challenge 
to bring; at times, they have insights to contribute; always, they share concerns for the 
people of Scotland. 
 
This will be done through briefings to Parliamentarians and to the churches, and by 
bringing people together for dialogue.  Often, this will be happening in partnership with 
others in Scottish civil society. 
 
Other faith communities and groups may also use the services of the Office.’ 
 
Taken from SCPO (a), What is the SCPO? 
 
 
MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS SOCIETY SCOTLAND 
 
Referred to as: The MS Society 
Primary parliamentary committee: Health and Community Care (Liberal Democrat 
Convener) 
Represents:  people with multiple sclerosis  
Membership: 44 Scottish branches with over 4,000 members in Scotland 
Structure: UK wide, with national offices in London, Ingilston, Cardiff and Belfast. 
Office personnel in Scotland: 12 
Established in Scotland:  1954 
About the Multiple Sclerosis Society:  ‘Multiple Sclerosis is not a new disease: it was 
identified about 150 years ago by physicians in Britain and France.  The Society’s 
inaugural meeting was held on 2nd December 1953, and the first Scottish branches were 
formed in 1954.  There are now 44 branches in Scotland with over 4,000 members.  This 
strong volunteer-based network provides the vital local support for people with MS, their 
carers and families. 
 
As a charity, our beneficiaries are people with multiple sclerosis and those affected by it 
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and by allied conditions, including carers, families and friends. 
 
As multiple sclerosis is a condition without respect for national boundaries, it follows that 
we work at an international level wherever it is appropriate to achieve our goals. 
 
Our ultimate aim is the eradication of multiple sclerosis. 
 
Our objects and purposes as a charity are:  
- To support and relieve people affected by multiple sclerosis 
- To encourage people affected by multiple sclerosis to attain their full potential as 
members of society by improving their conditions of life 
- To promote research into multiple sclerosis and allied conditions and to publish the 
results. 
 
The Council of the MS Society Scotland (which consists of one representative elected by 
each branch) meets at least annually to exercise its powers, although it may delegate 
ordinary business to its Executive Committee.’ 
 
Taken from MS Society (a), Our Constitution Scotland. 
 
 
SCOTTISH PARENT TEACHER COUNCIL 
 
Referred to as: The SPTC 
Primary parliamentary committee: Education, Sport and Culture (Labour Convener) 
Represents: parents of school children 
Membership: around 1,250 member Parent Teacher Associations/Parent Associations 
Structure: Scottish wide, Edinburgh based 
Office personnel in Scotland: 3 part-time staff 
Established in Scotland: 1947 
About the Scottish Parent Teacher Council:  ‘In 1947 a group of parents from Parent 
Teacher Associations around Scotland came together to share their hopes and ideals for 
their children’s education.  Out of their dreams the Scottish Parent Teacher Council was 
born.  They believed that education was about establishing a working partnership between 
parents and teachers to improve and to advance the education of children in Scotland. 
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Our aim is to advance education by encouraging the fullest co-operation between home 
and school, education authorities, central government and all those concerned with 
education in Scotland. 
 
SPTC has recognition as a national body for parents.  We ask for your views and present 
them to both regional and national authorities.  We are non-party political and non-
sectarian.  We meet with representatives from all the major political parties in Scotland.   
 
We are consulted by the Scottish Office Education Department, the Convention of 
Scottish Local Authorities and other national and regional bodies on matters relating to 
education.   
  
The SPTC has a Board of Directors made up of elected and co-opted members of the 
Council.  Anyone in membership can be elected or co-opted onto the Board of Directors 
to serve for one to three years. The Council's Board meets once a month to discuss 
education issues of concern to parents and to determine the Council's response.  
 
Membership is open to Parent, Parent Teacher and other home-school associations, to 
organisations and associations which are not school based and to individual parents and 
other persons with an interest in education.’  
 
Taken from the SPTC (a), What is the Scottish Parent Teacher Council? 
 
 
CONVENTION OF SCOTTISH LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
 
Referred to as: CoSLA 
Primary parliamentary committee: Local Government Committee (Labour Convener) 
Represents: local authorities in Scotland 
Membership: 29 local authorities (out of 33)  
Structure: Scottish wide, Edinburgh based 
Office personnel in Scotland: 48 
Established in Scotland: 1975 
About the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities:  ‘COSLA the Convention of 
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Scottish Local Authorities was created during the reorganisation of local government in 
Scotland in 1975.  The argument for establishing a single association to represent all 
councils was based on the belief that in presenting a united rather than a fragmented front 
to central government, the bargaining position of local government would be 
strengthened. 
 
COSLA is the representative voice of Scottish local government and has three key 
objectives:   
- To secure an effective relationship with the Scottish Executive and Scottish 
Parliament, European institutions and partner organizations, which provides for local 
government having greater control over its own affairs 
- To support local government’s role in providing leadership for the communities it 
represents, strengthening local democracy and public support and understanding of 
local government 
- To support local government’s commitment to continuous improvement in the 
delivery of quality services and value for money. 
 
COSLA also acts as the employers’ association on behalf of its member councils, 
negotiating salaries, wages and conditions of service for local government employees in 
Scotland with the relevant trade unions. 
 
COSLA also has a responsibility to develop, encourage and promote best practice for 
local government in partnership with its member councils.  Our aim is to enable members 
of different political groups to have the opportunity to contribute to COSLA’s work and 
to the development of policies that represent – as far as possible – consensus between the 
political groups. 
 
COSLA is financed by a levy on its member councils calculated on a population basis.  
The annual budget is around £2 million. 
 
Regular meetings of council leaders agree the overall policy and direction of work.  
Policy development work takes place through a small number of officers at Rosebery 
House (48 staff in total) in conjunction with 22 elected spokespersons who are charged 
with the development of policy matters in an inclusive manner through the involvement 
of all councils and political groups.  Policy documents are agreed by either the 
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Convention, the meeting of all Councils – where strict party balance is maintained or 
through one of the regular meetings of all Council leaders.’ 
 
Taken from CoSLA (a), www.CoSLA.gov.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
ROYAL SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF BIRDS 
 
Referred to as: The RSPB 
Primary parliamentary committee: Rural Development (Conservative Convener) and 
Transport and the Environment (Labour Convener) 
Represents: people who support the conservation of wild birds and their habitats 
Membership: 68,000+ members in Scotland 
Structure: UK wide with headquarters in Bedfordshire, Edinburgh, and Belfast and 
offices in Cardiff and Bangor as well as six English regional offices and 3 Scottish 
regional offices 
Office personnel in Scotland:  Over 130 staff, including those who work in the 50+ 
Scottish nature reserves 
Established in Scotland:  Before 1914 
About the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds:  ‘Scotland holds two-thirds of the 
UK’s most important sites for birds.  Our seabirds, wading birds, wildfowl and birds of 
prey are significant not just in a European context, but also on a global scale. 
 
RSPB Scotland is committed to conserving and enhancing Scotland’s unique wildlife 
heritage.  From small beginnings before the first world war, our work today is the 
responsibility of the Director and over 130 staff forming a network throughout Scotland.  
This reflects the awareness in Scotland of the special value of our wildlife, which is 
admired by the rest of the UK and by visitors from across Europe.  … The Director and 
the staff benefit from the advice of a Scottish Committee drawn from our membership in 
Scotland. 
 
Birds do not exist in isolation.  To conserve them it is necessary to conserve the whole 
environment, hence the RSPB’s interest in farming, crofting, forestry, fishing and 
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tourism.  Specialist staff help to put forward positive policies based on sound information 
and a practical understanding of the issues. 
 
The RSPB’s broad aim is to promote the conservation of wild birds and their habitats.  
The RSPB’s objectives include:  
 - conserving the most endangered bird species and their habitats 
 - safeguarding Scotland’s most important sites for birds through nature reserves and 
other mechanisms 
 - providing a range of information and fundraising materials to support this work 
 - campaigning to inform our members and the public about conservation and the 
countryside. 
 
RSPB Scotland spends over £4.5 million a year.’  
 
Taken from the RSPB (a), The RSPB in Scotland. 
 
 
The case studies, whilst looking at individual people within each of the six groups are ‘not 
about particular individuals per se; reports focus rather on the various patterns, or clusters, of 
attitudes and related behaviour that emerge’ (Hakim; 2000, p.34).  That is an important point 
to remember as particular individuals from each group were interviewed but the focus is on 
the group they represent rather than the individuals. 
 
Having chosen the case study as the methodology and the groups that were to make up the 
case studies, the next step was to go and collect the evidence.  The beauty of the case study is 
that they: 
‘may incorporate the analysis of administrative records and other documents, depth 
interviews, larger-scale structured surveys (either personal interview or postal 
surveys), participant and non-participant observation and collecting virtually any type 
of evidence that is relevant and available’ (Hakim; 2000, p.61). 
 
2.1.4  Triangulation 
Using as many sources of evidence as possible is desirable in an effort to achieve 
triangulation.  Sarantakos lists a number of reasons why triangulation is valuable but two of 
the most important reasons is that it allows for ‘a higher degree of validity and reliability’ and 
it uses ‘the strength of each method to overcome the deficiencies of the other’ (1993; p.155).  
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It means that a paper submitted to the Scottish Executive and an internal memo can 
corroborate an interviewee’s response.  It was therefore expedient to take advantage of the 
following data collection techniques offered by the case study: participant observation, direct 
observation, interviews, documents and archival information.  Not only will all these 
techniques add ‘rigor, breadth, and depth to any investigation’ (Denzin and Lincoln; 1998, 
p.4) but it will further the aim of understanding the case studies (Stake; 1995, p.9).  The 
advantage of using case studies and participant observation is that they ‘have in-built 
triangulation’ according to Kane and O’Reilly-de Brun as ‘each involves using a variety of 
approaches’ (2001; p. 215). 
 
2.2  Participant observation 
‘If we wish to learn anything about political behaviour in a particular context, we must also 
engage with that context and undertake what is referred to as participant observation’ 
(Harrison; 2001, p.80).  Participant observation allows access to the everyday world of the 
interest groups to see what happens in them from the standpoint of those working within 
them, how these things happen and most importantly why these things happen (Jorgensen; 
1989, p.12).  Before a researcher turns up with questions and a tape recorder, people have 
already applied meaning to their surroundings and the processes that they operate in.  It is 
part of the researcher’s job then to interpret what those surroundings and processes are (May; 
2001, p.38) and participant observation offers the opportunity to do that.  It allows the 
researcher to see the standpoint of those within the setting, which makes it less likely that the 
researcher will try to impose her own reality on what it is she is seeking to understand (a 
potential problem for those using other techniques) (May; 2001, p.149/p.153).   As Jorgensen 
states:  
‘Accurate (objective and truthful) findings are more rather than less likely as the 
researcher becomes involved directly, personally, and existentially with people in 
daily life’ (1989, p.56).   
 
Participant observation is especially useful because it can pick up on ‘nuances of attitude and 
behavior that might escape researchers using other methods’ (Babbie; 1995, p.281).  
However, there seems to be a consensus in the literature that participant observation ‘is more 
likely to proceed inductively’ (Gerson and Horowitz; 2002, p.200).  This research is 
obviously one of those instances that has chosen to go against the grain.  By having a 
theoretical framework beforehand it provided a focus to the observation and the data was not 
collected to then be forced to fit the theory because the purpose of this research is to find out 
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to what extent new institutionalism is applicable to the findings of the PhD – either to prove 
or disprove it.  So data that did not support the theory was equally valid and valuable.  
 
2.2.1  Participant observation applied to this research 
When the research design was being established, doubt was being cast on whether interviews 
alone would be sufficient to gain the information necessary to test new institutionalism 
because two approaches of the theory involved studying the culture, norms and beliefs of the 
groups.  It became apparent that in order to be rigorous, it would be necessary to undertake 
participant observation.  As Babbie states the key strength of participant observation is that it 
gives ‘comprehensiveness of perspective’ allowing for ‘a deeper and fuller understanding’ of 
the phenomenon being studied (1995, p.280).     
 
One of the biggest disadvantages about participant observation is that it is incredibly time 
consuming.  This was an important factor as it would have to be applied to six different 
groups within a limited timescale so after looking at the time available it was decided to 
undertake a feasible four week period of participant observation with each interest group.  
The participant observation took the form of working full-time in the office and carrying out 
any work that the groups assigned the researcher.  Four weeks of working full-time would 
allow sufficient time to get to know colleagues and to observe their behaviour and attitudes.   
 
 
WORK CARRIED OUT AS A PARTICIPANT-AS-OBSERVER 
 
Federation of Small Businesses: data entry for a survey they had conducted amongst a 
sample of their members on computer usage; analysis of that data, plus general research 
work. 
 
Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office: summarising Scottish Executive proposal 
papers/policies, monitoring the parliamentary website for the group’s monthly update. 
 
Multiple Sclerosis Society: writing up reports for every health board in Scotland based 
on the results of a survey of MS Society members; creating a rolling document of all the 
parliamentary questions that had been asked about MS and related matters. 
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Scottish Parent Teacher Council: administrative work, organising and sifting through 
documents on the computer.   
 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities: documenting the various bodies and 
organisations that CoSLA were involved with. 
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds: going through press cuttings to document 
how much coverage the RSPB had received in the media and on what topics; monitoring 
the parliamentary website and daily press for the RSPB’s daily internal update. 
 
Harrison states that it is important that researchers ‘place’ themselves - that is, admit who 
they are and why the study is being conducted (2001; p.82/83).  The researcher for ethical 
reasons felt this option to be the only viable one and each group was told the purpose of the 
four week placement in advance.  Fortunately, for this research being a “participant-as-
observer” (fully participating within the group but with everyone’s knowledge that this is for 
research purposes) was not an obstacle whereas for someone trying to observe other 
phenomenon this might not have been the case.  Another significant advantage of 
participating in the working life of each group was that they felt obligated to the researcher to 
a certain extent because she was undertaking unpaid full-time work for a four week period.  
Before beginning an observation placement it was made clear that rather than remuneration 
the researcher was seeking information.  Therefore, many of the groups went out of their way 
to provide documents, allowed access to meetings, pointed out information that might be 
useful and arranged interviews with relevant people.  
   
Those being observed were quite relaxed about the researcher probably due in part because of 
her age (twenty-three at the time of the first placement through to twenty-five for the last 
placement), sex (female) and relatively low status (student).  Being young (yet old enough to 
be thought trustworthy and mature), female and still at university made the researcher seem 
very unthreatening which was an advantage as it made people more open. 
 
Participant observation offered many advantages in not only observing people’s behaviour 
but also in providing access to situations that would not have been possible otherwise.  It 
granted the researcher access to staff meetings where progress was reviewed, strategy gone 
over and objectives set.  Another significant advantage was that access to the shared 
computer network was granted in each group (this was often necessary to carry out the work 
the groups wanted done for themselves).  The researcher was also invited to accompany a 
 32
director to a meeting with an MSP, into a meeting with a civil servant with another group, 
present when a Minister came to visit a group and also invited to attend one group’s annual 
conference.  This was beneficial from the research standpoint because it meant all sorts of 
documents could be studied relating to the interest groups and the Scottish Parliament - 
policy papers, notes on meetings, strategies from previous years, memoranda and letters.  The 
tendency for open plan offices proved to be a huge help in the observational process.  The 
researcher (with the exception of CoSLA - the main informants had their own individual 
offices) was allocated a desk close to the Parliamentary/Policy Officers which made it easier 
to observe - and also impossible not to overhear phone conversations or comments made to 
others in the office. 
 
Trust was built up over the course of the observation period and for this reason interviews 
were generally conducted at the end so that the interviewees would be freer with their 
answers and give replies that they would not have considered giving to an “outsider”.  They 
were also aware that their behaviour and conversations had been witnessed for four weeks so 
they were less likely to give answers that did not reconcile with their conduct (whereas 
someone conducting a survey or a “cold” interview has no way of knowing if what the 
respondents say they are doing actually corresponds to the reality).  As Babbie comments 
‘[c]ompared with criticisms that survey and experimental measurements are often superficial 
and not really valid, field research seems to provide more valid measures’ (1995, p.300).  
 
Throughout the research, patterns emerged about how the Scottish Parliament was affecting 
these groups.  Participant observation allowed an understanding as to how and why each 
group came to a decision on how they interacted with the Parliament and how this compared 
to how and why another group had come to the same decision but in a different context. 
 
2.2.2  Criticisms of participant observation 
Participant observation is often under fire because although it allows the researcher to get to 
know his/her subject, it can also result in a lack of objectivity.  The researcher can find him- 
or herself “going native” and losing the sense of detachment that they started out with, the 
effect of this is that the researcher can become selective and produce inaccurate findings so 
the validity of the research is undermined (Harrison; 2001, p.80).  However, Jorgensen gives 
a counter argument and states that: 
‘The potential for misunderstanding and inaccurate observation increases when the 
researcher remains aloof and distanced physically and socially from the subject of 
study.  Participation reduces the possibility of inaccurate observation, because the 
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researcher gains through subjective involvement direct access to what people think, 
do, and feel from multiple perspectives’ (1989, p.56). 
Furthermore, the participant observation undertaken only lasted for four weeks - long enough 
to get an insight into the groups but too short a period to “go native”.  The focus of this 
research is the institutional impact of the Scottish Parliament upon the groups, therefore the 
researcher was interested in how and why these groups had been affected by the Scottish 
Parliament rather than in the specific merits of what each group was campaigning for.  Case 
studies also allow the use of other research techniques so documents, interviews (in this case 
they were all recorded so the answers are verbatim) and evidence given to the Scottish 
Parliament can all be used to support any observations.  The researcher believes that any loss 
of objectivity was outweighed by the benefits of trying ‘to understand how the actors, the 
people being studied, see things’ (Stake; 1995, p.12), what their attitudes were and how they 
behaved.   
 
Another disadvantage of participant observation is that access is not always granted but this 
was not really a problem.  A request to participate in the very first group approached (the 
John Muir Trust) was denied because they felt that it would not have been beneficial for the 
researcher because at that stage (in 1999) it was too early on in the Scottish Parliament’s 
existence.  Unison (the trade union) was also approached in 2001 but while they were 
willing, their circumstances at the time did not allow it as their parliamentary officer had just 
left and they felt that it would not be constructive unless they had a parliamentary officer in 
place.  Other than that however, it was incredibly easy to get access as most groups were 
delighted to have a free pair of hands at a time when they were trying to adjust to their 
increased workload as a result of the Scottish Parliament.  (This was reflected in the fact that 
a lot of the work assigned to the participant were items they had put on the backburner that 
needed to be done). 
 
Access to politicians and other parliamentary actors is notoriously difficult.  This proved to 
be the case with the parliamentary committee clerks.  It was hoped that the researcher would 
be able to carry out placements with the Scottish Parliament’s clerks as they would have 
offered a real insight into the committees and the Scottish Parliament generally but the Head 
of the Clerking Services refused this request.  In her letter she explained that: 
‘I am afraid that the terms and conditions under which I and the clerks are employed 
would prevent us from participating in the research for your PhD.  In particular, we 
cannot participate in any project dealing with attitudes or opinions on political matters 
or matter of policy. 
 34
 
Accordingly, I am afraid that it is not possible to accommodate your request to 
shadow committee clerks or provide interviews’. 
 
(Although observation was not granted interviews were later carried out with three of the 
clerks - interviews set up by other contacts, see section 3.3.5).  But getting access is a 
problem shared with surveys, large numbers of interviews and other methods of data 
gathering, as someone can refuse to fill in a questionnaire, be interviewed or to release a 
document as easily as they can refuse to be observed.  In fact, if access is granted for 
participant observation then a whole wealth of information is opened up to you and 
interviews are much easier to get.   
 
Two of the most damaging criticisms however, is that participant observation has ‘a potential 
problem with reliability’ and generalisability (Babbie; 1995, p.301, 302: see also Harrison; 
2001, p.82).  By reliability Babbie means dependability - if ‘you made the same measurement 
again and again, would you get the same result?’ (1995, p.300).  For this reason triangulation 
is particularly important.  The researcher’s observations do not make up the entire body of 
this research.  Emphasis is put on the interviews that were recorded and transcribed verbatim 
to maximise accuracy.  The same is true for the wide range of documents collected (these 
include policy papers, letters, e-mails, minutes of meetings, plans, newsletters and so on) 
which were either photocopied or copied by hand, again to ensure accuracy rather than 
depending on memory or the researcher’s interpretation.  A further cornerstone to the 
reliability of the findings (and one not often available to researchers) is that the Scottish 
Parliament records its seventeen parliamentary committees’ meetings and all parliamentary 
debates verbatim on the internet for anyone to access.  This is particularly useful for the 
groups in the case studies that have given oral evidence to various committees and their 
responses to the MSPs can be compared with the responses that they gave the researcher.  By 
using these different sources of data means that the ‘more information you have about 
something from multiple standpoints and sources, the less likely you are to misconstrue it’ 
(Jorgensen; 1989, p.53) and therefore make the research more reliable.  In order to provide 
the reader with the opportunity of weighing up the evidence for him- or herself, the findings 
outlined in subsequent chapters contain frequent and often lengthy quotes from interviews, 
the parliamentary committees and excerpts from documents.  Babbie did state after all that 
reliability was only a ‘potential’ problem.   
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The criticism of generalisability is often a real one for participant research as the researcher 
has no way of knowing whether what is being observed is “typical” or not.  What might be 
true for one interest group representing parents may not be true for another group 
representing another set of parents or something else altogether such as animal welfare.  ‘The 
potentials for biased sampling are endless’ (Babbie; 1995, p.302).  However, it has already 
been explained in this chapter (see section 3.1.1) that this research makes no claims to 
statistical generalisation or the representativeness of the six interest groups chosen.  Instead 
this research is focusing on (what Yin terms) analytic generalisation.  The generalisability of 
this research comes from the theory of new institutionalism – how the Scottish Parliament 
affects interest groups (if at all). 
 
2.3  Interviews 
Having observed the context and the day-to-day world of the groups and individuals within 
them, interviews then ‘offer a systematic way to uncover people’s experiences over time as 
well as their perceptions, motives and accounts of these experiences and actions’ (Gerson and 
Horowitz; 2002, p.221).  Interviews are a very important source of information for the case 
study (Yin; 1994, p.84).  They offer the opportunity to understand how people see their world 
and why they act the way they do according to themselves. 
 
There are various types of interview – structured, semi-structured and unstructured.  All of 
the interviews conducted for this research were semi-structured where ‘[q]uestions are 
normally specified, but the interviewer is freer to probe beyond the answers’ (May; 2001, 
p.123).  Within the interest groups everyone was asked the same set of questions (if time 
allowed – one exception was the Acting Chief Executive of CoSLA who kindly agreed to be 
interviewed but he only had a thirty minute time slot available so a curtailed version of the 
questions was asked).  Asking the same questions allows for greater comparability between 
the answers given but unlike a structured survey the respondents could answer at length in 
any way they wanted and elaborate on points that they felt were important to them.  For 
example, the Head of Policy at the RSPB on being told the research was on the Scottish 
Parliament voluntarily brought up his own experiences, particularly emphasising his 
interactions with civil servants.  The set questions were there to ensure that key points were 
not missed but there was flexibility within the interviews. 
 
2.3.1  Benefits of participant observation  
Having spent four weeks observing the interviewees, listening to them on the telephone, in 
meetings, in the coffee area and having built up a degree of trust over the observation period, 
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it is harder for the interviewees to ‘offer responses that they perceive to be desirable’ 
(Devine; 1995, p.143).  In relation to interviews the other main benefit of participant 
observation comes at a later stage when those ‘observations facilitate the interpretation of the 
material’ (Devine; 1995, p.138).  Like documents, the interviews are from a specific 
standpoint in a particular context and they can best be understood if there exists a knowledge 
of that individual and setting.   
 
2.3.2  Tape recorded 
All the case study interviews were recorded with one exception (this was CoSLA’s Press 
Officer because having just been introduced to him, the researcher judged that he would 
probably be more forthcoming if he was not recorded so notes were taken instead).  Having 
built up a rapport over the previous four weeks in the interest groups, the rest of the 
interviewees were quite relaxed about being recorded.  If they wished to say something off 
the record the tape was simply switched off until after they had disclosed that particular piece 
of sensitive information.   
 
This was also the case for the parliamentary interviews.  The three MSPs, three committee 
clerks and the senior researcher all consented readily to being recorded, although in the case 
of the clerks they will remain anonymous in order not to compromise the individuals, as a 
request to the Head of Clerking Services had denied a request for the researcher to interview 
clerks.  Interviews were also carried out with two SNP party researchers and a senior civil 
servant but these were not recorded.  In the case of the party researchers the interviews were 
by chance.  One of the groups had arranged for the researcher to meet these individuals for 
another purpose (hence the tape recorder was not on hand) but the opportunity arose to 
actually interview them there and then.  The civil servant interview was off the record, and 
again because of his position as a neutral civil servant he will remain anonymous. 
 
The decision to record the interviews where possible was made for several reasons.  Firstly – 
accuracy.  By recording the interviews, the respondents could be quoted exactly, which 
ensures that the researcher does not substitute the respondent’s words with her own (May; 
2001, p.138).  Secondly, recording the interview left the researcher free to concentrate on 
what was being said rather than trying to keep up with the interviewee by scribbling notes 
down.  After having conducted all the interviews the researcher is convinced that a lot of 
useful information would have been omitted if only notes had been taken.  An interviewee 
may have mentioned something that seemed of little import at the time but as the research 
and time progressed it took on a greater significance.  It also made the interview more 
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relaxed as the researcher could participate in the interview with eye contact, acknowledging 
what was being said and being able to tease points out.  The literature often points out that 
tape recorders can be a distraction but modern small dictaphones can be bought which turn 
the tape over automatically and offer various tape speeds so that a sixty minute tape can last 
for 120 minutes which nicely covers a two hour interview.  (Although it is important to get to 
know the machine first and ensure the batteries are not running out – during an interview 
with a committee clerk the batteries petered out.  After that for every interview new batteries 
were inserted!). 
 
However, the major drawback to recording interviews is that you are left with the highly time 
consuming and tedious task of transcription.  A two hour interview can take an interminable 
day to transcribe.  But there is even an advantage in transcribing as it ‘assists the important 
analytic stage of becoming familiar with the data’ (May; 2001, p.139). 
 
2.3.3  Interviews applied to the interest groups 
All the interviews began with the warming up process of neutral, factual questions relating to 
the profile of the group itself (such as when it was set up, who/what it represented, number of 
personnel and so on).  Following that there came individual sections on the Scottish 
Parliament as a whole, MSPs, committees, committee clerks, Ministers, civil servants and 
their interaction with other interest groups.  The interviews were designed to discover from 
the respondents how they thought the Scottish Parliament had affected them and their group 
in terms of ‘concrete’ examples (such as having to increase personnel or re-prioritising 
workloads) and also in terms of their attitudes and then to find the reason why these changes 
had taken place.  As Kane and O’Reilly-de Brun point out ‘people’s beliefs and perceptions 
are as important as what they may actually be doing at the moment’ (2001; p.208).  They also 
make the valuable remark that ‘[b]eliefs are facts just as much as activities are’ (ibid.).  So 
the interviews endeavoured to elicit as much qualitative material as possible which could 
then be corroborated by documents and/or observation. 
 
The researcher selected who the interviewees were going to be.  In some cases the decision 
was more obvious than in others (for example the SCPO and the SPTC only had three office 
staff).  The researcher selected key informants who were chosen because ‘they are typical, in 
that they represent a pattern or attitude or have experienced something that you have 
identified as common’ (Kane and O’Reilly-de Brun; 2001, p.209).  Or as Jorgensen simply 
puts it: they are ‘especially knowledgeable about a matter of interest’ (1989, p.91).  For these 
reasons then the Parliamentary Officers or equivalent from each group were selected and in 
 38
the case of the SPTC or CoSLA who did not have such a person, other informants were 
identified (see below).  Any dependence on these key informants was diverted by relying ‘on 
other sources of evidence to corroborate any insight by such informants’ (Yin; 1994, p.84).   
 
PEOPLE INTERVIEWED WITHIN THE INTEREST GROUPS 
 
Federation of Small Businesses 
1. Policy Convener (unpaid, FSB member but in charge of the Scottish FSB)  
2. Press and Parliamentary Officer (paid, full-time staff) 
3. Deputy Press and Parliamentary Officer (paid, full-time staff) 
4. Administrator (paid, full-time staff) 
 
Reasons 
The Press and Parliamentary Officers were identified as key informants as their job was to 
deal with the Scottish Parliament on a daily basis.  The Deputy had only been hired as a 
result of the Parliament opening so she could only provide an ‘after’ picture but the other 
three people interviewed had been working for the FSB for some time.  The Policy Convener 
is the ‘face’ of the FSB as chairman of the Federation’s Scottish Policy Committee and he 
was able to provide a different viewpoint from the paid office staff.  The Administrator was 
interviewed to provide background material about the FSB and also to establish how her 
work had been affected.  For a large proportion of the questions she referred the researcher to 
the Press and Parliamentary Officer.  One person who was not interviewed, but would 
probably have proved to be a key informant was the Policy Development Officer (she had 
also been appointed as a result of the Parliament opening).  However, she worked from home 
and when she was in the office her time was taken up with meetings so it was not possible to 
secure an interview with her at that time. 
 
Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office 
1. Parliamentary Officer (paid, full-time staff) 
 
Reasons 
The SCPO is a very small office and at the time of participant observation, the personnel 
consisted of the Parliamentary Officer and his secretary although they were just at the end of 
the process of hiring a part-time research assistant.  The Secretary was not interviewed 
because the office was only created as a result of the Scottish Parliament and all their work 
relates to it so there would be no before and after picture in reference to her work which was 
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of an administrative nature.  The Parliamentary Officer carried out all parliamentary and 
media work and represented the SCPO at meetings with other groups/bodies. 
 
Multiple Sclerosis Society 
1. Director (paid, full-time staff) 
2. Policy Officer (paid, full-time staff) 
 
Reasons 
The MS Society had a staff of approximately twelve people.  However, a large proportion of 
that staff worked on fund raising issues.  At the time of observation the Director and the 
Policy Officer were the obvious key informants as they were the two members of staff 
assigned to parliamentary and press work. 
 
Scottish Parent Teacher Council 
1. Development Manager (paid, part-time staff) 
 
Reasons 
Out of the SPTC’s three part-time members of staff the Development Manager was again the 
only member of staff designated with parliamentary and media tasks.  
 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
1. Acting Chief Executive (paid, full-time staff) 
2. Convention Manager (paid, full-time staff) 
3. Head of Policy (paid, full-time staff) 
4. Press Officer (paid, full-time staff) 
 
Reasons 
CoSLA was quite different in that for a large organisation they had no one single person 
appointed to deal with the Scottish Parliament (although they did have for a short period 
when the Scottish Parliament first opened).   CoSLA had a different approach to the Scottish 
Parliament, preferring to have everyone incorporate it into their work.  Therefore the Acting 
Chief Executive was selected because of his strategic role, the Convention Manager because 
she generally has the job of delegating out parliamentary work and the Head of Policy who 
was the initial point of contact and because of his job of developing policy.  His line 
manager, the Director of Organisational Services, would have been desirable to interview but 
this was not possible because of his work commitments, indeed he was rarely in the office as 
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a lot of his work was taken up with meetings (CoSLA staff had a lot of pressure on their time 
due to staff reductions so getting the three interviews in itself was an achievement).  The 
Press Officer was also interviewed as all the interest groups use the media as part of their 
strategy to influence the Scottish Parliament and his job had changed considerably since it 
had opened. 
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
1. Head of Advocacy and Media (paid, full-time staff) 
2. Media Officer (paid, full-time staff) 
3. Parliamentary Information Officer (paid, full-time staff) 
4. Head of Policy Operations (paid, full-time staff) 
5. Senior Investigations Officer (paid, full-time staff) 
 
Reasons 
The first three interviewees listed were viewed as key informants as they comprise the 
RSPB’s Advocacy and Media Unit whose entire workload was made up of the Scottish 
Parliament and the media.  However, it was also necessary to hear the point of view from 
someone outwith the unit to see how the Scottish Parliament had affected the rest of the 
rather large RSPB office and to find out how the RSBB operated before it opened.  The other 
two interviewees were chosen through self-selection after the Parliamentary Information 
Officer circulated an e-mail round all the staff asking for volunteers to be interviewed.  The 
Head of Policy and the Senior Investigations Officer were two valuable respondents as both 
had worked for the RSPB for many years and were in charge of two separate departments.  
They were able to offer informed comment about how the RSPB has affected their units. 
 
2.3.4  Interviews applied to parliamentary respondents 
These interviews were not essential to the success of this research as the focus was on how 
the interest groups had been affected.  However, it was deemed desirable to get an insight 
from the Scottish Parliament about issues relating to culture and “how things are done”.  
Because these interviews were non-essential they were all relatively short (also this was a 
practical acknowledgement of the pressure on their time).  Therefore the interviews lasted 
between thirty minutes to an hour. 
 
At the start of the PhD process, the hope was to interview the six relevant committee clerks 
but after writing to the Head of Clerking Services, this did not appear to be remotely possible.  
This letter has already been referred to in section 3.2 but to recap she wrote that under the 
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terms of their employment the clerks could not participate in any project which dealt ‘with 
attitudes or opinions on political matters or matter of policy’.  So accordingly it was ‘not 
possible to accommodate your request to … provide interviews’.  However, it appears that at 
least three of the clerks were not so stringent about being interviewed.  Rather, they had 
adopted the Scottish Parliament’s principle of openness, with one of the clerks stating that the 
researcher could never have interviewed a clerk at Westminster.  The interview did not 
contain any questions on policy matters but it did ask questions about the impact of party 
politics in committee work, how effective they thought the committees were in relation to the 
Executive, how the committee chose which groups were going to give evidence and other 
questions that would come under the banner of ‘political matters’.  The three interviews with 
the clerks came about through other contacts.  One key informant at an interest group had a 
friendly relationship with a committee clerk and suggested that the researcher e-mail the 
clerk to request an interview, which he readily agreed to.  The other two interviews were set 
up quite by chance.  Having arranged an interview with a senior researcher at SPICe (Scottish 
Parliament Information Centre), the senior researcher suggested that it might be useful if he 
set up two other interviews with committee clerks, which he accordingly did.  The clerks had 
no problem with being interviewed but asked for anonymity. 
 
The civil servant interview (he was head of a department) came about again by chance 
through a contact with his wife and he very kindly agreed to be interviewed as long as it was 
off the record.  And (as previously mentioned) the informal interview with two party 
researchers also came about by accident (one of the groups had arranged for me to meet the 
researchers for another purpose altogether but the opportunity arose to informally interview 
them). 
 
Three MSPs were also interviewed – Johann Lamont (Lab), Sandra White (SNP) and Murray 
Tosh (Con).  Other MSPs were contacted for an interview but some refused due to other 
work commitments while others simply did not respond at all to the request.  However, it was 
possible to get further insights into the MSP point of view through the transcripts of 
parliamentary committee meetings, articles (in newspapers and books) authored by MSPs and 
their letters/e-mails to the six interest groups. 
 
2.4  Documentation 
Documents are often seen as neutral and independent but ‘a text must be approached in terms 
of the intentions of its author and the social context in which it was produced’ (May; 2001, 
p.184).  Again, this illustrates the importance of participant observation, which gives the 
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researcher an understanding of the context and a knowledge of the audience the documents 
are meant for and what the author is trying to get across.  As Jorgensen remarks ‘participant 
observation improves comprehension and analysis of documents’ (1989, p.93).  One of the 
main advantages of participant observation however is the access that one has to all manner 
of documentation and archival records (see section 2.5 for more details on archival records). 
 
2.4.1  Interest group documentation 
The interest groups were very liberal in allowing access to the documents and records that 
they had.  This is because they wanted to be helpful and also a desire to demonstrate that they 
had nothing to hide.  Filing cabinets, folders and computer networks were at the researcher’s 
disposal.  An important aspect to flag up is that while documents such as newsletters, briefing 
papers and reports are readily accessible to almost anyone, other more personal documents 
such as notes on how a meeting went, internal memos and other papers stored on computer 
files are not available to the public but only to staff members.  In order to remain ethical, 
permission was asked beforehand to access the computer files and other documents. 
 
To give a flavour of the documents that were used as part of the evidence in this thesis a list 
is given below:   
Annual strategies 
Annual objectives and aims 
Objectives to achieve from meetings with politicians 
Post mortems on meetings/events 
Action plans drawn up with public affairs companies 
Policy papers 
Communications to members 
Letters and e-mails to and from politicians/civil servants/clerks 
Notes taken from telephone conversations 
Reports 
Briefing papers 
Survey results 
Copies of papers presented to political actors at meetings 
Written submissions to the Parliament/Executive 
Copies of speeches 
Pamphlets/leaflets 
Newsletters 
Notes of advice/opinion to other colleagues 
 43
 
2.4.2  Parliamentary documentation 
In relation to the Scottish Parliament the researcher only had access to the same material as 
the interest groups themselves.  This was primarily official documents that could be retrieved 
from the Scottish Parliament or the Scottish Executive website.  These included press 
releases, policy papers, records of committee meetings, annual reports, the Standing Orders 
of the Parliament, research papers and so on.  Other documents relating to the Scottish 
Parliament were actually collected from the interest groups and this included letters inviting 
the groups to submit a response, attend a committee, a group/body set up by the 
Executive/Parliament and personal letters/e-mails of communication between 
MSPs/Ministers to the groups.  Otherwise newspapers were extensively used to keep abreast 
of parliamentary activity and behind the scene noises. 
 
2.4.3  Newspapers 
Due to the newness of the Scottish Parliament (and thus a lack of written material about the 
institution) newspapers were used as a source of current information.  Whilst acknowledging 
that newspapers in the UK are generally politically biased, nevertheless they were valuable as 
an ‘effective source for particular details’ (Hakim; 2000, p.107). They built up a picture of 
what was happening in the Scottish Parliament on a daily basis.  They were also useful in 
understanding ‘the context of political behaviour’ (ibid.), particularly as the politicians 
themselves read and react to these newspapers.   
 
For the purpose of this research two newspapers in particular were extensively monitored – 
The Scotsman and The Herald.  These two newspapers were picked for several reasons.  
Firstly these papers are the two main Scottish daily broadsheets and this is important because 
their main political focus is Holyrood not Westminster so they carry much more extensive 
coverage of Scottish political life.  As a result of this MSPs have a much bigger input into 
these papers than in London based papers via their comments, letters, articles, interviews and 
so on.  Scottish interest groups themselves are more likely to find themselves in The Herald 
and The Scotsman.  While the groups may want to get into the tabloid newspapers (they reach 
a bigger audience), it is much more difficult for the groups to get featured as the tabloids tend 
not to allocate too many column inches to the more serious and weighty messages of some 
interest groups.  Culture was also an important consideration, as the Scottish Parliament and 
the six groups are all operating within Scottish politics and Scottish society, it was therefore 
imperative to monitor the newspapers that reflect this.  Obviously, in England the SNP is of 
very little import but in Scotland they have a much greater prominence and are the second 
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biggest political party and with the advent of the new Scottish Parliament came a new 
electoral system different from the rest of the UK so it was important to use newspapers that 
reflect the Scottish scene.  Another factor is that a lot of MSPs and all six of the interest 
groups read those two newspapers.  In a survey of MSPs conducted by the RSPB, the results 
revealed that MSPs spent more time studying the Scottish media than the UK media. 
 
The newspaper articles were collected in two ways.  The first method was the old fashioned 
way of simply buying the newspapers and cutting out any relevant articles before filing them 
under various headings.  The second method was more technologically advanced using the 
archives on the papers’ websites and printing out pertinent articles after putting keywords 
into their search engines. 
 
All these various forms of documents provide a deeper understanding of how the groups have 
been affected by the Parliament.  As Yin comments, for ‘case studies, the most important use 
of documents is to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources’ (1994, p.81).  The 
research is not based on these documents alone.  In conclusion, documents ‘will, therefore, 
alongside other methods, yield ever more valuable insights into societies at the dynamics of 
social life’ (May; 2001, p.198). 
 
2.5  Archival records 
Yin classifies archival records (as opposed to documentation) as service records, 
organisational records, maps and charts, lists, survey data and personal records (1994, p.83).  
For the interest groups, personal records such as diaries were very useful.  The FSB, for 
instance, had a simple diary for the whole office making it easy to establish how many 
meetings they had with the various political actors. 
 
Survey data was also very illuminating.  The RSPB had commissioned MORI to conduct a 
survey of MSPs on what TV and radio programmes they listened to as well as questions 
relating to environmental interest groups.  This was valuable information which the 
researcher could not have had access to otherwise. 
 
2.6  Non-participant observation 
In non-participant observation the observer studies the subject ‘from outside the group 
without being involved in the life of the observed’ (Sarantakos; 1993, p.222).  This was the 
case for studying the Scottish Parliament and its committees.  Only MSPs and parliamentary 
clerks can participate in the committees (others do give evidence or advice but they are there 
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as temporary guests, they are not actually part of the committees).  So not being either an 
MSP or a clerk the obvious option was non-participant observation as it is possible for 
members of the public to sit and watch the Scottish Parliament in plenary and the committees 
in session.  There were many opportunities to do this during visits to Edinburgh.  This was 
helpful as it backed up information gleaned from the interest groups, from clerks, from MSPs 
and from reading the verbatim reports of debates and committee meetings on the internet.  
Yin states that non-participant observation ‘is often useful in providing additional 
information about the topic being studied’ (1994; p.87).  This proved to be the case because 
even though the Scottish Parliament provides verbatim committee reports, these reports do 
not indicate what happens during committee breaks for instance.  By observing a committee 
meeting this point was brought home.  Interest groups sometimes send someone just to 
observe the proceedings as a way to be seen by the MSPs and also to take full advantage of 
the opportunities that a fifteen minute committee break can provide.  Attending an Education, 
Culture and Sport Committee meeting with the Development Manager of the SPTC, the 
researcher was able to see how at the break time some MSPs left the room to smoke, other 
MSPs (of several parties) chatted together while others went and talked to people that they 
recognised in the public seats.  On this particular occasion one MSP came over on 
recognising the Development Manager and spent the rest of the break talking to her about 
various items.  Just before and after a committee meeting also provide contact opportunities 
for the groups.  This information only became apparent through the direct observation of the 
committee.   
 
Non-participant observation was also carried out in the parliamentary chamber during 
question time or at particular debates.  Again only MSPs can participate in these activities but 
they could be observed from the public gallery.  This was a useful activity as many people 
claim when in the full chamber the MSPs stick to party lines whereas in committee they are 
less partisan.  By observing the committees and then the full chamber the researcher could 
make her own comparisons. Direct observation of the chamber also highlighted how 
frequently MSPs are moved from one committee to another.  For one particular debate, which 
was based on a committee report, the current committee members had to enlist former 
committee members to explain and answer questions on the report as they had more 
involvement with it.  So while non-participant observation can be a burden on time, it 
nevertheless was worthwhile in providing further insights into the Scottish Parliament. 
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2.7  Analysis 
After collecting the information, it is necessary to break the data down into manageable 
sections in order to make sense of it, a process known as coding (Schwandt; 1997, p.16/17).  
Before conducting the research, certain categories were already in place for the information 
to be processed into.  These categories existed in advance because to fulfil the requirements 
of the research it was necessary to examine the different components of the Scottish 
Parliament and those components became the category headings (and eventually the chapter 
titles): the entire Scottish Parliament, the committees, the clerks, MSPs, Ministers and civil 
servants.  Once the research was under way, those categories were refined into specific sub-
divisions in response to the data that had been collected.  Those sub-divisions are now the 
section headings in each chapter of the PhD.  After the field work was completed, it was then 
a case of going through all the interviews, observations, documents and records and assigning 
any significant information to a relevant category.  (This was done group by group in order to 
get an overall response for each of the groups, so the responses of the interviewees, the 
written material and observations made were compared and if they supported each other, they 
were then put into a composite group response).   
 
Having coded the data, it then had to made sense of.  This was done by comparing the 
information under each category and coming to conclusions about how the Scottish 
Parliament had affected the six groups.  Those conclusions were then interpreted through the 
three new institutionalist approaches (rational choice, sociological and historical 
institutionalism – see chapter 3 for discussion on new institutionalism). 
 
2.8  Conclusion   
To conclude then, six interest groups have been selected as the case studies on which this 
research is based.  Participant observation, interviews, documentation and archival records 
were the methods used to collect the data from the case studies.  In order to get an insight into 
the Scottish Parliament the methods employed were documentation, interviews and non-
participant observation.  All the data is being used to probe the extent of how applicable new 
institutionalism is in explaining the response of the groups to the legislature and in the 
following chapter, the theory of new institutionalism and three of its approaches will be 
explained. 
 
It is the researcher’s belief that these qualitative methods were the most appropriate as they 
‘capture meaning, process and context’ (Devine; 1995, p.138).  Not only that but ‘qualitative 
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research, even when theoretically informed, is the most open-ended and hence least biased 
type of study’ (Hakim; 2000, p.6).  
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CHAPTER 3  DISCUSSION OF NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 
 
3.1  Introduction 
'But since contemporary social science is thought to demand more than accurate 
descriptions, plausible narratives, and perceptive interpretations, most authors of case 
studies feel the urge to use their findings as a basis for either formulating or testing 
theoretical propositions of supposedly universal application.  As a consequence, most of 
these studies begin with a discussion of competing general "approaches" (current favorites 
are the three institutionalisms, rational choice, historical and sociological) ... (Scharpf; p.8). 
 
And in the spirit of predictability this study will indeed begin with a discussion of the three 
favourites that Scharpf listed - rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism 
and historical institutionalism before applying them in chapters 5-8 which discuss how the 
Scottish Parliament has affected the six interest groups. 
 
3.2  Background 
Institutional theories have been around for a while, although the "old" institutional theories 
focused on the formal powers of institutions, to the neglect of what was actually happening 
inside them (Blondel; 1995, p.10).  This resulted in a "behavioural" response in the 1960s and 
1970s, which concentrated on the actors within the institutions and on the more behavioural 
and social aspects of the political system, focusing on such things as public opinion, interest 
groups, legislatures, executives, party politics and constitutions (Almond and Verba; 1980, 
p.106: Parsons; 1995, p.223).  However, the behaviouralists (as the institutionalists had done) 
went too far in the one direction and failed to appreciate that 'politics and policy-making take 
place in the context of institutions' (Parsons; 1995, p.223) and that institutions are also 
capable of shaping outcomes (Rosamond; 2000, p.114).  From this background "new 
institutionalism" emerged as a theory that aimed to redress the balance between its 
institutionalist predecessors and the behaviouralists and so it 'takes into account both the 
importance of institutions and the way in which these institutions are shaped by the behaviour 
of actors' (Blondel; 1995, p.10). 
 
New institutionalism is actually an umbrella term that houses several approaches, but all the 
approaches have one common theme - that institutions are the 'central component of political 
life' (Peters; 1999, p.150) and that they affect the behaviour of individuals (Lane and Ersson; 
2000, p.1: Hall and Taylor; 1996, p.939: Rhodes; 1995, p.46).  Although the various 
approaches of new institutionalism adhere to those two basic principles, they are not a 
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'unified body of thought' (Hall and Taylor; 1996, p.936).  New institutionalism has its roots in 
politics, economics, sociology and organisation theory so 'approaches to institutions rooted in 
such different soils cannot be expected to converge' (Powell and DiMaggio; 1991, p.3).  
Although this statement is true of rational choice institutionalism in comparison with either 
sociological or historical institutionalism, this is not the case with sociological and historical 
institutionalism which do converge quite substantially.  In fact, not everyone makes a 
distinction between these two approaches because of their similarity.  However, despite their 
common ground, they do merit separate distinctions because of the differences they have in 
emphasis.  Sociological institutionalism 'concerns itself with culturally framed actions, ideas 
and identities that follow from culturally-specific rules and norms' whereas historical 
institutionalism concentrates on 'the origins and development of the institutions' and how past 
decisions affect current ones (Schmidt, (a), p.1). 
 
3.3  Rational choice institutionalism 
It is very easy to distinguish rational choice institutionalism from its two main institutional 
rivals for reasons that will soon become apparent.  At the heart of this approach is the belief 
that individuals are motivated by self-interest - 'the pursuit of one's own good to the exclusion 
of any non instrumental consideration for others' (Grafstein; 1992, p.259) - and that the 
pursuit of their preferences is the rational thing to do.  A key point of rational choice 
institutionalism is that the actors’ preferences have already been determined exogenously to 
the institution so the institution plays no part in forming individual preferences, instead they 
are assumed as a given (this is a major difference between rational choice and the other two 
approaches).  Armed with their own particular preferences, actors then act in an entirely 
rational fashion by calculatingly setting out 'to maximize the achievement of their goals' 
(Tsebelis, p.5).  This makes the actor a more autonomous individual (Hay and Wincott; 1998, 
p.952).  Rational choice institutionalism is a very individualistic approach but, because it is 
also an institutional one, it acknowledges that political life operates within institutions and 
that both individual and institutional roles have to be reconciled in order to have a true 
explanation of politics (Peters; 1999, p.43). 
 
To understand just how institutions affect behaviour from the rational choice perspective it is 
crucial to know that it interprets institutions as formal rules (in the Scottish Parliament that 
would include its Standing Orders, Code of Conduct and other formal regulations) that will 
be upheld by sanctions and incentives (Lane and Ersson; 2000, p.7, 26, 36).  For the rational 
choice institutionalist then, institutions are synonymous with formal rules.  The benefit of 
having these formal rules is that they are 'constraints within which actors may maximize their 
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self-interests' and they are also 'transaction-cost saving devices regulating the interaction 
between men/women' (Lane and Ersson; 2000, p.35).  Quite simply, the rules help to 
minimise costs and constrain the behaviour of maximising actors.  The reduction of 
transaction costs (it is no surprise from the terminology that rational choice institutionalism is 
rooted in economics) is one of the main reasons why states create institutions because 
otherwise the costs of everyone seeking to maximise their own preferences without 
constraints is likely to be too high (Rosamond; 2000, p.116).  As part of the minimising costs 
process, options open to actors within the institutions will be limited, for instance the 
information supplied to the actors, the choice of action available to them, the items put on 
their agenda.  This is because limited options ensure that political decisions can be made 
(Hall and Taylor; 1996, p.951: Immergut; 1996, p.6).  Institutions are there in order to 
maintain stability so that they can perform their functions (Brennan; 1997, p.105). 
 
Rules and their enforceability allow a certain amount of predictability because all actors are 
subject to the same set of rules which forces them to behave in corresponding ways.  And 
because actors can factor into their calculations how someone else is likely to act (because of 
the institution's rules and penalties), uncertainty is reduced, which allows an individual to 
strategically choose a better course of action within the confines of the institution (Hall and 
Taylor; 1996, p.945: Gorges; 2001, p.139).  Tsebelis (p.5) explains that because all 
individuals are maximising, 'the outcome is the best that each one of them can do, given the 
choice of the others' and so equilibrium can be found amongst the competing interests.  So 
rational choice institutionalism is useful because of its predictive qualities of estimating the 
likely behaviour of individuals due to their self-interested motivation and the constraints that 
the institution then imposes, leaving the individual to 'choose the action with the best 
outcome' (Coleman and Feraro; 1992, p.xi).  This is why rational choice institutionalism 
'emphasizes the negotiation of coalitions and 'voluntary' exchanges', a feature that allows for 
cross-party decisions to be made between opposition groups (March and Olsen; 1997, p.140).  
This means that when a parliament, committee or cabinet come to a decision, it is derived 
from the aggregation of the individual preferences of the actors who have come to a group 
decision in accordance with the rules (Lane and Ersson; 2000, p.8).  Individuals co-operate 
with one another because they expect to gain from the co-operation in some way (Brennan; 
1997, p.96).  So although the institution does not determine an actor's preferences, it can 
affect the choices an actor makes on an individual basis and on a collective level (Immergut; 
1996, p.6). 
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Rational choice institutionalism states that an institution will continue to exist as long as it 
continues to be beneficial for the actors involved because they are better off with that 
particular institution than they would be with any other.  Change occurs when the actors 
consciously decide to try and change the institution 'based on their expectations about how 
change will help them maximise utility' (Gorges; 2001, p.140).  Change is a planned activity, 
not an organic process. 
 
The central point to remember about rational choice institutionalism is that institutions are 
'systems of rules and inducements to behavior in which individuals attempt to maximize their 
own utilities' (Peters; 1999, p.19). 
 
3.4  Criticisms of rational choice institutionalism 
The key criticism of rational choice institutionalism is that it has too simplistic a view of 
human behaviour (Hall and Taylor; 1996, p.950).  It reduces individuals to 'calculating 
automatons' who are only motivated by their own self-interest (Hay and Wincott; 1998, 
p.952).  Gerry Stoker points out that '[s]cope for non-egoistic and moral motivations should 
be given' (1995, p.9).  And even if an individual never behaved out of altruistic motives, 
critics state that individuals are not always capable of acting in a rational and detached 
manner, able to weigh up their best options (Ward; 1995, p.79).  Furthermore, individuals do 
not always have all the information that they need to make the best decisions so choices are 
made in uncertain conditions (Stoker; 1995, p.9: Ward; 1995, p.79, p.81, p.89).  Ward 
believes that rational choice institutionalism needs to introduce social factors to be credible 
because individuals are actually affected by external variables (such as their social class or 
religion), which do factor into their decision-making.  If any anomalies occur that cannot be 
explained by self-interested behaviour, then, as Schmidt points out, rational choice 
institutionalism for the most part cannot explain them ((a), p.2). 
 
Hall and Taylor also offer the argument that although rational choice institutionalism can 
explain why an institution continues to exist, it is on a lot shakier ground when it tries to 
account for why institutions were created in the first place.  If the creation of an institution is 
attributed to the benefits it will bestow on the actors who are agreeing to its creation, then 
Hall and Taylor argue that essentially rational choice institutionalists credit the origin of an 
institution 'largely in terms of the effects that follow from its existence', although unintended 
consequences mean that it is not reliable to 'deduce origins from consequences' (1996, p.952). 
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3.5  Sociological institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalists believe that influence is a two way street between institutions 
and their surrounding environments, so that on the one hand 'human behaviour is heavily 
influenced by the social environment in which it takes place' (Lane and Ersson; 2000, p.19) 
but on the other hand, institutions, particularly political ones, will also shape their 
surrounding environment to suit their own needs (Peters; 1999, p.108).  But sociological 
institutionalism goes further and states that '[i]nterests as well as the contexts of action are 
socially constructed' (Rosamond; 2000, p.119).  In rational choice institutionalism an actor's 
interests/preferences were determined outwith the institution but in sociological 
institutionalism 'actors and their interests are institutionally constructed' (Powell and 
DiMaggio; 1991, p.28).  The 'most basic preferences and very identity' of the actors are 
formed within the institution (Hall and Taylor; 1996, p.948).  It is the institution which 
allows individuals to find meaning in the world that surrounds them and specifies how they 
should act in any given situation and even specifies what the individual could imagine 
themselves doing in any given context (Rosamond; 2000, p.119: Hall and Taylor; 1996, 
p.948).  The individual does this by using the available institutional templates so that they 
can interpret their own role and then decide how to behave (Bell; 2002, p.486: Hall and 
Taylor; 1996, p.949).   
 
March and Olsen explain that institutions form the identity, meaning and preferences of 
individuals through the rules of the institution (1989; p.39, p.40, p.53).  By rules March and 
Olsen do not just mean the formal rules of the institution, such as regulations and other fixed 
aspects that rational choice theory focuses on, as their definition also takes into account 
normative aspects such as beliefs, cultures, values and knowledge that exist within any 
institution (March and Olsen; 1989, p.22).  Powell and DiMaggio see rational choice 
institutionalism’s omission of the normative context as a great failing because 'taken-for-
granted scripts, rules, and classifications are the stuff of which institutions are made' (1991, 
p.15).  And in a political institution it can be difficult to separate the formal and informal 
rules because the very machinery of government is steeped in the normative context (Bulmer; 
1997, p.5).  Because of this definition of rules, sociological institutionalists are, in the words 
of Hall and Taylor, breaking down the 'conceptual divide between 'institutions' and 'culture'' 
(1996, p.947).  And so according to Gorges we 'can expect institutionalisation of forms and 
practices that are widely valued within a broader cultural environment' (2001, p.139).  These 
practices may be institutionalised even if they are not rational, so even though they may not 
be the most efficient way to achieve the institution's end goals, they are adopted because of 
the enhanced social legitimacy that they give to the institution (Bell; 2002, p.488/9: Hall and 
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Taylor; 1996, p.949).  As both Parsons (1995, p.226) and Hall and Taylor (1996, p.953) point 
out, in sociological institutionalism institutions are not created in a vacuum, they come into a 
world which is already full of other institutions.  And these institutions structure the vision of 
those creating the new institution because they borrow 'from the existing world of 
institutional templates' (Hall and Taylor; 1996, p. 953).   
 
Through its rules (including informal practices) the institution will develop its own culture 
which will affect the actors within it, so even if the actors brought values with them which 
had been determined outwith the institution, their involvement with the institution will 
change those values to be more in line with the institution's (Peters; 1999, p.146, p.147).  
This happens because 'culture is perceived as a system shared by groups of people, who learn 
its main elements or configurations through interaction and living in its context' (Sarantakos; 
1993, p.264).  It is through this discussion and interaction that the actors come to share the 
same 'cognitive maps' and act appropriately (Hall and Taylor; 1996, p.950).  The rules at any 
given time represent the shared belief of what are the best methods to achieve the common 
good (March and Olsen; 1989, p.38, p.161, p.168).  Every new actor who enters the 
institution has to learn these rules as it allows them to follow what the sociological 
institutional literature has coined the 'logic of appropriateness', which means he will behave 
in a way that the institution deems to be suitable so the actor will follow the same pattern as 
his colleagues (March and Olsen; 1989, p.38, p.160).  If the institution is successful the actor 
will 'think more about whether an action conforms to the norms of the organization than 
about what the consequences will be for him- or herself' (Peters; 1999, p.29).  The rules allow 
actors to interpret the behaviour of others and the institution is an organisation where 'the 
collective behavior, in its entirety is the institution' (Lane and Ersson; 2000, p.7/8).  (This 
differs from rational choice institutionalism which has a more individualistic outlook).  As a 
result, the actors are not just driven by calculated self-interest but by other factors such as 
their institutional duties (March and Olsen; 1989, p.159).   
 
Institutions respond to the surrounding environment by incorporating societal norms and 
expectations of behaviour into the institutions own (formal and informal) rules.  In turn those 
rules define the behaviour of the actors within the institutions who then craft the policies and 
allocate the resources that go on to affect the surrounding society.  In this way political 
institutions are creating as well as responding to their environment (March and Olsen; 1989, 
p.39, p.40, p.46, p.53).  Politicians are able to carry out their work relatively smoothly when 
they abide by institutional rules that reflect society's expectations (March and Olsen; 1989, 
p.16: March and Olsen; 1997, p.141).  Institutional change will typically occur when there is 
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an anomaly between the 'values professed by an institution and its actual behavior, and the 
values held by surrounding society and the behavior of the institution' (Peters; 1999, p.34); 
the old understandings and rules no longer fit between the institution and its surroundings so 
change has to happen (Gorges; 2001, p.139: Bell; 2002, p.487).  Because an institution's 
values and understandings have been accumulated over a long period of time any changes or 
redefinition of those understandings will need to be compatible with what was formerly in 
place (Peters; 1999, p.104).  In sociological institutionalism changes come about much more 
organically than in rational choice institutionalism where change is planned rationally. 
 
Institutional isomorphism is a feature of sociological institutionalism.  Institutional 
isomorphism is when organisations imitate other organisations in their field because the 
process of institutionalisation forces those in a particular environment to follow convergent 
paths (Gorges; 2001, p.139: Bell; 2002, p.487: Parsons; 1995, p.587).  Bell found in his work 
that in 'the last decade, central banks around the world have broadly displayed such 
isomorphic characteristics' (2002, p.487).  Parsons (1995, p.587) explains the three reasons 
that Powell and DiMaggio give for explaining why institutional isomorphism occurs: 
Coercive - organisations are pressured into acting a certain way by other organisations that 
they are dependent on and also by society which has expectations about how an organisation 
will work. 
Mimetic - during times of uncertainty, an organisation will use a successful organisation as a 
model and copy what it does. 
Normative - those within an organisation may change its working practices because they have 
decided to adopt what is perceived as the preferred or dominant working practices in their 
field. 
 
3.6  Criticisms of sociological institutionalism 
One of the main criticisms of sociological institutionalism is that it ignores the individual, 
which becomes submerged in the collective.  Hall and Taylor state that an individual's own 
particular interests are neglected and that any clashes between individuals are also 
unaccounted for, even though clashes are likely to occur when an institution is being created 
or at times of change (1996, p.954).  Schmidt ((a), p.3) comments that by ignoring the 
individual, sociological institutionalism cannot properly explain why individual action does 
not always follow expectations, or if someone carries out 'rule-creating action as opposed to 
rule-following action'. 
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Peters also criticises how the approach is concerned more with processes rather than with 
ends, so while values and cognitive frames are accounted for, sociological institutionalism 
does not adequately explain how individual and institutional behaviour can be predicted 
(1999, p.105). 
 
3.7  Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism describes institutions as 'the formal or informal procedures, 
routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity' (Hall 
and Taylor; 1996, p.938).  Bulmer describes historical institutionalism as the 'thicker' end of 
institutional analysis by virtue of including normative and cultural dimensions which go 
beyond rationalist calculations' (1997, p.6).  Steinmo and Thelen, two leading lights of 
historical institutionalism, find rational choice theory far too confining, although they do 
agree that institutions determine the strategies of political actors and provide the context in 
which they pursue their interests.  But they also believe that institutions play a greater role in 
shaping politics and political history than rational choice institutionalism allows and that 
institutions shape the goals as well as the strategies of the actors so therefore:  
'perhaps the, core difference between rational choice institutionalism and historical 
institutionalism lies in the question of preference formation, whether treated as 
exogenous (rational choice) or endogenous (historical institutionalism)' (1992, p.9). 
 
So far there is nothing to differentiate historical institutionalism from the sociological variant 
as all the above statements could apply equally to both.  Steinmo and Thelen never mention 
sociological institutionalism (there are only 'two separate institutionalist critiques, one from a 
historical and another from the more formal "rational choice" perspective' (Steinmo and 
Thelen; 1992, p.4/5)).  Obviously, the historical and sociological approaches share key 
similarities but what is interesting is that historical institutionalism is more high profile even 
though it actually draws from sociological sources (Immergut; 1996, p.8).  Hall and Taylor 
argue that historical institutionalism is almost an amalgam of both sociological and rational 
choice institutionalism (1996, p.940).  But regardless of the common features of historical 
and sociological institutionalism, they do have differences and perhaps the easiest way to 
remember them is by their titles - sociological institutionalism concentrates on society and 
culture, whereas historical institutionalism emphasises the importance of history and its 
consequences. 
 
Historical context is essential to historical institutionalism.  For instance, Rosamond explains 
that the European Union’s supranational institutions came about as part of European 
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integration because of the particular circumstances at that time - Europe was in the process of 
post-war restructuring with the added prospect of ECSC bipolarity on the horizon (2000, 
p.117).  The decision to create those supranational institutions (such as the European 
Commission) has had consequences, some unforeseen, on European integration ever since.  
As Pierson states 'the short-term preoccupations of institutional designers have led them to 
make decisions that undermined long-term member-state control' (as quoted in Rosamond; 
2000, p.118).  So 'specific institutional arrangements structure particular kinds of politics' 
(Steinmo and Thelen; 1992, p.27).  With the passing of time a lock-in of these institutional 
arrangements occurs which then makes it difficult to change those earlier decisions.  
Historical institutionalism emphasises that the 'policy choices made when an institution is 
being formed, or when a policy is initiated, will have a continuing and largely determinate 
influence over the policy far into the future' (Peters; 1999, p.63).  In this way norms and 
patterns of interaction develop that outlast personnel.  This also explains how inefficient 
practices come about because actors are forced to follow a set path that pushes them into 
making certain choices, even if they are not the most efficient (Hall and Taylor; 1996, 
p.941/2). 
 
The idea of path dependency also impacts on the creation of a new institution because those 
doing the creating recognise 'the importance of existing institutional templates' (Hall and 
Taylor; 1996, p.954).  Anyone wishing to explain the origin of an institution can look for 
evidence in 'why the historical actors behaved as they did' (Hall and Taylor; 1996, p.954). 
 
Institutions tend to be quite stable because they follow a path that has already been 
determined by past decisions and it is difficult to change course (Gorges; 2001, p.138).  
However, change does happen at times and historical institutionalists explain this through 
'critical junctures’ which cause departures from the path that an institution has been following 
(Steinmo and Thelen; 1992, p.27: Hall and Taylor; 1996, p.942).  Many theorists fail to 
explain how these critical junctures come about interrupting the stability of an institution.  
Gorges suggests that crises can bring about such departures, causing abrupt change because 
leaders often respond to the crisis by employing new tactics to deal with it and then these 
new tactics end up becoming entrenched and so in this way a new path is established (2001, 
p.138).  One of the advantages of historical institutionalism is that it allows slow moving 
changes to be observed over extended periods of time.  This allowed Bell (2002, p.486) to 
explain how the Australian central banking and monetary policy had altered radically from 
policy twenty years ago. 
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Historical institutionalism focuses 'more squarely on the themes of power and interests' 
(Immergut; 1996, p.8).  Political institutions are able to fashion the outcomes of competing 
interests that exist in political institutions, so are not just regarded as neutral brokers (Hall 
and Taylor; 1996, p.938).  As rival groups compete against each other in order to have a 
share of the scarce resources that are available, the institution has the power to bestow some 
groups with privileges while denying access to others (Hall and Taylor; 1996, p.937, p.941: 
Hall and Taylor; 1998, p.961: Immergut; 1992, p.83: Immergut; 1996, p.11/12).  If groups 
are not recognised then their ideas, opinions and interests will generally make little impact 
(Parsons; 1995, p.226).  So in this way a political institution can channel interest groups into 
forming a broader alliance with other groups in order to increase their chances of being heard 
(Weir; 1995, p.194). 
 
Historical institutionalism also gives prominence to the importance of ideas, new innovative 
ideas that may change the current way of thinking within an institution or that may have the 
potential to become policy.  Ideas can become policies if they reach the national agenda and 
have found enough support along the way from those inside the political institution (Weir; 
1995, p.194, p.210: King; 1992, p.242).  If an actor within an institution is exposed to new 
ideas then his preferences have the potential to be changed (Steinmo and Thelen; 1992, p.27: 
Hall and Taylor; 1998, p.961).  An institution can also promote certain ideas as Hall and 
Taylor point out when they cite Goldstein's work on US trade policy, which was devised by 
an institutional structure that reinforced particular trade ideas and consequently undermined 
others (1996, p.942).  Hay and Wincott insist that proper attention should be given to the role 
of ideas in historical institutionalism (1998, p.957), although Weir does point out that all new 
ideas come up against the obstacle of existing policy and its roots in the past (1995, p.210). 
 
Perhaps Schmidt best sums up historical institutionalism when he states that it: 
'concentrates instead on the origins and development of the institutions themselves, 
seen as institutional structures and processes, which are explained by the (often 
unintended) outcomes of purposeful choices and historically unique initial conditions' 
((a), p.1). 
 
3.8  Criticisms of historical institutionalism 
Hall and Taylor were challenged about their assertion that historical institutionalism is almost 
an amalgam of rational choice and sociological institutionalism and although they stood by 
their belief, they did add that historical institutionalism is still not a theory that 'represents a 
fully-realized alternative to either of these approaches' (Hall and Taylor; 1998, p.958).  They 
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thought that while rational choice and sociological institutionalism have developed 
sophisticated theories of how institutions affect individual behaviour, historical 
institutionalism had not yet reached that stage although they believed it had the potential to 
do so.  Hay and Wincott agreed that historical institutionalism has that potential but they felt 
it had to be developed in a different way, as they believed that 'rational choice and 
sociological institutionalisms are based on mutually incompatible premises', and because of 
this they credit Hall and Taylor with doing historical theory a disservice (Hay and Wincott; 
1998, p.951).  Hay and Wincott wanted to 'transcend' the limitations of the other institutional 
approaches by concentrating on a 'structure and agency' approach (structure being institutions 
and agency being the individuals and groups in the institutions) as the key is to understand 
the relationship between the structure and the agents (1998, p.955-6). 
 
Historical institutionalism is actually termed a mid-range theory because it does not claim to 
be universal.  Instead it looks at a restricted number of countries at a given time or at a 
particular phenomenon that has affected a number of countries at either a specific time or 
across time (Schmidt; (b), p.3). 
 
3.9  Conclusion 
The premise of new institutionalism is that institutions affect behaviour and it is the 
institution’s rules (whether formal and/or informal depending on your approach) that are 
essential to explaining why behaviour is changed.  Therefore the three new institutionalist 
approaches will be assessed for their applicability in explaining how the Scottish Parliament 
has affected the behaviour of the six interest groups.  As Lane and Ersson (2000, p.3) point 
out: 
'Upon theoretical reasons a number of competing institutional models are conceivable 
between which only empirical tests can decide when it comes to how well they 
perform on criteria of truth or evidence'. 
 
3.10  Key points of the three approaches 
For easy reference the key points of the three institutionalist approaches are given here: 
 
Main Points of Rational Choice Institutionalism 
 
• Individuals are motivated by their own self-interest. 
• The preferences of individuals are determined outwith the institutions. 
• Institutions are synonymous with formal rules that uphold sanctions and incentives. 
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• Rules help to minimise costs and constrain the behaviour of actors. 
• Rules allow for predictability as they force people to choose the best available outcome 
between their own self-interest and the rules of the institution. 
• Institutions are created to reduce costs. 
• An institution will continue to exist as long as it is beneficial to the actors involved. 
• Change occurs when the actors decide to try and change an institution based on the 
expectation that change will help them maximise their utility. 
• Rational choice emphasises the negotiation of coalitions and voluntary exchanges 
because of the benefits received from co-operation. 
 
Criticisms 
 
• RCI has too simplistic a view of human behaviour - more scope should be given for non-
egoistic and moral motivations. 
• Humans are not always rational and capable of weighing up the best option and RCI 
cannot explain an anomaly if it is not attributable to self-interest. 
• How can an institution be created for future expected benefits that the institution may not 
actually bestow? 
 
Main Points of Sociological Institutionalism 
 
• The surrounding society influences institutions and vice versa. 
• The preferences of actors are constructed by the institution. 
• Rules include formal regulations and informal practices incorporating culture, beliefs, 
values etc. 
• The rules mean that everyone within the institution will follow the same ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ – an actor will think more about conforming to the organisation than 
about the consequences to himself. 
• Institutions are created by people who borrow from existing institutions. 
• Institutional change occurs when the behaviour of an institution is out of synch with 
society’s expectations.  Change is organic.  
• ‘Institutional isomorphism’ – organisations imitate others in their field because the 
process of institutionalisation forces those in a particular environment to follow 
convergent paths. 
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Criticisms 
 
• The individual is neglected and ends up being submerged in the collective. 
• Sociological institutionalism cannot explain properly why an actor does not follow the 
logic of appropriateness. 
• Sociological institutionalism does not adequately explain how individual and institutional 
behaviour can be predicted. 
 
Main Points of Historical Institutionalism 
 
• Rules include formal regulations and informal practices incorporating culture, beliefs, 
values etc. 
• The preferences of actors are constructed by the institution. 
• Historical context is essential in explaining why things are the way they are – past 
decisions have a huge influence over current and future policy. 
• Those creating an institution look at existing institutional templates and the circumstances 
at the time also play an important part in the decisions. 
• Institutions are generally stable following a set path until they are forced to change paths 
by a ‘critical juncture’. 
• Historical institutionalism focuses on how institutions can give privileges to some groups 
and deny them to others, thus shaping outcomes that are desirable to the institution. 
• Ideas are important to historical institutionalism as they can change thinking within an 
institution and have the potential to become policy.  Institutions can promote certain 
ideas. 
 
Criticisms 
 
• Historical institutionalism is not yet a fully developed alternative to either RCI or 
sociological institutionalism. 
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CHAPTER 4 NEW POLITICS  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 described how new institutionalism is centred around the belief that institutions are 
the 'central component of political life' and that they are capable of affecting the behaviour of 
individuals (Peters; 1999, p.150).  To fully understand how the Scottish Parliament has 
impacted the behaviour of the six interest groups, it is first necessary to establish the situation 
for the groups before 1999 when the Scottish Office, as the UK government's executive arm 
in Scotland, was the central component of Scottish political life.  The Scottish Office also 
mediated between Scottish civic society and the UK state (Brown et al; 1998, p.101-102).  It 
was fronted by a Secretary of State for Scotland (a Cabinet position) and a team of about five 
Ministers that presided over the Scottish Office departments: Agriculture, Environment and 
Fisheries; Development; Education and Industry; Home Department; Health; and the 
Secretary of State's Office.  The Scottish Office’s role in the policy making process ranged 
from complete autonomy, such as in education policy, to that of ‘complete dependence’ on 
the relevant department at the UK level, where the Scottish Office would simply follow the 
UK policy line (Keating and Midwinter; 1983, p.20).  The Houses of Parliament in 
Westminster was the policy making institution for the entire UK (after devolution the Houses 
of Parliament continued to remain sovereign and also reserved its powers over social 
security, employment services, defence and foreign policy on behalf of the entire UK).  A 
'before and after' devolution picture of the six groups will allow a more informed 
appreciation of the effect the Scottish Parliament had on the behaviour of the interest groups.  
 
4.2 Situation pre-devolution 
In Scotland, before the Scottish Parliament opened, three kinds of interest groups existed 
according to Keating and Midwinter (1983, p.70):  
1) UK wide groups with no particular provision for Scotland 
2) UK groups with a Scottish division that operate with some autonomy  
3) independent Scottish interest groups. 
The need for interest groups to lobby in Scotland prior to devolution was driven either 
because they had distinctive Scottish demands or needs that called for separate treatment 
from the rest of the UK (Keating and Midwinter; 1983, p.70).  Groups that were part of a UK 
wide organisation, or were affiliated to one, could try to influence policy at the relevant UK 
government department via their parent group but this was ‘unusual for a purely Scottish 
group’ to do as they tended to try to influence only the Scottish Office, which had a wide 
range of responsibilities for Scotland (Keating and Midwinter; 1983, p.73).  Therefore, major 
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economic groups operated at both a UK and Scottish level but teachers’ organisations and 
local government restricted themselves primarily to the Scottish Office (Midwinter et al; 
1991, p.73).  The groups dealing with just the Scottish Office (and not Westminster) were 
limited to areas where the Scottish Office was able to draft policy or else where they hoped 
the Scottish Office could influence the drawing up of policy at Westminster. 
 
Kellas described Scotland appearing defective compared to England in terms of the strength 
of voluntary organisations: ‘the Scottish political system is less ‘open’ than that of England to 
bodies of this kind.  There is less of a tradition of citizen participation, and more ‘elite’ rule’ 
(1992, p.192/3).  Burt and Taylor lay out three reasons why Scotland’s voluntary sector was 
stuck at the fringes of political influence pre-devolution: the voluntary sector was 
geographically distant from the political power centres in London and Brussels; secondly, 
they were philosophically distant from the Conservative governments which also contributed 
to the isolation of the sector and thirdly, the sector lacked the infrastructure necessary to get 
their diverse and numerous voices heard (2002, p.85). 
 
‘Given the absence of ministers and MPs in London for most of the week, interest 
group contacts, except for the largest and wealthiest groups, tend to be with the 
Edinburgh civil servants’ (Midwinter et al; 1991, p. 77).   
Politicians were therefore largely inaccessible to all but the biggest interest groups who could 
afford to follow Ministers and MPs to London.  The politicians might have been out of 
Scotland but they were not distant from the needs of their constituents as they spent Fridays 
in their constituencies.  But for interest groups working a Monday to Friday week in 
Scotland, the opportunities of meeting with politicians was limited.  The Scottish Office civil 
servants might have been more geographically accessible throughout the working week but 
‘civil servants simply did not have to finesse their process skills because government was not 
interested in the views of many external organisations’ (Ford and Casebow; 2002, p. 48).  
The key word in that sentence is ‘many’ – obviously some groups had active involvement in 
the policy making process and worked closely with civil servants but this was confined to 
certain kinds of groups.  Keating and Midwinter talk about the ‘major producer groups’ as 
being part of the ‘particularly close and informal’ insider network that operated in Scotland 
(1983, p.73).  However, for those not privy to the closed policy networks involving senior 
civil servants and interest group leaders (the Scottish Office's apparent favoured way of 
working), the concept of a Scottish Parliament was seen as a democratic check to this closed 
system of governance (Brown et al; 1998, p.63). 
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However, Jordan and Stevenson (2000, p.182) in discussing the Scottish Office believed that 
being part of the consultation process pre-1999 was not as difficult as some claimed: ‘In fact 
pre-devolution policies within Britain characteristically arrived at by consultation and 
negotiations between Whitehall and relevant interests’.  They comment that consultation was 
the departmental routine throughout the 1980s and 1990s and give some examples from 
various UK government departments – but pointedly not from the Scottish Office.  In a 
counter argument Brown et al write that: 
'even though the Scottish Office may consult pressure groups and so on, it is not 
obliged to pay attention to them.  Under the Conservatives, and on issues of deep 
controversy, the sense grew that the consultation was a charade' (1998, p.109). 
From a general UK perspective Richards and Smith state that politics had been an elite 
activity, with interest group participation occurring through closed policy networks between 
senior civil servants and the leaders of interest groups, although due to the Thatcher 
governments’ suspicion of interest groups, many of these policy networks were later 
undermined (2002, p.196).  Brown et al describe how the Scottish Office 'had evolved partly 
as the expression of a complex network of self-governing social institutions', but this changed 
as time went on when it 'became more obviously the instrument of the Westminster 
Government', which became a problem under the consecutive Conservative governments, as 
the majority of the electorate in Scotland had not voted for the Conservatives and so some 
resented being governed by them (1998, p.44/45). 
 
Having described the general situation for interest groups in Scotland before devolution, the 
specific situation of the six case study interest groups prior to 1999 will be briefly looked at, 
bearing in mind that the Scottish headquarters of the FSB, MS Society and the RSPB were 
much larger UK groups, while the SCPO did not exist before 1999 and both the SPTC and 
CoSLA were independent Scottish groups that were well established and already politically 
active long before devolution.  Except for the FSB (a business group) and CoSLA (local 
government), the other four groups fell under the voluntary sector heading. 
 
Federation of Small Businesses 
The FSB’s Parliamentary Office had already been established for some time in Scotland and 
before devolution they did have contact with Ministers and civil servants but these were 
limited relationships in terms of influence.  (The FSB had heavyweight competition in the 
form of the CBI and the STUC).  The FSB found it particularly difficult to establish on-going 
meaningful relationships with Ministers.  The Parliamentary Officer explained that it was 
hard just to meet with politicians because of the physical distance: ‘They go down on a 
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Monday night or Tuesday morning, they’re there till Friday, if you’re a Scottish organisation 
where are you going to meet them?’  Accessibility to politicians for the Scottish FSB was 
such that they were ‘lucky if we contacted them half a dozen times a year’ and that was just 
with MPs, they had very limited contact with Ministers (Policy Convener).  Generally, they 
found that prior to the Scottish Parliament ‘it was extremely difficult to interact with officials 
at Westminster on specific issues and on bills and consultations’ (Procedures Committee (a), 
Col 1403).  To summarise then, the Scottish FSB was involved in the political system prior to 
devolution but they had only occasional contact with politicians and officials. 
 
Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office 
Although the SCPO was only established as a result of devolution, the churches in Scotland 
(with a combined membership of 1.8 million people) were involved in the political process 
long before then and were at times influential in their interventions (Maxwell; 1999, p.135).  
In fact, some people boldly referred to the Church of Scotland’s General Assembly as 
Scotland’s Parliament in the absence of an actual one and the Catholic Church was also 
known to have a lot of influence in the Scottish Labour Party (Maxwell; 1999, p.135).  
Maxwell describes how the churches generally had ‘a strong tradition as independent and 
forceful contributors to Scottish public debates’ (ibid., p.135).  However, the SCPO’s 
Parliamentary Officer explained that the churches were limited in their political input because 
they found the system at Westminster to be very closed and ‘like most other civic bodies in 
Scotland, churches did not see themselves as able to play as on-going a part in the political 
decision making process’.  The churches were always willing to speak up in the political 
system but they did not operate in a sustained manner within it.  
 
Multiple Sclerosis Society  
At the MS Society, policy work ‘really hadn’t been done at all’ by the Scottish MS office 
before devolution according to their Director and Policy Officer.  The Policy Officer 
explained that: 
‘Scottish branches of the Society were engaged in fund-raising and they were engaged 
in welfare activities…  But they weren’t at all focused on seeking to influence public 
policy, either through local authorities, through health boards or central government’ 
(personal interview, May 2001).   
 
The Director said that when things were controlled by the Scottish Office and Westminster it 
was difficult for the Scottish MS Society to influence government and so political activity 
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was left to their colleagues down in London, who lobbied at Westminster on the principle 
that whatever was decided there would then be subsequently rolled out to Scotland.   
 
Scottish Parent Teacher Council 
Education policy was an area where the Scottish Office had a lot of autonomy.  It would 
therefore be expected that education interest groups, like the SPTC, would have been more 
politically active pre-devolution.  The SPTC had indeed been active and it must also have 
been in favour with the Scottish Office at some point, as it used to be in receipt of 
government funding and was one of the groups that fed into 'the networks of power' favoured 
by the Scottish Office (Brown et al; 1998, p.109).  The SPTC was one of those groups that 
was partly sponsored by the Scottish Office but also partly independent from it (Brown et al; 
1998, p.57).  Because the SPTC received a government grant they had regular six monthly 
meetings with civil servants from the Scottish Office, in large part to discuss their funding.  
The Development Manager said that when in came to lobbying she tended to contact civil 
servants she had met and had a link with, but the depth of her relationships depended on 
personal chemistry.  There was a time when she got on well with one particular individual, 
which was useful for the group, but then that link was broken when the civil servant moved 
on and she did not get on so well personally with his successor.   
 
However, before devolution, the SPTC’s political activity ‘wasn’t focused on politicians’.  In 
fact they rarely met up with politicians and even when they did the Development Manager 
said that ‘meetings with Ministers were trials, didn’t mean anything, they just went through 
the motions’ as a formality.  The Development Manager explained that the SPTC’s ‘political 
activity was more with other partner organisations to try and build coalitions up’.  Like most 
other Scottish groups, their trips to Westminster were very rare, although they still at least 
endeavoured to have some input there.  The SPTC obviously had political influence before 
devolution, particularly with civil servants in the Scottish Office, although it seems to have 
been affected by staff turnover. 
  
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
Because local authorities are made up of elected representatives and have to implement 
government policy, CoSLA had more liaison than most with the Scottish Office and most 
policy-makers were known to them personally.  George Kerevan writes that the ‘big Labour 
municipalities’ particularly used to weigh in ‘as key influencers of policy’ to the detriment of 
rural areas and small towns (Kerevan; 2002, p. 41).  But although CoSLA had close working 
relationships with the Scottish Office, it was hindered by its ideological differences with the 
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government, as local authorities tended to be Labour dominated in Scotland but had to work 
with a Conservative government.  CoSLA’s Head of Policy said that they had largely spent 
their time ‘fighting the Conservative administration’.  The Convention Manager spoke of 
how:  
‘it was a bad time in a lot of ways for local government and some of that was to do 
with the fact that it wasn’t a legislature that was really rooted in things that were 
happening here, the debate was happening somewhere else and then we were having 
things really imposed in a lot of ways through the Scottish Office’ (personal 
interview, December 2001).   
CoSLA had influence over technical and administrative issues, rather than ideological ones 
(Keating and Midwinter; 1983, p.106).  Kellas describes how the English local authorities 
had ‘entrenched power’ compared to Scottish local authorities but he did say that on occasion 
‘even in Scotland local authorities can show their power’, facilitated by the relatively small 
size of Scotland (1992, p.234).   
  
Before 1997 CoSLA primarily had friendly relationships with the opposition Labour MPs.  
The Convention Manager spoke of how they would get friendly MPs to ask parliamentary 
questions at Westminster in order to get information which they felt they were not getting 
from the Scottish Office, ‘but again that was an opposition situation if you like, where I 
suppose most of the political group represented on CoSLA were challenging an opposition 
party government’. 
 
The English local authority associations were more effective and thus more powerful than 
CoSLA pre-devolution, because unlike their English counterparts CoSLA was just ‘not well 
geared up to influencing Parliamentary legislation’ (Keating and Midwinter; 1983, p.107).  
Keating and Midwinter compare how the English Associations drafted detailed amendments 
to the Local Government Bill and actively lobbied for them in both Houses of Parliament, 
whereas CoSLA simply wrote a critical brief and sent it to Scottish MPs – the extent of their 
lobbying on behalf of the Scotland Bill for local government (ibid., p.107).  Generally 
though, local authorities were ‘confined in their dealings with central government almost 
entirely to the Scottish Office’ (Keating and Midwinter; 1983, p.73).  The opportunity to 
influence policy at Westminster was limited anyway.  The Acting Chief Executive explained 
that there was very little legislation going through that affected Scotland.  He commented 
that:  
‘if you look back about how much Scottish business was done in Westminster, it was 
usually something that was tagged on to a bill for England and something tagged on 
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for Wales and Scotland.  There wasn’t any fundamental legislation’ (personal 
interview, December 2001).   
Contact with Westminster was confined to:  
‘a specific Scottish piece of legislation or once a year when they were required to 
debate and agree the revenue support grant and the housing grant orders support for 
Scotland, they had to be debated in an affirmative resolution by the House, so an 
annual soiree was to go down and brief members of Parliament about the bill.  And of 
course for x number of years we were briefing Labour MPs, who were obviously the 
majority of MPs in Scotland, about Conservative government Secretaries of States 
revenue support grant’ (ibid.).   
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
As part of a wider UK group, the responsibilities for lobbying in the RSPB were largely left 
to their Westminster parliamentary officers who ‘effectively operated as a service department 
for the Society, so if there was Scottish legislation going through that was of particular 
relevance to ourselves they would concentrate on it’ (Head of Advocacy and Media Unit – a 
unit created as a result of devolution).  The Head of Advocacy and Media pointed out that the 
Society’s Westminster parliamentary officers did not get involved in Scottish politics very 
often, not because that was RSPB policy but simply because there was very little Scottish 
environmental legislation that went through Westminster.  Although, he did add that it was 
assumed in their offices in England that any decisions taken at Westminster would be the 
same for Scotland.  For the Scottish RSPB office: ‘our influence over those decisions…were 
considerably more limited and that’s partly because of the Westminster system, they were 
opaque, they were hidden’.  The Senior Investigations Officer said that ‘most matters to do 
with legislation… were really done at our headquarter level’ in England.  Politicians were 
dealt with ‘by our London colleagues because that’s where government was’ (Head of Policy 
Operations).  Before devolution the Scottish RSPB did not have ‘a political hat’ and the Head 
of Policy Operations job was ‘in public inquiries and individual casework’. 
 
The Scottish RSPB did have dealings with the Scottish Office but were not part of the 
‘establishment within the policy community’, (the Scottish NFU and the Scottish 
Landowners Federation were).  They rarely had contact with Scottish Ministers because the 
civil servants ‘really ran the country, not least because Ministers would be sent off to London 
at lunch-time on Monday, do Westminster business and then come back at lunch-time on 
Friday’.  The Head of Policy Operations said that when they had dealings with the Scottish 
Office they operated as ‘technocrats trying to influence other technocrats’.  The Senior 
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Investigations Officer said that their dealings with the Scottish Office were ‘often very 
unprofessional’ and at times the civil servants would simply say ‘no, I’m not going to talk to 
you’ because they ‘could get away with it’ due to the lack of scrutiny.  He describes 
situations that were quite petty such as a fight over goose licences in 1980, where they would 
fall out and ‘you got the impression they were never going to speak to you again’.  
 
4.2.1  Summary of interest group experiences 
To generalise then, the perceived political experiences of the six groups could be summed up 
by the following statements:  
• The system at Westminster was largely inaccessible to smaller groups based in Scotland.  
The groups also complained that it was difficult to get access to Ministers and MPs 
because they went down to London on a Monday and did not return until Friday. 
• Political involvement was primarily with the civil servants based in the Scottish Office 
but the civil service had established policy communities and could ignore who they chose 
to because of lack of scrutiny. 
• For the UK wide groups influencing politicians was largely the work of their UK 
headquarters (it was widely regarded that decisions made at Westminster would be rolled 
out to Scotland anyway). 
• There was very little primary legislation that was specifically Scottish going through the 
Houses of Parliament, so occasions for Scottish groups to play a bigger lobbying role 
there were limited anyway. 
• Geographic and ideological distances were the biggest obstacles to interest group 
involvement.  
 
4.3  Insider/outsider groups 
Four of the six interest groups could not have claimed to be what is known as an ‘insider’ 
group, as they did not have any meaningful access to government.  The SPTC was at some 
point part of a policy community network, a sign that they had a close relationship with the 
civil service.  CoSLA by virtue of representing local government was an insider group, 
although it was not always an easy relationship due to their ideological differences with the 
Conservative governments. 
 
A brief explanation of what is meant by an insider/outsider group will be given here as it is 
important to understand these terms in order to monitor if, and how, the relative position of 
the groups changed as a result of devolution. 
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The touchstone for insider/outsider distinctions is Wyn Grant’s work from 1978 and beyond.  
Grant states that the distinctions were ‘centred on the idea of interest group strategies, that is, 
how interest groups go about achieving their goals’ (Grant; 2000, p.21-22).  Insider groups 
are viewed as being legitimate by government and so are consulted on a regular basis 
(Coxall; 2001, p.5: Baggott; 1995, p.18).  By contrast outsider groups are split into three 
distinctions: those who are (a) potential insider groups because they have adopted strategies 
that are more acceptable to government, (b) outsider groups by necessity because they lack 
the political skills and knowledge to secure recognition and (c) ideological outsider groups 
who have made the conscious decision not to get involved in a consultative insider 
relationship with government (Baggott; 1995, p.18: Coxall; 2001, p.5: Grant; 2000, p.19).  
Because outsider groups do not have access to government they tend to direct their attentions 
towards the media and the public in order to get issues onto the political agenda (Smith; 
1995, p.14).  Whereas, ‘[c]rudely put, the less public an interest makes its affairs the more 
successful it tends to be, because it is able to get its needs met on the ‘inside track’ of public 
policy-making’ (Greenwood; 1997, p.16). 
 
Grant may be the touchstone for insider/outsider distinctions but Maloney et al have refined 
those distinctions even further.  They differentiate between access and influence: access only 
results in consultation but if a group is granted (by policy makers) privileged access, this 
‘leads to bargaining and negotiation’ and thus influence (Maloney et al; 1994, p.25). 
 
Grant comments that in the long run ‘most groups tend to veer towards an insider strategy 
because of the potential gain it offers’ (2000, p.20).  In Grant’s terms, an insider group has 
access to government and while that may not necessarily mean a group will be more 
effective, the implication is that insider groups are more likely to be effective because of their 
legitimate status (Jordan and Richardson; 1987, p.33).  The benefits of being a group with 
insider status according to Smith (1995, p.10-11) and Jones (2001, p.214) are that they are 
more likely to: 
• be consulted directly by policy makers about proposed policy changes at the pre-
legislative consultation stage  
• be given a seat on advisory committees/committees of inquiry/executive bodies 
• secure government funding 
• be involved in the daily making of policy (if the groups are privileged insiders). 
 
Most outsider groups can try to influence policy only once it has been written and by then it 
is difficult to persuade for change because the government has already committed itself.  But 
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in order to be awarded the status of an insider group and to reap the benefits of that position 
‘certain constraints and patterns of behaviour’ are imposed on the groups because ‘the state 
sets the rules of the game for pressure group activity’ (Grant; 2000, p.20).  To be an insider 
group the emphasis is on groups adapting their behaviour to suit government, ‘particularly to 
civil servants’ according to Grant (2000, p.20).  Most legislation originates from government 
and it is the civil servants in particular that craft the details of policy.  It is argued by some 
that the UK is a post-parliamentary democracy, where government uses interest groups to 
make policy rather than parliament, because the government can for the most part be 
confident that their policies will be passed by parliament because of strong party discipline  
(Smith 1995, p.7: Richardson; 1993, p.89).  So ‘[i]f a group had to choose only one point of 
access to the decision-making arena, it would invariably choose the bureaucratic arena’, 
although, many groups will lobby whatever channels are available to them including the 
parliament, the public (via the media) as well as Ministers and civil servants, for what is 
termed a ‘belt and braces’ approach (Richardson; 1993, p.90). 
 
To become an insider group, a government will look for particular qualities that include:  
• accurate, well researched and reliable information that tells the whole story  
• authority/representativeness, e.g. a group will represent a significant proportion of its 
potential members 
• expertise/specialist information 
• membership compliance  
• being prepared to compromise and accept incremental change 
• accepting the outcomes of the bargaining process 
• making moderate, non-radical and feasible demands that are compatible with government 
aims 
• talking the same language as civil servants 
• being trustworthy with confidential information 
• does not embarrass/threaten or strongly criticise the government in the media.  
(Compiled from Coxall; 2001, p.5-6, p.66: Grant; 2000, p.20-22: Jones; 2001, p.209-210: 
Jordan and Halpin; 2003, p.314: Jordan and Richardson; 1987, p.32-41: Smith; 1995, p.4, 
p.10: Wilson; 1990, p.21-23). 
 
Jordan and Halpin (2003, p.315) also suggest that if a group embarks on an insider strategy 
and seeks to nurture the qualities government is looking for, they will shift their reliance on 
group activists to the professionalism and specialisation that comes from paid staff.  
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4.4  New politics 
Henry McLeish, Chairman of the Consultative Steering Group, said that the CSG had been 
struck after their consultations about the degree of consensus that existed, in particular ‘that 
the establishment of the Scottish Parliament offers the opportunity to put in place a new sort 
of democracy in Scotland’ (Consultative Steering Group; 1998, p. v).  This new democracy 
was to be based on the four key principles of the CSG Report: power sharing, accountability, 
accessibility and equal opportunities.  The vision was for a Scottish Parliament that would 
encourage people to participate in policy making.  The PR electoral system (designed by the 
Scottish Constitutional Convention in 1995) was also intended to ‘encourage a new 
consensual type of politics with an element of power sharing’ (Burrows; 2000, p.34).  The 
ambition was for the Scottish Parliament to usher in an era of “new politics” based on a 
consensual style of working, the sharing of power, accessibility and operating in family 
friendly hours that work around the Scottish school holidays.  It was to be a contrast to 
Westminster (hence the “new” politics).   
 
As well as the various parliamentary actors (Ministers, civil servants, committees and MSPs) 
other access points were set up in the Scottish Parliament.  A specific Public Petitions 
Committee was established in order to give individuals, groups and organisations a direct 
channel into the Scottish Parliament.  The Public Petitions Committee had taken its model 
from the European Parliament where public petitions have the potential to become policy 
(Cavanagh et al; 2000, p.72), it was to be the antithesis to the petitions system at Westminster 
where public petitions were largely ignored.  In the Scottish version the Public Petitions 
Committee has to discuss every petition that is lodged with it (Lynch; 2001, p.83/84).  Some 
petitions are judged to require further consideration and are passed on to other relevant 
parliamentary committee(s), for instance, in response to a petition on genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) from Friends of the Earth, the Public Petitions Committee passed it on to 
the Transport and Environment Committee who then instigated a report into GMOs.  This 
report was debated by the Parliament in May 2001 – ‘an example of the parliament engaging 
with civic Scotland as devolution campaigners envisaged’ (The Scotsman (a); 2001, p.9).  
The Public Petitions Committee has been viewed as a tool to close the ‘democratic deficit’ 
and as ‘an extension of the boundaries of democratic participation in Scotland’ (Cavanagh et 
al; 2000, p.79). 
 
Another example of the Scottish Parliament’s attempt to be open and accessible is its use of 
information technology.  The Scottish Parliament developed a website that has become an 
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important source of information for interest groups, containing verbatim reports of committee 
meetings, parliamentary debates, research briefings and other parliamentary documents.  
Contact details of all the MSPs and committee clerks are also available on the website.  (Of 
course this is only available to those who have the internet but to overcome this, the Scottish 
Parliament set up a network of Partner Libraries throughout Scotland).  As Joyce McMillan 
put it: ‘if ever a parliament was set up with an overt mission to encourage a new culture of 
citizenship and participation, the Scottish Parliament of 1999 was that body’ (2001, p.38). 
 
Interest groups in Scotland certainly appeared to buy into the idea of this new politics, as they 
had ‘access to politicians in a way that is unprecedented’ (Brown; 2000, p.54).  The SPTC’s 
Development Manager summed it up succinctly for the other groups when she stated that the 
Scottish Parliament ‘certainly is open and accessible and anyone who says it isn’t, just hasn’t 
availed themselves of it.’  The FSB’s Press and Parliamentary Officer in his oral evidence on 
the CSG principles to the Procedures Committee stated that the FSB believed that ‘the 
Parliament has delivered responsible, open and participative government’ with MSPs, 
committees and Ministers all embracing those principles (Procedures Committee (a), Col 
1400).  He also added that access was extremely good at all levels ‘which was not so 
apparent in the days of the Scottish Office’ (ibid.).  As one of the FSB’s internal reviews 
summarised ‘since the start of the Scottish Parliament, FSB has had more consultation with 
officials and parliamentarians than ever before’.  They found the Parliament to be open, not 
just in terms of the accessibility of the actors, but also because it ‘widely disseminates 
information on its current and future work, contact is easy and the whole process is very 
open’ (as quoted in the Standards Committee report on lobbying – Scottish Parliament (d), 
2002, p.5).  A result of this, the FSB felt that they had a greater chance of achieving 
something (FSB’s Deputy Press and Parliamentary Officer). 
 
The SCPO in its written submission to the parliamentary Standards Committee commented 
that ‘we have generally found Parliament as a whole to be fairly open and transparent, and 
MSPs to be readily accessible’.  And in their written submission to the Procedures 
Committee (on the CSG principles), they wrote that ‘churches recognise and welcome the 
undeniably greater opportunities for “civic society” in Scotland to contribute to the 
Parliamentary decision-making process’.   
 
The MS Society, CoSLA and the RSPB had the same story to tell.  The MS Society in 
Scotland found that the Scottish Parliament was much easier to lobby than it ever would have 
been ‘when things were controlled by the Scottish Office and Westminster politicians’ 
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(Director).  At CoSLA both the Acting Chief Executive and the Convention Manager 
acknowledged that CoSLA had greater opportunities in the Scottish Parliament than they ever 
had at Westminster, not because ‘we’ve got a special position but because I think probably 
everybody does’ (Convention Manager).  The RSPB’s Senior Investigations Officer pointed 
out that he had been in his job for sixteen years and in all that time he had never been in the 
Houses of Parliament at Westminster, yet in the three years the Scottish Parliament had been 
in existence he had given evidence several times and provided answers to parliamentary 
questions.  Perhaps the RSPB’s Head of Advocacy and Media spoke for all six groups when 
he observed ‘I think people in the NGOs feel that they’ve genuinely played a much more 
important part in Scottish democracy than they ever have in the past’.  Voluntary sector 
groups and NGOs were able to be part of the public forum that debated social policy, thanks 
to the Scottish Parliament ‘working through the principles of the Consultative Steering 
Group’ (Paterson; 2002, p.59).  Whether the groups’ enthusiasm for the devolution process 
had influenced their judgement or not, there is no doubt that they sincerely felt that the 
system had opened up to them.  
 
Section 4.5 Theoretical perspectives 
Having briefly established the background to how things were before 1999 and the principles 
the Scottish Parliament had committed itself to, it would be appropriate to offer some 
theoretical perspectives from each of the institutionalist approaches on how the six groups 
were likely to respond to the Scottish Parliament.  These three different perspectives will be 
used as a benchmark in the chapters to come as to how the different components of the 
Scottish Parliament (the Scottish Executive, committees and MSPs) have affected the groups.   
 
4.5.1  Rational choice institutionalism 
The creation of the Scottish Parliament was a goal that the FSB, the churches (SCPO) and 
CoSLA had worked towards.  On that basis rational choice institutionalism would say that 
they would continue to calculatingly ‘maximise the achievement of their goals’ (Tsebelis, 
p.5).  The self-interested motivation for having devolution would be to 1) get policies 
appropriate to the needs of Scotland and their members’ interests and 2) provide them with 
an accessible parliament affording them greater opportunities to influence legislation.  But 
the risk for rational actors is that the institution may not bring the benefits that they hope for.  
People will change an institution if the benefits that they hope for from its existence cease (or 
fail) to materialise.  As long as the Scottish Parliament continues to be beneficial for the 
groups, they will support its continuation. 
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Rational choice institutionalism dictates that all the groups will be motivated by their own 
self-interest and the pursuit of their own good (Grafstein; 1992, p.259).  Therefore, it could 
be assumed that it would be in their interests to take advantage of all the new opportunities 
afforded to them by the Scottish Parliament if it meant they could maximise their goals.  The 
problem at the start of devolution was that no-one was quite sure how powerful the 
Parliament (committees and MSPs) was going to be, although it was heralded as being 
powerful enough to challenge the dominance of the Scottish Executive, unlike the norm at 
Westminster.  Based on those promises it could be expected that the groups would invest 
resources into lobbying committees and MSPs, as well as the Scottish Executive, in order to 
take advantage of all new possible routes of influence.  However, this is not particularly 
rational as the groups would be investing resources into an unknown quantity (the 
committees).  If the committees were merely talking shops then the groups would end up 
pulling back their resources and transferring them to the Scottish Executive if they believed 
that would help them to achieve their goals more effectively (this is unlike historical 
institutionalism where a group would be more likely to stick with their original lobbying 
strategy). 
 
It could also be expected that the groups would either work independently (so as not to 
compromise their demands) or else only join up with other groups when it would be most 
beneficial to do so (where they would get more out of the alliance than they put in). 
 
To summarise then, based on rational choice, it could be predicted that the groups: 
• would adopt a strategy that would allow them to become insider groups (because 
generally it would be in their self-interest to do so) 
• would lobby only the access points that would allow them to achieve their goals most 
effectively 
• would primarily work independently, except where it was expedient to join an 
alliance/network for the expected benefits that could not be gained working alone 
• would only support the Scottish Parliament as long as it proved beneficial to them  
• would remain fundamentally unchanged, as their preferences were formed outwith the 
Scottish Parliament. 
 
4.5.2  Sociological institutionalism  
Sociological institutionalism would attribute the establishment of the Scottish Parliament to 
Scottish culture and a joining together of civic Scotland united in their view that the 
government at Westminster was out of synchronisation with what Scots wanted.  The desire 
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of the Scots to govern themselves was born out of cultural and historical reasons and not 
simply rational self-interest.  The support for a Scottish Parliament extended throughout the 
country, it was not simply the Scottish elite and interest groups that voted the Scottish 
Parliament in, although they played a significant role in making it a reality.  As a product of 
Scottish society the Scottish Parliament would be expected to reflect the culture surrounding 
it.   
 
In turn the Scottish Parliament, once it was operational, would also expect to influence those 
involved with it, to the extent that the preferences of the groups would be constructed by the 
new political institution.  It would be expected that the values of the groups would come into 
line with the Scottish Parliament’s as a result of their interaction with it.  Furthermore, the 
groups, by following the formal and informal rules of the Scottish Parliament, would end up 
complying with its norms and operate in a way that the Scottish Parliament approved of.  By 
doing so they would essentially be adopting insider strategies as they would be conforming to 
how the Scottish Parliament expected them to behave.  In addition to working in a way 
viewed as desirable by the Scottish Parliament, the groups would imitate each other’s 
working practices as a result of institutional isomorphism.  Therefore the groups, under 
sociological institutionalism, would be expected to have vastly similar working practices 
when interacting with politicians and civil servants. 
 
Taking the sociological approach, it could be expected that: 
• groups would be more likely to be insider or potential insider groups because they will be 
acting in ways that have been deemed appropriate by the Scottish Parliament (the “logic 
of appropriateness”) 
• the groups will be fundamentally changed as the Parliament will determine their identity 
and preferences 
• groups will be keen to join alliances and networks to support each other and the 
Parliament 
• the groups will carry out activity at all the access points in the Parliament as it would be 
in keeping with their belief that the Parliament should be strong and not just subject to 
Scottish Executive dominance 
• the groups will adopt the same patterns of behaviour because of institutional 
isomorphism. 
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4.5.3 Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism would expect the groups to be affected by the Scottish Parliament 
in similar ways to sociological institutionalism, particularly that it would form the 
preferences of the groups.  However, historical institutionalism is not as fluid as the 
sociological approach, as the decisions that the groups make at the start of their lobbying 
strategy will influence all subsequent choices.  Due to institutional “lock-in”, the groups 
would continue to carry out the strategy/methods that they adopted when they first decided to 
get involved with the Scottish Parliament, even if after time another strategy would be more 
effective.  Change only occurs at times of ‘critical junctures’. 
 
Historical institutionalism would predict that the groups: 
• would be fundamentally changed as the Scottish Parliament will have determined their 
identity and preferences so that their goals, as well as their strategies, are changed 
• are more likely to take on what is seen as an insider strategy (because the Scottish 
Parliament will have determined their strategies and goals), although how successful they 
would be in achieving insider status would be dependent on their lobbying focus when 
the Scottish Parliament was new and how much resources they had allocated to political 
work 
• will seek to form alliances (if they are outsider groups) in order to have some influence 
until such time that the Scottish Parliament would grant them insider privileges 
• the groups would continue to influence the points that they identified at the start as being 
useful to them 
• will share similar views on the political system and what they can do within that, 
although that does not necessarily mean they will act in the same ways as other groups. 
 
The main difference between the approaches is whether the Scottish Parliament will have 
been able to fundamentally change the groups, i.e. will it be able to determine the preferences 
of the groups to the extent that not only their strategies will be changed but also their goals.  
If the goals of the groups remain unchanged then rational choice institutionalism will be the 
more applicable approach.  If the goals of the groups have been changed and the Scottish 
Parliament is able to supersede policy and strategy decisions that the groups made in the past, 
so that their behaviour will always reflect current expectations and behavioural norms, then 
sociological institutionalism will be the most applicable.  Thirdly, if the groups reflect the 
preferences and goals of the Scottish Parliament but remain stable in their ways of working 
and behaving (because they continue to stick to the course of action they originally settled 
on) then historical institutionalism is best placed to explain why that is the case.   
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4.6 The “old order” 
The relationship between the Scottish Executive and the groups will be discussed in chapter 
six and again in the concluding chapter in order to provide context to the main focus of this 
thesis – the Parliament (committees and MSPs).  The Parliament is given prominence 
because the CSG report was confined to how the Parliament would operate, its remit did not 
extend to the Scottish Executive.  In fact, Mitchell criticises the advocates of new politics for 
their focus on the Parliament and for failing to recognise that it would be the Scottish 
Executive which would dominate policy making (2000, p.610-614).  He also points out that 
devolution: 
‘involved the establishment of a democratic component to an existing distinctive 
structure of government in Scotland.  Groups and individuals would have to alter their 
behaviour accordingly rather than assume that they had to start completely afresh’ 
(Mitchell; 2000, p.615).  
But for the groups, the Parliament was brand new and for many, there was the hope that it 
would operate differently from Westminster and the Scottish Office.  So if the groups did not 
start ‘completely afresh’ with the new institution, how could they expect to have a Scottish 
Parliament that worked in a completely fresh way?   
 
Many of the groups began to prepare for the Scottish Parliament before it was operational, so 
decisions that they made at the start will have had subsequent effects on their behaviour and 
therefore it is necessary to look at how they responded generally to the Scottish Parliament in 
chapter five, as this will provide background.  Chapter 6 will focus on the Scottish Executive 
– civil servants and Ministers – as it is derived from Westminster structures and if it has not 
adapted to the new politics of the CSG report then it will have a significant impact on the 
ability of the Parliament to sustain a new way of working.  It is interesting that many aspects 
of the Scottish Parliament were designed so that they were the opposite to Westminster 
practices, yet the civil service was deliberately kept as part of the Home Civil Service after 
devolution because it provided continuity with relations in Whitehall and 'with established 
British civil service practices' (Kirkpatrick and Pyper; 2001, p.72).  After chapter 6 on the 
Scottish Executive, the different components of the Parliament will be examined (the 
committees and clerks in chapter 7, MSPs in chapter 8) as the Parliament was to be the 
standard bearer for the new politics.  Chapter 9, the concluding chapter, will return to the 
consideration of whether new politics made an impact on the six groups. 
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In order to come to those conclusions it is first necessary to know how the groups first 
approached the arrival of the Scottish Parliament and the intended introduction of ‘new 
politics’. 
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CHAPTER 5  THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT 
 
5.1 Introduction 
It is necessary to look briefly at what expectations - no matter how unrealistic they later 
turned out to be - the groups had for the new Scottish Parliament, as those expectations 
shaped the mechanisms that they put in place to interact with the new institution.  Any 
decisions that the groups made at the start, such as whether to create a parliamentary officer 
post within their organisation, or to actually create an entire new organisation, will have an 
important bearing on their subsequent relationship with the Scottish Parliament.  With the 
exception of the MS Society, the rest of the groups made decisions about how they envisaged 
working with the Scottish Parliament before it had even been elected and so they set up 
practices that were designed to interact with the Scottish Parliament generally, rather than 
any specific components at that stage. 
 
5.2  Expectations  
Arter wrote that the Scottish Parliament in its first four years perhaps ‘suffered from the 
tyranny of expectations.  Too much was expected of it’ (Arter; 2003, 19).  This was because:  
‘many Scots tended to believe that the political structures we would create would 
somehow be different from those in existence elsewhere – hence much of the Utopian 
daydreaming about the brave new politics of post-devolution Scotland’ (Craig; 2005, 
p.49).   
The interest groups were no exception; they too held idealistic hopes for devolution.   
 
After being heavily involved in the Constitutional Convention and having been committed to 
the devolution campaign it was understandable that groups such as the FSB, the churches and 
CoSLA were expecting a lot from the new Scottish Parliament that they had helped bring 
about.  The parliamentary officers of the MS Society and the RSPB had also personally been 
dedicated to the devolution cause for years. The Head of Advocacy and Media at the RSPB 
explained that ‘I’ve campaigned for it my entire political life and I think it’s living up to 
expectations.  It probably colours a lot of what I’ve been saying to you’. The Policy Officer 
of the MS Society had a similar story to tell:  
‘I campaigned in the 1979 referendum and I worked right through the Thatcher years 
to keep the issue on the Scottish political agenda, as part of the Scottish TUC, I was 
secretary to the sub-committees of the Constitutional Convention which looked at the 
economic powers of the Scottish Parliament which is a big issue and I had a very 
modest input into how it’s all turned out’ (personal interview, May 2001). 
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They felt that they had campaigned for a Scottish Parliament, a Parliament that could address 
the particular needs of Scotland in a way that Westminster never could hundreds of miles 
away in London.  In their view devolution was supposed:  
‘to mitigate the sclerotic effects of overcentralisation; to bring government closer to 
those who are affected by its activities, as the principle of subsidiarity mandates; to 
enhance accountability; to strengthen a sense of national identity’ (Convery; 2000, 
p.344). 
Devolution was to provide ‘a Scottish solution in a Scottish context’ (CoSLA; 12 January 
2001). 
 
The Head of Policy at CoSLA explained that he was in favour of the Parliament ‘because I 
think Scotland has a distinct culture that embraces our systems and structures and that needs 
a distinct system of governance’.  This was a sentiment echoed by the other groups: ‘it has 
brought policy back home’ (SPTC Development Manager); ‘they focus on Scotland so 
hopefully we should get better policy’ (FSB Press and Parliamentary Officer); ‘it’s not just 
about geography but obviously a new way of working and the fact of having a parliament in 
Scotland’ (SCPO Parliamentary Officer).  It was no longer a case of the Secretary of State for 
Scotland being ‘invariably somebody who implemented the UK policy in Scotland which 
some would argue in some periods of history was incompatible with what the Scots voted 
for’ (RSPB Head of Policy Operations).  The Convention Manager of CoSLA agreed that 
after experiencing ‘things that were very much imposed on Scotland, I think that probably 
brought a very keen awareness of what it is like to have a legislature that is not really rooted 
in your own culture’ and the experience of having ‘policy being decided five hundred miles 
away and then being sent up on the train’. 
 
These were perhaps obvious reactions to the ‘practice of inserting clauses relating to Scotland 
into what are essentially English Bills, instead of producing separate Scottish bills’ (Kellas, 
1992, p.94).  Westminster had only so much time at its disposal and therefore had very little 
of it to devote to purely Scottish issues, hence just the handful of Scottish bills that were 
passed each year.  As a result of this the Labour MSP, John McAllion, wrote that in the first 
year of devolution the Scottish Parliament committees found ‘themselves under siege from 
grass roots groups across Scotland urging investigations into areas of concern so long 
neglected under the Westminster system’ (The Herald (a); 1999, p.6).  The Scottish 
Parliament also allowed Scottish Ministers to develop a distinctive Scottish line on certain 
 81
issues, such as free personal care for the elderly and university tuition fees (Massie; 2002, 
p.44).    
   
Such idealised enthusiastic support of the Parliament was not just peculiar to the six groups 
in this study.  Throughout the parliamentary Procedures Committee inquiry into how 
effectively the Parliament has implemented the principles of the Constitutional Steering 
Group, it came through again and again how favourable interest groups’ attitudes were 
towards the Scottish Parliament.  Indeed, the Director of the Scottish Council Foundation in 
his report card of the Scottish Parliament’s first year observed that the ‘biggest supporters of 
the parliament are those who seek to influence it’ (The Scotsman (b), p.8).  Back in 1999 the:  
‘vision for the Scottish Parliament, including its emphasis on participatory 
democracy, was undoubtedly a powerful and effective mechanism for mobilisation of 
popular and elite action to bring about major change in the political process in 
Scotland’ (Bonney; 2003, p.466).   
 
The groups welcomed devolution as a way of getting Scottish legislation specific to the needs 
of Scotland and they believed that because they had played a role in bringing about 
devolution, they would be rewarded.  They felt that this came in the promise of the CSG 
report:  
‘Power sharing is not only about the balance of power between the Scottish Executive 
and the Scottish Parliament, but also about the empowerment of external groups and 
individuals in all sectors of Scottish society’ (Consultative Steering Group; 1998, 
p.6). 
In 1999 it appears that the groups hoped that power would be shared out, that new politics 
would be possible with the new Scottish Parliament.  The groups made the decision to 
participate in the new political system and to do that they had to make choices about staffing, 
offices, organisational priorities and workload priorities to ensure that they could play a 
meaningful part in the new political era. 
 
5.3  Personnel and premises 
This section details how the Scottish Parliament affected the number of personnel in the 
groups, as well as how it factored in to their choice of office premises.  Although these may 
be somewhat uninspiring details in and of themselves, they nonetheless indicate the 
commitment the groups were prepared to make to engage with the Scottish Parliament and 
the extent it affected the working direction of the groups. 
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Federation of Small Businesses 
Staff 
Before the Scottish Parliament, the FSB had a full-time Press and Parliamentary Officer and 
an Office Administrator based in their Glasgow office and they were assisted by various FSB 
members who fulfilled honorary roles, in particular their Policy Convener who was in charge 
of the Scottish FSB.  As a direct result of the creation of Scottish Parliament the FSB hired a 
Deputy Press and Parliamentary Officer and a Policy Development Officer.  An office 
assistant was also employed in order to cope with the extra secretarial work created by the 
new staff.  Having more than doubled the number of paid full-time staff, the FSB further 
supplemented their personnel by taking on secondees from British Telecom and from the 
Royal Bank of Scotland.  At the time of participant observation (August/September 2000) the 
FSB was hoping to gain a secondee from the Scottish Executive.   
 
Premises 
Although the FSB had a press and parliamentary office for years in Glasgow they still spent a 
year preparing and re-organising themselves for the Scottish Parliament.  This involved 
moving to bigger premises because they knew that they were going to take on more staff and 
so they required more space than they had in their rented one-room office.  In October 1998, 
the FSB bought a three storey building to accommodate a larger workforce, as well as 
providing them with conference rooms in anticipation of the Scottish Parliament.   
 
The FSB decided to remain in Glasgow rather than moving to Edinburgh because Edinburgh 
property prices were too high.  In response to whether they felt disadvantaged by their 
location, the unanimous answer from the staff was no because they felt that Edinburgh was 
only a short train ride away and distance was no real obstacle in the age of e-mails and faxes. 
 
Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office  
Staff 
The SCPO owed its entire existence to the Scottish Parliament as it was set up because ‘the 
churches were very much part of the civic society movement that brought the Parliament into 
being’.  Once the Scottish Parliament was a reality, the churches wanted to engage with it to 
make the most of the new opportunities it was going to create, therefore the SCPO office 
personnel owed their jobs to the creation of the Scottish Parliament.  Initially, a 
Parliamentary Officer was appointed to carry out the functions of the office in September 
1998 and the appointment of an Office Administrator followed.  By January 2001 (at the time 
of participant observation) the SCPO had also found it expedient to hire a permanent part-
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time research assistant.  Eight short-term volunteers had also supplemented the SCPO 
personnel by January 2001. 
 
Premises 
To house their staff the SCPO rented an office less than five minutes walk away from the 
Parliament’s temporary premises on the Mound in Edinburgh.  This was a deliberate choice 
as the Parliamentary Officer explained that the office: 
‘had to be not only in Edinburgh but very close to the Parliament so that I wasn’t 
spending a lot of time getting to and from the Parliament but also so that it was easy 
to get parliamentarians and others to come to meetings that we might organise here’ 
(personal interview, February 2001). 
 
Being in close proximity to the Scottish Parliament was such a high priority for the SCPO, 
that when the Scottish Parliament was expected to move to its permanent Holyrood site in 
December 2001 the SCPO had also arranged alternative office accommodation further down 
the Royal Mile to coincide with the relocation.  But as the Holyrood building timetable 
faltered and the Scottish Parliament stayed put, so did the SCPO.  
 
Multiple Sclerosis Society  
Staff   
The MS Society appointed a Policy Officer for the first time in March 2000 as a direct 
consequence of the Scottish Parliament.  Policy work was an area that the Scottish HQ had 
never been involved with before therefore a whole new budget area had to be established.  
The policy work had a knock-on effect on the Director’s role as he had to encompass this 
new area of activity into his existing workload; he reckoned parliamentary work was taking 
up as much as a third of his time. 
 
Location   
The Scottish Parliament may have affected the MS Society’s personnel but it had no impact 
on its location.  The Policy Officer felt it was more important that they were accessible to 
their members and the Director added that Edinburgh city centre properties were too 
expensive and that the traffic in the city centre was also an obstacle.  Their offices therefore 
at the time of participant observation were on the western outskirts of Edinburgh.   
  
 
 
 84
Scottish Parent Teacher Council  
Staff   
The SPTC staff numbers were completely unaffected by the Scottish Parliament which stayed 
constant at the three part-time paid office staff they had before devolution.  The SPTC’s 
Development Manager’s remit already encompassed political and media issues so when the 
Scottish Parliament opened she just transferred the focus of her work from the Scottish Office 
to the Scottish Parliament.   
 
Location  
However, the Scottish Parliament over time had managed to impinge itself on the location of 
the SPTC office.  For reasons unconnected to the Scottish Parliament, the SPTC office had 
moved in to the city centre of Edinburgh but once they experienced being within walking 
distance of it, the Development Officer thought that such a location was ‘advantageous’.  
This was echoed by the SPTC’s convener in their 1998-1999 Annual Report who wrote that 
they ‘were fortunate to be based in Edinburgh, making it possible to attend education 
committee meetings and parliamentary sessions’ (SPTC (b), p.1).  The Development 
Manager stated that the Scottish Parliament would certainly be a factor in future changes of 
location insofar as they would not move out of Edinburgh.   
 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities  
Staff   
Due to financial difficulties CoSLA actually had to reduce their staff numbers but they did 
initially appoint a Parliamentary Liaison Officer whose job it was to liaise with the new 
Scottish Parliament.  However, that post was subsequently scrapped as it had proved 
unsuccessful and a decision was made that everyone would incorporate a parliamentary 
dimension into their work rather than appointing one individual to carry out a specific 
parliamentary role.  The Convention Manager explained that this made sense as ‘really 
everything that the Parliament was generating cut right into the work’ of most CoSLA 
employees.  The Head of Policy said that while he believed that everyone should take 
ownership of the parliamentary dimension of their work, he also felt that having a specific 
Parliamentary Liaison Officer could be a very useful role if the right person was in it, but he 
added that such a post would be difficult to justify given CoSLA’s resource difficulties at that 
time. 
 
 
 
 85
Location   
The Convention Manager and the Head of Policy both felt that the Scottish Parliament (in 
particular the Scottish Executive) did have a bearing on CoSLA’s location because of the 
large volume of business that they carried out with it, making it impractical for CoSLA to be 
far away from the Scottish Parliament.  When CoSLA carried out a review in 2001, it was 
decided that their premises at Edinburgh Haymarket was an ideal location (right beside the 
train station and close to the Scottish Parliament and the civil service) even if it was an 
expensive site (see CoSLA (b)).  
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds  
Staff   
The RSPB actually created an entire department in response to the establishment of the 
Scottish Parliament.  They decided at the time of the 1997 referendum (see Appendix 1 for 
more information about the referendum) to appoint a parliamentary officer.  In addition to the 
parliamentary officer – whose title became Head of the Advocacy and Media Unit – the 
RSPB later established a Parliamentary Information Officer and a Media Officer and the 
three new posts combined to make up the Advocacy and Media Unit to carry out lobbying, 
media work and public relations duties.  The posts of parliamentary officer and parliamentary 
information officer were directly created as a result of the Scottish Parliament and while the 
Head of the Advocacy and Media Unit explained that it was possible that a media officer 
would have been appointed at some point anyway, devolution accelerated the timescale of 
one being put in place. 
 
Premises   
The RSPB’s HQ was already based in Edinburgh prior to the Scottish Parliament so they 
found no need to change.  But the Head of Advocacy and Media said that while most RSPB 
staff did work outwith Edinburgh, he saw a need for his department to remain close to the 
political centre so that he could carry out his work effectively. 
 
Summary 
All six of the groups made the decision to engage with the Scottish Parliament and as a result 
the dynamics of their organisations changed considerably - with the exception of the SPTC.  
Once the groups made the decision to interact with the Scottish Parliament they made sure 
their structures conformed to what was expected of them. 
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The FSB invested heavily into what it believed the Scottish Parliament would deliver before 
the elections had even taken place.  They had participated in the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention which campaigned and made plans for a Scottish Parliament.  They doubled their 
staff and bought a substantial new office building (they had previously rented).  The SCPO 
only existed as a result of the creation of the Scottish Parliament.  The churches, like the 
FSB, were part of the Scottish Constitutional Convention and also dedicated to devolution 
and so they appointed a Parliamentary Officer before the Scotland Act had even become law 
and then opened the SCPO office on the Mound in close proximity to the Scottish Parliament.  
The MS Society in Scotland had very little to do with political work prior to the Scottish 
Parliament but since then, the Society changed its dynamics to not only provide services to its 
membership but to also try and influence legislation.  This then became an integral part of the 
Society's work, reflected not just in the appointment of a Policy Officer but by the fact that 
parliamentary work was taking up a third of the Director's time.  The Scottish Parliament also 
changed the make-up of CoSLA, which was also a participant in the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention.  A Parliamentary Liaison Officer failed to carry out all the necessary 
parliamentary work so as a result most of CoSLA's office staff had to incorporate it into their 
daily working lives.  The Scottish Parliament had the effect of politicising the RSPB in 
Scotland and thus changed the dynamics of its office.  They created an entire department to 
engage with the Scottish Parliament and added parliamentary work to the duties of many 
RSPB HQ staff.   
 
The SPTC was the only group out of the six whose work remit had not been changed 
significantly.  If the Scottish Parliament were to close tomorrow, the SPTC would probably 
be the least affected as it would not have to change its personnel or its priorities.  The main 
difference was that while the SPTC had accommodated the Scottish Parliament to suit the 
structure and the priorities the SPTC already had in place, the other five groups changed their 
work around the Scottish Parliament. 
 
Rational choice institutionalism 
How then can new institutionalism explain the responses of the groups?  The FSB, CoSLA 
and the churches campaigned for a Scottish Parliament and so rational choice would say that 
they wanted a Scottish Parliament in order to reduce their transaction costs.  Westminster was 
so far away and due to the use of policy networks it was difficult to always know who had 
influence in the policy process at the Scottish Office, which meant groups could try to 
maximise their own preferences there without any real constraints making it hard to predict 
the behaviour of others, thus raising the transaction costs.   
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The MS Society and the RSPB were not particularly politically active in Scotland prior to 
1999 so they did not see devolution as being in their self-interest as policy work was not a 
priority for them (at their Scottish headquarters).  But when it became evident that there was 
to be a Scottish Parliament and that others were going to benefit from it, they decided that 
they wanted to be a part of the process in order to achieve their own interests. 
 
The SPTC did not campaign for or alter their staff and structures for the Scottish Parliament 
but once it opened and education became a devolved power then it was obvious that to pursue 
their own preferences the SPTC would have to do so through the Scottish Parliament.  But 
the SPTC, unlike the other groups did not allocate extra resources for lobbying because it had 
no way of knowing for sure what the benefits would be of having the Scottish Parliament, so 
the SPTC with its smaller resources did not change its priorities on the basis that they might 
turn out to be misplaced.  The SPTC was also rational in that it remained focused on existing 
arrangements on quangos and steering groups as well as looking to exploit new opportunities. 
 
Rational choice institutionalism would explain the behaviour of the other five groups by 
saying that they adapted their structures because of their expectation that they would 
maximise their utility by doing so.  The Scottish Parliament was expected to provide new 
opportunities to influence legislation so therefore it was in their own interests to hire 
parliamentary staff (and indeed actually create an office in the SCPO’s case) in order to take 
advantage of those opportunities.  The groups which already had parliamentary staff wanted 
to increase their numbers because of the anticipation that the Scottish Parliament would 
require more work and lobbying than they had previously been used to. 
 
The choice of premises could also be claimed to be made on self-interested grounds.  The 
FSB and the MS Society did not move into Edinburgh because they did not think that it 
would benefit them more by doing so.  The SCPO was brand new and its sole function was 
centred around the Scottish Parliament so it made sense for it to be where the Scottish 
Parliament was.  The other three groups were already in Edinburgh before 1999.  Although 
since then, the four groups based in the city centre of Edinburgh believed that if they did 
move away, it would actually diminish their utility maximisation because of the benefits they 
felt they enjoyed by being so close to it. 
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Sociological institutionalism   
Sociological institutionalism would state that it was the social environment surrounding the 
groups that motivated their behaviour to campaign and to change their behaviour for the 
Scottish Parliament.  The Scottish Parliament was the result of popular will – the wish of the 
nation to govern itself (albeit within a UK structure).  This desire for self-government was the 
reason the Scottish Parliament was created and the groups participated in the new system 
because their membership expected them to.  Members are part of wider society so it was no 
surprise that they agreed to the allocation of resources within their groups to participate in the 
new political system, even if it was a new direction for some of the groups. 
 
The groups decided on similar courses of action such as the hiring of designated 
parliamentary staff because of mimetic and normative isomorphism: they were copying a 
successful model as no-one was sure how the Scottish Parliament would work in practice and 
secondly, having a parliamentary officer appeared to be the normal practice when dealing in 
politics.  The SCPO was brand new but as with all new institutions it borrowed from existing 
templates and established a parliamentary office with a parliamentary officer.  In CoSLA’s 
case, once the system was up and running for a while they found that having a Parliamentary 
Liaison Officer was not actually an example of best practice and in fact due to the largely 
political nature of CoSLA’s work many people were required to take on a parliamentary role, 
not just one appointed person. 
 
Sociological institutionalism would argue that the SPTC participated in the new political 
system because it was expected of them by their membership but also because they were 
coerced into doing so by institutional isomorphism – in order to try and influence education 
policies they had to change their focus to the Scottish Parliament.  
 
The FSB was the only group to actually change premises as a result of the Scottish 
Parliament but it did not move to Edinburgh, perhaps because the office had always been 
based in Glasgow and the permanent paid office staff all came from and lived there so they 
were tied to those particular surroundings.  The SCPO based the office in Edinburgh because 
it was ‘a creature of the Parliament’ in the sense that the office’s entire workload was 
connected to the Scottish Parliament so it was sensible for them to be as close to it as 
possible.  The other four groups had no need to move as they had space for their staff in their 
existing offices and the Scottish Parliament had not had sufficient time to influence them at 
that point. 
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As time went on though, the four groups based within walking distance of the Scottish 
Parliament declared that they would not move out of Edinburgh, because having experienced 
being so close to the political centre they wanted to continue to operate in it.  They had 
become part of the ‘political village’.   
 
Historical institutionalism 
The six interest groups had to make a decision about how they would respond to the new 
political environment that they found themselves in.  With the arrival of the new Scottish 
Parliament it was hoped that interest groups would have the opportunity to influence 
legislation and accordingly the groups (except for the SPTC) allocated extra resources to 
carry out this work.  Given this context, the six groups decided to either begin or to boost 
their parliamentary activities and change the previous work balance that had existed within 
their offices.  For the groups that had little lobbying experience, they copied existing 
templates that other groups were using and once they decided to appoint certain staff 
members and so on, these positions would become entrenched (in historical institutionalism 
decisions made at the start continue until a ‘critical juncture’ occurs, even if that decision 
proves to be inefficient at a later date).  The exception was CoSLA which decided not to re-
appoint a Parliamentary Liaison Officer on the grounds that they no longer had the money for 
such a post – a critical financial juncture. 
 
The SPTC did not change its staffing as a result of the Scottish Parliament because its 
creation did not represent a critical juncture for it as it had not been involved in the 
devolution campaign and it was not embarking on a new area of work or intending to 
increase its political work by any significant measure.  For the SPTC it was business as usual 
as it recognised that much of the work that it had previously done would continue e.g. seats 
on advisory groups set up by the civil service. 
 
Again, the decision to move or not to move premises would be down to the context at the 
time the groups decided to engage with the Scottish Parliament and the groups obviously 
decided that location was not an important factor at that time, except for the SCPO, as the 
others had ties to their existing locations.  The churches decided that they were going to set 
up an office to interact with the Scottish Parliament that they had campaigned for and as the 
office was a new creation it made sense to locate it to where the Scottish Parliament was.  As 
time passed the four groups based in Edinburgh came to the realisation that they benefited 
enormously from being there and so location would be a factor in any future moves.  The 
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FSB and the MS Society had never experienced being within walking distance of the Scottish 
Parliament and so did not think there was any advantage to being in Edinburgh city centre. 
 
5.4  Political activity 
A major change in behaviour for three of the groups (SCPO, MS Society and the RSPB) was 
actually engaging in organised political activity for the first time and establishing a new 
culture within their organisations of influencing legislation.  For the other three groups (the 
FSB, SPTC and CoSLA), they had to adapt to dealing with a Scottish Parliament on their 
doorstep five days a week, making politicians geographically more accessible as well as 
presenting them with greater opportunities for influencing legislation. 
 
Federation of Small Businesses 
The FSB had been politically active for years but when the Scottish Parliament opened, the 
FSB changed the focus of its political work from Westminster to Holyrood.  In fact, the 
Scottish Parliament in its first year of operation managed to elbow Westminster almost 
entirely out of the FSB’s activities.  When asked if the Scottish Parliament made up 100% of 
their focus, the Press and Parliamentary Officer replied that this was ‘probably’ the case 
because most of the issues important to them had been devolved to the Scottish Parliament 
(although Westminster still had reserved powers over taxation).  By the end of the period of 
participant observation the FSB were beginning to consider casting an eye back to 
Westminster and its reserved powers.   The FSB was intending to make more of an effort to 
keep up contacts with it as there was ‘Westminster decisions that we’ve got to be involved in 
and we need to keep that door open’ (Policy Convener).  Contact, either written or oral, 
between the FSB and MPs had been virtually non-existent in the first eighteen months of the 
Scottish Parliament.  The exception to this general neglect was the Chancellor, Gordon 
Brown, who gave them an audience in September 2000.  Otherwise though, Holyrood had 
been the entire focus of their activities and this was reflected in the press releases issued by 
the FSB office.  Fifteen out of the nineteen press releases that were issued from May 1999 
until the end of August 2000 were concerned with the Scottish Parliament and out of the 
remaining four, the budget was the subject of two and general business matters made up the 
other two.  The emphasis was clearly on the Scottish Parliament.  At the time of the period of 
participant observation, the FSB had also decided that it would ‘like to get more involved in 
the European side of things’ (Deputy Press and Parliamentary Officer) and were trying to 
determine whether they could get involved with EU issues via the Scottish Parliament’s 
European Committee or if it should try an alternative route.   
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Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office 
The SCPO ‘is in a sense a creature of the Parliament’ (Parliamentary Officer) and thus its 
remit was to interact with and monitor the Scottish Parliament, this made up the office’s 
workload.  
 
Multiple Sclerosis Society 
The Director and the Policy Officer at the MS Society explained that prior to the Scottish 
Parliament the Society in Scotland was a charity delivering services, carrying out fund-
raising and welfare activities.  Since the Scottish Parliament opened it continued to do those 
things but it also added a policy dimension to its work by seeking to influence government 
and statutory provision.  Influencing public policy was a whole new direction for the Society 
and it was prompted to do so by the Scottish Parliament.  The Society decided that it ought to 
work with it as it offered opportunities to participate and its devolved powers included most 
of the major policy issues the Society was concerned about – housing, social work and the 
Scottish health service (the exception was welfare benefits which remained a reserved 
power).  Previously, its political work was limited to offering comments to their London 
colleagues on any legislation from Westminster that may have affected people with MS in 
Scotland.  Its new political work was reflected in the appointment of a Policy Officer, the 
expansion of the Director’s role and in their newsletter which ‘has changed because it has got 
quite a lot of policy coverage in there which didn’t used to be there at all’ (Director). 
 
Scottish Parent Teacher Council 
The SPTC had always been politically active but the Development Manager commented that 
this activity had taken a different direction since 1999.  She explained that before the Scottish 
Parliament she worked with civil servants and other partner organisations to build coalitions 
up.  Trips to Westminster did occur but were very unusual.  The SPTC’s work since 
devolution had focused more on politicians rather than civil servants because politicians had 
become more accessible and the SPTC found it no longer necessary to work as part of a 
coalition as the Scottish Parliament enabled the SPTC to act directly and independently.  
Because of this ‘the Scottish Parliament has had a big impact on the SPTC and allowed us to 
be far more involved in the policy making process’ according to their 1999-2000 Annual 
Report (SPTC (c), p.1). 
 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
CoSLA, because it represented Scottish local authorities, had always been a politically active 
organisation.  And since 1999 the vast majority of CoSLA’s political activity focused on the 
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Scottish Parliament, although it also employed one person in Brussels to keep abreast of EU 
developments. At the time of participation observation Westminster was CoSLA’s gap area 
(according to the Acting Chief Executive, the Convention Manager and the Head of Policy).  
The Acting Chief Executive explained that prior to the Scottish Parliament they had only 
focused on Westminster for specific periods anyway as not much legislation went through 
that affected Scotland, so they just went down to Westminster once a year when the revenue 
support grant and the housing grant orders for Scotland were being debated.  Westminster 
had not been completely ignored by CoSLA but the focus there ‘has been virtually reduced to 
minimal level’ (Acting Chief Executive) and it mostly centred round housing and social 
security issues.  The Convention Manager recalled an incident when a civil servant had said 
to her that it was a mistake for CoSLA not to have more to do with Westminster.  But she 
thought that he was wrong as most issues that were relevant to Scottish local authorities were 
now devolved to the Scottish Parliament.  The Head of Policy also agreed that it was sensible 
for CoSLA to be focused on Holyrood, although he added that on occasion he had felt that it 
was a drawback not to have more Westminster involvement.  For instance, when CoSLA was 
fighting against sections of a transport bill going through Holyrood, a transport bill was also 
going through Westminster which covered measures on railways and non-devolved modes of 
transport which affected Scotland.  However, CoSLA had to rely on the English Local 
Government Association to represent local government interests on that issue at Westminster 
even if it was not specifically representing Scottish interests; it was either that or nothing. 
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
Long before the RSPB set up its Advocacy and Media Unit, its colleagues in the RSPB’s UK 
national headquarters at Sandyford already had a small army of parliamentary staff dealing 
with Westminster and Europe.  So when there was legislation going through that was of 
particular relevance to Scotland (‘most of the time there wasn’t’) it tended to be that most 
matters to do with legislation ‘were really done at our headquarters level’ (Senior 
Investigations Officer).  The Scottish RSPB did try and influence policy but it dealt with civil 
servants at the Scottish Office and inevitably most of the political work was carried out by 
their national headquarter colleagues, because not only did it have the staff but as the Head of 
Policy Operations explained: ‘the logical policy analysis of the old UK was that if you got 
change in Whitehall it eventually flowed out in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland’.  
When devolution occurred the RSPB decided on a policy of “countrification” – giving its 
Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish offices the resources to interact with the new devolved 
institutions.  So as a result of the Scottish Parliament, the RSPB in Scotland got its first press 
and parliamentary team - known as the Advocacy and Media Unit - whose job was to focus 
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on the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish media, although the Unit had also incorporated a 
European aspect by extending its contacts to include Scottish MEPs.  The Head of the 
Advocacy and Media Unit described the effect of the Scottish Parliament on the RSPB’s 
political activity as ‘a powerful galvanising influence’. 
 
Summary 
The Scottish Parliament caused a substantial change in the behaviour of the six groups.  The 
groups split into two camps - those who only became politically active as a result of the 
Scottish Parliament (the SCPO – although the churches had been active for hundreds of years 
and the Scottish headquarters of the MS Society and the RSPB) and those who formerly 
lobbied the Scottish Office and Westminster but switched their energies and resources to the 
Scottish Parliament (the FSB, SPTC and CoSLA).  The groups were keen to participate in a 
system that they were promised would be open, accessible and powerful.  Carrying out 
sustained political activity was a major difference in the actions (not to mention the impact 
on their resources) of the SCPO, MS Society and the RSPB.  For the FSB and CoSLA their 
political activity increased because of the proximity and accessibility of the Scottish 
Parliament and they made the conscious decision to focus primarily on the Scottish 
Parliament and to devote a lot of their resources into doing that.  The SPTC’s political 
activity did not actually change much in volume (reflected in their unchanged staff numbers) 
but they did transfer their time and focus from the Scottish Office to the Scottish Parliament.  
The groups saw the Scottish Parliament as being the most important political institution to 
them, followed by the EU and finally by Westminster. 
 
Rational choice institutionalism 
Change occurred for all six of the groups in terms of their political activity to some degree 
(even the SPTC changed the focus of its lobbying as education became the responsibility of 
the Scottish Parliament).  Rational choice institutionalism explains the actions of the groups 
by stating that the groups consciously made the decision to either begin or increase political 
activity (thus changing the previous balance of work within their offices) because they 
expected that such changes would help to maximise their utility and therefore be in their self-
interests. 
 
Sociological institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalism would explain that change occurred in the first place because 
Westminster and the Scottish Office were out of synchronisation with what Scottish society 
wanted.  The creation of the Scottish Parliament and its emphasis on participation mobilised 
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Scottish interest groups to carry out parliamentary work.  This was because society had 
formed the Scottish Parliament and it was seen as a remedy for some of Scotland’s legislative 
needs, so there was pressure on groups to conform to the expectations of the surrounding 
society to be involved with the new institution.  
 
Historical institutionalism 
The third institutionalist explanation would state that the opening of the Scottish Parliament 
caused a critical juncture for the groups.  For years there had been a movement for a 
parliament.  Devolution occurred in the end when Labour (a devolution friendly party) won 
convincingly in the 1997 British general election.  Things moved rapidly after that resulting 
in the Scottish Parliament holding its first election in May 1999.  The creation of the Scottish 
Parliament created a new path for the groups to follow, which involved new tactics, hence the 
impact on their political activity. 
 
5.5  Professionalism 
This section discusses the effect the Scottish Parliament had on the professionalism of the six 
groups.  This is not to say that the groups were in any way unprofessional prior to devolution 
but it describes how the groups adjusted to interact with the new institution and its working 
practices. 
 
Federation of Small Businesses 
The FSB’s Deputy Press and Parliamentary Officer stated that the Scottish Parliament had 
‘forced the FSB to become more professional’. She explained that anecdotes had now been 
replaced with figures and the Policy Convener added that the FSB needed to have provable 
facts because if they ‘don’t have evidence then we can’t do anything’ with the Scottish 
Parliament.  These provable facts came from surveys of its members that the FSB conducted 
after the Scottish Parliament opened (they had never previously done so).  The findings from 
the surveys proved invaluable when giving evidence to the parliamentary committees 
because ‘you’ve got to know what you are saying’ otherwise ‘they’ll tear you apart’ 
according to the Policy Convener. 
 
This increased professionalism was also apparent in the output of the FSB.  The first time 
that the FSB published a report (their manifesto for the Scottish Parliament) was in March 
1999.  It produced a further eleven reports after that with another two in the pipeline at the 
time of participant observation in September 2000.  Some of the reports were responses to 
consultation papers while others were to raise awareness of issues that were of importance to 
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small businesses.  The Press and Parliamentary Officer conceded that the strength and quality 
of these reports was due to the fact that they were written with the Scottish Parliament in 
mind.   
 
The FSB knew that it was unlikely that politicians would find time to read much more than 
the executive summary of their reports, so with this in mind the FSB made a point of keeping 
their consultation responses short and concise.  The Policy Convener felt that they had to 
limit their responses to two sides of A4 while the Press and Parliamentary Officer put the 
limit at four sides of A4, but both were agreed that if the submissions were lengthy then they 
would not be read.  The Press and Parliamentary Officer said that such constraints had the 
effect of making the FSB quicker at developing and refining policies.   
 
The FSB also had to re-organise their internal decision making processes.  Since the opening 
of the Scottish Parliament the FSB found that it had to respond to more and more 
consultations and inquiries and it became obvious that their decision making procedures had 
to change so they could operate more effectively.  Formerly, the FSB had a Scottish Policy 
Committee which consisted of eighteen FSB members that met together as the Scottish 
FSB’s decision making body.  However, this body was made obsolete as it proved to be too 
slow and unwieldy a mechanism in the devolved political system and so it was decided that 
decisions would be made by only six members – the Policy Convener, the Vice-Convener 
and four regional chairmen.  They were collectively called the Scottish Policy Unit and made 
decisions on behalf of the wider Scottish FSB membership to pass on to the office staff.   
 
To aid them in their work with the Scottish Parliament the FSB also hired the services of two 
public affairs companies to provide them with up to date information on the Scottish 
Parliament.   
 
The FSB at the time of participant observation was also signalling its intent to become more 
professional.  The Policy Convener spoke of buying in experts to carry out specific projects.  
It had already paid the International Labour Market Unit at The Robert Gordon University to 
carry out research on the educational and training courses available to small businesses in 
Scotland.  The Deputy Press and Parliamentary Officer also felt that the office would 
probably have to take on more research staff.  This was in addition to the expertise that their 
two secondees from British Telecom (BT) and from the Royal Bank of Scotland had brought 
in.   
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Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office 
As the SCPO was formed in response to the Scottish Parliament there is no “before and after” 
picture.  However, the SCPO did not seem to have been disadvantaged by the fact that it only 
opened to coincide with the arrival of the Scottish Parliament.  All the groups had to adapt to 
working with the Scottish Parliament and its new political processes and in some ways it may 
have been simpler for the SCPO because it started with a clean slate and could tailor its 
working practices to suit the Scottish Parliament. 
 
The Parliamentary Officer did comment though that individual churches had to adjust to the 
Scottish Parliament.  He gave the example of the Clause 28 furore (which was to do with 
guidance on the teaching of homosexual issues in schools) in 2000 when the Church of 
Scotland realised that it had to think about how it was going to come to an agreement on 
issues that were cropping up in the Scottish Parliament.  The Church of Scotland operates on 
a committee basis and once a year at its General Assembly it determines its stance on issues 
that have been brought to its attention.  However, in politics a year is a long time and it is not 
always feasible to wait for the General Assembly, as Clause 28 demonstrated when the two 
relevant Church of Scotland committees put forward two radically different viewpoints.  So 
some individual churches had to think about how they could respond more effectively to the 
Scottish Parliament. 
 
Multiple Sclerosis Society 
Both the Director and the Policy Officer felt that there was no doubt that the MS Society had 
become more professional since the creation of the Scottish Parliament.  The Policy Officer 
remarked that it ‘gave us the impetus to do things in Scotland’ and the Director felt it had 
also ‘helped to make us more modern’.  As an internal paper stated the Society ‘had to be 
professionally equipped to make representations to Government’.  It only began to carry out 
lobbying work after the Scottish Parliament opened and since then the Society worked hard at 
building up its political expertise.  It also hired the services of a public affairs company in 
February 2000 for some expert assistance and to provide a parliamentary monitoring service.  
The Director and the Policy Officer also undertook media training as part of their public 
policy efforts. 
 
Scottish Parent Teacher Council 
The SPTC again proved the exception to the six groups as there was very little discernable 
difference in the way it operated as a result of the Scottish Parliament.  The SPTC had 
surveyed its members for years as a way of gathering up to date information.  It also had a 
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record of building up relationships with those in power and had always responded to relevant 
consultations.  It would seem that the Scottish Parliament had little effect on the SPTC’s 
working practices, as the systems that it had in place were readily adaptable to the Scottish 
Parliament (e.g. writing of submissions, meeting with decision makers).  Perhaps the only 
exception to this was the new experience of giving oral evidence to the parliamentary 
committees.  The Development Manager did her homework on how best to give oral 
evidence and studied other people giving evidence to the Education, Culture and Sport 
Committee so she could learn what techniques were effective and which were not.   
 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
CoSLA has a long history of dealing with governments and obviously politicians.  However, 
it had to gear up to become more responsive to the Scottish Parliament.  Representing 
Scottish local authorities meant CoSLA covered not only a wide political spectrum but also a 
wide geographical area, which had the effect of making decisions a slow and unwieldy 
process.  To combat this, CoSLA developed a system of twelve spokespersons (drawn from 
the local authorities) for twelve specific areas.  This meant that if the Scottish Executive or 
the Parliament wanted advice on a particular subject, or the media needed a quote CoSLA 
could respond much quicker as it had one designated point of contact.  During the period of 
participant observation CoSLA was also in the process of developing a more efficient system 
of recording what requests for evidence (written and oral) it was responding to.   It had just 
begun to implement a tracking system to ensure that these requests were being answered by 
the appropriate person and that all potentially interested people within CoSLA were able to 
have an input into the submission. 
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
The most obvious way in which the RSPB had become more professional was the formation 
of the Advocacy and Media Unit which incorporated lobbying, public affairs and media 
skills.  Before the Scottish Parliament, public affairs and media work were part of one 
employee’s duties.  But the Scottish Parliament was ‘priority enough that they put jobs to it 
and they gave us time and resources which they never did before’ according to the 
Parliamentary Information Officer.   
 
The rest of the office also became more professional in terms of parliamentary work.  The 
Advocacy and Media Unit provided the lobbying and media skills but they did not have the 
subject knowledge of their colleagues who were experts in fields such as agriculture, fisheries 
and forestry.  Therefore, Lead Policy Officers were appointed for each policy area and they 
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were expected to lead on their subject on behalf of the Society, attend parliamentary debates, 
write briefing papers, draft parliamentary questions and carry out other political work with 
assistance from the Advocacy and Media Unit.  This was all new for the policy staff so they 
had to sign up for media and advocacy training courses that their national UK headquarters 
ran (the Advocacy and Media Unit in their quarterly meeting in December 2001 had 
identified a need for the staff to undergo such training).  The Head of Policy Operations 
explained that before the Scottish Parliament the policy department ‘tended to operate as 
technocrats trying to influence other technocrats’ and were thus ‘more technical and 
bureaucratic’.  But since 1999 they had to deal with politicians so they had to change styles 
and now they ‘need to be more succinct, snappy briefings, documents and more smooching, 
ducking and diving in the bars round Holyrood’.  According to the Senior Investigations 
Officer it was not just the policy team that had to change to accommodate the Parliament but 
the entire office had to increase the quality of their information in order to have the best 
arguments possible, as the RSPB ‘can’t afford in that arena to be any less professional than 
some of the people we are up against’. 
 
Summary 
The groups adjusted their working practices to fit in with the Scottish Parliament.  Again this 
was because they wanted to optimise their chances of influencing legislation and to do that 
the groups institutionalised their working practices so that they could provide the Scottish 
Parliament with the information it wanted, including things like accurate survey figures, short 
written evidence contributions, cultivating politicians, providing useful oral evidence, making 
quick decisions and so on.  The effect of the Scottish Parliament was least pronounced on the 
SPTC which continued to use the same working practices that it used with the Scottish Office 
(although giving oral evidence to the parliamentary committees was new), although those 
practices were similar to those used by the other groups.  The other groups became more 
modern and equipped themselves with the tools to operate in the new political system.   
 
Rational choice institutionalism 
For rational choice institutionalism rules provide the ‘constraints within which actors may 
maximise their self-interests’ and because everyone is subject to the same rules, all actors 
behave in the same way (Lane and Ersson; 2000, p.35).  This could explain how the Scottish 
Parliament has affected the interest groups, even though some of the rules that motivated the 
increased professionalism of the groups were not of a formal nature.  The groups calculated 
what they had do in order to achieve their goals and knowing that they would be penalised if 
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they did not provide the quality of work expected by the Scottish Parliament, the groups 
decided it was in their best interests to become more professional. 
 
Sociological institutionalism 
The Scottish Parliament had not made it a regulation that groups should write reports on 
various issues, adopt quicker decision making mechanisms, or even that the groups should 
monitor parliamentary activity regularly, although there was no doubt that the Scottish 
Parliament preferred contributions that were informed, accurate and brief.  But those were 
informal rules; the unwritten yet taken for granted requirements that the groups knew would 
better their chances of promoting their cause.  Sociological institutionalism states that ‘we 
can expect institutionalisation of forms and practices that are widely valued’ (Gorges; 2001, 
p.139) and this accounted for the increased professionalism of the groups.  The groups could 
also have been following the logic of appropriateness, simply behaving in the way that the 
Scottish Parliament had decided was appropriate for them.  In this way the groups all 
followed the same pattern, even if it required more effort on their behalf in order to conform 
to the rules. Institutional isomorphism could also account for their behaviour: the groups 
might have felt pressured into those changes by the Scottish Parliament (coercive), as it was 
brand new and there was uncertainty about how things would work so the groups simply 
copied others who seemed successful (mimetic) and thirdly, the groups might have felt that 
their practices were not adequate so adopted working practices that seemed to be preferred 
(normative).  In this way the Scottish Parliament shaped the working practices of the groups 
to suit its own needs.  The SPTC had no need to change as its practices were already suitable.   
 
Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism also uses the informal rules of the Scottish Parliament as an 
explanation behind the increased professionalism of the groups – the groups were complying 
with practices that were widely regarded (see start of sociological institutionalism paragraph 
above).  Historical institutionalism would also reason that the Scottish Parliament had the 
power to bestow some groups with privileges but not others, so the groups had to compete 
against each other to get a share of the resources.  Therefore it made sense for the groups to 
be as professional as they could be in order to increase their chances of success.  
 
5.6  Workload 
The previous sections described how the groups had prepared and reacted to the existence of 
the new Scottish Parliament whereas this section will consider how it has affected the daily 
working behaviour of the groups.   
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Federation of Small Businesses 
When asked what had been the biggest impact of the Scottish Parliament, the unanimous FSB 
answer was the increase in their workload.  The FSB found that they had to write reports, 
carry out research, submit responses and evidence, attend meetings, organise seminars, write 
more correspondence, monitor parliamentary activities, read through political documents and 
survey members on a level they had never experienced before.   
 
The FSB found themselves struggling to cope with all the extra work created by the Scottish 
Parliament so they hired an outside public affairs company to carry out the task of monitoring 
the Parliament.  The FSB also paid another public affairs company to send them regular 
updates on the Scottish Parliament as well.  The staff felt it was worth the additional 
expenditure as it freed them to work on other activities, such as writing consultation 
responses. 
 
A lot of office time was spent dealing with or responding to documents from the Scottish 
Parliament.  The Policy Convener said that ‘there is not a document that comes out, you must 
read through it as there might be something in it concerning you’ which was a time 
consuming task and if any of the documents were relevant then responses had to be written.  
By the end of the participant observation period (September 2000) the FSB had submitted 
over fifty consultation or inquiry responses since the Scottish Parliament began working in 
July 1999 and it was these consultation papers that the Deputy Press and Parliamentary 
Officer felt was taking up so much of their time. 
 
Meetings were also a huge drain on office time.  The Policy Convener stated that he worked 
five, even seven days a week for the FSB compared to the couple of days a week he did 
before the Scottish Parliament opened. 
 
In fact, the FSB found themselves in a position where all they were doing was reacting to the 
output from the Scottish Parliament, ‘running in every direction’ and ‘trying to run to catch 
up’ according to the Policy Convener.  The Press and Parliamentary Officer explained that 
because they had to constantly react to the work generated by the Scottish Parliament it was 
taking them away from ‘developing your policy, doing your publicity, day to day activities’.  
The FSB was hoping that it would be able to sit down in November 2000 and get the chance 
to re-prioritise and work towards becoming more proactive.  But the Press and Parliamentary 
Officer was not sure how possible it would be to set their own agenda because even if they 
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had those objectives, ‘the day to day reality is you can try to become more proactive but you 
become very reactive to the Executive and the Parliament.  Very, very much so’. 
 
Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office 
The SCPO’s workload was heavy enough that the Parliamentary Officer estimated that he 
worked somewhere between fifty to sixty hours in an average week.  A large proportion of 
the SCPO’s time was taken up with monitoring the work of the Scottish Parliament as it sent 
out a detailed parliamentary update every month to the churches on its mailing list.  It also 
notified the churches of any consultations or developments that they should be aware of.  In 
order to do this, the SCPO trawled through all the parliamentary questions and answers, 
Scottish Executive and Parliament press releases, parliamentary motions, debates, committee 
meetings, consultation papers and the monitoring of newspapers – all very time consuming.  
As the Parliamentary Officer commented ‘the heavy emphasis has become, I think more than 
we expected, on monitoring the volume of output and trying to be selective about that’.  The 
monthly updates on the Scottish Parliament contained information on nineteen topics that the 
SCPO had identified as being of interest to the churches, such as asylum seekers, debt, drugs, 
health, rural affairs and voluntary issues.  The updates also included the business of the 
Scottish Parliament, such as debates, ministerial statements, the stages of any Bills, Time for 
Reflection and current consultations that were of interest to the churches.  In the SCPO’s 
Annual Report for 2000, the Parliamentary Officer noted that the churches in common with 
other organisations were struggling at times to keep pace with the consultation papers from 
the Scottish Parliament.   
 
The SCPO also sent out briefing papers (normally 4 – 5 sides of A4) to churches on relevant 
topics that were being raised in the Scottish Parliament.  By February 2001 (the end of the 
period of participant observation) twenty briefing papers had been written, on subjects like 
the Scottish Executive’s victim support strategy and the Care Commission.  Writing the 
briefing papers involved reading all the official documents relating to the topic (policy 
papers, evidence given to the parliamentary committees, the minutes of parliamentary 
debates and where applicable the Bill), which then had to be condensed into an easy to 
understand yet comprehensive briefing paper.   
 
If there was a united stance on any one issue from all the churches, the Parliamentary Officer 
could submit responses to consultation papers on behalf of the churches (which he had done 
for the siting of telecommunication masts and education issues) and also give evidence to the 
parliamentary committees if invited to do so.  He also spent a lot of time in meetings – with 
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politicians, with other interest groups and with church groups.  He spent a significant amount 
of time outwith the office talking to church groups about the SCPO’s work, as an informal 
way of relaying the work of the office back to the churches.  He also provided parliamentary 
advice to those within the churches and set up meetings with politicians on their behalf. 
 
Like most of the other groups the Parliamentary Officer stated that ‘realistically the majority 
of what we do is reactive’.  He would have liked the office to be more proactive but due to 
the pressure of the work being generated by the Scottish Parliament there was little time to be 
proactive, as he said the most surprising dimension of working with the Scottish Parliament 
was ‘just the sheer volume of stuff’. 
 
Multiple Sclerosis Society 
At the MS Society the Scottish Parliament made up 100% of the Policy Officer’s workload 
and his job was ‘almost solely directed towards influencing public policy’, although he added 
that ‘quite a lot of the overall output of the office has been directed in that direction as well’.  
This was mirrored in the Director’s workload as he estimated that parliamentary work 
probably took up as much as a third of his time.  The Policy Officer and the Director spent a 
lot of their time briefing politicians, meeting up with an individual MSP once a month, 
drafting and monitoring parliamentary questions, submitting responses to consultation papers 
and writing articles and letters on parliamentary work, developing a select dinner club 
involving MSPs, building up relationships with all the MSPs on the Health and Community 
Care Committee, as well as all the party health spokespersons.  They also organised a major 
lobby of the Scottish Parliament by MS Society members who came from all over Scotland 
to tell MSPs about their needs.  The lobby (which required a lot of organising as it had to 
include facilities for people in wheelchairs and appropriate transport) coincided with a 
parliamentary debate on multiple sclerosis.  The Society had arranged for it to be held on the 
same day and this meant that as well as briefing their members about the lobby, the Director 
and the Policy Officer had to spend time briefing MSPs who were going to speak in the 
debate. 
 
Scottish Parent Teacher Council 
The Scottish Parliament was also a permanent dimension of the SPTC’s workload.  However, 
unlike the other groups it was not continually snowed under with parliamentary work and it 
found that its parliamentary workload was erratic; sometimes it could be incredibly busy and 
then there would be quiet periods when the staff were thinking about what they could do next 
according to the Development Manager.  For instance, during the time of the SQA (Scottish 
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Qualifications Association) crisis the Development Manager was extremely busy and 
attended every parliamentary committee and every hearing of the Bill that dealt with SQA.  
She had to raise those issues with politicians, civil servants, the media, parents and other 
interested parties.  But the amount of work that the Scottish Parliament generated for the 
SPTC was issue dependent - it was not a constant source of work.  The Development 
Manager felt that her role had not changed as a result of the Scottish Parliament because ‘it 
was always a matter of writing responses and networking and keeping abreast of current 
affairs’, it was just that those tasks had switched to the Scottish Parliament.  
 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
CoSLA’s 2001 Review stated that: 
‘COSLA’s workload has increased considerably since 1999 and all organisations have 
a finite capacity.  This means that choices have to be made about workload priorities 
and ways of working’ (CoSLA (b), p.30). 
The Scottish Parliament was a heavy presence on CoSLA’s list of priorities and accounted 
for a massive volume of their work as they strived to represent and promote the interests of 
local government.  This meant that in order to cope with the workload CoSLA had to become 
more focused.  The Acting Chief Executive explained that ‘in the past we’ve been a bit like a 
sponge, if somebody asks us to do something we try and absorb it’.  That was no longer the 
case at the time of participant observation (November/December 2001).  CoSLA’s 2001 
Review identified over 240 groups that it was involved with and so it then embarked on a 
rationalisation process - sorting out the groups which it should continue to be involved with if 
there was ‘a clear political case for doing so’ (Head of Policy) and freeing up some of its 
resources by resigning from the others.  The Head of Policy commented that more work 
should have been done to prepare CoSLA for its engagement with the Scottish Parliament by 
dropping things that were less of a priority before it actually opened. 
 
CoSLA’s Management Team told the 2001 Review that there was:  
‘no doubt that the workload of the organisation has increased with the establishment 
of a Scottish Parliament and Executive and we believe that this level of activity will 
increase further in the future’ (CoSLA (b), p.51). 
The extent to which the Scottish Parliament had affected the workload of CoSLA was 
demonstrated by the answers of the Head of Policy and the Convention Manager, who 
independently of one another, stated that work to do specifically with the Scottish Parliament 
(particularly the Scottish Executive) made up 90% of their individual workloads.  Their time 
was spent responding to consultations, developing policy and attending meetings to discuss 
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policy with politicians and civil servants.  The Public Affairs Officer also found that the 
Scottish Parliament had had a ‘fairly dramatic effect’ on his workload because of the increase 
in media inquiries, the need for more press releases and the servicing of CoSLA’s twelve 
spokespersons amongst other things.  When interviewed he stated that he received over a 
hundred inquiries a month and he reckoned that there was a 50-50 split in the inquiries to do 
with the Scottish Executive and the Parliament.  The Head of Policy called the effect of the 
Scottish Parliament on the organisation’s workload as ‘shattering’.  Like many other groups 
he felt compelled to say that CoSLA were ‘just fire-fighting most of the time’.    
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
Not only was the RSPB’s Advocacy and Media Unit’s time occupied with the Scottish 
Parliament but as the Head of the Unit explained most of the policy staff also ‘had to drop a 
lot of stuff to take on the workload of Parliament’.  The Head of Policy Operations agreed 
that his policy staff had indeed seen their workload increase and diversify as they had to take 
on the writing of briefing papers, meet with politicians, give evidence to parliamentary 
committees and carry out media activity on top of their usual work.  The Senior 
Investigations Officer also found that he had to don a ‘political hat’ by working on wildlife 
legislation and promoting it by attending meetings, writing papers and putting forward 
arguments.  But in order to do all that he was being pulled out of his job of investigating 
wildlife crimes.  He commented that it had been ‘very stressful the amount of stuff we have 
to do now’, although he felt it was worth it if it meant things got changed for the better. 
 
The Advocacy and Media Unit monitored newspapers and the Parliament and Scottish 
Executive websites to produce a daily report every morning to notify RSPB staff of events 
from the day before and to alert them to events occurring that day.  They would also write a 
summary report on the main relevant political events of the week.  The Unit also provided 
advice and information to its colleagues, built up relationships with MSPs and their 
researchers by organising meetings, events and attending party conferences. 
 
Summary 
The political activity of the groups was reflected in their daily workload and attitudes.  
Workloads had to be re-prioritised to fit in the work generated by the Scottish Parliament, so 
for example the RSPB's Senior Investigations Officer attended meetings on proposed wildlife 
legislation instead of investigating crimes because of the RSPB's new political activity.  The 
workload of the groups (although this effect was not so pronounced on the SPTC, whose 
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political workload was erratic) had dramatically increased because of the Scottish Parliament 
and they were struggling to keep pace.   
 
All six of the groups, including those who had not been politically active before, had almost 
identical workloads in terms of the political activities that they carried out.  They were 
cultivating relationships with politicians, writing detailed reports, producing briefing papers, 
monitoring the Scottish Parliament etc.  The remarkable likeness in their workload again 
demonstrated that the groups were carrying out rule following behaviour. 
 
Rational choice institutionalism 
It was in the interests of the groups to re-prioritise their workloads.  By changing legislation 
they would be working towards making life better for those they represented, allowing them 
to achieve the goals of their organisation.  The SPTC was also acting out of self-interest even 
though its workload was more erratic.  As the smallest group it was limited in its staff, budget 
and time so it had to decide if it was worth allocating more of its resources to political work 
or if the costs incurred from doing so would outweigh any gains.  
 
It also made sense for the groups to comply with the rules that the Scottish Parliament had set 
down because it reduced their costs because although rules limit options, they also result in a 
stable environment. 
 
Sociological institutionalism 
The reactions of the groups could be attributed to the fact that it was the Scottish Parliament 
that specified how the individuals within the groups would act – the Scottish Parliament 
provided the institutional template for the groups to interpret their role and how they should 
act based on that template.  Not only that but as the Scottish Parliament constructed the 
preferences of the groups, it was unsurprising that the groups made parliamentary work a 
priority.  The culture of the Scottish Parliament affected the individuals that interacted with it 
as their values begin to conform to those of the institution.  This also explains why political 
work was given a high value within the groups (e.g. the MS Society Director spending a third 
of his time on parliamentary work) and getting involved in networks was seen as a valuable 
activity. 
  
Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism can also account for the way in which the groups increased and 
added parliamentary work to their workloads.  With the arrival of the Scottish Parliament, all 
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six groups made the decision that they were going to participate in the new political system.  
That decision caused them to go down a particular path (of parliamentary activity) that 
influenced the work that they were doing.  The groups did not know at the start exactly how 
far reaching those consequences would be but were learning as time passed.  For example, 
CoSLA decided that one or two people could not carry out parliamentary work but that all 
policy people had to incorporate it into their daily jobs.  Once the groups had committed 
themselves to working with the Scottish Parliament, they then had to respond to all the work 
that it was generating for them.  The SPTC also committed themselves to a particular, albeit 
focused, path, where it would follow particular issues – only dealing with school/educational 
matters and targeting MSPs on just one parliamentary committee.  
 
5.7  Devolution within the three UK groups 
This section looks at how devolution has affected the attitudes and the behaviour of the three 
UK groups in this study – the FSB, the MS Society and the RSPB.   
 
Federation of Small Businesses 
During the month of participant observation it was apparent that the Scottish FSB operated 
fairly autonomously.  The Deputy Press and Parliamentary Officer remarked that the Scottish 
Parliament had not affected their UK national office at all ‘as they don’t deal with it’.  The 
Policy Convener commented: ‘Up here we just get on with it, get the job done’.   
 
Multiple Sclerosis Society 
The Director and the Policy Officer of the MS Society both agreed that the Scottish 
headquarters of the MS Society had increased in importance as a result of the Scottish 
Parliament.  The Director explained that the Scottish Parliament had made it more important 
for the UK national office to understand what was going on in Scotland because of the 
separate set of policies involved, resulting in ‘a slightly increased understanding that 
Scotland is a different country from England’.  He added that some parts of the UK office 
were paying more attention to the Scottish scene because they could look at Scottish policies 
and use them to pressure the government at Westminster. 
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
During the period of participant observation it soon became apparent that there was a little 
friction in the Advocacy and Media Unit towards their counterparts in the UK national office 
(although they had no difficulty in co-operating with them).  When devolution was becoming 
a reality the RSPB decided to give more prominence to the Scottish, Welsh and Northern 
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Irish RSPB offices by giving them more resources, specifically in relation to parliamentary 
and media work.  However, the Head of the Advocacy and Media Unit explained that ‘the 
degree of imbalance historically, you know Westminster was perceived by the Society to be 
the be all and end all’ and this appeared to be a concept that perhaps the UK national office 
had found difficult to relinquish as it was still ‘built up as a big UK central function’.  He also 
spoke of what he referred to as “cognitive dissonance”, whereby in England they believed 
Westminster to be much stronger than it probably was and the devolved assemblies to be 
much weaker than they actually were and that the opposite case was true for those in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  He said that the RSPB (as well as other organisations 
he had worked for such as the Liberal Democrat Party and the NHS) were ‘finding this same 
cognitive dissonance causes problems inside its operation’.  The Head of the Advocacy and 
Media Unit observed that:  
‘for UK organisations, to a very large extent the UK end of things still thinks it is 
totally in control and the Scottish end of things tend to just get on with it within the 
parameters of Scottish decision making and politics’ (personal interview, December 
2001).   
He did add that he thought perceptions were beginning to change because as the Scottish 
Parliament passed legislation it was becoming more apparent that decisions were being taken 
separately for Scotland, whereas beforehand the ‘assumption was that the decisions were 
being taken and they would always decide to do the same thing as Westminster, even when it 
didn’t happen’.   
 
Summary 
As a result of the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish based offices of the UK organisations had 
expanded with more resources being allocated to their political work.  To a large extent the 
three offices in Scotland just got on with their own way of doing things and it appeared that 
their UK headquarters had very little input into their Scottish political activity.  If the Scottish 
based offices continued to work autonomously it could have the potential impact of 
fragmenting the policy line and lobbying tactics within the UK groups. 
 
Rational choice institutionalism 
The three UK groups saw an ideal opportunity to promote their causes when the Scottish 
Parliament opened.  They already had existing Scottish based offices that were well placed to 
interact with the new institution to influence Scottish legislation.  It also left the UK 
headquarters free to concentrate on the work they had always done at Westminster and so 
there was no rational reason for them to put a lot of input into Scottish politics when it was 
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being covered by their Scottish based colleagues.  It would only be in the interests of the 
groups to know about differences in policy if it could be used as leverage to change policy 
elsewhere. 
 
Sociological institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalism would argue that the Scottish FSB, MS Society and RSPB had 
to react to what their Scottish membership wanted.  For example, the MS Society only 
created the post of a Policy Officer and sanctioned lobbying activity as a valuable use of the 
Society’s resources once it was agreed by the Society’s Scottish Council (made up of Society 
members who were responsible for securing the best use of the Society’s resources).   
 
Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism would also add that the beefing up of the Scottish headquarters 
began as a new and good idea as a result of the Scottish Parliament opening and it then 
gained enough support to become policy.  The reason why the UK headquarters failed to 
accord the Scottish political system its due was because they were still rooted in past policy 
where decisions in Scotland were all made at Westminster or by the Scottish Office which is 
part of the Westminster system. 
 
5.8  Alliances and networks 
The Scottish Parliament has affected interest groups in various ways and one impact was the 
proliferation of alliances and networks of interest groups that sprung up.  Prior to the Scottish 
Parliament there were a lot less parliamentary officers and researchers around to form any 
networks.  However, as Lynch pointed out: 
‘devolution is likely to push the activities of a large number of pressure groups into 
the public sphere, particularly given the openness of the legislative process of the 
Scottish Parliament and the intention to facilitate pressure group involvement in 
policymaking’ (2001, p.111). 
This section looks at if and why the groups spent time interacting with other groups. 
 
Federation of Small Businesses 
Henry McLeish, then Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Minister, told the FSB’s Policy 
Convener that it was not possible for him to speak to all business groups and that he had to 
draw a line somewhere.  So the FSB brought together a small number of specialist groups 
such as the Bakers Federation for ad hoc meetings.  He said that the groups were wary at first 
fearing that the FSB was trying to poach their membership, when in fact the FSB was 
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actually after their specialist knowledge and expert advice.  The extra knowledge would 
allow the FSB to make more informed arguments when it lobbied the Scottish Parliament.  In 
return, because the Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Minister was not able to consult 
everybody, the FSB ‘could put their viewpoint across at the meetings we’re having with him 
so they’re not out of the equation’ (Policy Convener).  In this way, there were mutual benefits 
for everyone concerned. 
 
However, the FSB had steered away from joining any umbrella business organisations 
because:  
‘we worry about producing feedback that comes down to the lowest common 
denominator - a position that pleases everyone but does not reflect directly the views 
of the organisations’ (Press and Parliamentary Officer; Procedures Committee (a), 
Col 1399). 
 
Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office 
The SCPO’s Parliamentary Officer reckoned he spent between a quarter and a third of his 
time interacting with a whole range of other groups because of the Scottish Parliament.  The 
SCPO initiated a group called the Churches Social Inclusion Network as a way for the 
churches and church agencies to carry out a conversation with the Scottish Executive and the 
Parliament about social inclusion, social justice and poverty.  Another specific church group 
was the Church of Scotland’s User Group which involved the SCPO’s Parliamentary Officer 
meeting those involved with political issues within the church on a monthly basis to find out 
what people wanted to do in terms of the Scottish Parliament.  For the Joint Faiths Advisory 
Board on Criminal Justice he acted in an advisory capacity and although it was not ‘directly 
related to the Parliament, but again I suspect it might not have happened but for the 
Parliament’. 
 
The Parliamentary Officer also regularly attended the Third Sector Policy Officer’s Network 
(made up of parliamentary officers or equivalent in the voluntary sector) because it was 
something that he personally got a great deal out of, not only in terms of ‘peer support but 
also of sharing of information and experiences’ which he found ‘very useful’.  He was also 
actively involved in the parliamentary Cross-Party Group on Refugees and Asylum Seekers 
and the Cross-Party Group on Debt.   
 
The Parliamentary Officer was also heavily involved with Debt On Our Doorstep, a UK wide 
campaign that the Scottish churches had given their backing to.  The Parliamentary Officer 
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explained that it would have happened as a UK campaign regardless but it ‘needed to have a 
Scottish end because of the Parliament’. 
 
The various networks and alliances that the Parliamentary Officer was involved with were all 
in response to the Scottish Parliament.  But he did not think that being part of them would 
make the SCPO’s voice more likely to be heard because he did not believe that the Scottish 
Parliament had a system ‘of weighing up interests so that if you can say you represent x 
thousand or x million people or so many different groups you’re stronger’.  He said that ‘in 
fact five different contributions all saying the same thing in different ways are usually going 
to have more effect than one with five signatures on it’.  He felt that the benefit of being part 
of an alliance was the scope for specialisation it offered.  He gave the example of the 
Housing Bill where the churches, although they had opinions about housing stock transfers 
and the right to buy, were primarily interested in homelessness and improving the rights and 
situations of homeless people:   
‘So you can be in alliance with other groups that you agree with on other parts of the 
issue and they might be in alliance with us on homelessness but there’s an element of 
specialisation’ (personal interview, February 2001).   
 
Multiple Sclerosis Society 
The Director of the MS Society was involved with the Voluntary Health Scotland Network 
‘basically because the Executive finds it difficult to interact with lots of different voluntary 
health organisations and so they will tend to go there if they want to consult on something’.  
They were also part of Disability Scotland for the same reason – they felt the Scottish 
Executive preferred to approach umbrella organisations rather than lots of small groups.  
Keeping in mind the umbrella organisation approach but wanting to have a group that was 
more relevant to MS issues, the Society was trying to initiate an umbrella body to specifically 
cover neurology issues, ‘a sort of Scottish Neurology Network’.  The Director pointed out 
though that the purpose was ‘again for interaction with the Executive, not so much with the 
whole Parliament’.  The Society was advised to join umbrella organisations by Susan Deacon 
(the Health Minster at the time).  The Policy Officer’s notes from a meeting with Deacon in 
May 2001 testified that the Minister:  
‘thinks MS should be seen in the context of the wider issues for all patients with 
enduring chronic illness; and this group of conditions needs to get appropriate 
priority.  The Minister wants things taken forward in this context.  (This suggests we 
should be in dialogue with our fellow organisations for these conditions).’ 
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Susan Deacon commented in February 2002 that at least if the Scottish Executive ‘goes to the 
umbrella organisation, it knows that it will not cause a diplomatic incident by dint of going to 
one member organisation and not to another’ (Procedures Committee (a), Col 1382).   
 
However, the Policy Officer felt that the Society represented a constituency of people which 
had unique issues and that the problem of being a part of an umbrella organisation was that 
any submission to the Scottish Executive or to a parliamentary committee had to be fairly 
general in order to take account of everyone’s interests.   But, the Director felt that it was 
important that they had a presence on those networks because ‘we probably wouldn’t be 
consulted anyway’ and if there was ‘something we are very interested in it doesn’t preclude 
us from submitting individually anyway’.  
 
Meeting up with other groups had also been beneficial in other ways.  For instance, at the 
start of his appointment the Policy Officer tapped in to the expertise of other groups such as 
the EIS, the National Union of Students and the National Farmer’s Union to find out ‘how 
they had gone about things and how they had sought to influence individuals and how they 
had sought to influence the Parliament’.  He also attended the Third Sector Policy Officer’s 
Network because he found it ‘useful and beneficial’.  If it had not been for that particular 
network he would not have been alerted to the existence of a working group which was 
looking at disability access to the new Holyrood building.  As the Director said, the 
advantages of being part of these wider groups was the ‘sharing of information and it’s 
meeting people as well, just find out what’s going on’. 
 
Scottish Parent Teacher Council 
The SPTC did not regularly participate in any alliance or network.  It had representatives on 
various bodies, particularly quangos such as the SQA.  But unlike the MS Society the 
Development Manager did not feel that the SPTC was disadvantaged by not being part of a 
broader umbrella group.  She said that ‘it’s actually quite the reverse’.  There were very few 
parent interest groups in Scotland and by going it alone she felt that the SPTC got ‘quite a 
good crack at the whip’ when they gave evidence to the parliamentary committees.  She 
compared the SPTC’s experience with that of the unions such as the Scottish Trades Union 
Congress, which represented lots of unions and thus varied perspectives but because they 
came under the one STUC heading at parliamentary committee meetings, they got allocated a 
relatively short slot.  So she thought that ‘in that respect we have more clout in being able to 
speak directly than if we actually had to speak through another organisation’. 
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The other main parent interest group in Scotland was the Scottish School Board Association 
(SSBA) but the two groups were antagonistic towards each other and the likelihood of them 
forming an alliance was slim.  The Herald newspaper actually carried an article on this 
rivalry stating that the SPTC was embarking on a campaign ‘to recruit disaffected members’ 
of the SSBA (The Herald (b), 2001, p.16).  ‘The move marks an increase in rivalry between 
the two organisations and may make it more unlikely that a national parents’ representative 
body can be formed’ (ibid.).  
 
The Development Manager said that during the furore over Clause 28 the SSBA made 
themselves ‘particularly unpopular’ with the Scottish Executive because of their vocal stance 
against the Scottish Executive’s position.  The outcome of this was that after ‘a long arid 
spell where we lost out and the Scottish School Board Association had people on everything’, 
the SPTC found themselves being welcomed onto Scottish Executive bodies because the 
SSBA ‘blew it with Clause 28’.  But as time passed she sensed that the ‘SSBA’s popularity is 
being restored’. 
   
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
During the period of participant observation CoSLA was actually in the process of scaling 
back its participation in other groups and committees.  Their 2001 Review identified over 
240 groups which CoSLA was involved with and it was decided that it should carry out a 
rationalisation strategy and be more discriminating in how it used its resources.  Therefore 
the Head of Policy had been drafting letters to various bodies informing them that CoSLA 
was ‘having to review our core business in the light of our available resources and the work 
generated by Scottish Ministers and the Scottish Parliament’ (taken from copies of letters 
written in March 2001).  The result of this was that:  
‘we are therefore likely to limit our nomination of representatives now to a smaller 
number of bodies and groups which deal with matters of strategic importance to local 
government’ (taken from a copy of a letter written in March 2001). 
Due to the increased volume of work that CoSLA had to cope with as a result of the Scottish 
Parliament it stopped appointing people to any group or body that asked for a CoSLA 
representative.  Instead, people were only going to be put forward if there was a clear 
political case for doing so. 
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
The RSPB’s Head of Advocacy and Media thought that the Scottish Parliament ‘has meant 
an opening up of institutional life in Scotland’, resulting in ‘a stirring in the undergrowth of 
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Scottish civic life and there are new relationships being forged’.  He suggested that the 
benefit of those new relationships was the ‘exchange of ideas and information’ and ‘by 
talking to colleagues from a whole range of sectors I steal their ideas and they steal mine’.  
The Parliamentary Information Officer and the Media Officer gave a similar reply, citing the 
swapping of ideas and experiences. 
 
The other main advantage of involvement with other groups according to the RSPB was the 
opportunity to present a united lobbying front.  The Parliamentary Information Officer said 
that with the umbrella environmental group Link, ‘we’ll lobby together on an issue so we’ll 
all do petitions and we’ll all write to MSPs and we do training days’.  The Head of Policy 
Operations added that the RSPB tended to use Link where it wanted to ‘put in a small amount 
of effort and get something that is greater than the sum of its parts’.  Link also co-ordinated 
the groups on broad environmental issues so the Head of Advocacy and Media thought it was 
a good idea for the RSPB to be a part of Link because ‘the voice of the people who care 
about the environment is going to be heard more if many voices are making it.  It’s quite as 
simple as that’.  Another important reason was that the Scottish Executive preferred to 
consult umbrella groups on environmental issues, rather than approaching smaller individual 
groups.  This was also true of the parliamentary committees as both the Heads of Policy 
Operations and of Advocacy and Media observed that when it came to environmental issues 
‘the clerks and the committee chairs tend to go for umbrella groups’. 
 
Summary 
The Scottish Parliament had the effect of what the RSPB's Head of Advocacy and Media 
called the 'opening up of institutional life in Scotland'.  Groups who never carried out 
political activity before were doing so because of devolution.  They were also linking up with 
others, either because they would only be consulted by the politicians if they were part of a 
larger alliance and/or because of the benefits of sharing experiences amongst each other.  
This had the effect of bringing the interest groups closer together, allowing the sharing of 
information and the fostering of a culture to form a close knit civic community where 
everyone knows everyone (especially in a small country like Scotland). 
 
The SPTC once again proved the exception to the rule.  In fact the SPTC actually decided to 
work independently as a result of the Scottish Parliament because of the increased 
opportunities to participate in the legislative system.  CoSLA was also trying to reduce the 
scale of its involvement with other groups but this was precipitated by financial and resource 
reasons.  
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Rational choice institutionalism 
The groups participated in negotiations and voluntary exchanges because of the benefits that 
they received from them.  The SPTC did not participate in such networks because it was 
unlikely to get much benefit from them, as there were few other groups that dealt with 
parent/school issues.  CoSLA on the other hand was involved in so many groups that they 
were at the point of diminishing returns, they could be involved in far fewer groups yet still 
receive the same amount of benefits.   
 
Sociological institutionalism 
The groups coalesced together because they were part of the same culture and got support 
from meeting others involved in the same kind of work as them.  Political institutions can 
shape the surrounding environment to suit their own needs so in this way the Scottish 
Parliament pressured the MS Society and the RSPB to become part of wider umbrella 
organisations.  CoSLA was part of too many networks and had decided to only participate in 
networks where there was a clear political case for doing so, therefore CoSLA was actually 
going to become even more immersed in the Scottish Parliament. 
 
Sociological institutionalism has difficulty in explaining why the SPTC decided not to 
become involved in networks.  It was perhaps a chicken and egg situation: because they 
decided at the start not to participate in networks, they never became more fully integrated 
into the culture that the other groups were participating in and perpetuating, and if the SPTC 
was not surrounded by that culture then they would not be motivated to join up with other 
groups. 
 
Historical institutionalism   
The MS Society and the RSPB were compelled to participate in umbrella organisations 
because the Scottish Parliament was able to channel the groups into joining broader alliances 
because the Scottish Parliament had the power to deny access to some groups but give it to 
others.  Therefore, because the Health Minister and the Minister responsible for the 
environment at the time preferred to consult umbrella groups, the MS Society and the RSPB 
felt their best option was to join the main umbrella groups.  This also explains why the other 
groups became part of networks and alliances – as well as having the opportunity to make 
individual representations to the Scottish Parliament they could also have their input into a 
larger body, potentially doubling their opportunity to be heard.  The SPTC was only really 
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competing with one other school group so they already had a substantial chance of being 
awarded privileges so there was little need for them to become part of an alliance. 
 
5.9  Conclusion 
Objective 1 – whether the behaviour and/or belief systems of the six groups were affected by 
the Scottish Parliament. 
There is little doubt that the six groups were mobilised into action by the arrival of the 
Scottish Parliament, even groups that already had a well established parliamentary office like 
the FSB.  The expected benefits of the Scottish Parliament prompted the groups to invest a 
lot of resources into gearing up for the Scottish Parliament, including the hiring of new staff.  
The groups also reorganised their organisations (with the exception of the SPTC), although 
despite their restructuring they found it difficult to keep up with the output of the Scottish 
Parliament, particularly the Scottish Executive.  By mid May 2000, the Scottish Executive 
had issued a consultation paper at a rate of more than one per day (The Scotsman (b), p.8).  
The groups felt that they were simply fire-fighting and ironically were suffering from 
“consultation fatigue”.  On the one hand the groups were glad of the new opportunities to be 
involved in legislation but on the other were finding it a struggle to keep up with all the 
chances to participate.  However, what it did indicate was that the groups now had the 
opportunity to play a much bigger role because of the increased primary legislation for 
Scotland (62 Acts of Parliament in its first session).  Faced with the bombardment of 
consultations, meetings and information that flowed as a result from the Scottish Parliament 
and being unused to such a high level of political activity it is no surprise that the groups 
focused their resources on just Scottish politics, they had very little time to lobby other 
political arenas.  The numerous opportunities to be involved in the political system had the 
effect of the groups believing that the Scottish Parliament was open and encouraged 
participation. 
 
The groups appeared to take on the posture of potential insider groups, as they conformed to 
the rules of the game that the Scottish Parliament had set for interest group activity (Grant; 
2000, p.20).  They took on extra staff and/or diverted existing staff time to ensure they had 
access to expertise in parliamentary matters.  With appropriate staff in place the groups could 
then work at providing accurate information representing the views of their membership and 
then produce well researched briefings.  They also complied with how the Scottish 
Parliament expected information to be presented – short, robust and easy to understand.  In 
general the groups made efforts to establish themselves as credible and reliable authorities in 
their chosen areas.   
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The SPTC’s strategy remained largely unaffected by the arrival of the Scottish Parliament, as 
they already had a workable strategy in place that they had developed during their years of 
activity with the Scottish Office.  The only discernible impact of devolution on its strategy 
was that it took pains to identify the best way of giving evidence to the parliamentary 
committees and it was encouraged to work more independently, because interest groups in 
Scotland had more opportunity to have direct access to the policy makers.  It will not be 
possible to say definitively though, whether the groups were aiming to be insider groups until 
their strategy towards the Scottish Executive has been established (see chapter 6). 
 
It is not evident from this chapter whether the goals of the groups were changed.  The MS 
Society and the RSPB certainly gave significance to the new political work they were 
carrying out.  In fact, policy work was an entire new dimension to the MS Society.  All the 
groups (again with the possible exception of the SPTC) intensified their political activity and 
gave it a higher priority than they had before devolution.  But this was because the Scottish 
Parliament presented them with new ways of achieving their goals.  As part of their mission 
to eradicate multiple sclerosis the MS Society decided that it would be valuable to influence 
Scottish health policy and in the process lobby to get better care for people with MS – their 
goals remained the same but the Scottish Parliament provided a new route to achieve those 
goals.   
 
The SCPO was a special case.  It was established specifically because of the arrival of the 
Scottish Parliament and the churches set it up to build productive relationships with the 
Scottish Parliament as a way to ‘translate their commitment to the welfare of Scotland into 
Parliamentary debate’ (Parliamentary Officer in interview, February 2001).  The 
Parliamentary Officer explained that the SCPO was set up with the intention of 
complementing the CSG principles:  
‘The creation of the Parliament was to do with certain values that came through the 
Consultative Steering Group report about openness and accountability and so on, and 
a kind of vision if you like, about civic Scotland not being displaced by, but 
contributing to it.  A sense of what we should do was something that would fit quite 
obviously with that ethos’ (personal interview, February 2001).   
The SCPO's goal was to facilitate how the churches could feed in to the political debate. So 
while individual denominations had their own goals, the SCPO’s goals were knitted to the 
expectations that the churches held for devolution. 
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At the beginning it was much as Mcmillan stated: ‘if ever a parliament was set up with an 
overt mission to encourage a new culture of citizenship and participation, the Scottish 
Parliament of 1999 was that body’ (2001, p.38).  The groups responded to this and organised 
themselves to fit in with this new political body with new staff, new skills and so on.  Jordan 
and Stevenson, however, argue that expectations about the levels of participation in the 
Parliament were raised to unrealistic levels and that it was never going to be possible or even 
desirable for small minority groups to have their views included.  Instead the purpose of the 
Parliament was to put an end to the democratic deficit in Scotland by providing a parliament 
that reflected Scottish political views (Jordan and Stevenson; 2000, p.184).  However, some 
groups believed that they were integral to the new system and that:  
‘the movement for the parliament has given special privileges to some institutions 
which believe themselves to be, and are regarded by some other participants as, key 
parts of the new order’ (Bonney; 2003, p.466).   
 
Objective 2 - the extent to which the different types of institutionalist accounts are applicable 
in explaining the responses of the groups. 
The six groups responded to the opportunities offered by the Scottish Parliament.  But the 
reaction of the SPTC was different from that of the other four groups, as it underwent the 
least change as a result of devolution.  The other five groups employed extra staff to deal 
specifically with the Scottish Parliament (although CoSLA ultimately scrapped the post of 
Parliamentary Liaison Officer) and adapted to become more professional so they could 
demonstrate that they had what the Scottish Executive and the committees looked for.     
 
The SPTC was an unusual case as it did not alter its existing strategy for the Scottish 
Parliament (they simply absorbed the committees into its strategy) other than to strike a 
resolutely independent path, ignoring other networks and organisations.  The other groups 
underwent more upheaval as a result of the Scottish Parliament but the SPTC already had 
working practices in place similar to the ones that the other groups adopted, so it felt that it 
already had appropriate working practices in place that would allow it to best achieve its 
goals given its resource constraints.  The SPTC showed no indication that its goals and 
strategy had been significantly affected by the Scottish Parliament.  It was being very rational 
in its behaviour towards the Scottish Parliament, as it did not rush to put extra resources into 
its political work.  Instead, it waited until it was in a position to know how it could best 
maximise its goals.  The SPTC was one of the more politically mature groups having carried 
out lobbying work years before devolution (and having at one point obviously been favoured 
enough by the Scottish Office to receive government funding) and it felt less need to change, 
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as it was satisfied with its existing status and the number of seats it had on education quangos 
and advisory groups.  It appears to have differed from the other groups in that it paid 
attention to the institutions that went before and still existed after devolution. 
 
CoSLA's response is interesting, as it has always been an important player in Scottish 
politics, out of the six groups in this research it was the most influential.  It may have been 
ideologically opposed to the Conservative governments but as the body that represented 
Scotland's local authorities CoSLA could not afford to be ignored.  Therefore, it might have 
been expected that CoSLA, which already had in place long-standing relationships with the 
civil service, might have followed the example of the SPTC and held back until it established 
where it could most profitably serve its interests through the devolved institutions.  It could 
afford to wait as it already had access to the civil service.  However, CoSLA was an 
enthusiastic supporter of devolution and perhaps (like the churches), it was one of the 'home 
rulers' that Mitchell argues 'exaggerated the novelty of the Scottish Parliament' (Mitchell; 
2000, p.615).  Local government was a key player in the movement for home rule and 
CoSLA’s staff in section 5.2 said that they supported the Scottish Parliament because they 
wanted a distinct system of governance for Scotland that was rooted in Scotland's culture and 
attuned to its needs.  This accords with the explanation that sociological institutionalism 
gives for why change happens: when there is an anomaly between an institution's behaviour 
and the values held by its surrounding society, the old understandings and rules no longer fit 
and so change has to happen (see section 3.5).   
 
The SCPO's response to the Scottish Parliament was similar to that of CoSLA, which would 
follow given that CoSLA and the churches were active campaigners for devolution.  The 
churches, particularly the Church of Scotland, had campaigned for a Scottish Parliament 
because they believed that government could only be legitimate if it rested on popular 
sovereignty.  Culture and history were important factors in the decision to open the SCPO.  
Rational choice cannot explain why the ‘bonds of nationhood’ would motivate people even if 
it goes against their apparent self-interest (Heywood; 2003, p.163).  The SCPO’s 
Parliamentary Officer stated that the churches could have opened an office in London for 
Westminster years ago but they chose not to and waited for the Scottish Parliament to be 
opened instead.  As Heywood writes ‘[n]ationalism legitimizes the authority of government’ 
(2003, p.166).  A clear sign that rational choice is not applicable to the SCPO is that the 
purpose of the SCPO was not to lobby on behalf of the churches, which would be the strategy 
of someone looking to maximise their interests.  Instead the SCPO's function was to facilitate 
a fruitful relationship between the Scottish Parliament and the churches and what's more they 
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wanted to create an office that ‘would fit quite obviously’ in with the CSG principles of the 
Scottish Parliament and so the preferences of the SCPO were determined to a large extent by 
the Scottish Parliament.  The SCPO adopted similar working practices to the rest of the 
groups but this could be seen as the ‘logic of appropriateness’ – working in a way that the 
Scottish Parliament approved of.  Both sociological and historical institutionalism could 
apply equally to the behaviour of the SCPO.   
 
The FSB was also a group with a history of political activity in Scotland, although it did not 
have insider status.  It was part of a UK wide organisation and its UK headquarters had 
primary responsibility for lobbying Westminster and was the primary point of contact for 
politicians and civil servants.  The Scottish headquarters of the FSB concentrated on the 
Scottish political scene, but it had limited success (as they describe in section 4.2).  The FSB 
also campaigned for the Scottish Parliament but perhaps it falls into the category of home 
rulers that advocated new politics because they were 'outsider groups seeking insider status' 
(Mitchell; 2000, p.615).  It could be argued that the FSB used the new Scottish Parliament as 
a springboard to maximise the achievement of its goals.  But as Hall and Taylor have argued, 
it is not a rational decision for a group to employ extra staff and develop working practices 
that it thinks would influence an institution (in this case the Scottish Parliament) before it 
knew it would pay off for them.  It would be spending its resources on the expectation that it 
would benefit from something that had not yet existed (1996, p.952).  And it would be 
foolish to ignore the effects on the FSB of being part of the devolution campaign, as it shared 
ideas and arguments with other bodies. 
 
Neither the MS Society or the RSPB had an official stance on devolution.  But their 
behaviour could be explained by sociological institutionalism.  The RSPB started to make 
changes to their Scottish headquarters once it knew the Scottish Parliament was going to be a 
reality (after the referendum result).  The MS Society did not appoint a Policy Officer until 
March 2000 but both were responding to the effect of institutional isomorphism, whereby 
organisations will imitate other organisations in their field because the process of 
institutionalisation forces those in a particular environment to follow convergent paths.  As 
other UK wide groups began to further develop distinct Scottish offices (Jordan and 
Stevenson; 2000, p.172), others followed suit driven either by the expectations of their 
members or because they were unsure what was the best course of action to take and decided 
that they should follow what other organisations were doing.  Because the MS Society was 
that little bit later, it may have changed its working practices for normative reasons – to adopt 
the preferred or dominant working practices in their field.  
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Although sociological institutionalism was the most applicable approach for explaining the 
initial response of the FSB, MS Society and the RSPB, it is likely that as the uncertainty 
factor evaporated they would begin to become more discerning instead of carrying out 
saturated lobbying of the Scottish Parliament.  As the MS Society and the RSPB did not 
campaign for the Scottish Parliament but were simply following what others were doing by 
expanding their Scottish political work, it could be assumed that they had less of an 
attachment to support 'new politics' and therefore felt no obligation to it and thus free to 
chase their own self-interests.  The SPTC was already pursuing its own interests. 
 
Sociological institutionalism would predict that SCPO, CoSLA and even the FSB because of 
their commitment to the devolution cause would place a greater value in the Parliament 
(committees and MSPs), as they would want to add authority and legitimacy to the 
democratic component that they had campaigned for.  However, their response to the Scottish 
Executive is likely to differ, as CoSLA already had a strong and involved relationship with 
the civil service and would be likely to continue it, whereas the churches had shown no 
particular consideration for the Scottish Executive and the FSB was trying to become an 
insider group.   
  
The behaviour of the groups will be easier to explain once their reaction to the Scottish 
Executive has been examined because then it will be possible to identify whether they were 
adopting insider or outsider strategies, which is why the effect of Scottish Executive on the 
groups will be looked at next. 
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CHAPTER 6  THE SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE 
 
6.1  Introduction 
Officially the Scottish Executive is made up of the First Minister, ten other Ministers that the 
First Minister appointed and two law officers – the Lord Advocate and the Solicitor General.  
Some would argue that the civil service employed by the Scottish Executive is just the 
Scottish Office with a different name (Nelson; 2004, p.42: Parry and Jones, 2000, p.64).  This 
is because the Scottish Parliament did not get its own separate bureaucracy, as it was thought 
best to retain the civil service as part of the Home Civil Service in order to provide continuity 
(Kirkpatrick and Pyper; 2001, p.72).  The Scottish Administration is the collective term 
applied to the Scottish Executive, the deputy Ministers and the supporting administrative 
staff (Burrows; 2000, p.95).  However, in common usage the Scottish Executive has become 
the term that is understood to mean the government in Scotland – incorporating Ministers, 
their deputies and the civil service, therefore the term Scottish Executive shall be used to 
reflect the common understanding to mean government.  The term Executive will be used 
when talking solely about Ministers and their deputies but not the civil service. 
 
Of course even with devolution, Westminster has reserved powers over such areas as social 
security, employment services, defence and foreign policy and it continues to legislate and 
act on behalf of the entire UK on these matters.  The Scottish Office also continued to exist 
after devolution but in 2003 Tony Blair decided to abolish it, although he then watered his 
decision down so that it survived but it is now to be found under the new Department for 
Constitutional Affairs (Nelson; 2004, p.42).  The post of Secretary of State for Scotland also 
continued to exist but it too was downgraded in 2003 when Alastair Darling combined the 
Scotland brief with his position as UK Secretary of State for Transport.  Because the Scotland 
Office and the Secretary of State had so little to do in the four years immediately after 
devolution, Nelson referred to it as the "undead department" (2004, p.36) because its powers 
had been transferred to the Scottish Parliament (it used to have six departments: Agriculture, 
Environment and Fisheries; Development; Education and Industry; Home Department; 
Health; and Secretary of State's Office).  
 
6.2  Open and accessible government 
As discussed earlier the remit of the CSG report was only extended to the Parliament and not 
to the Scottish Executive.  The report stated that it believed ‘that it is essential that the culture 
of openness and accessibility is reflected in the working of the Scottish Executive’ because ‘it 
is clear when we consider the responsibilities which lie with Scottish Executive, that the way 
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it operates will have considerable influence on the way the Scottish Parliament is perceived’ 
(1998, p.8).  Therefore, before going on to look at how the Parliament affected the six interest 
groups it is important to put in context the impact that the Scottish Executive had on them.  
The Scottish Executive might be part of the “old order” but it is important to look at how it 
fitted in to the new politics that the Scottish Parliament was supposed to establish.  
 
As chapter four indicated the groups had varying degrees of access and influence to Ministers 
and civil servants in the Scottish Office.  With devolution Donald Dewar, the first ever First 
Minister, pledged that his government would operate in the spirit of the four CSG principles 
and he spoke of the Scottish Executive’s ‘commitment to open, stable, responsive 
government which is fully accountable to a modern, representative Parliament’ (Scottish 
Executive; 1999, p.1).  In addition to this, the Scottish Executive committed itself to a UK 
government initiated programme entitled “Modernising Government”, which was intended to 
reform the entire civil service.  From this, it issued an action plan for its 21st century 
government with four key objectives.  It would: 
• work in partnership  
• be open and accountable 
• be inclusive 
• deliver on its commitments.   
Jack McConnell, then Minister for Finance and responsible for modernising government, 
gave a speech where he stated that ‘21st century government will be about inclusion – we 
want to ensure people are not just interested spectators but are directly involved through 
consultation and civic participation’ (SPICe; 2000, p.5). 
 
Those objectives were backed by targets that included the opening up of government and the 
need to consult on public policy as it was being developed (Scottish Executive, 2000).  
Therefore, in theory Scotland’s main decision and policy making body was dedicated to 
being open, inclusive and consultative.  In practical terms, interest groups saw the policy 
process open up with the use of pre-legislative consultation and the stipulation that Bills must 
be accompanied by full explanatory memoranda.  The memoranda explain in plain English 
the main aims and objectives of a Bill and the impact it is likely to have on policy.  This was 
useful to interest groups as it meant that in addition to the technically and legally worded 
Bill, they had a straightforward explanatory document (Lynch; 2001, p.91).  Pre-legislative 
scrutiny allowed groups to have their say at the draft stage of legislation thus increasing their 
opportunities to influence it, as well as enabling questions or queries to be raised about the 
policy that the Scottish Executive had not been exposed to.  This process:  
 123
‘guarantees access and involvement to pressure groups.  They cannot be excluded 
from the process in its early stages and the Scottish Executive cannot be selective in 
allowing access to the policy process for certain groups’ (Lynch; 2001, p.90). 
Any group, regardless of size, power or attachment to a network could in theory have access 
to the policy process at an early stage.  
 
Given the above information it would seem that the Scottish Executive, despite being derived 
from Westminster structures, was also going to participate in the culture of ‘new politics’, 
with a commitment to being open, accessible and with a willingness to share power.  It might 
be anticipated though that the civil service, as the most established part of the new political 
system and having undergone the least structural change, might not have adapted as easily as 
Ministers to the new politics culture.  It is therefore useful to look at the response of the 
groups to the civil service separately from Ministers. 
 
6.3  Civil servants 
The civil servant that was interviewed for this research (head of a division) described the 
culture of the civil service as 'varied and changing'.  He said that the culture had been 
changing for the last ten years in response to the demand of Ministers for a faster, 
crosscutting, more open, accessible and accountable civil service but that the Scottish 
Parliament had accelerated that change.  The government had promised a civil service fit for 
the 21st century in its Modernising Government Programme, which described the civil service 
as a ‘diverse and professional service, open not defensive, strategic not reactive, reflecting all 
of Scotland not just its traditional roots’ (Scottish Parliament (e), p.5).  A former Scottish 
Office civil servant commented that 'there is no doubt that key staff are willing to 
contemplate change' (Mackay; 1999, p.267/8). 
 
However, outside the civil service doubt was being expressed about its ability to change.  The 
Scotsman in November 1999 stated that the ‘question is whether the former Scottish Office 
staff can satisfy the appetite for change and policy innovation evident in Scottish society’ 
((c), p.6).  It soon became apparent throughout the period of participant observation that the 
answer to that question was no for five of the groups (CoSLA was the exception) but this was 
unsurprising given that the groups saw civil servants as resistant to alternative policy advice 
before devolution.  Of course, from the civil service perspective it is their job to mediate 
between all the different interests and government and they have to ensure that government is 
not held captive by the vested interests of different organisations (Richards and Smith; 2002, 
p.171).  
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Federation of Small Businesses 
The FSB’s Press and Parliamentary Officer wanted to see ‘a reduction of the number of civil 
servants’ in order to ‘make the whole access there much simpler and easier’.  He also said 
that ‘they don’t consult as well as they should’.  He believed that civil servants worked under 
the ethos that they should not give out any information unless they absolutely had to.  To 
illustrate his point he recounted an experience the FSB had with civil servants over the issue 
of local government finance: 
‘we asked for information on the new evaluation.  Now there was a bit of arm 
twisting over the summer and we’ve now got the information we want, but it’s on the 
basis of well, we’ll give you this once, if you need this stuff again you’ll need to ask 
about it’ (personal interview, October 2000). 
Obviously, the Press and Parliamentary Officer was not happy with that situation but he was 
optimistic that the civil service culture would change because parliamentarians would force it 
to change.  He thought that it would have to ‘become more open and inclusive’ and that the 
parliamentarians were ‘not going to let them get away with the bland answers a lot of them 
have been trying to give us this year’ because they were going to ‘have to learn there is a 
different culture now in place’.  He did acknowledge that accessibility to the civil service had 
increased since the Scottish Parliament opened.  During a Procedures Committee meeting he 
said that prior to devolution ‘it was extremely difficult to interact with officials at 
Westminster on specific issues and on bills and consultations’ ((a), Col 1403).  Whereas, at 
the Scottish Parliament when the local government bill was proposed, civil servants came and 
discussed it with them.  
 
He did believe it was expedient for the FSB to try to build up good relationships with civil 
servants because of the advantages it would afford the group: ‘you can gain access to 
information, they tell you things before they happen, you can talk to them and you get papers 
that are seen before their time’.  But he felt that the FSB had not done as much as they could 
have in that area and that they really should have been working on building up better 
relationships because he was dissatisfied overall with the position the FSB had vis-à-vis civil 
servants. 
  
Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office 
The SCPO Parliamentary Officer knew that ‘at the stage before a consultation document goes 
on paper there will be informal soundings being taken of people likely to be heavily 
concerned’ and it would be important ‘to get churches involved at that kind of level’ but he 
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had found ‘it hardest to develop good working contacts’ with the civil service compared to 
the other political actors in the policy process.  But with the Scottish Parliament now on their 
doorstep, the Parliamentary Officer felt that the civil service had become more accountable 
and thus more open to the outside world than they were formerly: 
‘I think a lot of those who are career civil servants, who worked in the Scottish Office 
before, have had a huge culture shock in terms of the level of public and 
parliamentary scrutiny of what they do, which realistically was not that great before 
the Parliament’ (personal interview, February 2001).     
He hoped that the shift towards being more open would continue as his ‘experience at the 
moment is slightly patchy, that there is a reluctance to engage in terms of some civil servants 
still’.  But like the FSB’s Press and Parliamentary Officer he was optimistic about the culture 
of the civil service as he thought it was ‘probably sorting itself out’.  And as a result of the 
Scottish Parliament he felt that ‘there is now built into their job an openness to appearing in 
public’.  A demonstration of this was during a consultation amongst churches on a family law 
proposal when a ‘civil servant came along and not only explained the Bill to us but responded 
to questions and took back concerns’.  He found that remarkable because ‘I think that 
probably five years ago in the Scottish Office that would not have been considered 
appropriate for a civil servant to do’.   
 
Multiple Sclerosis Society 
The Director of the MS Society was frustrated by the lack of guidelines, informal or 
otherwise, about how interest groups should interface with the civil service.  The Policy 
Officer said that ‘up until now they haven’t been particularly open with us at all’ and he said 
that the Society had been ‘this little annoying fly that’s landed on their arm and been brushed 
off’.  The lack of progress in dealing with the civil service prompted the Director to ask the 
Health Minister who they should deal with and she gave them a contact name and assured 
them that contact would be made.  The Policy Officer was delighted that civil servants could 
no longer ‘just turn around and snub you’ because the groups could now go above their heads 
to Ministers who would hold the civil servants to account.   
 
The MS Society had not spent a great deal of time with civil servants at the time of 
participant observation but were trying hard to change that situation.  Like the other groups, 
the Society lamented how closed the civil service was to the outside world and that this was a 
residual effect from the previous Scottish Office days.  The Policy Officer said that in his 
experience prior to devolution it was the civil service that ran Scotland and that there:  
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‘are still plenty of places where civil servants hold a great deal of power not 
withstanding the new culture of the Scottish Executive, whereby it’s the politicians 
that run it rather than the civil service’ (personal interview, May 2001).   
He explained that because the civil servants had come from a culture of telling Ministers 
what to do, rather than the other way about, they were now having problems ‘adapting to a 
culture that isn’t quite what they would like it to be’.  The Policy Officer believed that the 
civil service had no desire to relinquish their position of running Scotland and although the 
Scottish Parliament had dented their authority, he thought in time they would build up their 
status again.  The Director felt that ‘the civil service needs to open up’.  He said that there 
had been a lot of ‘rhetoric about them being more open but I think they’re not used to that at 
all’.   
 
The Society felt that the lack of openness in the civil service was also manifested by the 
bland answers that the civil servants drafted in response to parliamentary questions.  The 
Director explained that when the Society contacted the civil service for anything or asked a 
friendly MSP to place a question for them, they had to be very precise in what they wrote 
otherwise ‘it makes it too easy for them to give you a bland answer’. 
 
One of the Society’s aims for 2001 was to build up relationships with civil servants because 
of the expected advantages from this (sources of information, influence with Ministers, 
oversight of the implementation of policy) and also to ensure that civil servants were ‘fully 
informed when they are filling in the detail of proposals’ (Director). 
 
Scottish Parent Teacher Council 
The SPTC actually used to meet up with civil servants a lot more before the Scottish 
Parliament opened.  The group used to be in receipt of a government grant so they had 
regular six monthly meetings with civil servants where they discussed their funding, before 
moving on to other issues.  The Development Manager stated that for the SPTC 
‘parliamentary committees have taken over.  I don’t know, it’s an interesting thought but we 
certainly aren’t working through civil servants in the same way’.  The Development Manager 
said there was a twofold reason for this: civil servants were a lot busier than they used to be 
and secondly, the parliamentary committees had become the main focus of the SPTC.   
 
She thought that civil servants were a good source of information and that if you had good 
contacts, then civil servants were more likely to support SPTC candidates for a seat on 
advisory boards or committees (although she felt that those committees were ‘mechanisms 
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for inaction rather than mechanisms for action’).  Another advantage was that they could 
indirectly increase their chances of influencing the Minister because it would be strange for a 
Minister to contradict the recommendation of a civil servant. 
 
Notwithstanding this, the Development Manager’s view of civil servants was largely 
negative, as she felt that given the choice of change or the status quo, civil servants would 
always opt for the status quo.  She described the SPTC’s experience when they wanted to 
contribute to the Education Bill: 
‘We had this argument which we took to Sam Galbraith and Peter Peacock when they 
were Ministers and they were delighted and convinced and said yes, yes, yes, it’s 
really good stuff, put in a paper for consideration with the Bill.  So we did and it went 
nowhere and the reason it went nowhere was because the civil servants buried it’ 
(personal interview, November 2001).   
Subsequently, the SPTC re-wrote the paper and presented it to the next Education Minister, 
Jack McConnell, who told the SPTC that it was the best paper on parental involvement he 
had ever read, so again the SPTC submitted it formally.  However, on phoning up a civil 
servant to check on its progress she again discovered that it was going nowhere.  The 
Development Manager attributed this situation to the civil servants because the ‘status quo is 
always very appealing, inertia is always the easiest course of action so it’s not going 
anywhere’.  She felt that the reluctance of the civil service to change had caused problems, 
the prime example being the Scottish Qualifications Authority fiasco where the civil servants 
tried to make the system work.  She stated that:  
‘in February before anybody sat the final exams it was obvious that the internal 
assessments weren’t working but there was no mechanism for actually saying it’s not 
working, we’ve made a mistake and we need to introduce change’ (personal 
interview, November 2001).  
 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
Both the Convention Manager and the Head of Policy explained that in order for CoSLA to 
be in at the start of legislation, CoSLA officials had to be in daily contact with civil servants 
(which they were: ‘easily several times a day probably’) to find out what was happening, ask 
each other questions, continue discussions and arrange meetings.  CoSLA at the time of 
participant observation in November 2001 was in constant dialogue with the civil service 
because of the need to ensure that policies would be deliverable.  Unsurprisingly, as a result 
of this close contact CoSLA had a much more positive view of civil servants than the other 
five case study groups.  The Acting Chief Executive ranked civil servants as being the most 
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important actors in the policy process because ‘we can’t do our job properly unless we 
understand what’s going on’.  He said there was ‘no point in having somebody in here who is 
dealing with social work and they’ve not made an appropriate contact with the Scottish 
Executive officials’ otherwise it ‘does leave us out on a limb’.  The Head of Policy also 
offered the observation noted by the other groups that ‘Ministers take their briefings from 
civil servants’ so if CoSLA could persuade a civil servant of the merits of its case, then the 
more chance it had of getting Ministerial support.   
 
The Head of Policy and the Convention Manager both felt that there was no clear culture in 
the civil service and that their experiences had been highly varied.  There were some helpful, 
open individuals, teams and divisions but some unequally unhelpful individuals, teams and 
even divisions. 
 
Generally, CoSLA were much happier with the civil service than the other groups.  The key 
difference obviously being that CoSLA had a central role in the formulation of policy.  
Although that did not mean that the people they represented had such a positive view of civil 
servants.  A Joseph Rowntree Foundation report found that there was ‘“mutual suspicion and 
distrust” between councils and civil servants, with the latter seen as being “dismissive of 
local government”’ (The Scotsman; (d), p.10).  
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
The Senior Investigations Officer, like his colleagues, believed that the civil service was 
doing its best to limit RSPB access to Ministers.  He commented that ‘everybody tells us it’s 
an open door but there are a lot of bureaucrats stuck in behind it, shoving the other way I 
think’.  The Head of Advocacy and Media stated that the ‘civil servants in the Environment 
and Rural Affairs Division keep NGOs as far away from Ministers as they possibly can’.  A 
view echoed by his colleagues:  
‘I think the civil service is still controlling the formal access to Ministers.  I mean we 
are regularly, both as RSPB and as LINK [environmental umbrella body], told that it 
wouldn’t be appropriate to meet the Minister at the moment’ (Head of Policy); ‘civil 
servants block our access to them, sometimes don’t let our letters go through’ 
(Parliamentary Information Officer); ‘I think a lot of obstacles are put in the way of 
direct contact between ourselves and Ministers’ (Media Officer).   
 
They apportioned blame to the civil servants because the Ministers claimed to have no 
knowledge of the RSPB’s invitations, letters or briefings.  The Head of Advocacy and Media 
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knew that other interest groups in other sectors had a much easier time in getting access to 
Ministers, although he still felt that generally civil servants did try ‘to keep alternative 
sources of policy advice away from Ministers’ and that ‘they’ve been peculiarly successful in 
that in environment and rural affairs’.   
  
The Head of Policy added that he thought the civil service was adapting to the Scottish 
Parliament ‘in order to retain their position in terms of their centrality in being influential’.  
But things were beginning to look more hopeful according to an RSPB internal document 
written after the Scottish Parliament’s second year, when the RSPB noted that there:  
‘have been definite signs of some easing of the problems in our relationship with the 
Executive.  Arranging meetings with Ministers has continued to prove problematic - 
but the number of substantive contacts has significantly increased.  It remains 
apparent that the civil service is uncertain of its position within the new settlement 
and has a tendency to attempt to exclude or control alternative sources of policy 
advice.  The openness and accessibility of government remains considerably less 
satisfactory than that reported by colleagues in Whitehall, Cardiff and Belfast, but 
there are signs of movement towards a more inclusive approach.’ 
 
The Policy Department had contact with civil servants on a daily basis, ‘most frequently at 
the middle ranking policy development person’ because ‘they are the people who do the 
drafting of Bills and the answering of PQs and so forth, so you try to influence them’.  They 
have to be in contact according to the Head of Advocacy and Media because civil servants:  
‘are still a hugely important force in the decision-making process and they still make 
the wheels of government go round and round.  And if I want to protect birds and if 
my colleagues want to protect birds, we’ve got to work with the civil servants’ 
(personal interview, December 2001). 
 
6.3.1  Unreconstructed civil service? 
Before the Scottish Parliament, for ‘Scottish Office civil servants, the demands of 
parliamentary accountability were, arguably less onerous than those faced by officials in 
other departments of state’ (Kirkpatrick and Pyper; 2001, p.74).  The lack of scrutiny led 
some to distrust ‘its complexity and secrecy, and would prefer a more open form of Scottish 
government’ (Kellas; 1992, p.50).  Hence the desire for ‘new politics’ from groups that had 
previously been excluded from the policy making process.  The perception that many of the 
groups had about the civil service was that it resented alternative policy advice and it did 
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what it could to protect its own power base.  An editorial from The Herald sums up the 
perception that the groups had after the Scottish Parliament opened: 
‘The greatest worry rests in the only part of the old Scottish administration which has 
not been reconstructed significantly.  That is the Civil Service.  It is obvious that a 
strong and effective Civil Service is essential for the working of Parliament, but while 
Holyrood sings a new song the civil servants are simply out of tune.  They have been 
allowed to proceed in the old, secretive, exclusive, and manipulative way by the 
Scottish Executive, probably because it suits Ministers’ ((c), p.18). 
Or to put it simply what ‘has emerged is, in many respects, the Scottish Office with the name 
changed’ (Parry and Jones, 2000, p.64).  A view that Kirkpatrick and Pyper also supported, 
stating that the early indications from the organisational changes to the civil service as a 
result of devolution were 'marginal and incremental' (2001, p.70).     
 
It was no real surprise that the FSB, SCPO, MS Society and the RSPB viewed the civil 
service with antipathy, as they did not appear to have had a particularly close relationship 
with the civil service prior to devolution.  Even the SPTC, which had obviously enjoyed a 
fairly close relationship with Scottish Office in the past, was quite negative in its comments 
about civil servants, accusing them of inertia.  (Although CoSLA, which did have an on-
going relationship with the civil service, had positive things to say about it).  There was a 
desire from the interest groups for the civil service to be more open in the devolved system, 
although it has been accused of struggling ‘to adjust to the shift in culture’ (The Scotsman 
(b), p.8).  The groups believed, however, that things were beginning to change slowly, which 
is interesting as other commentators have observed that the transition process to devolution 
has 'confirmed the dominant and protected position' of the civil servants in Scotland (Parry 
and Jones; 2000, p.64).  The groups felt that the civil service would become more open in 
time as it had to get used to a higher level of accountability from the increased numbers of 
Ministers and from having to appear before the parliamentary committees (Kirkpatrick and 
Pyper; 2001, p.75).  The civil service Code of Practice also had stricter rules on being more 
open once the Scottish Parliament opened.   
 
While there are many that will testify to how closed the civil service and the entire policy 
making process was before devolution, there are a few that maintain that it was ‘not as 
difficult as critics claimed’ and that a lot of consultation already took place between 
government departments and relevant interests (Jordan and Stevenson; 2000, p.181).  Brown 
et al wrote of how the Scottish Office used to construct a definition of the Scottish interest 
and would then pressure London to give favourable outcomes to Scotland and point to how 
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successful the Scottish Office was in this over Ravenscraig, juvenile justice and the Scottish 
share of expenditure (1998, p.118/9).  Brown et al state that long before devolution, the 
Scottish elite running the country might have been partial, but they were still 'closer to 
Scottish popular feeling than the central UK state tends to be, simply because many of them 
are in touch with Scottish professional organisations' (Brown et al; 1998, p.118).  However, 
eighteen years of Conservative Party rule had the effect of making left of centre and pro-
devolution teachers, doctors, church ministers and social workers more in tune with the 
popular mood than the civil service.  Richards and Smith describe how Whitehall civil 
servants used to consult with interest groups as a central part of the policy process but when 
the Thatcher government came to power, it was suspicious of interest groups and 
consequently the Conservative governments from 1979 – 1997 attempted 'to reduce the role 
of groups and undermine existing policy networks' (2002, p.179).   
 
When Labour came to power there was an initial increase in outside consultation resulting in 
an apparent change in the role of the civil service.  'The widely held assumption was that the 
Civil Service is good at policy advice' but this was challenged in the face of crises like the 
foot and mouth outbreak (Smith; 2003, p.70).  Smith describes how Ministers at a UK level 
were taking a much more pro-active role towards policy and were relying less on civil 
servants than they used to.  In fact, he describes how in the Treasury, all advice from civil 
servants had to go through Gordon Brown's special advisers – the special advisers were 
acting as gatekeepers between the Minister and the civil servants (Smith; 2003, p.73).  He 
argues that the role of civil servants is increasingly 'to organize the multiple sources of advice 
available to ministers' (Smith; 2003, p.75).  Richards and Smith attribute the Labour 
government's commitment to consulting interest groups in its first term as a reward to NGOs 
for when they serviced the Party when it was in opposition (2002, p.182).  They add however 
that the government quickly became immune to the influence of these groups, as it 
established other avenues of advice from task forces and special advisers (ibid.).  
 
It was not just the interest groups though that had objections about the civil service in 
Scotland.  MSPs also complained about it, suggesting that there was a clash between the old 
and new institutions.  The views of the MSPs help to put into context what the groups saw as 
being wrong about the old system and why they saw politicians as being allies in the fight to 
get things changed.  Sandra White (SNP MSP) in October 2001 said that a lot of MSPs 
entered the Parliament thinking ‘we would come in here and change the world and we’ve 
discovered that you’ve got to change the civil servants first’.  She was worried that the civil 
servants would remain ‘in the mould of the old Scottish Office’.  She also echoed the opinion 
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of many interest groups when she remarked that she was sure ‘they take training on how to 
avoid answering questions’.  Another SNP MSP (who shall remain anonymous because the 
comments were made informally to one of the groups) observed that there:  
‘was a general problem in getting meaningful answers to parliamentary questions 
from members of the Executive which I thought may have had its origin in the culture 
of ex-Scottish Office civil servants, who had been used to a life sheltered from public 
gaze.  I thought the culture would change, but slowly.  ...there was a breed of 
Executive civil servant which made an art form of not answering questions’ (taken 
from an internal minute of a meeting).   
 
Gil Paterson, also SNP, was stunned when it came to parliamentary questions as some ‘of the 
quality of answers we get back beggars belief’ (The Scotsman (e), p.9).  However, although 
civil servants research and then draft answers to the parliamentary questions, those answers 
have to be approved by the relevant Minister.  Guidance on parliamentary questions, as 
Kirkpatrick and Pyper highlight, emphasises the ‘primary accountability of ministers’ as 
outlined in the Executive’s guidelines: ‘It is a civil servant’s responsibility to help Ministers 
to fulfil their obligations but ultimately it is the Minister’s right and responsibility to decide 
how to do so’ (taken from Kirkpatrick and Pyper; 2001, p.74).  
 
Alex Neil, an SNP MSP, also ‘claimed that the political and bureaucratic establishments were 
rallying against him, with civil servants combining with the Labour leadership to try to kill 
off his bill’ (The Herald (d), p.6).  
 
It was not just SNP MSPs that complained about the civil service.  The Liberal Democrats 
released a series of e-mails in July 2002 ‘showing how supposedly neutral officials plotted to 
keep information from opposition MSPs’ (The Scotsman (f), p.9).  The e-mails ‘sought to 
avoid giving answers to awkward questions’ tabled by two Liberal Democrat MSPs (who 
incidentally as part of the Executive parties were not opposition MSPs as the article stated).  
One e-mail authored by a civil servant read: ‘I have gone for a narrow and pedantic 
interpretation of Taylor’s question which makes the answer pretty short and easy’ (ibid.).  
Proof of what some of the groups have long suspected about the civil service mentality 
towards parliamentary questions.  Although the civil servants could argue that due to the 
sheer number of parliamentary questions that they received it was no wonder that they looked 
for the easy option.  Between the opening of the Scottish Parliament and May 2001 it was 
revealed that 14,250 questions had been asked, costing the taxpayer £1.2 million (The 
Scotsman (g), p.9).  To put it in perspective, Donald Dewar, the late First Minister, stated that 
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in the first four months of the Scottish Parliament (a period that included the summer recess) 
more parliamentary questions had been placed than in an entire year at Westminster 
(Leicester; 2002, p.39). 
 
A Liberal Democrat MSP (Donald Gorrie) said that ‘committees have had some success in 
changing bills, but if the civil servants - it is usually they - and ministers stand firm, the 
convention is that they have to get the bill through’ (Procedures Committee (a), col 1384).  
He also commented in May 2000 on ‘the stranglehold which the Civil Service has over the 
Executive’s policy development’ and that civil servants must be persuaded ‘to change many 
years of secretive knowledge is power mentality – that everyone outside the laager of 
weapons is an enemy to be kept in the dark’ (The Herald (e), p.10).  Civil servants were quite 
as prepared to fend off MSPs as well as interest groups. 
 
Summary 
The attitudes of the groups towards the civil service demonstrated their desire to assert their 
right to have a share in the policy making process.  They felt that if the civil service was able 
to exclude them before devolution, it should not be able to now, as the groups believed they 
had every right to share power in the new political system that they had helped bring about.  
The groups were also aware that if the civil service refused to co-operate, they had recourse 
to Ministers and to MSPs (before devolution Ministers and MPs spent most of the working 
week in Westminster).  The groups were asserting that devolution was to be about a new way 
of doing politics that included civic society in the policy making process and was not just 
about conferring ‘democratic legitimacy on the apparatus of government in Scotland, so that 
it can govern largely as before’ (Brown et al; 2002, p.1).  Traditionally, the civil service is a 
prime lobbying target for interest groups who want to become insider groups but because 
some groups had hoped that the Scottish Parliament with its new culture would rely less on 
civil servants in the policy process and that interest groups would move in to provide advice.  
However, four of the groups (FSB, MS Society, CoSLA and the RSPB) had indicated that 
they were going to put a future emphasis on developing good relationships with civil servants 
because of the obvious importance that they continued to have in the policy process.   
 
The SCPO and SPTC were equally clear, however, that they were not going to invest further 
resources into working with civil servants, as both groups viewed the Parliament as the arena 
that they wanted to work in, although they were aware of how influential civil servants were. 
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Rational choice institutionalism 
Rationally, it would have been expedient for the groups to focus a lot of their resources on 
the civil service because of the powerful position they believed civil servants to have in the 
policy process.  However, only CoSLA appeared to have adopted this strategy from the start 
of devolution (a continuation from their established relationships with civil servants from the 
Scottish Office).  In order to become insider groups, it is necessary that groups adapt their 
behaviour to suit, in particular, civil servants but because of the clash between the pre- and 
post-devolution culture of how power would be shared in Scotland, tension between the 
groups and the civil service dominated the start of the new political system.  But as the 
groups began to realise that the civil servants would continue to be important the FSB, MS 
Society and the RSPB were evidently going to follow suit and were at different stages of 
building up relationships with civil servants. 
 
Rationally it is more difficult to explain the choice of the SCPO and the SPTC, particularly as 
the SPTC had a history of interacting with civil servants.  Perhaps, the two smallest groups 
perhaps they decided that it would be a more cost-effective use of their resources to target the 
parliamentary committees, as they might have run into resource difficulties trying to sustain 
on-going relationships with the civil service. 
 
Sociological institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalism would argue that the negative attitude of the groups towards the 
civil service was because the civil service culture jarred with the expectations of civic 
society, although it was beginning to show signs of moving towards a more open culture.  
The groups cared more about supporting and being involved with the politicians because they 
believed there was going to be a new partnership between government and civic society as 
outlined in the CSG power sharing principle.  The groups only began to consider investing 
more resources into influencing the civil service as time went on when it became evident that 
the civil service was just as influential as before.  (CoSLA already had a well established 
relationship with the civil service and had built up a successful working culture so their 
attitudes and experience of civil servants differed). 
 
Historical institutionalism 
Because of the prevailing shared hopes and expectations of what the Scottish Parliament 
would be like, historical institutionalism would argue that the groups believed that the civil 
service would decrease in influence as interest groups would simultaneously increase in 
influence in the policy making processes.  Therefore it could be argued that the SCPO and 
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the SPTC got so entrenched on this particular path of primarily interacting with the 
Parliament that their strategy got locked-in to the exclusion of civil servants.   
 
For the other four groups, once they were involved in the new political system they decided 
to become insider groups as the Scottish Parliament began to shape their strategies and goals.  
CoSLA was more successful in its relationships with the civil service because it had a history 
of interaction with civil servants.  The FSB, MS Society, CoSLA and the RSPB were having 
differing levels of success with the civil service because of the differing levels of resources 
they had invested into lobbying the civil service at the start of devolution. 
 
6.4  Ministers 
Lynch writes that the transfer from the Scottish Office to the Scottish Executive was pretty 
straightforward, with Ministers ‘inheriting a government bureaucracy, quangos and a range 
of interactions with pressure groups’ (2001, p. 29).  Because Ministers inherited a lot of 
Scottish Office structures it might have been expected that the groups would see Ministers as 
being part of the old order, along with the civil service.  But overwhelmingly the new 
Scottish Ministers were seen as part of the new system.  This impression was aided by the 
change in governing party.  There was also a lot more Ministers than before, it was a 
coalition government which was a novelty, all based full-time in Edinburgh and most of them 
brand new to office when they were elected in 1999, with the result that the Executive did 
seem to be new and different and open to the new culture offered by devolution.  In fact, 
Parry and Jones state that an initial weakness of civil servants was that they expected the new 
Scottish Ministers 'would learn 'our ways' and be socialised into the behavioural patterns 
associated with Whitehall ministers', when instead, the new young Labour and Liberal 
Democrat Ministers came with different ideas and expectations about how things would be 
run (2000, p.60).  However, Parry and Jones argue that the civil service proved resilient and 
Ministers became ‘trapped in behavioural expectations that did not always fit comfortably 
with hopes for a novel approach to government business' (2000, p.63).   
 
The Executive committed itself to the CSG principles and the Modernising Government plan, 
making it clear that there was to be a shift towards openness and accessibility.  In the 
excitement of 1999, many groups believed that they would be able to meet and influence 
Ministers in a way that they could never have hoped to experience before devolution. 
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Federation of Small Businesses 
The FSB quickly took advantage of the new system and put Ministers at the top of their 
political priority list.  They devoted a lot of time and effort to cultivating relationships with 
Ministers and they targeted them more than any other political actor (Press and Parliamentary 
Officer).  They found Ministers to be very accessible, with the Policy Convener remarking 
that ‘I don’t have a problem meeting with Ministers’.  During the period of participant 
observation the FSB enjoyed a particularly good relationship with Henry McLeish, the 
Minister for Enterprise and Lifelong Learning.  The Policy Convener said that he would find 
himself meeting with civil servants who told him that the Minister had instructed them to 
contact the FSB for their views.  The Policy Convener, during the fuel crisis of September 
2000, had Henry McLeish ‘chasing me all over the country to try and find out what my 
members think about it’.  When it was just the Scottish Office the FSB did not enjoy such 
Ministerial exposure but after 1999 they were taking advantage of all their links with the 
Scottish Labour party and making the most of having an Executive based full-time in 
Scotland.  
 
Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office 
The SCPO’s Parliamentary Officer did believe that Ministers made ‘most of the really 
important decisions’ and that in order to achieve anything groups would have to get them on-
side.  But the SCPO tended to deal more with the Parliament, because the Parliamentary 
Officer believed that it was the most appropriate arena for the churches to work in.  He had 
‘direct contact relatively rarely’ with Ministers, although he did speak to their offices more 
frequently.  The reason for this was that Ministers were under more time pressure but that 
they were ‘certainly far more accessible than Westminster is’.  He did point out though that 
this was going to be inevitable as Scotland is ‘a wee country and I mean there’s people that I 
knew twenty years ago when I was a student that I met then, that I’ve met again that are now 
Ministers and MSPs’.  He would like to see them being more open however, and to have a 
‘greater willingness to engage with Parliament rather than with the media as their priority’ – 
a desire for a strong legislature and for power to be shared. 
 
Multiple Sclerosis Society 
The Health Minister was a priority target for the MS Society as Ministers ‘wield the power...  
They can make things happen in a way that civil servants can’t’, according to the Director.  
The Society had put considerable effort into trying to build up a good relationship with the 
Health Minister at the time of the participant observation period.  The problem for the staff 
was that they felt the Minister had pretty definite ideas of her own.  They had a particularly 
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demoralising experience when they first met up with the Minister and since that the Society 
had strived to make her listen to them but had not found this very easy.  Instead, the Society 
managed to advance their interests through raising awareness with MSPs, parliamentary 
committees and the media and as a result the Policy Officer said they had ‘got the makings of 
a better relationship with her now’.  He also felt that they were in a position where the 
Minister was taking them more seriously as a group ‘not because we’ve convinced her I don’t 
think.  It’s because she has been getting too much heat, both in the Parliament and from the 
media’.   
 
The Director said that the Society had ‘generally taken the view that we want to, at least in 
public, we want to be in a position that we are being friendly and that we are being positive 
and we’re being supportive’.  The Director and the Policy Officer had a number of 
discussions on whether they would take the tack of being supportive in public or not, but in 
the end they decided that it was not in the Society’s interest to make an enemy out of the 
Minister.  The Policy Officer said that once they had got her respect they would be ‘perfectly 
prepared privately to give her a kicking’ but they could not start off from that position and 
they knew ‘when you could afford to say things like that’. 
 
Scottish Parent Teacher Council 
Occasionally the SPTC met with a Minister but those meetings ‘didn’t mean anything’, 
instead ‘we only really started to have connections I think with the Scottish Parliament’.  But 
even then the SPTC was not on an insider track as meetings with Ministers were still only 
occasional, formal and ‘have turned out to be damp squibs’.  She thinks that the SPTC will 
not meet up with the Education Minister any more than they did when the Scottish Office 
controlled Scotland’s education.  She suspected that Ministers had a list of interest groups 
which they worked their way through, meeting up with each in rotation.  But since the 
Scottish Parliament opened she did feel that meetings with Ministers had a greater 
significance.  The SPTC commented that pre-devolution ‘meetings with Ministers were trials, 
didn’t mean anything, they just went through the motions’, whereas ‘when you have a 
meeting with a Minister now it’s actually more meaningful than it used to be’. 
 
The Development Manager said that Ministers were the most important actors in the policy 
process and that if ‘you are trying to get something on the agenda then Ministers are very 
important’.  She did not, however, classify the SPTC as having a good relationship with any 
of the Education Ministers as she defined a good relationship as being able to go for a drink 
with the Minister in question and ‘if you never make it to that, you’re just an also ran’.  For 
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the groups that did have good relationships with Ministers, she said the advantage would be 
‘that your agenda is always considered, even if it’s not granted it is always given serious 
consideration’. 
 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
CoSLA’s Convention Manager and Head of Policy regarded Ministers as the most important 
actors in the policy process.  The Head of Policy justified this by saying that Ministers set the 
agenda, which the Parliament then reacts to.  He said that because Ministers have the power 
to control the agenda, it was ‘important to get Ministers on-side, CoSLA work hard at that’.  
The Convention Manager felt that Ministers were at the top of the hierarchy, so if civil 
servants were responding in a way that CoSLA felt was unsatisfactory then they had recourse 
to Ministers if the issue was ‘significantly important to us for a politician to get involved’.  
She viewed Ministers as ‘the next level’.   
 
Both the Convention Manager and the Head of Policy felt that Ministers were fairly 
accessible given the constraints of their time (although the Head of Policy commented that 
some Ministers were more accessible than others).  The Head of Policy thought that 
Ministers were open and accessible to CoSLA because ‘generally the culture in Scotland is 
more consensual in terms of having local government on board’.  He contrasted that with the 
Home Office at Westminster where:  
‘civil servants just swan into the room and say “Blunkett demands” and that’s the 
basis of the meeting.  It’s how soon will everyone deliver Blunkett’s demands 
because it’s got to be done by the 15th December or whatever.  Now this no longer 
applies as far as Scotland is concerned.  There is a basic difference in the culture and 
of course a lot of the Edinburgh Ministers came through local government, they were 
all on the same side, fighting the Conservative administration’ (personal interview, 
December 2001).   
 
The Convention Manager felt that good relationships with Ministers meant that ‘it can cut 
through some of the bureaucracy of dealing with the civil service’.  Normally the accepted 
process was that CoSLA would brief civil servants who would then brief the Minister.  She 
stated that there have ‘been occasions where we have just cut past the civil service and just 
gone to the Minister and said look, these are the issues, this is what’s happening and brief 
them directly’.   
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CoSLA’s relationship was strong enough that they ‘never have any qualms about criticising’ 
the Scottish Executive but that ‘doesn’t mean we go looking for opportunities to do it 
because we don’t’ (Head of Policy). 
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
The RSPB was having difficulty in establishing relationships with Ministers.  At an informal 
level they believed Ministers were more accessible than they used to be and found them to be 
open and helpful when they did meet with them.  The Parliamentary Information Officer and 
the Head of Policy Operations did say though that the accessibility and openness of a 
Minister depended to a certain extent on the personality of the individual.  For instance, the 
RSPB enjoyed a good relationship with Rhona Brankin whom they felt was very enthusiastic 
about her portfolio.  But they found it very difficult to arrange meetings with Ross Finnie, the 
Minister in charge of the environment at the time of participant observation.  Gaining access 
to Ministers generally at a more formal level had proved to be problematic and the RSPB 
blamed the civil servants for denying them access to Ministers. 
 
The RSPB decided to circumvent this problem by reaching Ministers more informally.  The 
Head of Policy Operations gave the example of when he talked with Wendy Alexander (who 
was the Minister for Enterprise and Lifelong Learning at the time) at the RSPB’s 
Lochwinnoch Reserve, which she attended in her capacity as a constituency MSP.  He was 
pleased that groups had the opportunity to meet Ministers in a more informal way, even if it 
annoyed civil servants.   Prior to the Scottish Parliament the civil servants found it ‘a damn 
sight easier if these Ministers are packed off to London and just enjoy the Carlton Club in the 
evening, instead of going home and meeting all these lobbyists’.  Now journalists can get 
their quotes from “sources close to the Minister” as they sit in the pub next to the Minister. 
 
The Head of Advocacy and Media and the Media Officer both said that if a group was able to 
build up good relationships with Ministers, then ‘they listen to you’ and ‘you actually 
manage to get your ideas and your thinking and your initiatives into the policy agenda’.  The 
Head of Policy Operations felt ‘because politicians stand for election on the basis that they 
want to bring about change’ it is easier for groups to get change despite civil servant 
reluctance. 
 
6.4.1  Ministers – old or new politics? 
Mitchell has remarked that the type of interest group that has access to the Scottish 
Executive, owes its position as much to the fact that the Executive is made up of the Labour 
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and Liberal Democrat parties, as to the actual creation of the Scottish Parliament (2003, 
p.174).  This might apply to the FSB (who had cultivated relationships with the Labour Party 
when they were in opposition at Westminster) and to CoSLA, which was certainly more in 
favour of a Labour government, but since devolution the other four groups did not have ready 
access to Ministers.  (In fact the MS Society and the RSPB were experiencing real difficulties 
in building up relationships with them).  Nonetheless, the six groups had largely favourable 
attitudes towards Ministers and the view was that Ministers were more accessible than they 
had ever been before.   
 
However Parry, despite the early perception of the groups, had a different interpretation of 
the Executive, stating that it:  
‘essentially retains the mystique of the UK Cabinet system…  Students of post-
devolution Scottish government have enjoyed reasonable access to officials, rather 
less good access to ministers, whose diaries are guarded and weighed down.  Self-
consciously imitative of what officials regard as the best traditions of Cabinet 
government, the Scottish devolved system shows a lack of transparency in its 
processes’ (Parry; 2003, p.450). 
He comments that this was because in big policy areas such as education, health and housing, 
the main policy trends had already been set in motion within the 1997-99 Scottish Office.  
Burt and Taylor (2002, p.88) offer an equally pessimistic view that was at odds with the 
groups’ first impressions of Ministers, as they comment that while in theory all interest 
groups could have direct access to the Executive, the reality was different, as those with 
direct access tended ‘to be the small elite of relatively ‘large nationals’ with incomes in 
excess of £1 million per annum’, as they were the only groups who could afford to sustain 
relationships with the Executive.   
 
Summary 
Despite some experience to the contrary the groups did feel that Ministers were part of the 
new politics and that they were trying to involve interest groups in the policy making process 
(with the exception of the MS Society who put their unfavourable experience down to the 
personality of the individual Minister).  This suggests that the groups really did hope that a 
new power sharing politics was possible.   
 
Rational choice institutionalism 
The groups were being perfectly rational in their strategy to build up relationships with 
Ministers, as they saw Ministers as being able to change policy in a way that civil servants 
 141
and the Parliament could not.  So what better way to achieve their goals than to have direct 
access to the relevant Minister?  Rational choice would argue that the SCPO and the SPTC 
did not have the resources to build up influential relationships with Ministers, so therefore 
they would be better off maximising their goals where they could be most effective.  For the 
other four groups however, rational choice institutionalism would state that it would be 
beneficial to them in the long run if they could strengthen ministerial relationships and to do 
what they could to attain an insider position as the rewards would be greater. 
 
Sociological institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalism would argue that the groups were so enthusiastic about 
devolution and the idea of new politics that they expected to be involved significantly in the 
policy process.  Their approval of the system extended to all the politicians, even when there 
were indications that Ministers were not going to be as accessible as some had hoped.  
(Although both the SPTC and RSPB blamed the influence of the civil service and its old 
practices for thwarting access to Ministers). 
 
Sociological institutionalism would argue that even the smaller groups, like the SCPO and 
the SPTC could also influence Ministers despite their lack of resources because of the 
inclusiveness of the new system and because they could still use the Parliament as a channel 
to Ministers. 
 
Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism would argue from the same starting point as sociological 
institutionalism – that the groups were expecting Ministers to adhere to the CSG principles as 
a way of working because that was the expectation for the new Scottish Parliament and the 
groups wanted to take advantage of those opportunities.  In that historical context, it made 
sense for the groups to make the decision to foster good relations with Ministers and to 
continue with that strategy at whatever level they could achieve.   
 
6.5  Conclusion 
Objective 1 – whether the behaviour and/or belief systems of the six groups were affected by 
the Scottish Parliament. 
Although the civil service and Ministers might be referred to collectively as the Scottish 
Executive, the groups saw it made up of two distinct and separate strands.  There was an 
element of friction between five of the groups and the civil service, mainly because the 
groups felt that the civil service was doggedly trying to retain the authority it had over policy 
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before devolution.  Ministers on the other hand were seen as being an integral dimension of 
the new politics rather than a continuation of the Scottish Office.  The groups were willing to 
support Ministers but were grudging in attitude towards civil servants.  These attitudes were 
evident in their behaviour, as the groups acknowledged that they had not given the civil 
service the attention they knew they should have.  CoSLA was the exception to this but this is 
unsurprising given that the civil servant interviewed spoke of how the groups most important 
to the civil service were those that had a role in implementing policy and local authorities 
would certainly fall into that category.  Therefore, the civil service would have actively 
sought out CoSLA.  Even before devolution CoSLA had a good relationship with the civil 
service, most of CoSLA’s frustrations was with a government that it was not in ideological 
agreement with. 
 
In the early stages of devolution the groups placed a lot of value on the elected components 
of the Scottish Parliament and neglected the civil service.  However, it was evident that the 
groups were realising that new politics did not quite equate to a Parliament powerful enough 
to challenge the Scottish Executive’s dominance and so the currency of lobbying the 
Parliament was going down as the stock of the Scottish Executive (and thus the civil service) 
was going up, therefore making it sensible for the groups to adopt insider group strategies if 
they wanted to achieve their goals.   
 
Objective 2 – the extent to which the different types of institutionalist accounts are applicable 
in explaining the responses of the groups. 
The intentions of the FSB, MS Society, CoSLA and the RSPB were clear in their responses 
to the Scottish Executive – they were manoeuvring themselves to a situation where they 
could work on achieving privileged access with the main policy makers.  Even those groups 
that had originally by-passed the civil service, knew that they would have to change that and 
actually begin to build up good relationships with the civil service.  The groups experiencing 
obstacles to becoming insider groups were prepared to tolerate them for the sake of their 
longer term goals and to use other access points in the political system to boost their position 
meantime.  Obviously, for these four groups rational choice institutionalism is the most 
applicable approach.  Their goals have remained unchanged and they are operating in a way 
that would maximise their own interests. 
 
However, rational choice institutionalism runs into difficulties in explaining the behaviour of 
the SCPO and SPTC.  Yes, they were the smallest two groups and thus lacked the resources 
of the others but on the other hand the SPTC was an active political operator before 
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devolution.  It had regular meetings with civil servants and was part of the Scottish Office’s 
policy networks.  Why if you have limited resources, decide to invest them in parliamentary 
committees when you could have used them to boost existing, albeit declining, relationships 
with the civil service?  Although the SPTC still made sure that it protected the seats it had 
previously attained on advisory groups.  The SPTC had been neither for or against 
devolution.  It would seem that historical institutionalism would be the most applicable 
approach in explaining the SPTC’s behaviour because it made a choice at the time of 
devolution that it would put an emphasis on the new Parliament. 
 
Sociological institutionalism on the other hand appears to be the appropriate theoretical 
approach to explain the behaviour of the SCPO as its reaction to the Scottish Executive 
would indicate that it was not motivated entirely out of self-interest.  The churches had long 
campaigned for a Scottish Parliament and in 1989 the Church of Scotland wanted to see ‘the 
democratic control of Scottish affairs through a Scottish Assembly established with the 
support of the Scottish people’ (Church of Scotland; 1989, p.151).  Having played a 
substantial role in creating the Scottish Parliament, the SCPO was set up primarily by the 
Church of Scotland ‘to build a fruitful relationship with the new Parliament’.  The SCPO had 
always been bound to the Scottish Parliament, not least because the office was solely 
established because of devolution, so it was not surprising that it focused on the new 
elements of the Scottish political system, particularly the committees and MSPs. 
 
Mitchell argues that with all the talk of new politics people concentrated on the Parliament, 
rather than the Scottish Executive despite the fact ‘[p]ower lies in attenuated form in the 
Scottish Parliament’ (2000, p.614).  He says that acknowledging the fact that the Scottish 
Executive is more powerful is not suggesting that the Parliament is powerless but that ‘it does 
raise questions about the nature of meaningful participation’ (ibid.).  This was something that 
had dawned on the groups and for four of them at least, they were putting their money where 
they believed the power was – the Scottish Executive.  But this is not to say that the 
Parliament (especially the committees) was still important to the groups as we shall see in the 
next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 7  COMMITTEES 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The parliamentary committees were the key to the entire ‘new politics’ that devolution was 
intended to establish, particularly in achieving an accessible Scottish Parliament (CSG; 1998, 
p.10).  The committees were to be a hinge between society and the Scottish Executive, to be 
‘key conduits for inserting civic ideas into legislative debates’ – all part of the ‘democratising 
process’ that devolution was to trigger (Arter et al, (a)).  In order to effectively bridge the gap 
between society and the Scottish Executive, the committees were designed to be open, 
accessible and relatively powerful.  Standing Orders were drawn up stating that: they should 
always meet in public unless there was good reasons not to; they should reach out to all 
sections of society; they had the power to initiate their own inquiries and to introduce Bills.  
The devolution campaign had wanted the committees to play a significant part in the power 
sharing process and so they were given more powers than the committees at Westminster and 
as a result the Scottish Parliament committees became ‘the smallest, but most powerful in 
Western Europe’ (Arter et al, (a)).  Henry McLeish (in the parliamentary debate on the CSG 
principles) reassured any doubters that ‘no one need complain that an Executive is simply 
taking decisions on behalf of Scotland; each of the 129 MSPs will have a significant role in 
the committee structure’ (Scottish Parliament (b), col 371).   
   
The CSG authors encouraged the committees to adopt innovative mechanisms ‘appropriate to 
the issue under consideration’ that would enable people to participate and to get involved in 
consultations (1998, p.11).  In this way the committees ‘have learnt to be very 
accommodating for those who find the traditional committee system intimidating, such as 
young people’ (ESRC; 2004, p.4).  The CSG believed that better legislation would be the 
outcome of a more participative system (1998, p.3). 
 
One of the most obvious differences between the Scottish Parliament and Westminster is that 
the Scottish Parliament is unicameral.  This is the legacy of the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention which stated that ‘Scotland’s Parliament will be a single-chamber legislature.  
There will be no role in its legislative process for the House of Lords’ (1995, p.24).  The 
Scottish committee system would therefore necessarily have to be stronger to ‘provide for 
rigorous scrutiny of proposed legislation’ (ibid.).  The Labour government in 1997 (in the 
White Paper “Scotland’s Parliament”) had expressed the intention of having a strong 
committee system in the Scottish Parliament, envisaging that the committees would have the 
power to initiate legislation which Westminster committees could not do.  The CSG built on 
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the foundation that the White Paper had laid and agreed that the Scottish Parliament ‘should 
have all-purpose Committees, combining the Westminster select and Standing Committee 
role’ (Consultative Steering Group; 1998, p.5).  This meant that the Scottish Parliament 
committees had the power to undertake inquiries, consider legislation and scrutinise the 
Scottish Executive (ibid., p.175).   
 
Scrutinising the Scottish Executive had ‘opened up the strategic direction and funding plans 
of all the Executive’s departments to an unprecedented level of scrutiny’ (Scottish Parliament 
(f)).  The committees also have the power to scrutinise quangos and government agencies, 
which prior to the Parliament had very little in the way of outside accountability.  In the 
Scottish Parliament’s Annual Report 2001, George Reid MSP, Convener of the Conveners’ 
Liaison Group (the Convener’s Group was made up of the seventeen committee conveners 
who met to discuss any matters that arose in the committees and George Reid as a Deputy 
Presiding Officer chaired it), states that in line with the CSG’s recommendations ‘the 
committees of the Scottish Parliament have wider powers than those of any national 
legislature in Western Europe apart from some of the Scandinavian democracies’ (Scottish 
Parliament (c)).  Because of the legislative role that the committees have it is no surprise that 
the six groups all had an interest in them. 
 
7.2  Background 
There was a total of seventeen parliamentary committees at January 2003 (although the 
number of committees can change).  Eight of those were ‘mandatory’ committees because 
‘there are certain Committees whose functions are so fundamental to the running of the 
Parliament that these should be required to be established’ (Consultative Steering Group; 
1998, p.26).  The mandatory committees were as follows: Audit, Equal Opportunities, 
European, Finance, Procedures, Public Petitions, Standards and Subordinate Legislation.  The 
CSG also suggested a further eight ‘subject’ committees be established once the Scottish 
Parliament was up and running.  The subject committees (which are of a more political 
nature) were decided after inter-party talks and their remit closely corresponds to ‘the 
structure of the Scottish Executive which would facilitate close scrutiny of Executive actions’ 
(Consultative Steering Group; 1998, p.6).  Eight subject committees were originally set up 
but by January 2001 an extra committee was established when the Justice and Home Affairs 
Committee was split into two committees – the Justice 1 Committee and Justice 2 
Committee.  Unsurprisingly, it is the subject committees that have received the most 
lobbying from the groups. 
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The six groups found the committees to be very accessible and found themselves far more 
involved in the policy-making process than they had ever been.  The accessibility of the 
committees was important as it encouraged the groups to participate in the system, and it also 
resulted in the groups spending more time and resources on the committees than might 
otherwise have been the case. 
  
7.3  Committee membership 
Each committee is made up of a number of MSPs from across the political parties and are 
serviced by a clerking team (see section 7.10 for more detail on the clerks) and by the 
Scottish Parliament’s Information Centre (known as SPICe which assigns researchers to each 
committee).  Prior to January 2001 a significant number of MSPs were sitting on two or three 
committees each, ‘but as they have become increasingly disillusioned by the grind of 
committee work, the Parliament has been forced to review arrangements’ (Leicester; 2002, 
p.39).  The solution was to reduce the committee sizes so that most MSPs would not have to 
serve on more than one committee.   
  
The political balance of each committee was carefully worked out through a formula (the 
d’Hondt formula), which was designed to approximately reflect the make-up of the political 
parties in the Scottish Parliament.  The membership was weighted so that Labour did not 
have a majority on any of the seventeen committees but it had a functioning majority through 
its alliance with its coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats (Lynch; 2001, p.72).  To 
illustrate, in January 2003 the two biggest committees with eleven members each were the 
Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee and the Rural Development Committee; on the 
Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee there were 5 Labour MSPs, 3 SNP, 2 
Conservative and 1 Liberal Democrat and on the Rural Development Committee there were 4 
Labour MSPs, 3 SNP, 2 Conservative and 2 Liberal Democrats.  Although the committees 
claim that they strive for consensus, from an interest group perspective it is in their interest to 
cultivate the Labour and Liberal Democrat MSPs, because when it comes to a vote they will 
carry the day if they vote along party lines (although unlike Westminster Standing 
Committees party whips are not automatically members of every committee). 
 
7.4  Committee conveners 
Each committee is chaired by a convener and in his or her absence by a deputy convener.  
The distribution of the convenerships was different from the Westminster process where the 
party in power automatically held the committee convenership, although the allocation of 
convenerships is still weighted in favour of the biggest party in the Scottish Parliament (Lord 
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Semphill; 2000, p.19).  At the start of the parliamentary session all the committees elected 
their convener and deputy from within their own membership.  However, this choice is 
limited to a particular party which is determined by a prior inter-party agreement about which 
party the conveners of each committee would be drawn from.  Thus in 1999, the parties had 
bargained beforehand that Labour would convene 8 of the original sixteen committees, the 
SNP 4, the Conservatives 2 and the Liberal Democrats 2 (and each party would also have the 
same number of deputy convenerships).  However, when the Justice and Home Affairs 
Committee split into two a row broke out between Labour and the SNP about who would 
convene the newly formed seventeenth committee.  In the end Labour won the vote with the 
support of its coalition partners, the Lib Dems, and also of the Conservatives who had been 
promised the deputy convenership by Labour (BBC News, 20.01.01).  (The deputy conveners 
are not necessarily from the same party as the convener, so for instance, the Social Justice 
Committee had a Labour convener and an SNP deputy convener).   
 
The Scottish Parliament’s guide on “The Role of Committee Convener” acknowledges that 
being ‘chosen by a committee as its convener immediately gives the individual holding that 
post a degree of influence and prominence’ (Scottish Parliament (g), p.1).  The convener is 
responsible for setting the committee’s agenda, allocating time for proceedings, the length of 
time a member can speak for, deciding when to take a decision and so on.  Lynch believed 
that ‘the partisan affiliation of conveners is unimportant’ because the conveners are 
constrained by the rest of the committee.    However, Sandra White (SNP MSP) gave an 
example of why she thought conveners had a key role.  She compared her experiences of 
being on the Social Inclusion, Housing and Voluntary Sector Committee with the Local 
Government Committee, both of which had Labour conveners.  In the former committee she 
felt an inordinate amount of items were taken in private at the behest of the convener.  She 
described how she would attend the committee and ‘told basically what will be taken in 
private before it was even taken to a vote, so right away there was a confrontational attitude 
and that comes from the convener’.  This is in comparison to the Local Government 
Committee where items were only taken in private if there was an ‘exceptional’ reason and 
‘the convener will ask if anyone has any objections, she’ll explain why she wants it taken in 
private’.  This example suggests that the convener can dictate the style and culture of a 
committee to a large degree but as one of the clerks in interview said: ‘the party of the 
convener probably is less important than the convener itself as a person’. 
 
As well as formally having the power to control the committee agenda and what does or does 
not go on it (although for the most part a convener will accept any items the other members 
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request, as the convener needs to have the support of his or her committee in order to fulfil 
their role), the convener also has to take the lead.  One clerk said that: 
‘the programme of work that we decide to draw up for an inquiry, effectively that will 
be the convener and I trying to think what makes sense.  The paper that goes to the 
committee will be from him and it will be what he thinks is right.  Okay, members 
may disagree with things and will change things as well but that’s the starting point.  
You know, that arrangement applies on lots and lots of things’ (personal interview, 
August 2001). 
Murray Tosh, the convener of the Procedures Committee, said that conveners also have to 
read all the papers before the committee, have a sense of where the work is going, reach 
decisions and negotiate solutions.  
 
Another important power given to the convener is that of having the casting vote, so in the 
event of a committee vote being equally split, the convener’s vote is given more weight than 
the other members.  
 
7.5  Lobbying targets  
The conveners do have an important strategic role on the committees and thus should be 
prime targets for interest groups - and to a large extent this is true.  It is interesting to know 
whom the groups view as the key person(s) on the committees as this will have a bearing on 
their strategy and where they concentrate their lobbying resources.  
 
Federation of Small Businesses  
The FSB had made a point of arranging a one to one meeting with the convener and the clerk 
of the Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee early on in the life of the Scottish 
Parliament.  This would suggest that they did regard the convener and clerk as having a 
particular significance on the committee.  However, the FSB valued all the MSPs on the 
committee and so cultivated a relationship with every member, which they felt was 
worthwhile because at the end of the day the entire committee is involved in the decision-
making process.  The FSB sent their briefing papers to everyone on the committee and they 
‘try not to politicise the matter’ (Press and Parliamentary Officer; Procedures Committee (a), 
col 1405).  They were more interested in MSPs sympathetic to the needs of small businesses.  
During the period of participant observation they were beginning to establish who was 
sympathetic towards businesses on the European Committee by studying what people said in 
the committee and by chatting to them informally.  
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Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office 
The key member on a committee for the SCPO ‘would normally be the convener’ but if the 
SCPO was wishing to promote an amendment, the Parliamentary Officer would look to who 
he believed would be the best placed person(s) to do that.  He considered ‘who might 
instinctively be on your side?  Who might be likely to carry the whole committee?  And that 
might not be the same person’.  On a specific issue to do with land reform he: 
‘consciously targeted a Labour backbench member of the committee as maybe being 
more likely to carry the committee than somebody who might have been instinctively 
more strongly on our side from another party’ (personal interview, February 2001). 
 
Multiple Sclerosis Society  
The Director and the Policy Officer at the MS Society had slightly different answers when it 
came to key people on a committee.  The Director replied that ‘it’s the sort of leading lights 
from each party and I suppose if we’re honest the governing party is always going to be a bit 
more important than isolated minorities’.  The Policy Director had more emphasis on the 
cross-party aspect of the committees and he specifically mentioned the group of MSPs that 
the Society had taken pains to cultivate through regular informal meetings.  He also felt that 
depending on the convener’s style of chairing they could also be important.  The Society had 
given the convener of the Health and Community Care Committee ‘some special attention’ 
by asking her for a one to one meeting and arranging for her to shadow an MS nurse. 
   
Scottish Parent Teacher Council 
The SPTC’s Development Manager was unique amongst the groups in that she felt the 
Opposition members were the key people on a committee in relation to the SPTC.  She 
explained that it was ‘interestingly not the chair and never has been the chair.  The SNP 
people have actually always been quite useful; they are more open about taking on issues’.  
She believed that this was unlike Executive party members who saw their role as protecting 
the Executive on the committees. 
‘So therefore if you want to say something different then your routes are often 
through the Opposition members.  I mean on SQA we’d spoken quite a lot with Ian 
Jenkins because he used to be a teacher and therefore he actually had a practical 
understanding of the issues and the SNP people and on some issues with Brian 
Montieth of the Tories’ (personal interview, November 2001). 
 
However, she did not dismiss the convener out of hand because of the convener’s power to 
prevent issues being raised.  She found that when the convener was from one of the 
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Executive parties ‘then they can defend the Executive’s position quite powerfully by moving 
certain things out of order’. 
 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
Both the Convention Manager and the Head of Policy at CoSLA were agreed that the 
convener was the key person on a committee.  The Head of Policy also felt that it was good 
to brief MSPs that were friendly to the local government standpoint and perhaps ‘prime them 
with questions to ask’.  But that strategy varied because sometimes they did ‘a blanket 
briefing to all MSPs who are on the relevant committee and pick it up, sometimes we go with 
the Executive members of that committee’.  Although, the Convention Manager actually felt 
that it would have been beneficial to engage with all MSPs on the committee, as all MSPs 
were involved in the decision-making process. 
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds  
The RSPB’s Head of Advocacy and Media and the Parliamentary Information Officer had 
the same response: they believed that the convener and the clerk, followed by the MSPs who 
were friendly with the RSPB, were the key actors on a committee.  The Parliamentary 
Information Officer said that the convener and the clerk were important because they ‘sit 
down and work out what they are going to take and what the committee is going to do’.  The 
Head of Advocacy and Media explained his answer by saying: 
‘Because the clerk advises not just the convener but all the other MSPs on the 
committee and we are never privileged to hear their advice, but if their advice is that 
the RSPB are a heap of crap then we are less likely to get called to give evidence for 
example, so they are important.  The convener obviously is taking decisions and 
directing committees, and chairing a meeting is a very powerful position.  But then 
after that, what I would call in inverted commas, friends of all the parties ... and we 
will concentrate effort on them on a committee because they are most likely to ask 
questions for us.  They are most likely to appreciate the points that we are making and 
most likely to take up the arguments and argue them powerfully’ (personal interview, 
December 2001). 
 
The Media Officer also felt that the convener was the most important person on the 
committee but the Head of Policy had a different perspective.  He believed that the key 
people were the ‘Executive members because at the end of the day when push comes to 
shove, the whip gets put on all members and if it goes to vote the Executive ones are the key 
ones’.  He acknowledged that the conveners were important to a certain extent but at voting 
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time they were like any other committee member using their vote to back their party line.  
Therefore:  
‘at the end of the day if there is a really contentious thing the most important 
members are the Executive members and I suppose the Executive members who are 
willing to defy the whip and vote against the Executive are the most important that 
there are, but there aren’t any of them’ (personal interview, January 2002). 
 
Summary 
Although the convener had more powers than other MSPs on a committee, it appeared that 
generally, that did not affect the behaviour of the groups per se, instead the groups targeted 
the committees as a whole, although on occasion they did make distinctions between 
committee members, particularly Labour and Liberal Democrat MSPs.  The committees 
made themselves accessible to interest groups so it was easy enough for groups to lobby 
everyone on the committee.  The advantage of lobbying all committee members was that if 
they came to an agreement on the issue at hand then they produce a unanimous report which 
carries more weight.  Another benefit is that it encouraged individual MSPs to go back and 
push for particular issues inside their own parties, all the time applying more pressure on the 
Executive.  The groups believed to varying extents that the committees had the power to 
change things, even if it was agreeing to amendments, so the groups tended to invest 
resources into lobbying all the committee members rather than singling out individual MSPs. 
 
Rational choice institutionalism 
It was perfectly rational for the groups to target an entire committee as every member on it 
has a say in the decision making process, so to only lobby a few members on the committee 
could be a risky strategy, as the more people that support the group’s position the better.  It 
also makes sense for the groups to target particular committee members if they are pivotal 
and if it will increase their chance of success. 
 
Sociological/historical institutionalism 
The parliamentary committees were a completely new and unknown area for all six of the 
groups.  Some of the groups had experience of the Westminster committees but the Scottish 
Parliament committees were a new breed.  The groups saw the committees as a collective 
package and did not see a group of individual MSPs from different parties which was in 
keeping with the ethos that the committees were to work by “consensus”.  Consensual 
politics was the buzz phrase back in 1999 and it was envisioned that MSPs would lay aside 
party differences when they were in committee and focus on the merits of the issue under 
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examination rather than party allegiances.  The groups therefore were responding to the 
expectation that to influence the committees they would have to get the backing of all 
committee members.  However, as time passed it soon became apparent to the groups that the 
committees were not going to operate primarily by consensus when it came to voting time, as 
MSPs generally voted along party lines.  But by then it had become the norm to lobby all 
committee members even if it appeared to be more beneficial to concentrate resources on the 
Labour and Liberal Democrat MSPs as they had the majority vote on all the committees 
(although some Lib Dems tend to be more unpredictable in their voting patterns than their 
Labour colleagues), as well as the convener who has a much bigger say in the operation of 
the committees than any single individual member.   
 
Section 7.6  Legislative functions 
As the committees had the power to initiate their own legislation, it was felt at the beginning 
that this would be a real attraction to interest groups.  But by January 2003 there had only 
been two committee bills: the Justice 1’s Protection from Abuse (Scotland) Bill which 
became an Act in November 2001 and the Standards Committee’s Scottish Parliamentary 
Standards Commissioner Bill which became an Act in 2002.  According to one clerk a 
committee bill could tie the committee up for a year so they needed to ensure that the 
Scottish Executive was not going to introduce a raft of legislation that would fall under their 
remit.  In the main though committee work was split, usually unevenly, between the 
scrutinising of Bills and the instigation of reports/inquiries on topics of their own choosing.  
Some of the committees actually found that they had been so busy with Scottish Executive 
legislation (which they are obliged to scrutinise), that they were struggling to find time to 
fulfil some of their other functions.  Legislation took priority over inquiries and the 
committees have to adhere to a strict timetable which governs legislation (agreed between the 
Parliament and the Scottish Executive), so the committees can only flex their own agenda 
muscles if they have time spare after they fulfil their scrutiny role.  For instance, the Justice 
and Home Affairs Committee was so swamped by Scottish Executive legislation in its first 
year, it did not have the opportunity to do anything else (which is why another justice 
committee was established to help spread the workload).   
 
It was generally at Stage 1 of an Executive Bill (Executive Bills make up most of the 
legislation that goes through the Scottish Parliament) that the committees were of particular 
significance to the interest groups.  Before legislation arrives at a committee, the Scottish 
Executive would have presented the Bill to Parliament accompanied with memoranda that 
outline the objectives of the policy, the potential financial implications of it and a list of 
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everyone it has consulted.  The draft legislation is then assigned to a lead committee and 
perhaps to other interested committees, although two committees looking at the one piece of 
legislation can often lead to an overlap in the work, for instance, both the Health and 
Community Care Committee and the Local Government Committee were looking at the 
Regulation of Care Bill which led to a repetition of witnesses who covered the same ground.  
Once the draft legislation has been designated to the lead committee it is at this point (Stage 
1) that groups actively target the committees, although the groups would have hoped to have 
been involved in the proposed legislation at the drafting stage with the Scottish Executive 
(McFadden and Lazarowicz; 1999, p.44).  At Stage 1 the groups have the opportunity to 
submit written evidence and hopefully an invite to give oral evidence to the committees.   
 
The committee(s) and the clerks go through the written submissions and select some groups 
and individuals to present oral evidence to them.  The groups have to persuade the committee 
of their case; that the proposed legislation will particularly affect the people they represent or 
else submit a very useful submission that grabs attention.  The committee then meet to take 
oral evidence from those they have selected.   (Those meetings and what is said in them go 
on public record in the Scottish Parliament’s Official Report).  After the committee takes all 
the evidence it wants or has time for, it then writes a report stating its recommendations on 
the Bill’s general principles and the report then goes on to inform debate on the proposed 
legislation when the Scottish Parliament meets in plenary session.  The MSPs then vote on 
whether they agree with the proposed legislation’s general principles.  If the Parliament 
approves it in principle it then goes back to the lead committee for Stage 2, which is when the 
committees examine the draft legislation in greater detail, adding amendments and writing 
their final report.  In theory, interest groups have the opportunity to have further input at 
Stage 2 of the legislative process but the committees rarely ever take further oral evidence at 
this stage although groups might still be able to submit written evidence to them.  Persuading 
MSPs to table amendments is a key goal at this stage. 
 
7.6.1  Written evidence 
The parliamentary committees send out a lot of consultation documents and interest groups 
will take the time to read these before deciding whether or not to respond, although if the 
issue under consideration is at all relevant they will put a submission in.  Murray Tosh in his 
role as convener of the Procedures Committee stated in a letter to the SCPO the emphasis the 
committees put on written evidence: 
‘I would like to stress however how enormously important the written material 
received by a committee is to every inquiry.  In complex matters in particular, it can 
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often be a more satisfactory means of obtaining a systematically rigorous view than 
what is often a rather time-constrained witness session’ (extract from a letter to the 
SCPO dated 4 November 2002). 
The committees welcome submissions from interest groups because of their expertise and 
their ability to highlight any ‘potential problems in the drafting, purpose and implementation 
of a Bill’ (Burns; 1999, p.53).  The committees usually have a list of ‘usual suspects’ who 
they almost certainly want to get written evidence from on almost anything that the 
committee does.  An obvious example of this would be the Local Government Committee 
and CoSLA.  The CSG believed that better legislation would be the outcome of a more 
participative system (Consultative Steering Group; 1998, p.3).  The principle is the same with 
committee inquiries where interest groups are actively welcomed to participate because of the 
expertise that they have to offer (and because the committees help the Scottish Parliament to 
fulfil its principles of openness and accessibility).   
 
Submitting written evidence to the parliamentary committees is a skill in itself that all the 
groups had to develop.  Brevity is the key.  The committees have to trawl through a large 
amount of submissions and they do not have the time to read a thirty page report on the topic 
no matter how worthy the material.  The groups need to put across their main points as 
succinctly as they can, the shorter the better but certainly no more than four A4 pages long.  
There is a place for lengthier material however, such as relevant survey results that interest 
groups produce.  One clerk stated that current, reliable survey work that reflected what the 
world was like at that particular moment was ‘really quite important’ and could informally 
influence the committee’s work.     
 
As well as brevity, the clerks and Murray Tosh stated that the committees also looked for 
positive recommendations from written evidence.  Groups who submitted what was largely a 
critique of what was wrong were less likely to be invited to give oral evidence than the 
groups who not only raised concerns but also offered constructive solutions.  They did stress 
that critiques were useful but they did appreciate alternative suggestions.  Mr Tosh said that 
‘simply registering discontent, which a lot of it is, is not the same as coming forward with an 
agenda’.  Johann Lamont (Convener of the Social Justice Committee) said that as well as 
representative and authoritative witnesses, they were looking for information, ‘worked out 
ideas’ and ‘policy’.  She also said that they were looking for authenticity from those who 
were giving the evidence rather than just a clever lobbying technique.  One clerk also pointed 
out the need to make evidence accessible to the MSPs.  Interest groups often forget that 
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MSPs are not usually experts in the field of their committee remit (although the Justice 
Committees do have a high proportion of lawyers on them).   
 
Perhaps the Education, Culture and Sports Committee instructions on written evidence sums 
up best what the groups have to do: 
‘Written evidence should be as concise as possible (3-4 sides) and where appropriate, 
explain the interest or expertise of the person/organisation making the submission.  
The committee welcomes both factual information and recommendations for action 
which it can consider’ (25.02.00, p.1).   
 
7.6.2  Oral evidence 
The groups made the effort to submit written evidence in response to a committee report or 
inquiry that was relevant to them.  Anyone can submit written evidence but only the 
groups/people selected by the committee are called to give oral evidence (and then have that 
evidence published on the Scottish Parliament website).  The written evidence is the trigger 
for being selected to give oral evidence.   
 
The selection of witnesses lies in the hands of the committees although the committee clerks 
and SPICe also have a hand in the process.  SPICe give suggestions for potential witnesses 
and are particularly helpful in choosing academic input, as they knew who is active in a 
particular field and who can write a good report.  The clerks with SPICe draw up an 
indicative list of potential witnesses which they try to make as balanced as possible.  One 
clerk noted that on a witness list for a particularly high profile policy, the clerks and SPICe 
had included witnesses from the private sector to keep things balanced but the committee 
chose to drop those names from the list - ultimately it is the committee members who have 
the final decision on who is picked.   
 
The Senior SPICe Researcher explained that when SPICe draw up their indicative list of 
potential witnesses they first of all look to see who are the most likely people to be involved 
in the policy development.  Within that group SPICe had a hierarchy of those who they think 
would be accomplished at giving evidence ‘rather than the ones who might be quite 
knowledgeable but might not give you very good evidence’.  They look to groups or 
individuals who have a command of their subject and who have produced some robust work.  
(SPICe will accept information from anybody although they do not guarantee that they use it,  
‘but the more we know about what is out there, the more we are able to make better informed 
judgments about who should go and speak to the committee’).  They then put forward their 
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list of suggestions to the committee.  But like the clerks, the SPICe researcher made a point 
of saying that it is the MSPs who make the final decision and that MSPs often add or subtract 
names.  He said that some MSPs had their own particular agenda, for example one might 
have an interest ‘to do with employees and peddles that in every possible way, oh we’d better 
get Unison in or better get this person in, even if they might not be relevant to what you are 
looking at’. 
 
Murray Tosh described the selection process on how witnesses were chosen within the 
Procedures Committee: 
‘Ultimately it would be the committee but you would expect usually that the clerk and 
the convener will have some ideas and maybe whittle it down and present some 
options to the committee to discuss who they want to meet up with.  On this particular 
one [inquiry into CSG principles], the committee clerk and I are doing most of the 
selection but the committee members are aware of who has responded and who has 
asked to come.  They have all been asked if there is anybody here who you would like 
us to interview or would like us not to interview. …  So the committee members are 
as involved in that as much as they want to be, which is I think by and large - they are 
happy me doing it’ (personal interview, October 2001).   
 
The committees invite groups to give oral evidence if, as already mentioned above, they have 
offered positive recommendations as to what can be done, rather than just a document 
outlining their criticisms.  The committees also endeavour to choose representative groups – 
‘basically you look to see if they have got a wide membership and if they are actually 
representing the groups that they say they are’ (Sandra White SNP MSP).  One clerk also 
said that they tended to look for umbrella groups because they ‘might be slightly more 
representative, they can see a broader spectrum of what is required’ whereas smaller groups 
may have a narrower perspective which ‘may be to the detriment of somebody else’.  They 
want to choose people who have authority and substance on the subject.  Murray Tosh said 
that the Procedures Committee, like the other committees tended to go for the known 
organisations because: 
‘it is often difficult to get beyond the usual suspects because the usual suspects are in 
touch and are resourced to handle proceedings.  And I’ve been on a committee where 
I’ve seen people come from much further away from the system and they have much 
less to say.  They don’t really have the research, the breadth in their approach’ 
(personal interview, October 2001).   
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Two clerks noted that their particular committees also really liked to hear anecdotal evidence 
from people who had gone through a particular experience and it was this evidence that they 
tended to remember later on.  Although academics are often selected as well because they are 
seen as being dispassionate about issues and more likely to give analysis than make a case.   
 
Natural justice is also part of the selection process - if there was an investigation into water 
charges, then the water boards would have to be invited to give their side or if there was an 
inquiry into university funding then the Scottish Higher Educational Funding Council would 
be called to give oral evidence.   
 
All six of the groups sought selection to give oral evidence as it was seen as a good 
opportunity to persuade the committee(s) of their case and there also seemed to be an element 
of prestige in being called to give oral evidence.  In fact one Labour MSP, Kenneth 
Macintosh felt compelled to comment that: 
‘Organisations place great stock on giving oral evidence.  I am not sure what your 
experience of giving evidence is, but if written evidence is read and taken in, it can be 
more productive than oral evidence sessions’ (Procedures Committee (a), Col 1417). 
 
Apparently, because of the time constraints that the committees faced, the practice of 
drawing up lists inviting witnesses for oral evidence was sometimes done before the 
committees had even received any written submissions.  The SCPO’s Parliamentary Officer 
wrote a letter expressing his concern about this practice to Murray Tosh as convener of the 
Procedures Committee.  Mr Tosh wrote back and said that: 
‘It does seem preferable for committees to determine the final list of oral witnesses in 
the light of the interest revealed via the general call for evidence, but timetabling 
considerations on legislative work may mean that this is not always possible’ (letter to 
SCPO). 
He also added that: 
‘it is the case that, as committees become more experienced, their ability to anticipate 
their witness lists accordingly are bound to improve.  I do not suggest that this ever 
will, or should, determine the final arrangements, or that committees should not give 
serious consideration to everyone who expresses a desire to speak, only that it is 
likely to be the outcome of committees’ growing expertise in their fields and 
maturity’ (letter to SCPO).  
 
 158
7.7  Impact on workload 
This section will look at how the committees specifically impacted on the workload of the six 
groups.  Not that things are as clear-cut as dividing the impact of the workload between the 
committees, MSPs and the Scottish Executive.  For instance, the majority of Bills in the 
Parliament are initiated by the Scottish Executive but are then passed to the parliamentary 
committees for further examination and evidence gathering.  So although it is the committee 
asking groups to submit evidence, the source of the legislation is usually from the Scottish 
Executive.  But as all legislation is required to go through the committees it is relevant to 
look at how this stage of the legislative process affected the groups at the time of participant 
observation. 
  
Federation of Small Businesses 
The FSB dealt primarily with the Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee and during 
the Scottish Parliament’s first year it was the only committee that the FSB had regular 
sustained contact with.  The FSB had devoted a lot of time into cultivating relationships with 
the committee and they had established good contacts with everyone on it by attending 
committee meetings as observers, setting up meetings with members, sending out briefings 
and providing information to the MSPs. 
 
Contact with other committees such as the Local Government Committee and the Transport 
and the Environment Committee was on an ad hoc basis.  In this way they got in touch ‘as 
necessary, when there is a Bill coming up, we will look at the Bill and if it is interesting to 
small businesses then we will get in contact with them’ (Policy Convener).  This meant that 
they had to monitor the activity of all the committees in case anything relevant to them came 
up, which they either did themselves via the parliamentary website or via the public affairs 
companies they hired.  The FSB decided early on that they were not going to be able to 
manage the time consuming task of monitoring all the committees on top of their other work, 
and this was one of the reasons why they hired the services of a public affairs company. 
 
In the future the FSB were looking to ‘be more involved’ with the European Committee 
(Deputy Press and Parliamentary Officer).  In order to do this they had asked the committee 
clerk to pass on to them any details of the committee’s agendas, inquiries and so on.  They 
were also going to monitor the committee’s activity and were in the process of identifying 
MSPs on its membership that were sympathetic to small businesses.   
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Written submissions involved a lot of work because of the reading of all necessary 
documents, the collation of members’ opinions and the actual drafting of a response.  
Responses to legislation or committee inquiries also became the catalyst behind the writing 
of some of the FSB’s bigger reports.  
 
The FSB also responded to the more imaginative ways that the Enterprise and Lifelong 
Learning Committee tried to reach out to civic society by attending events like Business in 
the Chamber, where the committee invited lots of businesses to a day event in order to get 
feedback on an interim report the committee had compiled on economic development.   
   
Oral evidence 
The FSB submitted written evidence regularly but they particularly valued giving oral 
evidence.  The FSB’s Policy Convener stated that he highly rated oral evidence because of 
the benefits of being there in person to present the facts.  But he did caution that it was not 
necessarily an easy task and ‘you’ve got to know your homework.  You’ve got to know 
because they’ll tear you apart if they think you are trying to bluff it’.   
 
From the table below it can be seen that the FSB had been successful in being invited to give 
oral evidence, gaining a total of fourteen appearances over the course of the first three years 
of the Parliament.  Unsurprisingly, it was to the Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee 
that the FSB had given most of their evidence to, followed by the Local Government 
Committee (local councils collect the rates for business premises and so on). 
 
FSB oral evidence from July 1999 until week ending 8th November 2002. 
COMMITTEES 1999 2000 2001 2002 TOTAL
Enterprise & Lifelong Learning 1 2 0 2 5 
Finance 0 0 1 0 1 
Local Government 1 1 1 1 4 
Procedures 0 0 0 1 1 
Rural Development 0 0 0 1 1 
Transport & the Environment 0 1 1 0 2 
TOTAL 2 4 3 5 14 
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Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office 
The SCPO was primarily interested in the work of the Social Justice (formerly Social 
Inclusion, Housing and Voluntary Sector) Committee.  Almost everything that the committee 
studied was of relevance to the SCPO.  The Justice and Home Affairs Committee (now split 
into Justice 1 and 2) came a close second.  Like the other groups, the SCPO kept an eye on 
the work of all the committees just in case a topic of importance cropped up in one that the 
SCPO did not usually interact with.  This meant that the Parliamentary Officer spent a lot of 
time monitoring committee activity.  This allowed him to keep abreast of what was 
happening and he could also pass on important information to relevant people within the 
churches, as well as advertising it generally in the SCPO’s monthly updates on the Scottish 
Parliament.  The updates covered nineteen topics that the churches were particularly 
interested in such as debt, housing, education, drugs and nursing homes.  Monitoring the 
committees also meant that the SCPO could flag the churches’ interest in a piece of 
legislation with a committee at the earliest possible stage.  When the Social Inclusion, 
Housing and Voluntary Sector Committee had homelessness on its agenda, the SCPO’s 
Parliamentary Officer (through the auspices of the churches Social Inclusion Network) raised 
their interest to the committee at the very start and so they were amongst the first round of 
witnesses who were invited to give oral evidence.   
 
Another time-consuming task that the committees created for the SCPO was the summarising 
of committee discussions.  If a Bill or an inquiry was of interest to the churches the SCPO 
had to keep them fully up-to-date on progress.  The Regulation of Care (Scotland) Bill was 
hugely important to the churches that ran homes for the elderly, therefore the SCPO had to 
study every stage of the Bill.  This involved looking at all the relevant sessions of the Health 
and Community Care Committee (the lead committee) and the Local Government 
Committee, which was also scrutinising the Bill.  The SCPO trawled through all the 
information and then produced a short summary of the main issues, what witnesses said, the 
leanings of committee members and so on.  This information with details of the proposed Bill 
was then sent out as a briefing paper to those within the churches.   
 
The SCPO distributed a comprehensive report on all the committees at the end of the 
parliamentary year, detailing every meeting taken in private, every issue that was discussed, 
who gave evidence, what inquiries were carried out that year and other pertinent points 
relating to the work of the committees.  This involved taking detailed notes every week of the 
seventeen committees. 
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As the SCPO primarily carried out a facilitating role for the churches, part of the 
Parliamentary Officer’s job was to build up relationships between a committee and the 
corresponding people in the churches.  For instance, he tried to ensure that the MSPs on the 
Education, Culture and Sports Committee were acquainted with the key church people 
dealing with education issues.  This also involved advising church people on how to 
approach the committees and set up meetings. 
 
The SCPO also spent a reasonable amount of time responding to committee consultations and 
submitting written evidence.  This obviously involved reading the relevant parliamentary 
documents, co-ordinating a response that all the churches could agree to, or else on issues on 
which the churches were divided, the Parliamentary Officer had to submit several responses 
and assist churches with their own individual responses.  In the SCPO’s 2000 Annual Report 
the Parliamentary Officer wrote that: 
‘In common with many bodies, churches are at times struggling to keep pace with the 
opportunities to respond to consultation papers from the Scottish Executive and 
Parliament’ (SCPO (c), p.1). 
 
The SCPO also participated in events organised by committees.  For instance, the Social 
Inclusion, Housing and Voluntary Sector Committee wrote to the Parliamentary Officer 
inviting him to attend an Open Day where various interested groups were going to discuss 
what they would like to see on the committee’s agenda in the future.  So these less frequent 
means of consultation also added to the SCPO’s workload. 
 
Oral evidence 
The Parliamentary Officer felt that the committees wanted to hear from groups who were 
experienced, had a specialisation and had evidence to support their claims.  So for example, 
the churches could tell a committee what was happening in hostels for the homeless, what 
asylum seekers were saying to the church agency working with them and so on. 
 
When it came to evidence the SCPO did not wait for the committees to ask, instead the 
Parliamentary Officer put a request in to them.  When the Scottish Parliament had just begun 
and the committees were still settling in to a way of working the procedure was that groups 
had to get in as quickly as possible if they wanted to give evidence, as at the start it was often 
a case of first come, first served according to the Parliamentary Officer. 
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For the SCPO, oral evidence provided more work as the Parliamentary Officer had to instruct 
individuals who were representing individual churches or church organisations on how best 
to put their case to the committees and to prepare them for what they could expect from the 
committee. 
 
The SCPO’s Parliamentary Officer felt that the biggest benefit of giving oral evidence was 
that ‘anybody is more persuaded by direct communication than by something on paper.  You 
can give detail on paper but to persuade, I think face to face is more likely’.  But like the 
FSB’s Policy Convener he too warned that you could not just go in to the committee meeting 
unprepared and that ‘you need to make sure you get the right people giving evidence.  People 
need to be very well briefed because you can undermine your case by looking stupid’.  
Sometimes the experience of giving oral evidence could be a somewhat unpleasant 
experience.  The SCPO’s written submission to the Procedures Committee inquiry into the 
CSG principles stated that: 
‘While those who have given evidence on behalf of churches have generally felt the 
experience positive in terms of the Clerks’ briefing in advance and the Committees’ 
questioning and listening, there have been concerns about the treatment of 
“witnesses”, who have occasionally felt under a level of cross-examination that goes 
beyond robust questioning about material presented towards a courtroom model of 
establishing a case’ (taken from a personal copy of the SCPO’s submission). 
 
The SCPO officially had only given oral evidence on one occasion to the Procedures 
Committee for the CSG inquiry.  However, this is slightly misleading in that the 
Parliamentary Officer had given oral evidence at least twice more but under the auspices of 
the Scottish Land Reform Convention (to the Justice and Home Affairs Committee in 
November 1999) and as part of the Third Sector Policy Officers Network (to the Standards 
Committee in February 2001).  It was only very rarely that all the denominations that the 
office represented had a common stance and so the opportunities for the Parliamentary 
Officer to give oral evidence on their behalf was limited. 
 
SCPO oral evidence from July 1999 until week ending 8th November 2002. 
COMMITTEES 1999 2000 2001 2002 TOTAL 
Procedures  0 0 0 1 1 
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Multiple Sclerosis Society 
The MS Society almost exclusively focused on the Health and Community Care Committee 
and at the time of participant observation did not foresee this changing, as it was the 
committee that was most likely to cover issues that were relevant to people with multiple 
sclerosis.  In their July 2000 newsletter they informed their members that the Director and 
Policy Officer had ‘attended their first meeting of the vital Health and Community Care 
Committee, to get a feel for how it operates’ (MS Society (b), p.3).  Before attending it, they 
also read up on the minutes of the previous committee meetings as another way of getting a 
feel for the committee.  The Policy Officer’s objectives for 2001 listed the Health and 
Community Care Committee as one of his main parliamentary targets (along with health 
spokespersons from the parties and particular MSPs).  Although, at the time of participant 
observation (May 2001) the committee had discussed very little that was of relevance to the 
MS Society, so as a result the Society had not submitted many written contributions to it. 
 
Other committees had occasionally been of relevance to the Society such as the Social 
Inclusion Committee and the Transport and the Environment Committee.  The Transport 
Committee may be an odd committee for a health group to look at but the Transport Bill was 
of interest because it dealt with disabled parking.  The Director in April 2001 had also 
submitted a seven page contribution to the Health and Community Care Committee’s Inquiry 
for the Scottish Budget 2002 – 2003 in a bid to get more funding for MS services and he 
commented that he had spent a significant amount of time and effort on that.  Overall though, 
the Director stated that the Society had only submitted written evidence to the committees a 
total of four times (at the time of participant observation).   
 
Oral evidence 
At the time of participant observation the MS Society had not been asked to give oral 
evidence but were hoping that they would soon have the opportunity to do so.  Both the 
Director and the Policy Officer felt that oral evidence would have more of an impact on the 
committee than written evidence and thus one of their aims for that year was to be called to 
give oral evidence to the Health and Community Care Committee.  Up until the week ending 
8th November 2002 this aim had not been achieved but on the 18th December 2001 they had 
the opportunity to make a presentation to the Public Petitions Committee to support the 
submission of their petition on the availability of a drug called beta interferon for people with 
MS. 
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MS Society oral evidence from July 1999 until week ending 8th November 2002. 
COMMITTEES 1999 2000 2001 2002 TOTAL 
Public Petitions* 0 0 1 0 1 
*It was a presentation rather than formal oral evidence 
 
Scottish Parent Teacher Council 
The SPTC primarily focused on the Education, Culture and Sport Committee. Although 
‘periodically and occasionally’ the Development Manager had attended the Enterprise and 
Lifelong Learning Committee, and had submitted written evidence on post-16 education to it, 
for the most part, however, the Education, Culture and Sports Committee was its main target 
as it dealt with school education.  The committee had dealt with several major education 
issues, including the repeal of Section 28, the SQA crisis and the Education Bill.  The SPTC 
had submitted contributions on those issues and kept progress of committee meetings through 
the website (‘you actually do have to keep an eye on the website’) and also made the most of 
the office’s proximity to the Scottish Parliament by attending many committee meetings as 
an observer.  If a ‘relevant and mainstream’ issue came up then the Development Manager 
tended ‘to go along and often have informal chats with people’.   
 
Another task prompted by the committees was the dissemination of information to the SPTC 
membership.  For instance, one of the clerks to the Education Committee wrote to the 
Development Manager in March 2000 stating that the committee would:  
‘welcome written evidence from individuals or organisations on any aspect of the 
remit.  I would be most grateful if you could publicise this to PTAs, any of whom are 
welcome to contribute to the inquiry’ (taken from a letter to the SPTC). 
As well as alerting particular individuals who she thought would wish to contribute, the other 
way of publicising committee activities was through the SPTC newsletter Backchat.  This 
involved writing up articles and explaining the issues that the committees were discussing. 
 
Oral evidence 
The Development Manager of the SPTC was in no doubt that ‘oral evidence is very 
important’ because the ‘whole point about giving oral evidence is that they then read your 
written evidence’.  She believed that due to the various time pressures on committee 
members, they actually paid very little attention to the written evidence and only took it 
seriously once they had to prepare their questions for an oral evidence taking session.  This 
came home to her during the Clause 28 furore when the SPTC had sent out information to 
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MSPs but it was not until she was selected to give oral evidence that the MSPs actually read 
it. 
 
Normally the Development Manager or the SPTC convener (or both together) represented the 
SPTC in parliamentary committees, but if an issue came up where a member would be better 
placed to give evidence then she would put them forward.  The Development Manager did 
her homework on how best to give oral evidence.  Before her first experience of giving 
evidence (on the Education Bill) she ‘went to all the previous hearings of people giving 
evidence and I noticed how some people blew it’.  So having studied others and taken notes 
of best practice as well as becoming acquainted with all the arguments she went in fully 
prepared and better able to give an effective case as she felt that ‘a lot would ride on that 
initial evidence that we gave’.   She also added that if the SPTC was asked to give oral 
evidence they always agreed to go, ‘even if you’ve got nothing to say, you never say no’.   
 
She thought the difficulty of getting selected to give oral evidence was that ‘inevitably they 
go to the main interest groups which are the key players’.  Considering that the SPTC office 
was run by three part-time members of staff they still managed to get selected for oral 
evidence six times by 8th November 2002.  Asked about the likelihood of being selected to 
give oral evidence the Development Manager replied that the committees tended to go for 
key people ‘so if you have what you think is a very important issue or contribution to make 
but are not one of those obvious key people then you tend not to be heard’.                                              
 
SPTC oral evidence from July 1999 until week ending 8th November 2002. 
COMMITTEES 1999 2000 2001 2002 TOTAL 
Education, Culture & Sport 0 3 0 2 5 
Justice 2 0 0 0 1 1 
TOTAL 0 3 0 3 6 
 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
CoSLA, because it represented local government was obviously most interested in the Local 
Government Committee, although it did also have dealings with most of the 17 committees, 
as many other topics affect local government such as education, social work, transport and so 
on.  A covenant (similar to the one that already existed between CoSLA and the Scottish 
Executive) was being drawn up to formalise the relationship between CoSLA and the 
Scottish Parliament.  The draft covenant (so wording may change or be omitted altogether in 
the final version) recognised that a lot of the legislation from the Scottish Parliament would 
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have an impact on local government.  Therefore it stated that it was primarily through the 
committees that ‘there will be active involvement of local government on both the principle 
and practice of any proposals which impact upon local government’ (CoSLA (c), p.3).  
Compared to the other five groups in this research CoSLA certainly had frequent active 
involvement in the committees as demonstrated in the table below detailing CoSLA’s oral 
evidence. 
 
As the work of so many committees was relevant to CoSLA it spent an enormous amount of 
its time organising submissions to the committees.  At the time of participant observation 
(November/December 2001) CoSLA had not kept track of the number of times it had given 
evidence due to its heavy workload and internal re-structuring.  But it was currently in the 
process of organising a system which would allow it to do so in the future, but it was in no 
doubt that the committees had added to its workload (which is supported by the amount of 
times they have given oral evidence).  The submission of the CoSLA Management Team to 
the organisation’s 2001 Annual Review stated that the:  
‘Parliamentary committees are very active and this has meant a great deal of activity 
in terms of presenting both written and oral evidence with the consequent time 
investment in preparing papers and briefing notes’ (CoSLA (b), Appendix 2).  
CoSLA was so busy responding to consultations that the Convention Manager said they were 
largely reactive to the Scottish Parliament and while she would like that to change, she did 
not know if that would be possible.  The level of committee work was such that CoSLA were 
often forced to submit bland responses as they did not have (or had not been given) enough 
time to do real justice to the issues under scrutiny.  In common with other groups submitting 
written evidence it was not always as simple as one person within the office writing the 
contribution, as CoSLA had to consult with all interested parties within the organisation and 
it took time ‘persuading and cajoling local authorities to respond to national proposals and 
initiatives’ (CoSLA (b), p.30).  The Convention Manager said that she found herself 
actioning either written or oral evidence at least once a week.  CoSLA did not spend much 
time monitoring the committees mainly because they had neither the time or staff to do so but 
also because they felt there was no need, as the committees always got in touch with them 
anyway. 
 
CoSLA compiled a massive report of 250+ pages (“Putting the local into local government 
finance”) for the Local Government Committee’s inquiry into local government finance.  At 
the end of a news release at the “Notes to editors” section it stated that: 
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‘CoSLA has campaigned for a long time for a review of local government finance and 
welcomes the Local Government Committee’s decision to undertake an inquiry – 
something the Executive refused to do’ (CoSLA (d), p.2). 
So while in one sense the 250 page report was the result of a committee inquiry, CoSLA was 
using the inquiry as an opportunity to get their message across to the Executive hence the 
detailed document and all the manpower that involved.  The Acting Chief Executive 
explained that because of the significance of the inquiry, CoSLA  ‘set up a variety of working 
groups bringing in contributions from every Council and spanning all of the political parties 
within the Convention, officers and advisers’ to produce what he called ‘a telephone book of 
evidence’.  CoSLA then gave oral evidence on the inquiry and followed that up by getting 
MSPs to ask a series of parliamentary questions on the issue.  So the committee inquiry 
provided a channel for CoSLA to put pressure on Ministers. 
 
Oral evidence 
CoSLA was perhaps in the enviable position that it ‘tends to get invited automatically’ (Head 
of Policy) by the Local Government Committee to give oral evidence.  Therefore, CoSLA 
was giving evidence fairly constantly and there were no signs of that letting up according to 
the Convention Manager.  She believed that oral evidence was a good thing because it gave 
MSPs an opportunity to ask local councils how a policy would operate in practice, how it 
would affect a particular area and what the practical consequences of such a policy would be.  
If the matter under discussion in the committees was of a politically divisive nature, such as 
free personal care for the elderly or proportional representation for local elections, then 
CoSLA would put forward councillors as witnesses because of their positions as elected 
members of local government. 
 
Since the parliamentary committee meetings started meeting from July 1999 until the week 
ending 8th November 2002 CoSLA had given evidence a whopping 72 times to parliamentary 
committees.  In terms of workload the committees were a heavy burden because behind every 
oral evidence session, a written submission with the necessary preparation had gone before it.  
The table below shows that the Local Government Committee commanded the largest 
number of appearances, with CoSLA appearing before it a total of twenty-three times since 
the committee first met.  The Education, Culture and Sport Committee come second but it 
was a long way behind with a total of nine CoSLA appearances.  There were only two out of 
the seventeen committees that CoSLA had not given evidence to - the Audit and Public 
Petitions Committees. 
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CoSLA oral evidence from July 1999 until week ending 8th November 2002. 
COMMITTEE 1999 2000 2001 2002 TOTAL 
Audit     0 
Education, Culture and Sport 1 3 1 4 9 
Enterprise & Lifelong Learning 1  1 1 3 
Equal Opportunities   1 1 2 
European 1 2 1 2 6 
Finance    2 2 
Health & Community Care  1 2  3 
Justice 1   1 1 2 
Justice 2    1 1 
Local Government 1 7 9 6 23 
Procedures    1 1 
Public Petitions     0 
Rural Affairs (until Dec 2000)/ 
Rural Development (from Jan 2001) 
 2  1 3 
Social Inclusion, Housing & 
Voluntary Sector (until Dec 2000)/ 
Social Justice (from Jan 2001) 
1 2 2 3 8 
Standards  1 1  2 
Subordinate Legislation     0 
Transport and the Environment 3 2  2 7 
TOTAL 8 20 19 25 72 
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds  
The RSPB’s main targets were the Transport and the Environment Committee and the Rural 
Development Committee, as they covered most of the policy areas that the RSPB dealt with, 
such as wildlife, fisheries, farming and the environment.  The European Committee came 
third in terms of relevance to the RSPB.  For those three committees any time they ‘have got 
anything in relation to what the RSPB is doing, we get in touch so they know what we are 
saying’ (Parliamentary Information Officer).  But because relevant issues did arise in other 
committees, the RSPB did monitor all seventeen of the committees.  For instance, the RSPB 
was interested in the Local Government Bill because it had a section containing a 
biodiversity action plan which the RSPB was interested in so it spent time following the work 
of the Local Government Committee, which it did not normally do. 
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When the Scottish Parliament opened the RSPB decided to appoint Lead Policy Officers 
(LPOs) to act as spokespersons on each particular area that the RSPB worked in.  Amongst 
other things the LPOs had to become adept at presenting evidence to the parliamentary 
committees both in written and oral form, a job that was added to their normal workload.  
The Head of the Advocacy and Media Unit commented that they had submitted evidence and 
briefings on every Bill that had been of interest to them which ‘must run to at least a third of 
the Bills, I’d say more, probably nearer half of the Bills’. 
 
The LPOs also drafted briefing papers but were assisted in these activities by the Advocacy 
and Media Unit which checked the briefing papers to ensure they were worded properly and 
directed to the right audience.  The Unit frequently discussed with the LPOs what was going 
on in the Scottish Parliament and what needed to be done so that everyone was up to speed 
on current issues.  An internal review of the RSPB’s work over the course of the Scottish 
Parliament’s second year stated that: ‘Our work with the Committees of Parliament has, 
similarly become more intense and more detailed.  Parliamentary briefings have developed in 
number and quality’.  The RSPB frequently briefed the Rural Development Committee and 
the Transport and the Environment Committee, as well as investing time in talking to the 
conveners of the committees and maintaining good relationships with the committee 
members.  The Head of Advocacy and Media had tried to ensure that RSPB briefings were 
accessible to the politicians and that above all else they were brief.  ‘Never more than two 
sides of A4 for the politicians.  They don’t have time.  They get vast, vast amounts of stuff.’  
So he hoped that the MSPs’ researchers would read them and then pass them on to the MSPs 
(as it is generally the researchers that sift through MSPs’ mail). 
 
As well as contributing submissions, the RSPB monitored the committees on a daily basis.  
The Advocacy and Media Unit’s first task each morning was to compile a parliamentary and 
press update which featured the work of the committees.  The Parliamentary Information 
Officer would advertise upcoming committee meetings that were of interest to the RSPB and 
then the next day the update described what actually took place at the meeting.  The daily 
updates were then compressed into a weekly report for the RSPB employees to digest to keep 
them up to date of current policy developments. 
 
The RSPB also used the Public Petitions Committee to further their case for a new wildlife 
law.  This involved getting petition signatures (the RSPB collected 8,000) and gathering them 
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together before they presented the petition to the Public Petitions Committee on 21 June 2001 
(RSPB (b), p.1).   
 
Any important and/or interesting parliamentary committee activity had to be reported back to 
RSPB members and this was mainly done through the Society’s newsletter and via the media. 
 
Oral evidence 
The RSPB was in the opposite situation to CoSLA as it was struggling to get selected to give 
evidence, unless it was under the auspices of LINK (an umbrella organisation for 
environmental groups).  The RSPB felt that there had been times when it should have been 
called to give oral evidence but was not because some committees preferred to consult 
umbrella groups on environmental issues.  To try and promote the RSPB, the Head of 
Advocacy and Media would flag up the RSPB for selection for oral evidence to the 
committee convener or clerk (or in the case of the Rural Development Committee the sub-
group of three who decided who would be invited to give oral evidence). 
 
Like the SPTC, the Head of Advocacy and Media asked the question ‘how much written 
evidence is actually read?’  He hoped that all material sent to the committees was being read 
by the MSPs ‘but if I confidently said those hopes were fulfilled I would be lying because I 
know how busy politicians are’.  So oral evidence meant you got heard.  Not only that but:  
‘if you’ve got a real good performer in front of a committee, talking to people and 
they are on the ball and they don’t get distracted, that’s probably the most effective 
political communication’ (personal interview, December 2001).   
However, he too was of the opinion that oral evidence had its pitfalls as it was subject to 
derailment by MSPs who might drag a witness from the path that they were hoping to take.  
The Parliamentary Information Officer also pointed out that an advantage of oral evidence 
was that it got published on the web giving others the chance to read what the Society’s 
stance was on various issues.   
 
Under its own auspices the RSPB had only given oral evidence four times which was 
surprisingly low considering the size of the organisation in terms of its membership and staff 
numbers.  The Head of Policy Operations commented that there were ‘some individual 
members of some committees who are antagonistic to environmental arguments or to the 
RSPB’.   
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RSPB oral evidence from July 1999 until week ending 8th November 2002. 
COMMITTEES 1999 2000 2001 2002 TOTAL
Public Petitions* 0 0 1 0 1 
Rural Development 0 0 1 1 2 
Transport & the Environment 0 1 0 0 1 
TOTAL 0 1 2 1 4 
*It was a presentation rather than giving evidence 
 
Summary 
There was no doubt that the committees had affected the workload of the groups and 
furthermore that the work had become a priority for the groups.  The impact was remarkably 
similar on the six groups, as they tended to pay special attention to one or two committees 
whilst keeping an eye on the activity of most of the committees.  The groups went out of their 
way to submit written evidence, they highly valued oral evidence and strived to get selected 
for it and they wrote and sent briefing papers to all the committee members.  The differences 
in workload related to the breadth of legislation and issues the committees were considering.  
CoSLA’s workload in relation to the committees was dramatic because local government has 
a big interest in many areas.  For some of the groups the scale of committee work resulted in 
a complete overhaul of their workload in order to make way for this new area of work. 
 
Rational choice institutionalism 
Once the working practices of the Scottish Parliament and the committees had become settled 
and known, the groups were able to calculate the strategy that would suit them best and they 
decided that it would be in their best interests to lobby as many channels as possible to 
influence policy.  It was easier for the groups to have an input into the work of the 
committees than with the Scottish Executive and the committees had the capability to amend 
legislation. 
 
The groups were all subjected to the same formal committee rules (such as submission 
deadlines) and so they behaved in similar, predictable ways but this was beneficial to them as 
it reduced their costs as they knew how other groups would act. 
 
Sociological institutionalism 
At the start of the Scottish Parliament, some of the groups felt that if they did not respond to 
one consultation, they would not be asked to respond to the next one and this initially 
prompted them to write submissions that were not the best use of their time.  Because it was a 
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brand new political institution there was a lot of uncertainty about how things worked, for the 
politicians within it as well as the interest groups outside it.  In such conditions, sociological 
institutionalism puts the reaction of the groups down to institutional isomorphism for 
coercive reasons - they felt pressured to act in a certain way by the committees.  However, as 
time passed and the rules became apparent the groups stopped responding to everything and 
became more focused but they still imitated each other in how they interacted with the 
committees.  Again, this was because of institutional isomorphism but this time for normative 
reasons, as the groups decided to adopt what was perceived as the best working practice.  
Monitoring all seventeen committees was seen as good practice and all six groups shared the 
belief that oral evidence was highly desirable and that committee work in general was 
important. 
 
Historical institutionalism 
Like sociological institutionalism the historical approach also concentrates on conventions 
and norms that are part of the fabric of an institution and so the committees had a similar 
effect on all the groups because they had to learn the “institutional script”.  This prompted 
them to respond in particular ways, even if it was not entirely rational, such as the dash to get 
written submissions in on time at the expense of other work and the submission of bland or 
sub-standard responses, all in an attempt to meet tight deadlines.  The committees managed 
to not only shape the strategies of the groups but also their goals, for instance the desire to get 
selected for oral evidence.  The groups wanted to be favoured by the committees.   
 
7.8  Criticisms 
Three main criticisms of the Scottish Parliament’s committee system became apparent over 
the course of participant observation - the increasing tendency of committees to meet in 
private and therefore denying groups access to what was being said, the tight deadlines 
committees gave for written submissions and the frequency with which MSPs were taken off 
one committee and put on another.  The CSG had envisaged MSPs serving on one committee 
for an entire parliamentary term (i.e. four years) in order to give them enough time to build 
up expertise in the areas that their committees covered and thus more effective in their 
scrutiny role.  The reality proved to be very different with committee membership resembling 
a game of musical chairs as party managers shunted their MSPs around.  For the groups, the 
result of this high committee turnover was that they spent valuable time building up 
relationships with MSPs and then had to start all over again when a new MSP joined the 
committee.  Indeed, by early February 2001 when Johann Lamont was interviewed she had 
already been on four committees – Equal Opportunities, Local Government, Education, 
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Culture and Sport and finally the Social Justice Committee.  Although to be fair, those 
changes were exaggerated by unforeseen circumstances.  In three years there were as many 
First Ministers with the consequent reshuffles, there was also a change in the SNP leadership 
and then the size of the committees were reduced.  All those changes resulted in the 
Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Committee having an almost complete turnover of its 
membership with only three of the original eleven members left on the committee by the end 
of 2001.   
 
The decision of some parties early on in the Parliament to appoint their party spokesperson to 
the relevant committee also meant that membership would change whenever a portfolio 
exchanged hands.  For instance, the SNP’s Finance Spokesperson Andrew Wilson was 
serving on the Finance Committee but when he took on a different role he not only passed on 
the finance portfolio to his successor Alasdair Morgan but also his place on the committee.   
 
Another reason (although smaller in scale) why committee membership changes is that on 
occasion party managers see fit to remove those they see as awkward individuals.  Murray 
Tosh said the famous example (although he was not sure if it was true or not) was the Labour 
MSP John McAllion being taken off the Social Inclusion, Housing and Voluntary Sector 
Committee because of his opposition to his party’s policy on stock transfer.  In this way 
parties can use committee membership as a way of reinforcing discipline.  Or as the Senior 
SPICe researcher put it: ‘some committees will be seen as a punishment, you’ve gone there 
because you’ve been bad’.  In 2001 The Scotsman reported that John Farquhar Munro (Lib 
Dem MSP):  
‘will face disciplinary action when the Lib Dems allocate committee places.  He is 
currently a member of the transport and environment committee, but is likely to lose 
that place during a mini Lib Dem “reshuffle”’ (The Scotsman (h), p.10).   
 
A criticism that some of the groups had about the committees was the short timescales given 
to respond to proposed legislation, which resulted in the groups dropping other pieces of 
work and rushing to get their submission in on time.  George Reid (SNP) in his role as 
convener of the Conveners’ Liaison Group explained in response to a letter from the SCPO’s 
Parliamentary Officer in November 2002 that the time available for written submissions 
depended on the timetable that had been set for the overall passage of a Bill through its three 
stages and: 
‘As a result, the amount of time that can be allowed for the submission of written 
evidence at Stage 1 is often less than the time which a committee would afford for 
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submission of evidence in connection with a committee inquiry’ (extract from Mr 
Reid’s letter to the SCPO). 
Mr Reid argued however, that normally a Bill would have been included in the Executive’s 
legislative programme so any interested parties should have anticipated its passage and 
prepared submissions in advance and would also have had the opportunity to comment on the 
Bill during the pre-legislative process.  He added in the letter that the Conveners’ Liaison 
Group had already considered the question of introducing standard consultation periods for 
the committees but had decided ‘that such standardization would not be appropriate.  The 
committees require flexibility in order to meet the overall timetables within which they 
work’. 
 
The committee meetings were supposed to be held in public as much as possible but a rising 
concern amongst many of the interest groups was that the committees seemed to have settled 
into a pattern of increasingly working behind closed doors.   
 
Federation of Small Businesses 
The Deputy Press and Parliamentary Officer said in September 2000 that her only complaint 
about the committees was the very short timescales that they set for written evidence to be 
submitted.  She said that the effect of this was an inferior quality of written submissions due 
to the rushed nature of them.  She explained that:  
‘What can happen to us is that they’ll come in and say can we have a response in two 
weeks time and now we’ll have to consult, we’re representative of our members, 
we’re supposed to consult with the members.  How can we do that in two weeks?’ 
(personal interview, September 2001). 
By February 2002 the FSB still had the same complaint as the Press and Parliamentary 
Officer told the Procedures Committee that:  
‘a particular bone of contention is the length of consultation periods.  We 
acknowledge the practical constraints on the Executive and the Parliament, but tight 
timescales for consultation make it difficult for organisations or individuals to submit 
detailed and evidence-based responses’ (Procedures Committee (a), Col 1399). 
 
Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office 
In a briefing paper, the SCPO expressed concern at the:  
‘massive movement of MSPs around committees, largely at the direction of the 
parties.  Not only has this emphasised the role of the parties as against independently-
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minded MSPs, but it has undermined the building up of committee identities and 
expertise’ (SCPO (d)). 
During the time of participant observation the Parliamentary Officer commented that what 
worried him most about the committee changes was ‘the extent to which they reflect the 
power of the parties to shunt people around’.  He also brought this point up in his evidence 
on the CSG principles to the Procedures Committee in January 2002. 
 
In February 2001 the Parliamentary Officer of the SCPO was already dismayed at the amount 
of committee business done in private.  He had raised the issue in the SCPO’s briefing papers 
and in a report on the parliamentary committees.  Furthermore he directly approached the 
convener and the clerk of the Social Justice Committee to ask for an explanation as to why 
the committee had considered in private oral evidence on asylum seekers that he had given 
(along with two other groups) in public evidence sessions.  The Convener replied that there 
were occasions stated in the Scottish Parliament’s Standing Orders where committees were 
expected to retire to private session and it was normal practice to discuss a draft report in 
private because there:  
‘is a danger otherwise that points/arguments made in Committee at the discussion 
stage of a report may be misinterpreted by press or public as the Committee’s final 
position on an issue’ (letter dated 7th February 2001). 
But the Parliamentary Officer was not satisfied that the discussion of his evidence, which he 
gave in public, merited being held in private according to the guidance given in the Standing 
Orders.   
 
He highlighted the issue of committees meeting in private in the SCPO’s written response to 
the Standards Committee inquiry into lobbying and at the Procedures Committee inquiry into 
the CSG principles.  He told the Procedures Committee that during ‘the past year, four of the 
parliament’s committees had substantial items in private at more than 50 per cent of their 
meetings’ (Procedures Committee (b), Col 1218).  He also expressed the hope that the report 
on the CSG principles would help to reverse the trend of committees meeting in private in the 
future (SCPO (d)).   
 
Scottish Parent Teacher Council 
When asked what she would like to change about the committee system, the SPTC’s 
Development Manager said she would like to see committee membership remaining static 
and she said that there was no obvious reason why this could not be the case.  She felt that 
the personnel should not change for the course of a parliamentary term ‘unless for some 
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reason somebody has to retire from the Parliament’.  She ‘idealistically thought that when 
they were setting up the committees then the membership would be constant but it’s changed 
so often, it’s terrible’.  She felt that MSPs had failed to build up expertise as a result, which is 
why she thought permanent advisers should be appointed to the committees.  It also meant 
that she found herself: 
‘listening to a debate on higher education for example, the other day, it was quite 
clear that the personnel who had undertaken the inquiry were not the current 
committee and you think to yourself, why?’ (personal interview, September 2001). 
 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
The changing membership of the committees was not an issue for CoSLA as they did not 
have time to build up personal relationships with individual MSPs, therefore they dealt with 
committees as collective units.  They engaged ‘with whoever is there’ (Convention Manager) 
and ‘just look at the group’ (Head of Policy).  The Head of Policy commented that a change 
of personnel:  
‘would be disruptive if it happened half way through the stages of a bill for example, 
but it doesn’t bother me at all that there may be a change of half the membership 
between dealing with issue A and coming back five months later to talk about issue 
B’ (personal interview, November 2001). 
CoSLA had no problems with committee changes but it did have real concerns about the 
timescales that they were presented with by the committees for both written and oral 
evidence and they were not particularly enamoured with the way in which they were asked to 
give evidence.  The Acting Chief Executive explained that ‘one of the things that we’re 
concerned about is, it’s not just an invitation to attend, it’s more of a demand to turn up and 
appear within a very short period of time’.  This complaint was echoed by the Convention 
Manager who said that short timescales resulted in CoSLA submitting fairly bland responses 
along the lines of ‘CoSLA broadly welcome the principles but they cannot give any further 
detail as they have not had the time to expand further’.   
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
All three members of the RSPB’s Advocacy and Media Unit said that if there was something 
that they could change about the committee system, it would be ‘a bit more consistency on 
people that sit on the committees’.  The Head of Advocacy and Media simply said ‘I wish 
people would stop changing committees, they are changing the committees around too 
much’.  It made it difficult for the Society because it meant they had to keep building up new 
relationships and educating the newcomers.  He also felt (in common with the SPTC) that the 
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radical changes of membership prevented the committees from building up any kind of 
expertise and therefore limited the effectiveness of the committees. 
 
The RSPB’s Parliamentary Information Officer also suggested that she would like to see the 
committees meeting less behind closed doors because ‘they do so much in private that it’s 
very hard for us to know what’s happening sometimes’. 
 
Summary 
(The MS Society due to its lack of knowledge and inexperience of the committees did not 
offer much comment on the workings of the committees).  The criticisms of the committees 
related more to the attitudes of the groups rather than their behaviour, although obviously the 
committees’ ‘flaws’ had implications for the actions of the groups – such as having to 
develop new relationships with committee members more frequently than they had 
anticipated, or having to drop whatever they were doing in order to get a written submission 
in on time.  The significance of the criticisms is that they highlight how the groups bought 
into the ‘new politics’ of the Scottish Parliament and then became disappointed when the 
working reality failed to meet their expectations.  The Scottish Parliament promoted the 
belief that it was an open and accessible institution and the groups believed in that.  They 
certainly believed that the committees were accessible but as time passed the groups began to 
find fault with some of the practices that the committees appeared to be developing, which 
contravened the culture the groups had come to expect.  Secrecy and meeting in private was 
not something that the groups had associated with the Scottish Parliament, instead they 
believed that it would abide by its four CSG principles: the sharing of power, accountability, 
accessibility and equal opportunities.  The criticisms that the groups made of the committees 
highlight the fact that the Scottish Parliament created certain expectations about the way 
politics in Scotland would work which the groups entered into and as a result were left 
feeling disappointed when they felt that the committees had failed to live up to the standard. 
 
Rational choice institutionalism 
Obviously, it was not in the interest of the groups if their costs were increased by the 
shuffling of MSPs round committees, denying the groups access to committee discussions or 
allowing them insufficient time to write meaningful responses.  The Scottish Parliament, and 
thus the committees, agreed that it would abide by the CSG principles and this knowledge 
underpinned the actions of the groups.  By not abiding by this “contract”, the groups could 
not predict the behaviour of the committees proficiently and this made things more costly and 
difficult for them.  
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Sociological/ historical institutionalism 
In interview, MSPs, clerks, the SPICe researcher and the party researchers, all talked 
enthusiastically about how open and accessible the committees were.  There was a definite 
shared belief amongst not only the parliamentary actors but also those who interacted with it, 
that the system was open and accessible.  This was not just due to formal rules but also to 
normative expectations and a shared culture (this was why the clerks gave interviews even 
though formally they were not supposed to).  Therefore, when the committees appeared to be 
developing practices that went against the norm the groups were upset. 
 
7.9  Effectiveness 
The groups all spent a lot of time and effort on the committees, but did they actually think the 
committees were effective?  The Scottish Parliament committee system was purposely 
designed to be a deliberate reversal of the Westminster system, ‘where the committee system 
was seen to be weak and contributed to executive dominance and a lack of effective 
legislative scrutiny’ (Lynch, 2001, p.69).  Therefore the Scottish parliamentary committees 
combined both legislative and scrutiny functions in order to counter executive dominance.  
Because the Scottish parliamentary committees could initiate legislation and were not 
confined solely to ‘the deliberative stage of the policy cycle’ but were able to ‘exercise some 
independent capacity to generate and substitute policy’ of their own, theoretically they should 
have been more attractive to the interest groups, making them more of a target in their own 
right than a channel to government (Norton, 1999, p.167).  The six groups agreed that the 
committee system was stronger than the one at Westminster, but they were also agreed that 
the Westminster norm of executive dominance had not been reversed.  As a result, the groups 
felt that when it came to policy-making, the Scottish Executive was more powerful than the 
Parliament.  One example of the Scottish Executive apparently ignoring the committees was 
when the Health and Community Care Committee produced a report on Arbuthnott (which 
was about NHS resource allocation), a policy that the Scottish Executive was keen to press 
ahead with and The Herald newspaper reported that the committee’s report apparently ‘had 
been rubbished in advance by Executive sources’ and that the Scottish Executive was going 
to carry on implementing Arbuthnott regardless of what the committee report had to say (The 
Herald (f), p.6).  It was a predictable outcome that the majority felt that the executive was 
much more important to them in the policy process than the legislature, even though the 
legislature in the Scottish Parliament has more powers than most.  But while it was true that 
the majority regarded the Scottish Executive as being more powerful, the evidence suggested 
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that the groups regarded the targeting of the committees as being an essential part of their 
work.   
 
Federation of Small Businesses  
The Press and Parliamentary Officer of the FSB thought the committees were effective at 
initiating inquiries and scrutinising bills but that they were not so effective in challenging the 
Scottish Executive.  He bemoaned the way the Scottish Executive could choose whether or 
not to take on board any recommendations from committee reports, such as the time when the 
Transport and Environment Committee produced a critical report of an Executive initiative 
and ‘it doesn’t seem to me that the Executive has actually taken cognisance of the 
Committee’s report.  Now if that continues to happen then what’s the point of the 
Parliament?’  He personally felt that Ministers would just do what they wanted to do and 
therefore it was more valuable for the FSB to invest resources into Ministers and civil 
servants.  But despite that, the FSB also thought it was important to respond to the 
committees because as the Deputy Press and Parliamentary Officer explained, the committees 
were a ‘reinforcement’ of their message to the Scottish Executive.  And when the FSB 
disagreed with the actions of the Scottish Executive it turned to the committees because:  
‘the committees scrutinise the work of the Executive so if you can convince them that 
some action of the Scottish Executive is wrong or some legislation being pushed is 
wrong, then it’s a good way of getting to the Scottish Executive’ (Deputy Press and 
Parliamentary Officer; personal interview, September 2000).  
 
Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office 
Despite his criticisms the Parliamentary Officer considered the committees ‘to be the quiet 
success story of the Parliament’ (Procedures Committee (b), Col 1218).  According to the 
Parliamentary Officer the best things that happened in the Scottish Parliament were done in 
the parliamentary committees: ‘serious work, sensible discussions, scrutiny of the Executive’ 
(personal copy of the text of the Parliamentary Officer’s Sunday Herald article published on 
13 May 2002).  In an SCPO briefing paper he gave the example of how oral evidence for the 
Poindings and Warrant Sales Bill ‘persuaded the committees to support the Bill, and this 
cross-party consensus forced the Executive to back down from its intention to halt the Bill’s 
progress’ (SCPO (d), p.1).  
 
The SCPO, in conjunction with two other groups, had submitted a petition which was first 
considered by the Public Petitions Committee in July 2000.  His thoughts on how effective a 
petition to the committee was that:  
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‘our experience suggests that a petition may be an effective way of getting something 
on to the parliamentary agenda, perhaps by provoking a committee inquiry…but I 
don’t think that petitions on issues which are already being hotly debated have had 
much impact on discussion’ (personal interview, February 2001). 
This was because he believed that the committees were just not as powerful in the policy 
process as Ministers.  Acting in the capacity of parliamentary adviser to a newly formed 
justice group, he advised them that it was ‘the Executive who make most of the important 
decisions’.  When interviewed he added that the benefit of having good relationships with 
Ministers was that it gave more chance of success because ‘if you’re going to achieve 
anything then some of it’s got to be done through them’.  He believed that Ministers even in 
the face of committee opposition ‘won’t turn round their policy, or they’ll only very rarely 
turn round their policy completely’.  But while he thought that the committees could not do 
much in shaping the ‘overall, overarching policy’, he did believe that the committees had a 
role ‘in shaping the particular details of legislation’ which made them an important target.  
He explained that it was worthwhile for the SCPO to devote a lot of its resources to the 
committees because even though it could not do much more than nudge the Scottish 
Executive, ‘I suspect that we can’t do much more than nudge either’ and that the committees 
were ‘one of the key ways for us to try and influence policy slightly one way or the other’.  
He added that he thought the executive was not as dominant in the Scottish Parliament as at 
Westminster.  He attributed that difference to the coalition government because ‘they have to 
keep people on board’ otherwise ‘as we saw over warrant sales the Parliament can assert 
itself’.   
 
Multiple Sclerosis Society 
The MS Society was reserving judgement on the effectiveness of the committees until more 
time had passed.  The Policy Officer had found that his: 
‘experience has been that the committees have not yet established themselves as 
powerful enough bodies to be creating agendas to a significant extent ... but I think 
it’s really a matter of committees growing up and maturing and finding their own feet 
and finding their own role and where they can change things and where they can’t and 
we’ll just grow along with them as part of that process’ (personal interview, May 
2001). 
At the time of participant observation they were waiting to see if a paper on the budget they 
had submitted to the Health and Community Care Committee would come to fruition.  The 
Director had spent a lot of time writing the budget paper which friendly MSPs had advised 
him to submit, so for the Director that paper was a test to see ‘whether they [the committees] 
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can actually effect any concrete difference on the budget for next year’.  If the committee 
failed to change the budget then the Director acknowledged that it might be for two reasons: 
either ‘the committee as an institution is never going to have any power’ or that ‘it could be 
that the personalities and the timing and the proposal was not right’.   
 
Although the Society did believe that ‘obviously the power to do things is concentrated in the 
hands of Ministers’, and the Policy Officer’s ‘experience has been that the committees have 
not yet established themselves as powerful enough bodies to be creating agendas’.   Because 
of their experience with the Health Minister, he added that for the Scottish Parliament he 
would like: 
‘to see a government which operated in a way which everything didn’t hang or fall by 
whether an individual Minister was competent and favourable to the outcome that you 
wanted but the Parliament as a whole was responsive to democratic pressure’ 
(personal interview, May 2001).   
 
The Director had a similar outlook, stating that ‘the Executive is more important because 
they have the power and the Parliament doesn’t really’.  He saw the committees as only being 
‘maybe a little bit influential’ and a way of reinforcing the Society’s message to the Scottish 
Executive.  Nonetheless the Society, like all the other groups, spent a disproportionate 
amount of its time on parliamentary committees and MSPs.  But as the Director pointed out 
MSPs ‘are easier to spend time with.  Access to the Executive is a bit restricted’.  And he 
believed that it was necessary to lobby both the Scottish Executive and the Parliament 
because: 
‘if you just did some of these groups in isolation none of them would be terribly 
important so you probably have to do all of it.  Advance on all fronts because we’re 
not sure which is most important, I think that’s the truth really’ (personal interview, 
May 2001).   
 
Scottish Parent Teacher Council 
The Development Manager at the SPTC also found it ‘very hard to say’ how effective the 
committees were.  She felt that there were times when Ministers ignored the reports of the 
Education, Culture and Sport Committee but on the other hand the Committee had scored 
some successes.  In the SPTC’s written submission to the Procedures Committee CSG 
inquiry, the Development Manager wrote: 
‘It is quite clear that the Education Committee has responded to views it has heard.  It 
has not pursued its own line regardless of the evidence presented to it.  It has 
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challenged the Executive, which in turn has responded to that challenge and made 
changes to its proposal’ (copied from an internal SPTC copy). 
 
But she believed that the Parliament would never challenge the Executive because of the 
coalition government that PR produced and felt that it was nothing but a ‘lock-in mechanism 
which gives the Executive a very comfortable ride’.  Although she did acknowledge that 
there had been cases where MSPs had asserted themselves, such as the Poindings and 
Warrant Sales Bill but she felt the problem with MSPs was that on the whole they had not 
been particularly interested in asserting themselves because of their party allegiances.  For 
most of the MSPs ‘it’s their government and therefore what the Executive says is what they 
will support and that’s their role.’  At the end of the day she regarded the Scottish Executive 
as being more powerful than the Parliament.  The key factor was ‘how you get to Ministers’ 
and that civil servants were crucial ‘because they make recommendations to Ministers and I 
think it is strange for a Minister who contradicted the recommendation that the civil servant 
had made’.   
 
As for the effectiveness of the committees she felt there was evidence for both sides of the 
case and therefore thought that (in line with the MS Society) it was still too early judge.  
However, she believed that the most important thing that the committees did was bring things 
out into the open and ‘it’s very, very hard to evaluate the impact of that’ but ‘there is no 
doubt that having those hearings in public had a big effect on what the government said’.  
She also believed that the committees were never going to reach their full potential unless 
their membership was allowed to remain stable.  The result of the high turnover was that ‘if 
they don’t know what they are talking about, ...they don’t make good decisions and therefore 
you need hard expertise for the committee to be effective’. 
 
The bottom line for the SPTC was that they ‘can only ever chip away at the edges’ which she 
also thought was all the committees could do but ‘if they’re chipping and we’re chipping then 
it’s a double chip’.   
 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
CoSLA’s Head of Policy commented that ‘Ministers tend to set the agendas, Parliament by 
and large reacts’.  Notwithstanding that, CoSLA was very positive in its outlook of the 
committees.  The Acting Chief Executive and the Convention Manager at CoSLA agreed 
with the SPTC that what the committees did best was to make things public.  Committees 
‘are effective because they do allow issues to be debated in the open’ and they are a ‘forum 
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for debate and openness’.  However, the Acting Chief Executive did add that the committees 
were limiting their ability to be effective by being over-ambitious in the amount of work they 
undertook at any one time.    
 
He also believed that the committees were effective in their scrutiny role ‘because they can 
take the Executive’s policy documents and try and tease them out’.  The Head of Policy 
supported the idea that the committees ‘can sink their teeth into something’.  Not only that 
but if the committees came to the conclusion that the proposed policy line was wrong, then 
they ‘really carry on and on at the Minister and quite often the Minister will change the 
policy line.  So they can be effective. ...certainly by comparison to Westminster’.   
 
The Convention Manager felt that all of the political actors had particular influences in the 
policy process and therefore the key was about ‘using the different routes to get to the same 
end result’.  But CoSLA also saw the committees as a channel to the Scottish Executive.  The 
Acting Chief Executive said that:  
‘I certainly see the opportunity of the committees is to reinforce the message that we 
are giving to the Executive and on occasions to try and embarrass them if there is a 
reason for embarrassing them, if they are not actually acknowledging some of the key 
issues we think are important’ (personal interview, December 2001).   
For that reason CoSLA supported the Local Government Committee when it commissioned 
an independent inquiry into local government finance after Ministers had previously refused 
to do so.  The McIntosh Commission Report on local government had come up with thirty 
recommendations and while ‘twenty-nine were accepted by the Executive, the one that 
wasn’t accepted was an independent review of local government finance’ (Acting Chief 
Executive).  However, CoSLA was able to get its message across through the Local 
Government Committee which decided to pick up the issue. 
 
CoSLA did not consider the committees to be the most important component in the policy 
process but nonetheless it did see them as being significant in the lobbying process. 
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds  
At the RSPB they were agreed that the committees in the Scottish Parliament were more 
effective than the ones at Westminster and the Parliamentary Information Officer stated that 
this ‘is something that Westminster really envies when you talk to them about what we are 
doing’.   
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But other than the Media Officer who felt that the committees were effective and powerful, 
the rest of his colleagues were not persuaded about the effectiveness of the committees. The 
Senior Investigations Officer said that when it came to the committees he was ‘still to be 
convinced completely’ but that he was ‘quite heartened not just by the fact that we get our 
point over at these committees but they seem to have taken it seriously and it’s been followed 
up’.  The Head of Policy Operations judged that they were ‘not as powerful as the political 
rhetoric about how powerful they were going to be’.  The reason for this was because of the 
‘Executive whip, if they hadn’t created a majority on every committee, they could be 
immensely powerful’. The Head of Media and Advocacy also thought that the committees 
‘have a long way to go’ and like his colleague believed that the committees would only come 
into their own if they decided to assert themselves against the Executive.  He gave the 
example of a fishing issue where ‘party whipping got in the way and the Executive parties 
both went into line’ in the committees.  The Parliamentary Information Officer also said that 
‘your average top civil servant probably can do what he likes or she likes still anyway 
regardless of the committee structure’.  The Head of Advocacy and Media also thought the 
frequency with which the membership changed on the committees was another reason why 
they were not as effective as they could be.  But he was optimistic that in time the 
committees would assert themselves and he took encouragement from instances such as the 
way the Transport and the Environment Committee handled the Executive over the question 
of mobile phone masts.   
 
The committees were primarily a channel for the RSPB to the Scottish Executive.  Although, 
the Parliamentary Information Officer felt that if they wanted to achieve anything then it was 
necessary for them to lobby everyone in the policy process.  The Media Officer also agreed 
that this was the case; that the Society had to ‘communicate with the Executive but work with 
the committees to develop legislation’. 
 
Generally the RSPB felt that the committee structure had failed to live up to expectations.  
The Head of Advocacy and Media commented that ‘I think that the Parliament could have 
exerted itself over the Executive much more than it has done.’  A feeling shared by the Head 
of Policy Operations who suggested that as soon as the coalition was formed:  
‘it created an overall majority for the Executive that immediately took power away 
from the Parliament… When it comes to the crunch, the party whips will get an 
Executive motion through and therefore if a Minister is convinced by a civil servant 
that line x has to be followed, the whip will ensure that line x is followed irrespective 
of what their backbenchers think’ (personal interview, January 2002). 
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Summary 
The committees had changed the behaviour of the groups despite the fact that there was a lot 
of uncertainty about just how effective the committees were.  All the groups had built up 
relationships with MSPs on the committee(s) that they were most interested in, they 
monitored committee activity and submitted evidence to them.  The groups diverted 
resources into this work (which was new for all of them) because although they believed the 
Scottish Executive to be more powerful than the committees, they thought that the 
committees could make a difference and it also reinforced their message to the Scottish 
Executive. 
 
Rational choice institutionalism 
It was impossible for the groups to assess the benefits or otherwise of lobbying the 
committees.  The groups knew that the committees could put pressure on the Executive and 
sometimes that pressure made a difference.  From a rationalist stance, the groups did a lot of 
committee work because they expected to maximise their utility even though they could not 
quantify the benefits of that work.  They wanted change but knew change could be difficult 
to engineer on their own and that their endeavours would be helped if they had the support of 
the committees who could apply a lot of pressure and also give an issue publicity.   
 
Sociological institutionalism 
The committees could manipulate the groups to suit their own needs; they required evidence 
from the groups and so encouraged them to participate in the committee process by being 
accessible (much more so than the Scottish Executive) and making the system fairly simple.  
So although the groups were not entirely convinced about the effectiveness of the 
committees, the practice of giving evidence and maintaining contact with committee 
members became institutionalised within the groups.  This might not be entirely rational but 
the groups enjoyed an enhanced social legitimacy by doing so from their members and other 
interest groups.  And many have hoped that the committees were going to be powerful as a 
result of the hype about the powers they were to have, which was part of the general over-
emphasis that some groups placed on the Parliament rather than the Scottish Executive. 
 
Historical institutionalism 
The groups were led to believe at the start that the Scottish parliamentary committee system 
would be powerful and so they decided on a policy that would incorporate a lot of committee 
work, especially as the committees were more accessible than the Scottish Executive.  The 
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groups soon realised that executive dominance would be the norm in Scotland as well as at 
Westminster, but having decided on a particular course of action the groups continued to 
carry on down that path even though it may not have been the most efficient use of their 
resources in terms of what they were getting for their investment. 
 
7.10 Committee clerks 
A team of clerks service the parliamentary committees, ensuring that they run smoothly: ‘As 
well as meeting the day-to-day needs of the Parliament and its MSPs and its committees, the 
clerks advise and support MSPs and committees’ (Scottish Parliament (h), 2000).  The clerks, 
like the committees, were a new innovation that came with devolution.   
 
It is important to look at the strategic role that the clerks play in the committees, as they have 
a lot of input into the running of the committees (in conjunction with the committee 
conveners), as well as being the first point of contact for outside bodies.  Therefore, if the 
committees are to live up to the CSG principles, they require a clerking service that sees the 
CSG principles as part of its standard operating practices.  A deliberate effort was made by 
the committee clerks to get in place a culture based on the CSG report before MSPs were in 
place in 1999 (personal interview with clerk, August 2001).  The clerk commented that they 
began to develop procedures and rules 'that preferred openness'.  Because the committee 
clerk positions were brand new and the clerks themselves came from a variety of 
backgrounds, it was easier to foster a ‘new politics’ culture, because unlike the civil service, a 
long-standing and established culture had not already been in place.   
  
The clerks pointed out that they are considerably more accessible than their Westminster 
counterparts: 'if this was Westminster you would never get to interview a clerk for an hour'.  
A senior SPICe researcher assigned to one of the committees remarked that 'there is a 
genuine commitment amongst all our working practices to make the committees accessible' 
and that while the committees may not always live up to the ideals of the CSG principles, the 
principles do 'affect what everybody does'.  One clerk added that the clerking staff share the 
aspirations of the CSG report ‘and try and do things in a very open and flexible way and try 
to build the bridges with the outside and be accessible.  I think that exists as a culture’. 
 
7.11  Background 
The clerks played an important role liaising between the committees and the Scottish 
Executive, particularly with civil servants.  They keep the Scottish Executive ‘informed as to 
what is happening on the street'.  But despite this regular interaction between clerks and civil 
 187
servants, the clerks were very keen to point out that they were part of the Parliament and not 
the Scottish Executive.  They explained that a creative tension exists between them and the 
civil servants because: ‘it’s our job to support MSPs in challenging the government whereas 
it’s the civil servants’ job to defend the government’.   
 
The clerks also played an important role in linking the committees to outside bodies and they 
try to come up with new ideas about how to involve society in the work of the committees 
and they kept a database of who they want to respond to consultations.  They are also the first 
point of contact for anyone who wants information about the work of the committees (see 
section 7.12). 
 
The clerks work behind-the-scenes, facilitating the work of the committees and because of 
their background role there is some confusion about who they are (some MSPs actually 
thought that they were part of the civil service).  It is true that a small number of the clerks 
were civil servants before moving on but the clerks came from all sorts of backgrounds such 
as the health service, the private sector, local government and so on.  Sandra White as an 
Opposition MSP spoke of her impression of the clerks at the beginning and explained ‘at first 
I think most folk were hostile to them a wee bit because they think they work for the 
Executive or the convener’.  Each committee has a clerk and assistant clerks but they are 
there to serve the whole committee not just the conveners, although they do ‘tend to work 
basically with the conveners’.  But Sandra White said that when she went to ask for 
assistance from the clerks to write amendments for a particular Bill they were more than 
willing to help her and her colleagues.  And the Parliament’s guide states that is generally 
accepted that the committee clerk will ‘provide impartial procedural advice to, and 
administrative support for, the committees that they service’ (Scottish Parliament (i).   
   
The clerks are apolitical as demonstrated by the Head of the Clerking Services letter (see 
Section 2.2.2) where she stated that: ‘In particular, we cannot participate in any project 
dealing with attitudes or opinions on political matters or matter of policy’.  This is why the 
clerks interviewed for this research have remained anonymous.  
 
There was a definite split amongst the groups on how much influence they thought the clerks 
had in the committees.  Some of the groups solely saw the clerks as administrators, while 
others believed that the clerks played a pivotal role in deciding things like who gives oral 
evidence. 
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7.12 Administrators 
The clerks are the committees’ administrators.  They are the people that provide the MSPs 
with the background information on whatever topic the committees are looking into, they 
also arrange the rooms where the committees are going to meet, distribute agendas and 
papers, ensure witnesses know when and where to turn up, organise events and so on.  The 
clerks are the first point of contact for people seeking information about the committees and 
it is the clerks who send out letters to the groups on their databases notifying them about any 
inquiries or reports the committees are carrying out.  One clerk said that he spent quite a lot 
of his time in meetings with organisations where ‘I’m really briefing people and telling them 
what the committee is doing and all the rest of it’. 
 
7.13  Procedural police(wo)men 
Another role that the clerks have is ensuring that the committees stick to the rules of the 
Scottish Parliament and to tell Members when they are straying beyond their devolved 
powers.  The clerks are the experts on procedure and are able to provide guidance on what 
routes are open to the committees.  
 
7.14  Gatekeepers 
The word gatekeeper often crops up in relation to the clerks and this is where the clerks 
become of more value to the interest groups.  In one sense they have to be gatekeepers 
because they have to ensure the committees are focused on the work that they have to do.  
But one clerk explained that interest groups ‘see you as a gatekeeper, someone to convince 
that they have a good case for giving oral evidence to’.   
 
Section 7.6.2 has already described how the clerks and SPICe draw up a list of potential 
witnesses for each inquiry/report, which they then pass on to the MSPs.  Those lists are only 
suggestions as MSPs have the final say but it should be remembered that MSPs have a lot of 
different duties as well as their committee work, whereas the committees are the sole focus of 
the clerks.  It is more likely that the clerks have a much better idea of the evidence that has 
been sent to the committees, as they will have sifted through all the written submissions.  
This inevitably means that for a lot of committee business MSPs will rely on the clerks.  The 
Senior SPICe Researcher commented that ‘if clerks are thinking about who to invite to give 
evidence, the members are very dependent on clerks and SPICe to produce that’.  For an 
inquiry that the Procedures Committee was carrying out Murray Tosh said that ‘the 
committee clerk and I are doing most of the selection’.  While clerks do not make the final 
decision on who is selected, busy MSPs might not have the time to give the reams of written 
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evidence they receive proper attention and therefore the recommendations of the clerks are 
bound to have some weight. 
 
The Senior SPICe Researcher also said that it is ‘probably a mistake’ for interest groups not 
to talk to the clerks.  Although he did stress (as the clerks themselves did) that they are 
resolutely impartial and cannot be lobbied.  But as one clerk said ‘people do try to build 
relationships with us, try and speak to us and give us information and always ask that we 
keep them in mind if things happen’.  The clerks have to be aware that some interest groups 
may try to influence them and so they do try to be ‘even-handed’. 
 
7.15  Strategic role   
One clerk commented that the interest groups had caught on quickly to the fact that clerks 
had a strategic role in the committees.  As well as being able to suggest which groups should 
give oral evidence, the clerks help to draw up committee agendas (which are decided by the 
‘convener in discussion with the clerk’), the drafting of committee reports and the drafting of 
questions for evidence sessions.  When asked about the extent of their role one clerk revealed 
that because they mostly work primarily with the convener and ‘given the fact that they are 
busy, we have quite a powerful role in deciding or recommending what we do and generally 
they will accept our recommendations’. 
 
When it comes to the drafting of reports: ‘In practice, the clerk will, of course, work with the 
convener to produce a draft report for the convener’s approval’ (Scottish Parliament (i).  The 
clerks stressed their impartiality and said that they write the reports based on what the 
committees have discussed and agreed on.  Although, off the record it was revealed that on at 
least one occasion a clerk has drafted a report (on a highly political issue) before the 
committee had even heard from any witnesses but presumably these views were later taken 
into account and at the end of the day all the reports are subject to committee approval.  The 
clerks also have to be ‘an honest broker’ if the committee is having difficulty in trying to 
agree on a report and when there is a bit of a difference of opinion, ‘you do have a role of 
trying to suggest a middle way, or language that everyone will be comfortable with’. 
 
As well as procedural knowledge the clerks also have to possess policy knowledge ‘because 
you draft questions for them when they are interviewing witnesses’.  The questions that are 
asked in the committee meetings are important because the groups want to get their best case 
across but they have to rely on what they are asked in order to do this.  It is perhaps not so 
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widely known that a clerk is sometimes given the responsibility of drafting some of the 
questions. 
 
7.16  Response of the interest groups 
The groups for the most part were quite clued up on the roles that the committee clerks had, 
although they varied in the significance that they attached to the clerks. 
 
Federation of Small Businesses  
The FSB was divided in its opinion of the clerks.  The Deputy Press and Parliamentary 
Officer felt that the clerks were not gatekeepers in any way but were actually just ‘another 
source of information’.  She explained that good contact with the clerks meant ‘you get 
advance notice of events, you can start predicting a bit better if you know what’s going to 
come up on their agenda, you can see if your agenda is going to match their agenda’.   
 
The Press and Parliamentary Officer also thought that the clerks were important in getting 
‘more information up front’ but he understood that the clerks played a significant role in 
getting access to the committees, especially in terms of being invited to give oral evidence.  
He said that because the clerk and the convener work together, the convener is going to listen 
to the clerk’s advice in the same way that a Minister will to his/her civil servants.  So he 
reckoned that the conveners ‘don’t have to take it, but in general they take it so we have to 
have a good relationship with them’.   
 
Although the Press and Parliamentary Officer attached importance to the clerks he said that 
the FSB had not really tried to cultivate any relationships with them.  He explained that this 
was because of a lack of time and resources but that he was hoping to work on this in the 
future as they had not done ‘as much as they should have’ with the clerks.  At the time of 
participant observation (September 2000) the FSB diary had only recorded one face-to-face 
meeting with a clerk.  Like most groups, correspondence between the FSB and the clerks had 
primarily been the exchanging of information such as dates and times of committee meetings, 
press releases and the sending and receiving of reports.  When the FSB wanted to send 
information to a committee as a whole they did so via the clerk who would distribute a copy 
to all the committee members.  The FSB made a point of ensuring that the information they 
passed on to a clerk was of a high standard because of the influence they felt the clerks had in 
recommending people for oral evidence. 
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Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office   
The Parliamentary Officer at the SCPO also believed that it was important for him to have a 
good relationship with the committee clerks.  He remarked that although clerks: 
‘are not people who should have an important role in the political decision-making 
process in terms of deciding whether an amendment should or shouldn’t be passed at 
that kind of level, but they do have an influence in terms of the way that committees 
go about their business and who they will hear and that kind of thing so that’s quite 
important’ (personal interview, February 2001). 
Like the FSB he thought the clerks had a pivotal role because of the ‘advice that the clerks 
give on issues like who gives evidence’, and what subjects the committee will or will not 
cover.  The Parliamentary Officer said that their importance depended on the working 
relationship between each particular clerk and convener, as his ‘impression is that some 
conveners lean more heavily on clerks than others’. 
 
He also saw the clerks as being a useful source of information.  He said that the clerks can:  
‘give me a feel for where the committee is and where they might be going and if they 
are aware of the kind of issues that we might be concerned about, then they can 
suggest to the committee, that we might be interested in an issue’ (personal interview, 
February 2001).   
 
When the Parliamentary Officer contacted a committee he normally did so in the first 
instance through the clerk.  Even if he wanted to set up a meeting with MSPs on a committee 
he would still either contact the clerk or the convener or both of them first.  Generally though 
he would sound out the clerk first and then he would take the clerk’s advice on how best to 
proceed, unless he knew the convener very well and better than he knew the clerk.  So when 
he was setting up a meeting between the Moderator of the Church of Scotland and the 
Education, Culture and Sport Committee to discuss the arts he first of all e-mailed the clerk 
who then passed the e-mail on to the rest of the committee.   
 
The Parliamentary Officer made a point of consciously building up relationships with the 
clerks.  If he was submitting evidence to a committee that had a clerk that he did not already 
know he made the most of the office’s proximity to the Scottish Parliament and personally 
handed the evidence to the clerk and introduced himself.  This was helped by the fact that he 
was frequently in touch with them: ‘I would be surprised if a week had passed in the last six 
months in which I hadn’t at least had a telephone conversation with a clerk’.  
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Multiple Sclerosis Society 
The MS Society was still finding its way around the Parliament at the time of participant 
observation (May 2001).  It did not feel that the clerks were a high priority and it had no 
immediate intention of building up a relationship with any, although the Director remarked 
that he ‘would like to be in contact with the Health Committee clerk.  I suppose the clerk of 
any relevant committee where there is anything of interest'. But he felt that on the whole they 
did not know much about the true role of the clerks and before they put resources into 
building up a relationship with one he would want to ‘find out more about them really’.  The 
Policy Officer explained that ‘it’s just for our purposes we haven’t really got to that point yet, 
seeking to influence the inner workings of committees’.  But he was not ruling out the 
possibility of seeking out clerks in the future: 
‘We haven’t got there yet but we will get there, it’s part of the process of growth and 
maturation politically and when we do get to that point, then yes relationships with 
individual clerks will become much more important’ (personal interview, May 2001). 
 
The Director thought that if they did have good contact with a clerk it would probably enable 
them ‘to understand a bit more about the actual workings of the committee and find out what 
they have been talking about’.  The Policy Officer did comment though that:  
‘they obviously have a role in determining the agenda of committees and how big 
their role is, I suppose will depend on the personality and style of the chair of the 
committee to a large extent’ (personal interview, May 2001). 
 
At that stage the MS Society had only really been in touch with clerks ‘two or three times in 
the course of the last year’ and that was for the purpose of finding out deadlines for written 
submissions. 
 
 Scottish Parent Teacher Council 
There was little danger of clerks being lobbied by the SPTC as the Development Manager 
saw clerks as ‘just kind of admin people for the committees, to keep them straight on 
procedure’.  The SPTC had ‘never had any reason to approach a clerk except to send them 
information’.  Therefore, interaction between the SPTC and the clerks had been for purely 
administrative matters concerning committee work. 
 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities   
At CoSLA, the Convention Manager felt that she had ‘more of a relationship with the civil 
service’ than with clerks but she did feel that ‘there is potential there for an important 
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relationship’ as it might allow her to have advance warning of what was going to come up in 
the committees.  But she had not had the opportunity to exploit that potential at the time of 
participant observation (November/December 2001) and her experience of the clerks was 
primarily in relation to responding to their requests for evidence to the committees.   
 
Her colleague, the Head of Policy, had a different approach to the clerks in that he had built 
up a relationship with some of them.  He explained the reason for this by stating that the 
clerks: 
‘are very constrained by how they must behave and treat people and they always do 
that well.  They don’t leak things, they don’t have favourites, they don’t favour one 
sector against another because they are in a sense neutral.  They are not people we 
need to try and win around.  However, by nature of humans and government, it is 
always helpful to have good personal relationships with some key committee clerks 
and I would imagine that all my colleagues do as I do and that you’ve got a level of 
banter with them’ (personal interview, December 2001). 
He said that the advantage of this was that when he chatted to the clerks they sometimes told 
him things that he would have had to wait a week or two to get in writing.  He got in touch 
with clerks in ‘flurries’ depending on what was happening in the committees but overall he 
said that ‘any form of contact with a clerk would be once every week or two’. 
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds  
At the RSPB the views of the importance of the clerks differed a little but the staff agreed 
that the clerks were very professional and careful to maintain their neutrality.   
 
The Head of Policy Operations believed that as servants of the committees they were 
important to know ‘in terms of administration and practicalities’.  He thought that the Society 
should inform the clerks of their arguments because it was the clerks who ‘do the donkey 
work of drafting reports’ but really ‘the most important reason for knowing them is practical, 
in terms of knowing deadlines for evidence to committees, arrangements for meeting 
committees and all that sort of stuff’.   
 
The Head of Advocacy and Media felt that in order to put pressure on committees ‘you’ve 
got to know the clerks, because they don’t control access to the committee but are quite 
important’.  In fact he rated the clerk along with the convener as the most important people 
on committees.  He felt clerks were important because they advised the whole committee and 
‘we are never privileged to hear their advice but if their advice is that the RSPB are a heap of 
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crap then you are less likely to get called to give evidence’.  The Parliamentary Information 
Officer agreed with this and added ‘if you can get to your clerk you can get in easier [to a 
committee] than by your MSP’.  She said that the clerks were absolutely unbiased but by 
having a good relationship with them she could tell them what the Society had to offer in 
terms of evidence and then the clerks ‘will actually suggest to the committee, I find, what 
they see as being good so they can be really powerful people’.  She felt that the advantage of 
having good contact with the clerks was that ‘hopefully they will choose us as the special 
people who give evidence’.  The Media Officer had the same point to make and after the 
committees he actually felt the clerks were the next most important actors in the policy 
process because: 
‘they are filtering the information that the committees get and if you can develop a 
good relationship with the clerk of the committee you are trying to engage with, you 
have a much better chance, I think, of your information being passed to the committee 
and your voice being heard’ (personal interview, January 2002). 
 
The Parliamentary Information Officer explained that ‘I have invited them out but they won’t 
come and see us because they can’t, I didn’t realise they weren’t allowed to see NGOs’.  
Instead the RSPB were in touch via phone and e-mail (‘probably once a week during 
parliamentary sitting’) and whenever an RSPB person gave evidence to a committee they 
further consolidated those contacts. 
 
Summary 
The effect of the clerks on the groups was somewhat ambivalent.  Five of the groups (the 
SPTC being the exception) believed that the clerks could influence committee decisions, 
particularly in regard to the selection of witnesses for oral evidence.  But even although the 
groups placed a lot of importance on carrying out work in relation to the parliamentary 
committees and in the giving of oral evidence, only the SCPO, the RSPB and to a certain 
extent CoSLA’s Head of Policy incorporated the clerks into their parliamentary strategies. 
 
Rational choice institutionalism 
The SCPO, the RSPB and CoSLA’s Head of Policy were acting rationally – they believed 
that the clerks could make a difference to their goals and so they acted accordingly.  The 
SPTC was also acting rationally in the sense that it believed that the clerks only carried out 
administrative duties, so therefore it was not in the SPTC’s interest to devote resources into 
targeting clerks.  In terms of self-interest it is more difficult to explain the actions of the FSB, 
the MS Society and the rest of CoSLA.  The groups had to make priorities in terms of their 
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resources so they could have decided that it was more profitable to concentrate on other 
parliamentary actors first and then perhaps the groups could look in the future at developing 
their relationships with the clerks. 
 
Sociological/historical institutionalism 
The culture surrounding the clerks can best explain the reactions from some of the groups: 
the official committee clerk stance was to promote the image that they were impartial, 
professional servants of the committees and this was supported by a formal regulation that 
forbade the lobbying of clerks.  Combined, this all had the effect of successfully deflecting 
interest group attention onto targets which were more accessible and who ostensibly were 
more powerful.  Clerks and civil servants, because they are not elected should not be lobbied 
but that has not prevented groups from giving civil servants special attention and making a 
point of providing them with information and forming good working relationships with them.  
Some of the groups through their interaction with the committees realised not only the extent 
of a clerk’s duties but also that the clerks had actually adopted the  principle of accessibility 
and were open to forming working relationships with groups, as long as the groups 
understood that the clerks would remain impartial and could not be lobbied.  
 
7.17 Conclusion 
Objective 1 – whether the behaviour and/or belief systems of the six groups were affected by 
the Scottish Parliament. 
The general view of the groups towards the committees was that they were accessible and 
open (notwithstanding the criticisms of meeting in private to discuss draft reports) and that 
they were effective in holding the Scottish Executive to account.  However, if the Scottish 
Parliament’s model of governance was to be one of power sharing (as the Procedures 
Committee’s report on the CSG principles suggests; 2003, para 63), then in the eyes of the 
groups the committees both succeeded and failed.  They succeeded in making the groups feel 
that they were able to contribute in the work of the committees.  But although the groups 
were able to contribute to the work of the committees, the FSB, SCPO and MS Society felt 
that the committees lacked the power to stand up sufficiently to the Scottish Executive.  The 
SPTC and RSPB put this down to party politics, especially on big issues, where MSPs voted 
along party lines but as the Procedures Committee were told, this is how it should be, as ‘the 
Executive’s first and foremost duty is to deliver the programme on which it was elected’ 
(2003; para 52).  
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There was a feeling in the groups (with the exception of CoSLA) that because the Scottish 
Executive was not obliged to act on a committee’s recommendations then the committees 
were always going to be at a disadvantage.  The perceived weakness of the committees in 
getting the Scottish Executive to change policy meant that for some of the groups the 
committees had a very unequal partnership in the power sharing process, because generally 
they could only achieve small incremental amendments.  But for the smaller groups (SCPO 
and SPTC) which felt that they could not do much individually to influence the Scottish 
Executive, the committees provided them with a venue that they found valuable.   
 
All six of the groups spent a lot of their resources on parliamentary committee work (even if 
it was disproportionate to their beliefs in the actual effectiveness of the committees).  
Although the groups believed that the committees could not achieve major policy changes, 
they still thought that they could shape the final version of the legislation through 
amendments.  The groups were also frank in their admission that one reason why they spent a 
significant amount of time on committee work was for the simple reason that the committees 
were accessible. 
 
The perception that the committees were not as strong as it was first hoped they were going 
to be would suggest that groups, such as the FSB, that wanted to become insider groups, 
would stick to the traditional route of trying to influence government, rather than the 
legislature.  The committees were seen as a valuable pressure point in the political process, 
useful particularly on the occasions when the groups disagreed with the Scottish Executive.  
The SCPO and SPTC felt best equipped (at the time of participant observation) to focus their 
activities at the committee level but they were well aware that the influence of the 
committees over policy was secondary to the power that the Scottish Executive had.  Jordan 
and Stevenson argued that as soon as Labour decided to form a coalition with the Liberal 
Democrats rather than go it alone as a minority government, ‘then the likelihood of much 
significant negotiation within the Parliament, and between forces in Parliament and the wider 
society, was curtailed’ (2000, p.179).  As a result of the coalition, for MSPs voting on 
legislation it became a case of either being for or against the Scottish Executive, with the 
consequence that Ministers and civil servants became the most important lobbying targets. 
   
The criticisms that the groups had about the committees revealed that they strongly believed 
that the committees should adhere to the CSG principles and if they were seen to breach 
them, the groups soon voiced their dissatisfaction.  Of course, by doing so, they were 
guarding the ready access that they had to the committees.   
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Objective 2 – the extent to which the different types of institutionalist accounts are applicable 
in explaining the responses of the groups. 
March and Olsen argue that the organisation of political life makes a difference (Marsh and 
Stoker; 2002, p.94).  And so the committees were intentionally designed to facilitate the ‘new 
politics’ (e.g. the allocation of the committee convenerships amongst the parties, the 
encouragement to set aside party differences, the power to initiate inquiries and legislation, 
guidelines to hold meetings in public wherever possible etc).  The working practices of the 
committees achieved an overall satisfactory response from the six groups, although it was felt 
that the committees had not tried to increase their influence in the policy process (although it 
could be argued that the Executive has a democratic mandate to fulfil its promises to the 
electorate and that the Parliament is therefore not entitled to the same share of power).  The 
groups may have held somewhat unrealistic expectations about how influential the 
committees were going to be thus leading to their subsequent disappointment.   
 
When the Scottish Parliament opened there was a lot of uncertainty about how the 
committees would work, as they were a new dimension in Scottish politics but it was also 
hoped that they would be powerful, participative and would be a check on executive 
dominance.  From a historical institutionalist viewpoint, the groups would have decided at 
the beginning of their involvement with the Scottish Parliament that the committees would be 
a high priority for them, a decision that would reverberate on their future resource decisions.  
Sociological institutionalism would explain the response of the groups by saying that they 
were simply behaving in the way expected of them by the Scottish Parliament: that their 
interaction was to be primarily through the committees, as the committees were supposed to 
be the link between society and the Scottish Executive.  In addition, the groups were carrying 
out appropriate behaviour in how they participated and responded to committee activities.  A 
major advantage of sociological institutionalism is that it factors uncertainty into the way that 
institutions can affect the behaviour of groups (e.g. institutional isomorphism), which is 
important because when the committees were first set up they were an unknown quantity.  
Rational choice institutionalism makes no provision for decisions that are not made in a 
rational and detached manner despite the fact that not all circumstances allow for such 
certainty.   
 
However, it could be argued that the groups were convinced that the committees would play 
a central role in the policy making process so it was a rational decision for them to cover all 
bases.  When practices and procedures were established, it would become in the best interests 
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of the groups to comply with what the committees were looking for in terms of submissions 
and evidence sessions, in order to further their interests. 
 
Once time had passed and the groups had a more realistic idea of how the committees fitted 
into the policy making process, the groups would be more likely to look to their own self 
interests and the best ways of realising them.  There was an indication from the FSB that it 
was increasingly frustrated at the inability of the committees to mount a challenge to the 
Scottish Executive, so it would have to decide whether the committees were a good use of 
their resources or what could they do to improve the situation.  However, at that stage the 
FSB was not quite an insider group and it would be rational for groups like the FSB, MS 
Society and the RSPB, that were experiencing some difficulties in getting access to the 
Scottish Executive, to use whatever points of access were available to them.  Once they were 
granted insider status, then they could use up less resources on other access points that were 
not so advantageous to them.  But, until such time that the FSB, MS Society and the RSPB 
could achieve insider status and establish closer working relationships with the Scottish 
Executive, it would remain in their interests to also pursue their goals through the 
committees.  The committees will always be useful if a group has a point to make that has not 
been included in the legislation or if it wants to go against Executive policy, because issues 
can be raised and amendments lodged in the committees.  Therefore, even groups that adopt a 
rational choice approach will still find it in their interests to adopt a strategy that 
encompasses the committees. 
 
The SCPO’s Parliamentary Officer explained that his strategy was to primarily target the 
committees (despite the fact that he believed that the Scottish Executive made all the 
important decisions) because he thought that it was the venue where churches should be most 
involved.  He was supportive of the committees, believing that a lot of serious work was done 
in them.  He felt that if the SCPO had a committee on-side, then the pressure on the Scottish 
Executive would be much greater than if the SCPO was pushing for change alone.  This 
relates to the origins of the Scottish Parliament and the emphasis that bodies like the churches 
put on the new structures, particularly the legislature, that were put in place with devolution. 
 
The SPTC’s Development Manager said that it was at the committee level that the SPTC 
could make their biggest impact.  The Education, Culture and Sport Committee provided it 
with a contained and accessible lobbying target.  Given that the SPTC was a small office (in 
terms of resources it was the smallest of the six interest groups) with only three part-time 
members of staff, it had still amassed a total of six invites to give oral evidence to the 
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committees – a total that only CoSLA and the FSB had managed to surpass.  The SPTC was 
obviously effective at a committee level and if that paid of in terms of achieving their goals it 
would behove them to maintain that level of input into the committees and it would also 
boost their profile with the Scottish Executive. 
 
CoSLA did not spend time and resources monitoring the committees because it knew that the 
committees would come to them for the local government viewpoint but it still invested a lot 
of time and energy into submitting written responses and sending representatives to give oral 
evidence.  This was very much in their self-interest.  Local government has a big stake in 
implementing policy and it was important for them to ensure that policy would be passed in a 
way that would be workable for them to implement and be as advantageous to them as 
possible.  Again, CoSLA saw the committees as a channel to exert influence on the Scottish 
Executive, especially on occasions when it disagreed with the Executive’s policy. 
At the time of participant observation, most of the groups (the SCPO was the exception) were 
largely behaving in a manner that can probably be best explained by rational choice 
institutionalism.  This is despite the fact that the committees represented ‘new politics’ more 
than any other component of the Scottish Parliament.  What counts for the groups at the end 
of the day is how they can best achieve their goals rather than boost a particular model of 
governance.  However, at the beginning of devolution the groups responded to the 
participative system of the committees to the extent that they responded to all consultations, 
even those not directly relevant to them.  The accessibility of the committees encouraged the 
groups to spend more time and resources on committee work than they might otherwise have 
done if they were being strictly rational about it.  But it is likely that as time goes on the 
groups will become more targeted in their activities with the committees, looking to what 
will benefit their organisations the most. 
 
For those groups that were having difficulty in getting access to the Scottish Executive 
(SCPO, MS Society, SPTC and RSPB) it might be reasonable to expect that they will spend 
more time on parliamentary access points, than those groups that professed they were having 
some success in influencing the Scottish Executive.  For this reason it would be reasonable to 
assume that those four groups will put a higher value on their work with MSPs, which we 
come to in chapter 8.   
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CHAPTER 8  MSPs 
 
8.1 Introduction 
MSPs, Members of the Scottish Parliament, are the fundamental building blocks to the whole 
Scottish Parliament and are central to the whole concept of ‘new politics’, as it is through 
local MSPs that members of the public will have the most contact with the Scottish 
Parliament.  Local issues are often the main political focus for the general public and as a 
result contact with MSPs is the most effective way for people to participate in the new 
political system.  The CSG Report said that MSPs 'have a duty to be accessible to their 
constituents' (1998, p.23) and as part of this aim the telephone numbers for their constituency 
and parliamentary offices, e-mail address and postal addresses were all made readily 
available to make it as easy as possible for the public to communicate with  them. 
 
MSPs are also what could be termed very 'local' politicians because most of them live 
throughout the week in their constituencies and simply commute to Edinburgh when they 
have to and because of this MSPs are seen at their local supermarket, running for the train 
and are generally visible in their constituencies.  This was recognised in the Procedures 
Committee report on the CSG principles, which saw MSPs as being a highly important 
element in deepening the terms of engagement between the Scottish Parliament and those 
who were not engaging with it, aided by the fact that 'MSPs are closer to home than MPs, and 
they have more time available to them as a result to spend in their constituencies’ 
(Procedures Committee; 2003, para 134).   
 
MSPs were also given a number of prerogatives to facilitate their role in making the CSG 
principles a success.  They have the power to bring forward Member's Bills, two each 
parliamentary term, which means that there is another alternative to introducing legislation 
(which generally, but not always, requires the support of the Executive to be successful – see 
section 9.3.2 for more details).  The CSG Report also said that MSPs would have an 
important role in holding the Scottish Executive to account through their ability to ask written 
and oral parliamentary questions (1998, p.58).  Interest groups can use this prerogative to 
their advantage by asking a sympathetic MSP to lodge questions (see section 8.3.4).  The 
ability of MSPs to ask parliamentary questions (PQs) of the Scottish Executive is not only an 
accountability mechanism but also one that allows outside bodies access to information that 
they might otherwise have difficulty getting.  MSPs also have a slot for debate just after 
decision time (held at approx 5:10pm) on Wednesdays and Thursdays to raise non-
controversial constituency issues.  Votes are not taken after a Member's Debate but the 
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relevant Minister will respond at the end.  When registering their votes in debates or when 
participating in parliamentary committee meetings, the CSG Report encouraged MSPs to be 
as open as possible about all the decisions that they take and to only withhold information 
when the wider public interest takes precedence (1998, p.23).   
 
The CSG group was very aware that the success of ‘new politics’ depended on the extent to 
which MSPs would embrace the new culture (CSG; 1998, p.7).  To this end it wrote of how 
the Scottish Office was setting up an induction training programme for MSPs and added that: 
'we believe that it is important that it is important that this should include helping 
MSPs to make the Parliament a success in terms of openness, accessibility and 
participation and accountability of Members to their constituents' (1998, p.7). 
Many of the MSPs came from a background in adversarial Scottish local politics and a 
minority had previously been elected to Westminster but the role of MSP itself was brand 
new and the newly elected politicians knew that the success of the Scottish Parliament rested 
on them, and so the CSG was confident that if MSPs were properly inducted then there 
would be no reason for ‘new politics’ not to work.   
 
8.2  List MSPs 
There are two kinds of MSP – fifty-six list MSPs and seventy-three constituency MSPs (see 
appendix two for more details).  When a voter is faced with their ballot paper they have two 
votes, one for their constituency MSP where all the candidates are named and the second vote 
is for a party, not for individuals.  Therefore, list MSPs owe their position to their party.  The 
Additional Member System (AMS) is more proportional than first-past-the-post but it puts a 
lot of power into the hands of the central party leadership or the local political parties 
(depending on the political party) as they choose which candidates go on their regional list 
and what ranking they will be given.  A candidate who is first or second on the regional list 
will obviously have a much higher likelihood of getting elected than someone who is in fifth 
position.  This means that in the first instance every regional MSP owes their seat to their 
party and that in order to get re-elected they have to ensure that they are well placed on the 
party lists, so their parliamentary behaviour is bound to be influenced by this.  According to 
Massie after the first Scottish Parliament election ‘there was scarcely one who wasn’t a good 
reliable party man or woman’ and all ‘the List MSPs were there because they had as 
individuals found favour with their party chiefs rather than with the public’ (Massie; 2002, 
p.41).  Margo Macdonald, the high profile SNP MSP, found herself at odds with the party too 
often.  In 1999 she was first on the Lothians regional list for the SNP.  However, in January 
2003 her local party had demoted her to fifth place for the 2003 election, which effectively 
 202
meant that she would not get re-elected so she decided to resign from the SNP having lost her 
party’s confidence and instead she successfully stood as an Independent.  She was not the 
only MSP to find herself in that position.  Lyndsay MacIntosh of the Conservatives also 
found that she had slipped down the Central Scotland list because other candidates had found 
more favour with the party.  Duncan Hamilton (SNP) decided long before the 2003 elections 
to stand down as a list MSP and called for the AMS system to be abolished.  He said that the 
impact of the system had been ‘destructive’ as it ‘builds in a perverse incentive for MSPs to 
play to an internal audience’ rather than the voters (The Scotsman (i)).  Party allegiance 
diminished the power of the MSPs according to the groups as well, who were of the opinion 
that MSPs were too inhibited by it.  Every group expressed real disappointment at the lack of 
independent spirits within Holyrood.  (Indeed, even the MSPs interviewed voiced the same 
sentiment).    
 
8.3  What MSPs have to offer 
A lot has been said about the high number of female MSPs in the Scottish Parliament (48 out 
of the 129 after the 1999 election, equalling 37% of the total putting it almost on a par with 
Norway and Sweden which had the highest level of female MSPs in the world).  However, 
gender balance and other interesting facts such as the average age of MSPs or their previous 
political experience apparently had very little bearing on the interest groups so they shall not 
be described here (although for more information see Lynch; 2001, p.50-53 and Pilkington; 
2002, p.105).  Other background details were of much more significance to at least three of 
the groups, including the former occupations or personal circumstances of the MSPs.  For 
instance, the MS Society targeted David Davidson (Con) because he used to be a pharmacist 
and they also approached Jamie Stone (Liberal Democrat) because his wife used a 
wheelchair. 
 
MSPs have a number of roles available to them within the Scottish Parliament that are of 
particular importance to interest groups – membership on the parliamentary committees, 
Member’s Bills, tabling motions and amendments, contributing to debates, asking 
parliamentary questions (PQs) and voting on legislation.  These different roles shall now be 
described in a little more detail. 
 
8.3.1  Committee membership 
Chapter 7 goes into a lot more depth about the role of the parliamentary committees but to 
recap, the seventeen parliamentary committees scrutinised legislation, initiated their own 
inquiries and could introduce Committee Bills.  Backbench MSPs serve on the committees, 
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with committee places allocated through the d’Hondt system, which determined how many 
committee places each party was given.  It then tended to be the party leadership that decided 
who sat on the different committees.  It was committee membership that determined just how 
valuable an MSP was to an interest group because even the groups which did not feel that 
MSPs were very effective felt it worth their while to build up relationships with the MSPs on 
the committee(s) that they primarily dealt with.  This was testament to the importance that the 
groups attached to the committees in terms of policy making.  The committee system 
provided the groups ‘with a clear target audience’ allowing them the opportunity to 
concentrate their resources rather than ‘sending material to a wide range of members in an 
attempt to find those who might have an interest in their cause’ (Norton; 1993, p.169).   
 
8.3.2  Member’s Bills 
Every backbench MSP could introduce two Member’s Bills during a parliamentary term.  At 
Westminster, Member’s Bills are chosen by a ballot system but at Holyrood where the 
number of Members is much smaller, a Bill was assured of being introduced to the Scottish 
Parliament as long as it had the support of 10% of the MSPs (so at least another eleven MSPs 
had to register their support) within a month of it being published.  Two Member’s Bills 
really stood out from the Parliament’s first term – the Poindings and Warrant Sales Bill and 
the Protection of Wild Mammals (Scotland) Bill.  The Poindings and Warrant Sales Bill was 
brought forward by Tommy Sheridan (SSP) and his two co-sponsors John McAllion (Lab) 
and Alex Neil (SNP).  It was particularly remarkable because it did not have the support of 
the Executive but it did have the backing of the parliamentary committees that had 
scrutinised the Bill.  Normally the Executive’s opposition would signal the death knell of a 
Member’s Bill but the strength of backbench support was such that the Executive backed 
down and withdrew a wrecking amendment at the Bill’s first reading and decided that while 
they would not vote in favour of the Bill neither would they vote against it.  This allowed it to 
be approved by 79 votes to 15 (the Conservatives voted against) with 30 abstentions (the 
Ministers and their deputies along with a large proportion of Liberal Democrat MSPs).  The 
Herald newspaper stated that the Poinding and Warrant Sales Bill ‘provoked the Scottish 
Parliament’s first successful backbench rebellion’ (The Herald (g), p.7).  The Protection of 
Wild Mammals (Scotland) Bill was sponsored by Mike Watson (Lab) and was memorable 
for the strength of feeling it provoked.  The Bill sought to ban hunting and the issue prompted 
people to march in the streets to demonstrate their feelings and it also filled many newspaper 
column inches.  The Rural Development Committee (the lead committee) was divided over 
the proposed legislation and ended up spending months considering the Bill.  In the end the 
Committee recommended that it should be rejected as they felt it was flawed and 
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unworkable.  However, the Scottish Executive supported it and the Scottish Parliament 
decided to go against the Committee’s recommendations and at the Stage 1 vote, it was 
approved with a comfortable majority of fifty. 
  
8.3.3  Debates 
 MSPs can table motions for debate (so can the committees, the Executive and the political 
parties).  Interest groups find parliamentary debates useful because they raise awareness 
about a particular subject or issue.  A Member’s Debate is usually the last item of business 
that the Scottish Parliament deals with at the end of a Wednesday and a Thursday for 
approximately forty minutes.  Normally, only a few MSPs remain for a Member’s Debate 
because they often focus on issues or projects that are of a local nature and a vote is not taken 
on these debates as they do not determine plans for action, instead they simply draw attention 
to an issue.  If MSPs found that their mailbag had a lot of letters about a particular topic, this 
is a forum where they can raise those issues whether they are of a local, Scottish, British, 
European or indeed international nature.  The relevant Minister (normally a Deputy) usually 
gives the Executive’s stance on the topic as the last contribution to the debate.  For all 
debates, not just Member’s Debates, interest groups brief MSPs so that the MSPs will 
hopefully include the information from the briefings during their contributions.   
 
8.3.4  Parliamentary questions 
MSPs can ask oral and written questions of the Scottish Executive, which was useful for 
groups wanting to find out information and it was also another way of putting pressure on the 
Scottish Executive.  Interest groups often suggest the wording of parliamentary questions 
(PQs) to MSPs.  Once a written PQ is tabled, it is then up to the relevant civil servants to find 
the information and draft an answer to it before the Minister checks it for his or her approval.  
There are no limits to the number of written questions that an MSP could ask, although they 
were asked to be responsible about the numbers of questions, as some MSPs were asking vast 
numbers which was costing a lot of time and money.  The Scottish Parliament has a detailed 
guide on how PQs should be written.  Once a written PQ has been submitted correctly, an 
MSP could expect to have a reply (which was also published on the Scottish Parliament’s 
website for the public to see) within fourteen days, unless they were designated as a ‘holding 
answer’, which just meant that the answer was being looked into and as soon as the 
information was compiled, the MSP would receive an answer.   
 
Question Time was held on Thursday afternoons.  An MSP could only lodge one oral 
question per week but they could ask related supplementary questions.  A total of thirty oral 
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questions were selected each week for Ministers to answer and six oral questions were 
chosen for the First Minister.  (The Ministers usually did not have enough time to answer 
thirty oral questions at Question Time so whichever ones were not reached were then treated 
automatically as written questions).  The First Minister and the Ministers know these 
questions in advance to Question Time so they came prepared with their civil servant 
briefings and tended to give answers that did not give away very much.  But the opportunity 
to ask supplementary questions meant that Ministers had to think on their feet and this could 
sometimes be more productive in getting information.  Questions were often planted or 
‘inspired’ by Labour and Liberal Democrat MSPs who asked PQs that coincidentally tied in 
with the Executive announcing funding for a project or a new strategy or some other good 
news. 
 
It was quite easy for interest groups to get an MSP to table PQs for them.  This is by no 
means a new or rare practice as a 1986 survey of Westminster revealed that 80% of the 
organisations interviewed had asked MPs to table parliamentary questions (Norton; 1999, 
p.25). 
 
8.3.5  Cross Party Groups 
Many interest groups contact MSPs through Cross Party Groups (CPGs).  Large numbers of 
CPGs sprung up at the beginning of the Scottish Parliament and some MSPs spread 
themselves too thin, so MSP attendance at them could be poor.  The CPGs had no formal 
powers but interest groups found them useful because it gave them an opportunity to lobby 
MSPs, circumvent party politics, share information and pressurise the Scottish Executive 
because CPGs are also open to outside members so they are particularly attractive to interest 
groups.   
 
The CPGs were regulated by the Parliament’s Standards Committee and they had to abide by 
certain rules, e.g. they had to have at least five MSPs on them (and there had to be one from 
each of the main parties).   A CPG could only be convened if there were at least two MSPs 
who were members of the group present, which perhaps accounts for the fact that some 
groups met formally very erratically.  CPGs only run for a parliamentary session and there is 
a stipulation that they have to re-register after each Scottish Parliament election. 
 
8.3.6  Voting and amendments 
Obviously the fact that MSPs vote on legislation makes them attractive to interest groups.  
The first stage of legislation is when a Bill has been introduced to the Scottish Parliament and 
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assigned to a lead parliamentary committee (and perhaps to other committees) which 
considers it and then reports back to the Scottish Parliament about the Bill’s general 
principles and then the full plenary session vote on the Bill’s general principles.  If the 
majority agree to the principles, the Bill then progresses to Stage 2 where the Bill returns to 
the committee(s), which then considers the details of the legislation.  Amendments can be 
proposed at this stage to both the committees and to the plenary session where MSPs will 
vote on the Bill again.  Lodging amendments is another capacity that makes MSPs attractive 
to interest groups, as amendments can significantly change the details of a Bill.  If the Bill is 
approved it then moves on to Stage 3 for its final refinement and amendments in committee 
and then back to plenary session when MSPs vote for the last time on it, either to pass the 
Bill or to reject it.   
 
Generally, amendments in plenary session have fallen along party lines.  At any stage of the 
legislative process various amendments were put forward for debate and it was normal 
practice that an Executive amendment or one tabled by a Labour MSP was approved, 
whereas an amendment tabled by an SNP, Conservative or a minority party MSP tended to 
fall.  Opposition policies rarely got far unless they had the Executive’s support because 
without the Executive’s support Labour and Liberal Democrat MSPs were unlikely to vote in 
favour of it.  Michael Russell (SNP) brought forward his Member’s Bill (Gaelic Language 
(Scotland) Bill) in March 2003 and surprisingly the general principles of it were approved at 
Stage 1, but this is because the Executive decided to back it.  Previously, however, the 
Executive had said that there were better ways to preserve Gaelic but on the strength of the 
Education, Culture and Sport Committee’s report on Mr Russell’s Bill, the Executive decided 
to vote in favour of the Bill’s principles.   
 
8.4  The response of the groups  
The majority of the six interest groups believed that MSPs were not very effectual in the 
policy process, yet many of them spent a remarkable amount of time and energy on lobbying 
MSPs although this was generally because of their committee membership.  All the groups 
declared themselves as being non-political so they did not align themselves with any 
particular political parties, preferring to keep their options open.  All the groups were agreed 
that MSPs were incredibly accessible.  Therefore the selection of MSPs that they targeted 
was not limited by questions of access.     
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Federation of Small Businesses 
When asked if the FSB targeted particular MSPs, the Policy Convener replied that ‘we target 
different committees’ and he went so far as to say that ‘there’s no use going to other MSPs if 
they are not involved in them because you are wasting your time’.  If an MSP was not on the 
three committees that the FSB dealt with (Enterprise and Lifelong Learning, Transport and 
the Environment, and European) then the Policy Convener said all they were doing was 
providing them with ‘outside information’ which was ‘not constructive as far as I’m 
concerned’.    
 
However, the FSB while not particularly committed to investing a lot of their time into MSPs 
on non-relevant committees were still happy enough to supply information to any MSPs who 
requested it.  That was relatively frequently - some weeks every day and then on others not at 
all, but they did ‘make an attempt to approach’ the FSB (Press and Parliamentary Officer).   
 
Occasionally the FSB lobbied all the MSPs in the Parliament and organised events for them 
(such as holding a dinner for each of the political parties); an acknowledgment that MSPs did 
have some uses outside of their committee roles.  They also carried out blanket mailings of 
all MSPs on particular issues such as the Working Families Tax Credit and sub post offices.  
The FSB was particularly keen on giving opposition MSPs information about issues which it 
thought the Scottish Executive had got wrong, so the MSPs could raise the issues the group 
was concerned about.  Kenny MacAskill, the SNP’s transport spokesperson at the time, had 
arranged a meeting with the FSB so that he could get an idea of what questions he should be 
putting to Ministers.  The FSB had a particularly good relationship with the Enterprise and 
Lifelong Learning Minister (Henry McLeish at that time) so they did not want to spoil that 
relationship but it was sometimes useful for them to lobby opposition MSPs.  For example, 
the FSB had a proposal which they felt was the ‘only game in town’ but the Scottish 
Executive were not keen on it and while the FSB was not going to hand over ‘ammunition to 
the Executive’s political opponents’ in order to penalise the Executive, the FSB turn to 
opposition MSPs if it felt it was getting nowhere on an issue (Press and Parliamentary 
Officer).   
 
The FSB said it did not utilise the mechanism of PQs as much as it could have.  The FSB 
found opposition MSPs particularly useful for this task as they were more willing to ask 
questions that might show the Executive up.  The Deputy Press and Parliamentary Officer 
remarked that PQs could provide them with useful information and that this was a beneficial 
capability that MSPs possessed. 
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The FSB regarded the full chamber as a bit of a ‘talking shop’ and the Deputy Press and 
Parliamentary Officer remarked that the debates were ‘not a very good quality you could 
expect from parliamentarians’.   
 
It would seem that the effect of MSPs on the FSB was limited, although the staff had made a 
point of building up relationships with MSPs on the Enterprise and Lifelong Learning 
Committee.  According to the office diary at the time of participant observation (August 
2000), the FSB had only arranged five formal face to face meetings with MSPs (compared to 
the nine occasions they met up with Ministers). The MSPs could take heart though because 
they were not as far down the FSB’s list of priorities as their Westminster colleagues who 
were left out of the picture altogether when the Scottish Parliament opened. 
 
Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office 
Like the other groups the SCPO’s Parliamentary Officer was happy at how accessible MSPs 
were.  In his written submission to the Standards Committee inquiry into lobbying, the 
Parliamentary Officer wrote that the SCPO had found ‘MSPs to be readily accessible’ and 
‘consistently willing to meet with representatives of the churches’ (taken from a personal 
copy of the written submission).  He felt that MSPs did not have the gentleman’s club 
atmosphere that existed at Westminster and that MSPs ‘are more firmly rooted in their own 
communities than Westminster MPs are’.  This was helped by the fact that a large proportion 
of MSPs commuted to work on the days the Scottish Parliament was in session.  The 
Parliamentary Officer was able to take advantage of his own train journeys into work and 
joked that he did ‘a lot of my best work on the train’.  He also found it easier to keep up 
relationships with MSPs due to the fact that the SCPO premises were on the Mound.  This 
meant that on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays when MSPs were in Edinburgh it was 
more than likely that the Parliamentary Officer ‘will have one or two conversations with 
MSPs’ informally as he bumped into them on the street.   
 
SCPO contact with MSPs was primarily informal.  The relatively few formal meetings held 
with MSPs in 1999 and 2000 (estimated by the Parliamentary Officer at ‘only a dozen or so’) 
were not a true indication of MSP contact.  During the period of participant observation it 
became very clear that he was on speaking terms to many MSPs of all parties.  And as one of 
the SCPO’s ten lobbying commandments state: ‘good relationships bear fruit’ (SCPO (e), 
p.4). 
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 The SCPO like all the other groups was non-party political and so did not specialise in 
contacts with any one party.  When it came to lobbying MSPs the SCPO’s practice was to 
‘approach particular people on particular issues’.  The Parliamentary Officer targeted the 
MSPs on the parliamentary committees that were of interest to SCPO, or MSPs who were 
sympathetic to the views of the church, or on relevant cross-party groups or by their 
constituency/region area.  However, it was through the committees that MSPs were most able 
to shape legislation according to the Parliamentary Officer so ‘we tend to target the MSPs 
who are on a particular committee.  Not exclusively, but mainly’.  And when he said that 
MSPs could shape legislation in the committees, he meant they did not determine 
overarching policy but that they could shape the details of a Bill.  MSPs can do this by 
putting forward amendments and so the Parliamentary Officer accordingly advised one of the 
networks that he was involved with during the period of participant observation, that it would 
be useful to ask MSPs to submit amendments to the Housing Bill which they were then 
interested in at the time. 
 
The SCPO advised that when lobbying an MSP: ‘Briefing papers which offer sound evidence 
for your case – experience and research (including some statistics and vivid examples) - will 
be useful tools for MSPs’ (SCPO (e), p.1/2).  The Parliamentary Officer also suggested that 
in order to better their chances of getting the briefing paper read, face to face contact with 
MSPs should be made and he helped this process by facilitating meetings with MSPs and 
church people.  MSPs were seen as a good way for people in the churches to lobby the 
Scottish Parliament. 
 
The Parliamentary Officer believed that MSPs had more opportunity to be effective in the 
Scottish Parliament than their Westminster counterparts, for example, the Scottish Parliament 
structure encouraged Member’s Bills more.  Any MSP could table a Member’s Bill at 
Holyrood (MSPs could introduce two Member’s Bills in a parliamentary term) compared to 
Westminster where MPs had to win a lottery.  By February 2001 the Parliamentary Officer 
felt that backbench MSPs had produced a couple of significant Bills, particularly Tommy 
Sheridan’s Poinding and Warrant Sales Bill, where the support of the parliamentary 
committees scrutinising the Bill fostered a cross-party consensus which ‘forced the Executive 
to back down from its intention to halt the Bill’s progress’ (SCPO (d), p.1). 
 
The SCPO rarely wanted to table a parliamentary question although the Parliamentary 
Officer did point out to the churches that ‘MSPs do take account of constituents’ views and 
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can get answers for you from Ministers or may even ask parliamentary questions on issues 
you raise’ (SCPO (e), p.2).   
 
More negatively he found with MSPs that ‘ambition and the desire to get re-elected might get 
in the way of independence of spirit.  And they succumb to the yah boo temptation’.  He also 
criticised the lack of independence amongst MSPs in his written submission to the Standards 
Committee where he stated ‘the way in which party discipline and decision-making tend to 
dominate; these processes are not open or transparent’ (taken from a personal copy).  He also 
repeated those criticisms in a written submission to the Procedures Committee. 
 
The SCPO spent a lot of its time in making contacts with MSPs but the Parliamentary Officer 
believed that the ‘committees are the area in which bodies like the churches should be having 
their key influence’ and when asked how MSPs would feature in the future plans of the 
SCPO, he answered that they would ‘continue working with them in committees’. 
 
Multiple Sclerosis Society 
The MS Society invested a lot of time and resources into MSPs.  The Director actually 
thought that Ministers, civil servants and the committees were more important than 
individual MSPs in the making of policy but ‘we spend more time with them because they 
are easier to spend time with.  Access to the Executive is a bit restricted’.  His Policy Officer 
on the other hand, listed MSPs as being the most important actors in the policy process to the 
MS Society because:  
‘I think it’s fair to say that MSPs have continued to be our main focus because 
they’ve provided us with the guidance and advice that’s allowed us to get to the 
committees, Ministers, civil servants and the clerks’ (personal interview, May 2001).   
 
The MS Society devoted a lot of their time to building up relationships with MSPs.  When 
asked about the MSPs they targeted, the Director responded ‘committee members and health 
spokespeople and people who have shown an interest already’.  The Policy Officer also 
added to the list MSPs ‘who had a health background, or maybe a scientific background, or a 
background with a disability issue’.  For instance, they targeted Richard Simpson (Lab) 
because he was the only GP in the Parliament at the time ‘and the word has it that the Health 
Minister pays particular attention to what he says’ (Policy Officer).  So while membership of 
the Health Committee did immediately make an MSP of interest to the Society, it certainly 
did not preclude other MSPs from receiving attention from them.   
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One of the first things that the Society did on the Policy Officer’s appointment was to ask 
their public affairs company to trawl through all the PQs that had been asked about multiple 
sclerosis (MS) or issues of concern to people with MS and to list the MSPs that had asked 
them.  By May 2001 twenty-three MSPs had asked over sixty questions between them on MS 
and MS related issues.  This suggested that they had received pressure from their constituents 
on these matters which prompted them to ask the PQs or that they had a particular interest in 
it for other reasons.  Either way, it allowed the Society to pinpoint those MSPs for further 
lobbying and they began to arrange meetings with them to determine just how sympathetic 
the MSPs were to the MS Society and who they could develop good working relationships 
with.  
 
The Society was advised by one MSP that PQs would be a useful way for it to get 
information and to get the official Ministerial position on the record.  The Society have since 
been very keen to get PQs asked and at the time of participant observation were 
contemplating drawing up a list of questions they would like to have tabled. 
 
One of the Policy Officer’s aims was to educate all 129 MSPs about MS.  In one newsletter 
the Society informed their members that it was preparing briefing papers for MSPs because it 
wanted ‘every MSP to know exactly what needs to be done’ in relation to people who have 
MS (MS Society (b), p.3).  The Society embarked on an on-going series of written briefings 
to MSPs.  It also organised a briefing session at the Scottish Parliament and invited every 
MSP.  Fifteen MSPs attended and several others sent their apologies and requested more 
information.  All those MSPs were noted as having shown interest in MS and any new names 
that were not there before went on to the Society’s target list of MSPs.  The Society kept a 
look out for any potentially sympathetic MSPs, so when the Policy Officer heard Rhona 
Brankin (Lab) talking about transport access for people with impaired mobility, he 
immediately sent her a letter to inform her about the Society (as transport access is a relevant 
issue for people with MS).  The Society worked away at getting their message across and 
their intention was to have a drip effect.  The Policy Officer remarked ‘I bet half of the 
Health Committee and certainly well over half of the Parliament didn’t know what the letters 
MS stood for and they know now’.  On the advice of their public affairs consultants the 
Society had a strategy where they tried to arrange a meeting with an MSP every month.  The 
Director admitted that the benefits of those meetings were for the most part ‘quite marginal’.  
But the Society continued with them because they helped to raise the profile of MS and at the 
end of the day he felt that ‘it’s time well spent even if they are not individually influential 
immediately.  They are all potential decision-makers’. 
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The Society managed to get Tricia Marwick (SNP) to sponsor a member’s debate which 
required close liaison with Ms Marwick (and originally with Alex Neil who first suggested to 
the Society that he could table a debate for them, but the Society switched sponsors when he 
entered the SNP Scottish Group leadership campaign after Alex Salmond stepped down).  
The Society selected Tricia Marwick to sponsor their debate because it saw her as a ‘fixer’ - 
someone who could get cross-party support.  There was also the added bonus that she served 
on the Parliamentary Bureau (which decides the business timetable for the Scottish 
Parliament).  The Director was keen for the debate to be held because debates ‘are good for 
publicity and awareness raising’.  The Society also made the case to the Parliamentary 
Bureau that they should fix the date for the debate well in advance (which was unusual for 
the Scottish Parliament to do) because many of the Society’s members need to use 
wheelchairs so a lot of practical considerations had to be taken into account, which 
necessitated a fixed day for the debate.  The Society then arranged a lobby of the Parliament 
on the same day as the debate, so their members could come to Edinburgh to speak to MSPs 
and then listen to the debate later on.  Over 150 of the Society’s members attended the 
Scottish Parliament that day and had the opportunity of lobbying fifty-three MSPs who came 
along to hear what they had to say.  The lobby helped to raise the profile of people with 
multiple sclerosis but it also meant a lot of work for the Policy Officer and the Director as 
they had to make all the arrangements for their members, advertise the event to their branches 
and to MSPs alike.   
 
The Society found that one of the advantages of having good relationships with MSPs was 
the useful and candid advice that it received from them.  MSPs helped with strategy and 
advised the Policy Officer and the Director on the best way to go about things.  Their advice 
prompted the Director to say that MSPs are ‘better than your public affairs consultants about 
giving that sort of advice and it’s free!’  One example of such advice that the Society acted 
upon was the formation of an informal “dining club” composed of MSPs and MS experts 
which operated under Chatham House rules in order to encourage those present to be open 
and frank.  The dining club allowed the politicians to learn more about MS and the Society 
and it was also an opportunity for the Society to get MSPs to become what the Policy Officer 
termed ‘parliamentary terriers’ to champion the MS Society cause.  Another piece of advice 
that they received was that they should submit a paper to the Health and Community Care 
Committee which was considering the health budget, so that the Society could ask for money 
to be apportioned to MS nurses and other MS services.  Submitting a paper to the 
parliamentary budget process was not something that had occurred to the Society or indeed to 
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their public affairs consultants.  They were also advised by an MSP not to set up a cross party 
group on MS, which the staff had been considering, because they were told it would be a 
waste of the Society’s time.  This was because cross party groups were cumbersome, there 
were too many of them and MSPs were finding it difficult to attend the meetings so as a 
result of this advice the Society has ‘sought to do things purely informally’. 
 
The Society’s considerable activity with MSPs allowed them to develop a core group of eight 
to ten MSPs whom they were actively and regularly in contact with.  The Society’s ultimate 
aim was to get their branch members to develop relationships with their own constituency 
and regional MSPs which would allow the Society to be ‘in a much stronger position than we 
are just now’ (Policy Officer). 
 
While the Society had enjoyed largely positive experiences with MSPs, they too voiced the 
familiar complaint of MSP lack of independence.  The Policy Officer found this to be 
particularly the case amongst the Executive parties, some of whom ‘have been incredibly 
defensive’.  But generally though the Society was keen to maintain the relationships it had 
with MSPs because MSPs can: 
‘do the questions, sponsor meetings with health boards, take up issues for constituents 
for sort of the general run of the mill and then it’s the specific ones who are more 
influential because they are on the committees or know so and so or are prepared to 
have a word with the Minister’ (Director; personal interview, May 2001). 
 
Scottish Parent Teacher Council 
In contrast the SPTC invested nowhere nearly as much effort into MSPs as the MS Society 
did.  The Development Manager said that MSPs were important to the SPTC ‘only in terms 
of being part of committees.  We haven’t even contacted MSPs much outside the Education 
Committee’.   
 
The Development Manager had made an effort to get to know the MSPs on the Education, 
Culture and Sport Committee.  She raised her profile by attending committee meetings 
simply as an observer because MSPs notice people who turn up again and again.  The 
Development Manager went along and often had informal chats with committee members.  
During the Scottish Qualifications Association (SQA) crisis she had a lot of contact with Ian 
Jenkins (Lib Dem) as he used to be a teacher and ‘therefore he actually had a practical 
understanding of the issues’.  She also spent time informing Brian Monteith (Con) and all the 
SNP members of the Committee about SQA.  More sustained contact with non-Labour MSPs 
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was par for the course for the SPTC but this was not a deliberate strategy of theirs.  They 
wrote to all the MSPs on the Committee when there was a particular issue they wanted to 
raise and then they would ‘take it up with whoever got back to us’ which tended not to be the 
Labour MSPs.  But Ian Jenkins, Brian Monteith and the SNP MSPs were very good at 
acknowledging any material sent to them from the SPTC.  Nicola Sturgeon (SNP) was quite 
keen to use the SPTC’s expertise when she was the Education Spokesperson for her party.  
When she changed portfolio she wrote to them to thank them for all their input into the 
consultation period of the Standards in Scotland’s Schools Bill because with the information 
the SPTC supplied, she was able to lodge amendments to the Bill.  The SPTC then developed 
a relationship with Michael Russell who took over Nicola Sturgeon’s position as education 
spokesperson and her seat on the Education Committee. 
 
When it came to the plenary sessions, the Development Manager said that many of the MSPs 
had not got a clue what they were talking about in debates and ‘it’s been quite frightening to 
listen to them in the Chamber’.  She did add: 
‘I have to say after being rude about them occasionally you get debates which are 
valid and worthwhile.  But I think it really depends on the issue and there have only 
been a few issues where they have been really engaged and I think a lot of them don’t 
use the chamber as much as it could be used to be honest’ (personal interview, 
November 2001).   
When asked about how effective she thought MSPs were at introducing, shaping or changing 
legislation she was hard pressed to think of any examples other than the Poindings and 
Warrant Sales Bill sponsored by Tommy Sheridan (SSP), John McAllion (Lab) and Alex 
Neil (SNP).  The only other example she could think of was free personal care ‘insofar as a 
sort of rather uncertain Executive was made more certain by all the responses from the 
Chamber’.   
 
The reason why she thought MSPs failed to assert themselves was again party discipline.  ‘I 
think the thing that pre-empts it from happening is the political selection process, which has 
meant that in general and for all parties, it is party loyalists who end up being appointed 
rather than mavericks’.  She felt that there were occasions where MSPs could have asserted 
themselves but for the most part they were not interested in doing so because for the majority 
of them it meant going against their own Ministers.  Like many within the interest groups she 
was impressed by Tommy Sheridan and added that:  
‘I think in fact Parliament would benefit from more independent voices.  The way 
he’s used the Parliament as a kind of platform has been very effective.  He has 
 215
actually managed to get the Poinding thing through even though the Executive have 
now sat on it and he hasn’t got any master who can silence him’ (personal interview, 
November 2001). 
 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
CoSLA had a close working relationship with the Scottish Executive, which took up a large 
proportion of its time so backbench MSPs by default got less attention.  This was made 
obvious by the shortage of references to MSPs in CoSLA’s written material and in the 
interviews.  However, MSPs featured in CoSLA’s vision and strategic plan which stated that 
they would brief MSPs as a means of initiating policy and influencing the parliamentary 
agenda.  And they did send briefings to MSPs ‘both on request and at our own behest’ but 
again, like the other groups it tended to be just to the MSPs on the relevant committees that 
CoSLA targeted and sometimes they might only ‘go with the Executive members of that 
committee’ (Head of Policy).  When asked about personal contact with MSPs, both the Head 
of Policy and the Convention Manager said that it was generally in the context of the 
committees.  The only other time MSPs come to the foreground of their daily work was if an 
MSP was bringing forward a Member’s Bill which had issues that impinged on local 
government and this perhaps explained why they both spoke about Tommy Sheridan and 
talked of him as an effective MSP.  The Head of Policy commented that Mr Sheridan 
‘usually has a disproportionate influence’ in the Scottish Parliament which he attributed to 
the fact that Mr Sheridan was ‘not constrained by wider party politics, the others are one way 
or another’.  The Convention Manager also brought up the Socialist MSP in her interview 
and agreed with her colleague that ‘you can see somebody like Tommy Sheridan able to get 
an initiative progressed even without the whole machinery behind him of a coalition’.   
 
Both the Head of Policy and the Convention Manager complained that in the Chamber ‘the 
quality of debate can be embarrassing’.  They did not even see the need to ask an MSP to 
place a parliamentary question, because where they saw a need at Westminster to ‘flush out 
information’, at the Scottish Parliament they felt they ‘are on information overload’. 
 
Perhaps the Convention Manager summed it up best for CoSLA when she said that when it 
came to ‘the whole gaggle of backbenchers…I don’t really know if I have a strong view on 
them as just a group of MSPs but that’s probably because that’s not how we really relate to 
them’.  The Head of Policy explained that he did not have time to build up relationships with 
MSPs but he did not feel that it had been a barrier in any way and that such relationships 
‘would be helpful rather than necessary anyway’.  At the time of participant observation, 
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however, the Acting Chief Executive was actually looking into how best to target MSPs and 
was planning to draw up a list of relevant committees and party spokespersons.  His intention 
was that CoSLA would have on-going communication with sympathetic MSPs and that it: 
‘should be looking at targeting our information to specific MSPs, not just when they 
are having an inquiry into anything or looking at particular pieces of legislation or 
bills, but we should be sending them anything we’ll say on a subject matter they say 
they have got an interest in and that way I think they get a better understanding as to 
what is going on and what we’re saying’ (personal interview, December 2001). 
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
Because the RSPB was having difficulty in getting access to the Scottish Executive, the 
Advocacy and Media Unit spent a lot of time developing good working relationships with 
MSPs.  In common with the other groups they found that MSPs were ‘much more effective 
when they form into committees’ (Head of Advocacy and Media).  MSPs on the Transport 
and the Environment Committee and the Rural Development Committee were the MSPs that 
they ‘are going to cultivate most.  And we’ve got to be targeted, you can’t do everyone, even 
with one hundred and twenty-nine you can’t do everybody’ (Head of Advocacy and Media).  
But the RSPB did include other MSPs in their lobbying strategy by casting their net to 
include environmentally friendly MSPs.  Or as the Head of Advocacy and Media put it:  
‘There are far too few people who are semi-decent environmentalists inside Scottish 
politics, so if I come across one, I don’t care if they are on the Outer Mongolian sub-
legislation committee, I’m going to cultivate them’ (personal interview, December 
2001). 
His colleagues made the same observations, with the Media Officer saying that the RSPB had 
to focus their attention and efforts on the committees that related the most to the 
environment.   
 
Out of the one hundred and twenty-nine, the RSPB had approximately thirty-five MSPs 
which they had reasonably good working relationships with.  The RSPB worked hard to 
make those connections.  For instance, one of its internal reports revealed that the RSPB had 
met up with MSPs a total of 47 times in 2000 and had a further 47 meetings with MSPs by 
August 2001.  On top of this the Parliamentary Information Officer also reckoned that the 
RSPB probably spoke to MSPs three or four times a week.  Further contact was made when 
the RSPB arranged days where MSPs and their researchers visited RSPB nature reserves, or 
attended an RSPB event or sailed on a seabird cruise.  In the 2000 summer recess the RSPB 
reported that twenty-four MSPs, two MEPs and twenty-four researchers had taken them up 
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on invites to such events – the RSPB hoped that this imaginative approach would stick in the 
minds of the MSPs. 
 
An internal review of the RSPB’s work in the second year of the Parliament also saw the 
RSPB reporting that: 
‘considerable effort has been made to cement good working relationships with the 
environmental and rural affairs researchers of all the political parties in Parliament 
and the Scottish Parliament Information Centre’ (personal copy of internal review 
document, 2000). 
The Advocacy and Media Unit had invested a lot of time into developing those relationships 
with MSPs’ researchers and the people from SPICe because they saw them as being 
important.  In fact the Parliamentary Information Officer said that she thought they ‘are more 
powerful than MSPs sometimes’.  She understood that it was the researchers who effectively 
decided what was going to be said in debates as they were the ones that read what SPICe 
produced on a particular topic, read the input from interest groups and applied the party 
policy to the issue before putting it all in a briefing for their MSP to use.  ‘So if you get it 
right with them then it can definitely feed through to MSPs’.  Another benefit of cultivating 
researchers was the placing of parliamentary questions as the researchers helped with the 
final wording of questions and also got an MSP to ask the PQs.  In addition they found that 
‘parties are now beginning to invite RSPB participation in policy consultation and the 
process of manifesto writing’ (taken from an internal document). 
 
The RSPB also sent out briefings to MSPs.  They preferred to send them via e-mail and only 
to a closed group of MSPs, usually those on the Transport and the Environment Committee, 
the Rural Development Committee and the European Committee and any green MSPs that 
they had identified.  They saw no point in sending out briefings to MSPs that were going to 
have no interest in it whatsoever.  The Parliamentary and Information Officer said that the 
advantage of having green MSPs who were not on those three Committees was that there 
were more MSPs to put across the environmental viewpoint in debates. 
 
Informal lobbying had also been used to good effect by the RSPB.  On one occasion two of 
the staff had to travel to Inverness to give evidence (on behalf of LINK, an environmental 
umbrella body) to the Justice 2 Committee, which was convening in the Highland capital on 
that particular day.  The train that the RSPB representatives were catching was also the same 
one as the Committee members, which gave them the opportunity to talk to the MSPs for the 
whole journey.  The Parliamentary Information Officer commented that some of the best 
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lobbying happened when MSPs were waiting for committee meetings to start or during the 
breaks of the meetings. 
 
The RSPB commissioned MORI to conduct a survey of MSPs attitudes (in particular what 
they thought of the RSPB in comparison to other environmental groups) in 1999 and repeated 
the exercise again two years later in August 2001.  The information they collected would 
obviously help them to hone their lobbying strategies (for example, to build on the RSPB’s 
perceived strengths, perhaps adopt different tactics for rural and urban MSPs, with Executive 
and non-Executive MSPs and so on).  The information was augmented by the findings in the 
same MORI survey of the radio and television programmes that the MSPs listened to for 
political information and what MSPs felt interest groups should do if they wanted to develop 
and maintain good relationships with them. 
 
The RSPB’s overall view of MSPs was that they were not as important in the legislative 
process as Ministers and civil servants but until the RSPB got a breakthrough in getting 
access to the Scottish Executive, it was investing its resources into MSPs who could aid them 
in their campaign meantime. 
 
Summary 
An off the record interview with a Head of Division within the civil service revealed that he 
did not rate the importance of individual MSPs in the policy process very highly.  He put 
individual MSPs in last place after Ministers, civil servants, committees and interest groups.  
The groups also rated MSPs as being very low down the ladder of influence.  And yet they 
spent a lot of resources on lobbying and cultivating relationships with MSPs, adopting the 
‘belts and braces’ approach to do what they could to influence policy.  MSPs were also very 
accessible which helped to make them attractive to groups, particularly those having 
difficulty in gaining access to the Scottish Executive.  
 
The groups wanted to see more independent minded MSPs and they were impressed with 
Tommy Sheridan because they saw him as being effective, someone who would not conform 
to executive dominance (the Scottish Parliament was supposed to create a strong legislature).  
But the majority of the MSPs failed to impress the groups, yet the FSB, SCPO, MS Society 
and the RSPB still went to considerable lengths (briefing papers, meetings, invites to events 
etc) for what they saw as the marginal benefits of tabling PQs and raising points in debate, 
although they valued their committee roles.   
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Rational choice institutionalism 
The groups all prized the role of the committees in the legislative process and as a 
consequence they had to invest resources in the MSPs on those committees – that was 
entirely rational self-interested behaviour.  But only the SPTC and CoSLA confined 
themselves to lobbying MSPs on relevant committees.  The MS Society spent time with 
MSPs to get useful strategy advice in order to further its goals was also rational; the Society 
was new to the political process and benefited from the insider suggestions.  The FSB, SCPO 
and the RSPB also spent time developing relationships with MSPs but it is harder to make a 
rational argument for their behaviour.  They were getting some return on their investment, 
e.g. the airing of issues, the tabling of PQs, getting the parties to adopt an issue and so on, 
which all went towards pressurising the Scottish Executive but whether it was worth the 
resources they put in to courting MSPs is questionable. 
 
Sociological institutionalism 
Where rational choice had a problem explaining the behaviour of some of the groups, 
sociological institutionalism is hard pressed to explain why the SPTC and CoSLA did not 
follow the pattern of the other groups in lobbying MSPs outwith relevant committees.  It 
seems that they did not see such activity as an efficient use of their time and money, which is 
a rationalist explanation.     
 
This leaves sociological institutionalism to explain the behaviour of the other four groups, 
which it would put down to the groups following the logic of appropriateness, that they 
shared the same cognitive maps as a result of their interaction with the Scottish Parliament 
and each other.  Having adopted the same cognitive maps they then proceeded to follow the 
same pattern of behaviour that conformed to the expectations of the Scottish Parliament.  The 
SCPO, MS Society and the RSPB were active participants in the Third Sector Policy 
Officer’s Network which met up regularly and discussed parliamentary issues.  Out of the six 
groups those three placed a higher emphasis on MSPs than the others.  The FSB because of 
its regular interaction with the Scottish Parliament  and its original support of devolution 
could have found itself influenced by its culture, bringing the FSB’s values more in line with 
the Parliament’s and so they too followed a set pattern of behaviour of lobbying MSPs.  This 
would explain that even though the FSB was doubtful about the benefits to be had from 
lobbying MSPs on non-relevant committees, they still did so – a hangover from their part in 
the Scottish Constitutional Convention, where there was a desire for a strong legislature. 
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Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism would go back to the point when the groups decided on their 
lobbying strategy with the different devolved institutions.  MSPs were very accessible and so 
it was easier for groups to carry out political work with them and the groups were keen to 
make an impact.  They had to demonstrate to their members that they were being effective at 
a parliamentary level.  As a result of the groups having committed themselves to investing 
manpower into engaging with the Scottish Parliament, they were forced to continue that 
practice and would continue to go down that path until a critical juncture occurred that would 
give them the opportunity to leave less efficient practices behind..   
 
8.5  Conclusion 
Objective 1 – whether the behaviour and/or belief systems of the six groups were affected by 
the Scottish Parliament. 
The Procedures Committee in its report on how the Scottish Parliament had lived up to the 
CSG principles found that 'MSPs are an obviously significant resource in the task of 
connecting the other partners in governance, the public and civil society, with the Parliament 
in a meaningful way' (2003, para 58).  The report acknowledged that there was no doubt that 
the local work carried out by MSPs, such as showing school children round the Scottish 
Parliament, taking on cases on behalf of individuals and so on, meant that MSPs have 
increased public participation and provided a needed link to the person on the street 
(Procedures Committee; 2003, para 137).  And it does seem that in terms of new politics it is 
with the general public that MSPs have the biggest role to play.  The interest groups found 
that MSPs were living up to the CSG principles and they all agreed that they were highly 
accessible but they found MSPs to be of limited influence in policy making, unless they sat 
on a committee relevant to the interests of the group.  It is membership of parliamentary 
committees that most defines the value of an MSP for interest groups.  Notwithstanding this, 
the accessibility of MSPs did actually affect the behaviour of those groups that were 
struggling to make an impact on other organs of the Scottish Parliament. 
 
The SPTC was an effective committee operator and it also had seats on relevant Scottish 
Executive steering groups, quangos etc and CoSLA had continuous interaction with both the 
Scottish Executive and the committees, which might explain why they had very defined work 
with MSPs.  It is also perhaps an indication that they were more aware than others that not all 
the institutions in the devolved political system were new and that they had a lot to gain from 
maintaining the contacts that they already had.  The other four groups for various reasons 
(still new to political activity, not satisfied with their level of influence, having difficulties 
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accessing the Scottish Executive and/or committees) invested time and resources into 
relationships with individual MSPs because they felt there was some benefit to gain from 
doing so, even outwith their committee role.  Groups that feel that they are being excluded 
from other more powerful access points will look to where they are able to make an input and 
because the MSPs were so open, they made an obvious starting point for the groups furthest 
away from power.  It could be predicted however that as a group gains influence its interest 
in MSPs will drop off as it transfers its energies elsewhere (the FSB appeared to be at this 
transitional stage, although it was still influenced by its earlier attachment to the Scottish 
Parliament). 
 
The evidence given to the Procedures Committee led it to conclude that MSPs had a key part 
to play in community leadership roles and that MSPs were the most effective way for 
constituents to participate in the governance of their community and of the nation.  As for the 
interest groups, with the exception of the MS Society (new to political activity), the interest 
groups did not see MSPs as being their key link to participating in the political process, 
although the FSB and the SCPO (both to a limited extent) and the RSPB spent substantial 
time on individual MSPs.  The SPTC and CoSLA only gave MSPs attention insofar as they 
were the members of committees that they were interested in; it was the committees rather 
than the individual MSPs per se that were of significance.   
 
Objective 2 – the extent to which the different types of institutionalist accounts are applicable 
in explaining the responses of the groups. 
Rational choice institutionalism appears to be the most applicable approach in explaining the 
reaction of the groups towards MSPs.  The SPTC and CoSLA had decided that given their 
success at other levels they would benefit very little from developing links with individual 
MSPs.  The MS Society at the time of participant observation, was relatively new to political 
activity (at a Scottish level) and it was utilising the easiest point of access in order to learn the 
skills it would need to make an impact at the committees and the Scottish Executive.  The 
RSPB was struggling to a large extent to get access to the Scottish Executive and to the 
committees, therefore it made sense for it to work at the level where it could make the biggest 
impact in order to raise its profile and to help it overcome the obstacles in its way to more 
powerful policy makers. 
 
The FSB and the SCPO both questioned the utility of targeting MSPs outwith their 
committees but felt it preferable to err on the side of caution.  This would suggest an element 
of uncertainty – they knew that the benefit to their groups of targeting MSPs was limited but 
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did so anyway.  This could suggest that their response to MSPs is not solely based on a 
rational decision but could be because they had placed a higher value on the legislature when 
they first began dealing with it, so it may just be a hangover from their original involvement 
in the campaign for a Scottish Parliament (sociological institutionalism), which caused them 
to adopt at the beginning a strategy that put emphasis on MSPs that has since become locked 
in (historical institutionalism).  
 
The pattern seems to be that once interest groups reach a certain stage in their involvement 
with the Scottish Parliament the more rational their strategy becomes, although they are still 
influenced by previous approaches.  Such patterns will be looked at in the following chapter 
which will draw together the response of the groups not just to MSPs but to the Scottish 
Parliament as a whole. 
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CHAPTER 9  CONCLUSION 
 
9.1  Introduction 
The impact of the Scottish Parliament and its different components on the six interest groups 
has now been looked at in detail.  Therefore, it is now time to return to the questions that 
were asked in the introductory chapter: do the six groups believe that the Scottish Parliament 
had created a ‘new politics’?  How did the institutional structures of the Scottish Parliament 
affect the behaviour and attitudes of the groups (the first objective of this research)?  Can 
new institutionalism explain why the groups responded in the way that they did to the 
Scottish Parliament (the second objective)?  The answers to these questions help assess the 
central aim of this research as to how the new institution of the Scottish Parliament impacted 
upon the way organised interests engaged with it. 
 
9.2  Objective 1: new politics? 
The first objective of this research was to analyse in particular, whether the behaviour 
and/or belief systems of organised interests are affected by a new parliamentary institution.  
There is evidence from the previous chapters is that the six groups were certainly mobilised 
by the arrival of the Scottish Parliament.  Paterson made the following observation about 
interest groups interested in the work of the Consultative Steering Group: 
'As it worked on its 1999 report, the civic organisations of which the Group was the 
vanguard were staffing themselves up to the new opportunities that the CSG 
principles would bring, employing in abundance the research officers, the 
parliamentary liaison people and the lobbyists that would allow them to move more 
swiftly into the spaces which these principles created' (2002, p.57).  
Different organisations had worked hard to introduce devolution and their involvement gave 
them the opportunity to lobby for the new institution to be based on the principles of power 
sharing, accountability, accessibility and equal opportunities.  These principles outlined in the 
CSG report signalled to interest groups that their support of devolution had been rewarded 
with a Scottish Parliament designed (in theory at least) to be participative; giving groups the 
opportunity to be influential in the new policy making process.  Despite Westminster 
continuing to remain sovereign, as well as reserving its powers over major areas such as the 
economy and social security, the six groups focussed their attention on Holyrood and actually 
spent very little time on Westminster activities.  There are several reasons why groups chose 
to concentrate on Holyrood rather than Westminster: the Scottish Parliament was 
geographically accessible; for some of the groups the Scottish Parliament was a cherished 
goal realised; and there was also an expectation that interest groups would have more input 
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into the policy making process than was possible under the pre-devolution system.  Even for 
those groups that were not 'swiftly moving into the spaces' back in 1998/1999, such as the 
MS Society, soon came to realise that others were benefiting from political involvement and 
that they too could gain from becoming politically active.   
 
Having equipped themselves with the resources that they needed and re-prioritised their 
workload to accommodate the Scottish Parliament, did the groups believe that it had 
delivered a ‘new politics’?  This is not entirely clear-cut, as the Scottish Parliament was not 
an entirely brand new institution.  The Procedures Committee pointed out that new politics 
was an experiment 'taking place within institutions which are derived from the traditional UK 
legislative and administrative framework', resulting in tensions between the desire for a new 
participative politics to engage people and 'the conservative working practices inherited from 
the pre-devolution era’ (Procedures Committee; 2003, para 70).    
 
The devolution process involved both change and continuity but, perhaps inevitably, people 
tended to focus on the change, with prominence given to the Parliament in particular (Lynch; 
2001, p.3).  In debates leading up to the Scottish Parliament, those in favour of home rule 
argued that the parliamentary committees should be given greater policy-making powers than 
the committees at Westminster.  Mitchell remarks that in drawing up the methods of 
operation for the Scottish Parliament, the 'working assumption' of the Consultative Steering 
Group 'appears to have been that the Parliament would be important in policy-making' (2000, 
p.610).  There was a determination amongst those involved in setting up the Scottish 
Parliament that the parliamentary committees would be given enough power to provide a 
balance to the Executive.  A plausible interpretation is that a significant contributory factor in 
this was a fear ‘of an underlying trend towards what Lord Hailsham in 1978 described as 
‘elective dictatorship’ in the British state, as the executive dominated the parliamentary 
process to the detriment of the power of the legislature, something that Judge believed 
stretched into the Thatcher governments (Judge, 1993, p.197).  Devolution offered the 
prospect of a departure from such centralism.   
 
This was further evidenced by the introduction of a PR electoral system for the Scottish 
Parliament, which was meant to ensure that it would be very unlikely for a single party to 
dominate.  Coalition governments were seen as being more accountable and responsive to the 
electorate (Judge; 1993, p.201).  While not all the aspirations for the committees came to 
pass, they were nonetheless granted a combination of Westminster's Standing and Select 
Committees, as well as the power to initiate legislation.  These factors added up gave rise to 
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the perception that the committees had the potential to be very powerful and as a result 
interest groups have shown a sustained interest in them.  In fact, both the SCPO and SPTC 
declared their intention to concentrate their resources on the committees, rather than with 
Ministers or civil servants.  But the committees were a priority for all six groups, even to 
CoSLA, the insider group.  Judge comments that ‘parliament has become of increased value 
in retrieving details lost at the formulation stage of legislation’ (1993, p.130). 
 
The original expectations for the committees and the parliament may have been difficult to 
fulfil, although they do show a real desire for parliament to play a stronger role in our so-
called post-parliamentary world (where public policy is the product of negotiations between 
government and interest groups, with parliament largely bypassed in that process because 
governments are generally so strong that they can get their legislation through parliament 
with little difficulty (Richardson; 1993, p.90)).  But despite the desire for a strong Parliament 
in Scotland, the Scottish Executive was always going to be the key policy making actor, 
which is right as government is given a mandate to govern and to drive forward legislation 
that will fulfil its manifesto promises.  Interest groups might complain at the inability of the 
committees to routinely overturn Executive policy but the committees do not have the same 
mandate to govern.  Mitchell argues that the advocates of new politics made too much about 
the powers of the Parliament, failing to recognise that the Scottish Executive, as government, 
was always going to be the most powerful devolved institution.  He questions the emphasis 
that was put on participation in the Parliament, given that parliaments only hold power in 
attenuated form: '[p]articipation through its organs would go some way to providing it with 
greater authority but is not necessarily a route to changing public policy' (Mitchell; 2000, 
p.614).  Mitchell points out that if interest groups simply acknowledged that the Scottish 
Executive is the most important devolved institution in the policy process - which would not 
be tantamount to declaring that the Parliament is toothless - they could then ask rational 
questions about where they could best use their resources when trying to influence policy 
(2000, p.614).   
 
Power sharing was a key aspect of the CSG principles but did the Parliament simply end up 
being what Norton calls a channel to the Scottish Executive, rather than a target in its own 
right (Norton; 1999, p.173)?  Often the groups did see their parliamentary work as 
reinforcing their message to the Scottish Executive, particularly their work with MSPs but 
also their lobbying of the committees.  For instance, the Director of the MS Society said that 
one of the advantages of having good contact with the parliamentary committees was that 
'even if the committee itself was powerless', it would still give them 'a little extra credibility 
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and presumably a bit of increased access to the Minister'.  The committees were capable of 
making small scale policy changes or as Norton put it: ‘Parliament is utilized primarily but 
not exclusively as a vehicle through which proposed change can be amended, restricted, or 
even abandoned’ (1990, p.180).  CoSLA’s Head of Policy also explained that the committees 
are: 
‘a way of getting a message through to the wider membership of the Parliament.  
Because ultimately a Bill is voted on by the full chamber.  And if the committee is 
known to have taken a particular line on part of a Bill and the chamber knows that the 
committee has talked about this in-depth and said this is what should happen despite 
what the Executive says, then you have a chance that the chamber will vote your way 
so it’s not so much a message to the Executive, although it can be used for that 
purpose, the message is to the wider Parliament and sometimes it’s a place in its own 
right’ (personal interview, December 2001). 
 
Parliament is often attributed as being insignificant because of its marginal role in law 
making because it can only occasionally make substantial changes to legislation (Norton; 
1993, p.205).  But as in Italy, the Scottish Parliament committees ‘have emerged as important 
gatekeepers of legislation’ (Della Sala; 1999, p.75).  The fact that the committees do on 
occasion vote against the Scottish Executive and exercise their independence is one factor 
that makes them attractive to interest groups (Norton; 1990, p.179).  The committees can 
conduct their own inquiries into issues or policies and their conclusions from their inquiry or 
scrutiny can put pressure on the Scottish Executive to effect change.  This makes committees 
a target in their own right and it also means that the Scottish Executive has to take into 
account the likely reaction of the committees when forming policy.  This is in keeping with 
Norton's conclusion that parliaments that have powers to affect outcomes beyond the 
deliberative stage will be regarded as more than channels (Norton; 1999, p.173). 
 
The Procedures Committee, in their report on the CSG principles, accepted that the 
Parliament could do more to improve access and participation, but the committee also found 
over the course of its evidence that the Parliament’s approach and ‘its actions to fulfil the 
CSG principles, appear to have been effective, and to have been welcomed by our witnesses’ 
((c), para 127).  Further, Bonney writes that insofar as the Scottish Parliament has made 
progress towards a participative democracy, it 'is the participatory democracy of organised 
interests' (2003, p.467).  In fact, Bonney suggests that the Scottish Parliament's procedures 
might actually have had the effect of letting well-organised interest groups into the policy 
making process to the extent that the groups may themselves prevent change, as they try to 
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protect their own vested interests (2003, p.467).  Susan Deacon MSP, a former Health 
Minister, provides tacit support for this interpretation with a different outcome in mind, as 
she believed that the committees ended up spending too much time considering the views of 
the differing vested interests (2005, p.165). 
 
Despite the changes to the Scottish political system brought about by devolution, there is still 
significant continuity in how Scotland is governed, which one would imagine would have an 
impact on the implementation of a new kind of politics.  Lynch highlights the continuity 
when he writes that the Scottish Executive is ‘essentially the Scottish Office, staffed by the 
same civil servants’ (although Ministers come from a coalition government); that Scotland 
continues to have a Secretary of State (although that post has been downgraded); the House 
of Commons still has Scottish Question Time, a Scottish Grand Committee and a Scottish 
Affairs Select Committee; Westminster politicians such as Gordon Brown ‘remain major 
players within Scottish politics’ and finally Westminster continues to be sovereign and is 
responsible for large areas of government in Scotland including the economy, social security, 
foreign affairs and employment law (2001, p.3).  Could a new politics grow in a system that 
continued to be rooted in the Westminster system of governance?  Brown et al believed in the 
run up to devolution that no matter how radical the Scottish Parliament was going to be, it 
was not going to be capable of starting a revolution because of the policy making styles it 
was inheriting (1998, p.98).   
 
The interest groups did believe at the time of participant observation in the early days of the 
Scottish Parliament that a new politics did exist, as they found MSPs, committees and 
Ministers to be generally open and accessible, although they felt that the same culture had not 
fully spread to the civil service.  With the exception of CoSLA, the other groups perceived 
the civil service to be largely closed off to them and determined to protect their policy 
making influence by blocking access to Ministers (as claimed by the RSPB) or through an 
unwillingness to give out information that some groups felt that they were entitled to (see the 
FSB’s comments in section 6.3).  The six interest groups in this research acknowledged the 
power of the civil servants in the policy process and knew that they would have to work with 
them, but with the arrival of the Scottish Parliament they were thankful that they had recourse 
to politicians in a way that they had not experienced before.  The groups believed that the 
civil service was under greater scrutiny after devolution, '[c]ompared to the situation before 
devolution, when Westminster scrutinised only a small part of the Scottish Office's work' 
(Bonney; 2003, p.460).  The RSPB’s Head of Operations explained that the Scottish 
Parliament meant that the civil servants no longer operated in a ‘democratic vacuum’, 
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whereas they ‘could get away’ with ignoring interest groups before unless the groups created 
‘a pretty big stink to get Ministers to question’ what the civil service were doing.  Those 
comments illustrate that the RSPB (the Scottish RSPB at least) was an outsider group 
because ‘most departments have particularly close ties with certain pressure groups whose 
work is closely interrelated with the concerns of the department’ (James; 1997, p.37/38).  
Departments will consult with affected groups because policies are improved as a result of 
interest group advice (Jordan and Richardson; 1987, p.24) and because civil servants want to 
avoid conflict and problems at the implementation stage of a policy (Smith; 1995, p.16).  
Certain interest groups obviously did have an input into policy before 1999 (the SPTC had 
previously been part of a Scottish Office policy network) but the difference post-devolution 
was that the connections between interest groups and civil servants became more open and 
the circle of those consulted widened so that the civil service could be seen to be even handed 
and thorough in their consultation procedures.  With the exception of CoSLA the other 
groups had not made much of an effort in building up good relationships with the civil 
service because of the negative perception they had of the administration and because of the 
importance they attached to the newly elected elements when the Scottish Parliament first 
opened.  Forging strong links with the civil service was something that the groups knew they 
ought to do but in the immediate years after devolution they had spent more of their resources 
on the committees and Ministers.   
 
The groups thought that the civil service had emerged relatively unscathed from the 
devolution process, but as time progressed the Scottish Parliament’s culture of openness was 
beginning to make an impact on the administration, as there were indications from the civil 
service that it was beginning to be more accessible and willing to speak to interest groups.  
The suggestion from the groups was that as more time passed the civil service would 
gradually be more in alignment with the open and participative culture of the Scottish 
Parliament.   
 
What frustrated some of the interest groups, like the SPTC, is that they believe that the civil 
service will always want to keep the status quo.  James (1997, p.90) explains that this is 
because civil servants are cautious by experience because they want to establish if a policy 
will actually work in practice, as civil servants have to ensure that it is implemented and that 
it will achieve the desired results.  Civil servants cannot let every interest group have 
unfettered access to Ministers or to the policy process but they do have a duty to present the 
various viewpoints.  When civil servants advise Ministers they will of course highlight what 
they perceive to be the preferred course of action (usually because they believe it to be the 
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most workable), but the Minister should still be presented with the alternatives so that the 
Minister can make his or her own decision based on the options, data and advice before him 
or her (James; 1997, p.90: Dowding; 1995, p.110).  There may even be a ‘departmental 
view’, where a civil service department has a particular outlook on certain policy issues but it 
is still Ministers that make the final decision.  While most UK Ministers appear to have been 
happy with their civil servants, Tony Benn (former Industry Secretary and then Energy 
Secretary in the 1974-9 Labour governments) was not and complained publicly that they 
blocked his initiatives through the deployment of various techniques, such as the selective 
presentation of information and the mobilisation of internal Whitehall forces against his 
particular policy (quoted in James; 1997, p.91-97).  There is no doubt that civil servants can 
be very powerful but ultimately it is the Minister's choice whether to follow the advice of his 
or her civil servants.   
 
What is interesting is that the groups blamed the civil service for its lack of change; they did 
not hold Ministers or the Parliament responsible for failing to make the civil service more 
accessible.  The perception that politicians also had to tolerate the civil service was supported 
by the fact that MSPs were just as prepared as interest groups to criticise it (see section 
6.3.1).   Susan Deacon wrote that 'the roots of much of the inertia and caution, not to mention 
failures of policy implementation, … are to be found in a Civil Service not yet fit for purpose' 
(2005, p.171).  The groups even commended the Parliament and Ministers for managing to 
introduce the changes that the groups felt were becoming more evident in civil service 
procedures (such as an increasing willingness to attend meetings to explain new Bills).   
 
Mitchell's astonishment at the attitudes of civic Scotland towards the Scottish Parliament 
have already been noted, where he found it extraordinary that interest groups lost sight of the 
fact that it was not a completely new institution, as devolution had simply 'involved the 
establishment of a democratic component to an existing distinctive structure of government 
in Scotland' (Mitchell; 2000, p.615). As a result of the continuities in institutions pre and post 
devolution Mitchell argued that there was no need for interest groups to re-invent the 
lobbying wheel.  But perhaps that misses the point: the majority of the groups in this research 
expressed dissatisfaction and alienation from the political process before devolution, so why 
would they want to perpetuate a system that they believed largely excluded them?  They 
campaigned for years for a Scottish Parliament which they felt would be more relevant to 
Scotland and its needs (see section 5.2). 
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It is interesting that the groups not only believed that the Parliament was living up to the CSG 
principles but that Ministers were also abiding by the principles (despite the fact that the MS 
Society and the RSPB had experienced real difficulties in getting access to Ministers).  It was 
the democratically elected components of the Scottish Parliament that were seen as being 
successful in achieving a new politics.  The relationship between the parliament and the 
groups - a relationship that is generally 'under-explored' (Norton; 1999, p.167) – reveals that 
a parliament can through its design be a central locus of power, even to groups that have 
privileged access to the Scottish Executive.   
 
9.3  Objective 2: changing applicability of the approaches 
The second objective of this research was to find the extent to which the different types of 
institutionalist accounts are applicable in explaining the responses of the groups.  Hall and 
Taylor stated that ‘the time has come for a more open and extensive interchange’ among the 
three new institutionalist approaches (1996, p.957).  The evidence from this research would 
support such an interchange as the findings in the previous chapters would support the 
argument that in most instances all three approaches are applicable in explaining the response 
of the interest groups.  However, it is also apparent that one institutionalist approach is more 
relevant at any given time. 
 
This research suggests that the pattern begins with sociological institutionalism which is the 
most applicable approach during movements for change and periods of discontent.  For 
instance, the Home Rule movement occurred over many decades and the churches, CoSLA 
and the FSB were a part of that campaign.  The devolution movement garnered substantial 
support amongst the Scottish electorate and those interests that were involved in the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention saw their ideological goal realised.  Sociological institutionalism 
was more applicable at that time in explaining the behaviour of the groups involved as they 
tried to influence the design of the devolved institutions based on societal expectations at that 
time.  Once the decision to grant devolution was made and the Scottish Parliament was 
established, this shift in circumstances meant that historical institutionalism became the most 
applicable approach in explaining the behaviour of the groups as this time was a period of 
rule making and institution building.  Devolution happened for a number of reasons that 
came together at a particular time which dictated the particular set of rules, procedures and 
culture that the Scottish Parliament was built on.  An institution and its rules has to be 
understood in the context of when they were created, hence the importance of historical 
institutionalism (for example the Scottish Parliament's methods of operation were 
consciously designed to be anti-Westminster and pro civic society participation because of 
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the experience of many under the consecutive Conservative governments immediately prior 
to devolution).  During these periods rational choice institutionalism remains in the 
background because bigger collective forces are at work.  But it comes into the ascendancy 
once institutions and/or rules became regulated and well established.  Having accomplished 
the collective goal of a Scottish Parliament, it then became appropriate for groups to seek 
their own good and to determine how the Scottish Parliament could best serve their interests, 
so for this longer period of time rational choice institutionalism will be more applicable.  
Rational choice institutionalism will remain dominant until such time when a significant 
proportion of people again press for change due to their discontent with the institutions and 
system in place and at such a time sociological institutionalism will again become the main 
approach.  In order to outline this premise each approach will be looked at in terms of the 
Scottish Parliament’s development, before looking specifically at the relevance of the 
institutionalist approaches to the behaviour of the six groups. 
 
9.3.1  Sociological institutionalism: movement for change 
One of the main criticisms about sociological institutionalism in section 3.6 was that it 
ignores the individual, which becomes submerged in the collective.  However, that is a 
necessity when a bigger ideological goal is at stake for the perceived good of the majority, 
the idea that sometimes individual sacrifices have to be made in order to achieve the greater 
good.  Change in a democratic society requires a majority collective desire if it is to be 
successful.  Therefore, the importance attached to the collective in sociological 
institutionalism is not actually a flaw when regarded in its proper context.   
 
The devolution experience demonstrated that for those groups involved in trying to bring 
about change, sociological institutionalism was the most applicable approach in explaining 
their behaviour.  Society is influenced by institutions, but on the other hand society also 
influences institutions in turn, so an institution has to be in synchronisation with the 
expectations of its surrounding society (an integral premise to sociological institutionalism).  
In the 1979 referendum for a Scottish Parliament, the electorate felt that the Labour Party had 
adopted a pro-devolution stance for self-serving purposes and not because they truly believed 
in it.  A correct assumption if one believes the late Lord Crowther-Hunt (Harold Wilson’s 
Constitutional Adviser in 1974): ‘most civil servants were fundamentally opposed to 
devolution, and so, for that matter, were most ministers’; the 1979 referendum appears to 
have been an instance where outside interests played a major role during the reign of a 
minority government (as quoted in Dowding; 1995, p.123).  Support for devolution within 
the Labour Party leadership increased as time went on however, and the policy had the 
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heavyweight support of luminaries such as John Smith, Donald Dewar and Gordon Brown.  It 
was also boosted by the Labour Party’s fear of the SNP gaining support in Scotland.  For the 
1997 referendum though, Labour, the SNP and Liberal Democrats laid aside their political 
differences and agreed to focus together on the goal they all wanted - getting a positive result 
in the referendum.  The Scottish Parliament was then set up, although it was embedded in the 
UK governance structure (Lynch; 2001, p.3). 
 
The most fundamental point about sociological institutionalism is that it ‘concerns itself with 
culturally framed actions, ideas and identities that follow from culturally-specific rules and 
norms’ (Schmidt, (a), p.1).  Midwinter et al explain that ‘[s]ince the Second World War, 
despite trends to assimilation in the economy and tendencies to centralisation in government, 
Scottish identity has in critical respects been strengthened’ (1991, p.20).  They write that this 
strengthening of identity was putting an ‘increasing strain on the unitary state’ (ibid.).  Harvie 
also talks about how there was ‘an acute awareness’ of how distinct Scotland was from its 
neighbours (1998, p.252) and how the SNP was the only party in a position to exploit these 
inadequacies (1998, p.177).  Pilkington (2002, p.60) explains that in the late 1960s the SNP 
attracted support because the Labour Party was being blamed for not doing more to stop the 
decline of mining, steelworks and shipbuilding – the traditional industries – causing Scotland 
to suffer a slowdown in the standard of living that seemed disproportionate to that of 
England.  The SNP were seen as ‘the party likely to do the most for Scotland’ (ibid.).  After 
the failed 1979 devolution referendum the Conservative Party and Mrs Thatcher gained 
power in Westminster.  During her period of office, the issue of being ruled from London by 
a party that did not have the support of the majority of the Scottish electorate inevitably came 
to the fore.  For Vernon Bogdanor, ‘[t]he fiasco of the poll tax seemed to prove to the Scots 
and Welsh that, in rejecting devolution, they have surrendered themselves to a government 
which cared little for their interests’ (Bogdanor as quoted in Pilkington; 2002, p.65).   
 
Paterson connects the distinct Scottish culture with the value that Scots placed on the concept 
of community and its ‘ethic of social responsibility’ (2002, p.117).  These values were 
reflected in how the majority of Scots voted for parties that held the principles of fairness and 
equality at the centre of their policies (Paterson; 2002, p.117-118).  Paterson goes on to claim 
that: 
‘The same kinds of communitarian principles were generalised in the debates on the 
constitutional question from 1988 onwards.  One of the striking features of these 
discussions, compared to the 1970s, was the interest in sovereignty and the emerging 
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conclusion that Scottish ideas about legitimate government rested on the principle of 
popular sovereignty’ (2002, p.118). 
 
In this interpretation, a significant factor for constituent citizens was their Scottish identity 
and they wanted that reflected in how they were governed after a significant period when 
such an option was not available.  And although home rule came behind voter priorities like 
unemployment, health, education and taxes, it ‘sustained itself as a primary demand, not least 
because it could be mixed with other policies’ (Harvie; 1998, p.237).  It was also sustained 
by bodies like the Scottish Constitutional Convention, where a broad coalition of civic groups 
kept the issue of devolution at the forefront and also planned ahead for a future Scottish 
Parliament.  As section 1.2 outlined, these civic groups (politicians, churches, local 
government, trades unions and so on) believed that Scotland was being governed in a way 
which was at odds ‘with the social democratic ethos of civic life’ (Paterson; 1999, p.37).  
This is why the Scottish Constitutional Convention campaigned for a Scottish Parliament and 
advocated a new kind of politics.  Paterson writes of how the parliamentary committees were 
to ‘rely on advice from civic organisations’ in order to ‘provide a counter-weight to the civil 
service’ (1999, p.38).  Many of the bodies that constituted the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention later sat on the Consultative Steering Group and fed in their expectations into the 
CSG’s Report which was to form the blueprint for the Scottish Parliament.  Having spent two 
decades arguing that legitimate government rested on popular sovereignty, the movement for 
devolution was determined that its part in establishing a Scottish Parliament would not go 
unrewarded, hence the four key principles of openness, accessibility, equal opportunities and 
power sharing.  This ties in with sociological institutionalism which breaks down the divides 
between culture and institutions (Hall and Taylor; 1996, p.947) and expects ‘forms and 
practices that are widely valued within a broader cultural environment’ to become 
institutionalised (Gorges; 2001, p.139).   
 
Civic Scotland wanted change: change from the system of governance that they alleged was 
at odds with Scottish culture and identity and one that they felt largely excluded from.  This 
dissatisfaction prompted the different civic bodies to coalesce to form the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention knowing that as a united group they would be a potent force.  
They had learned the lesson from the 1979 referendum (see Appendix 1) and knew that if the 
devolution campaign was going to be successful in implementing change then there had to be 
a broad base of support for it.  This meant that they had to set aside what differences they 
might have had in order to fight for the one cause that they all believed in. 
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9.3.2  Historical institutionalism: establishing change 
Sociological institutionalism might be the more applicable approach in explaining behaviour 
during times of change, but once change has been agreed to and decisions are made about 
how to institutionalise change, historical institutionalism becomes the most relevant 
approach.  The strength of historical institutionalism is that it can explain why particular 
operational arrangements and rules are chosen at times of institutional creation.   
 
The Scottish Parliament was not very old before people began to complain that the list 
system of selecting candidate MSPs was flawed but given the context at the time it is easy to 
trace why campaigners pursued a PR electoral system for the Scottish Parliament and why 
the Labour Party agreed to its introduction (fear of the SNP becoming the governing party, 
see Appendix 2 for further details).  It is also not hard to fathom why there was such an 
emphasis on having an accessible and participative Scottish Parliament.  Kellas describes 
how the Scottish political system was based on elite rule and not on civic participation – the 
elite were ‘insulated from democratic politics because of the absence of a Scottish 
legislature’ (Kellas; 1992, p.193).  The CSG principles reflect the influence of those bodies 
that had campaigned for the Scottish Parliament and their influence will continue to have a 
long-term impact on the Scottish Parliament’s methods of operation.  As historical 
institutionalism explains, those procedures become locked in as time passes, making it hard 
to reverse earlier decisions (for instance, the electoral system).  Although civic society helped 
to develop the template the Scottish Parliament’s methods of working, once the institution is 
up and running it can then structure the framework in which civic society operates.  This is 
acceptable as the Scottish Parliament will constrain the behaviour of groups that start to fight 
for their own interests once the new institution is operational. 
 
9.3.3  Rational choice institutionalism: maintaining the status quo 
During times of uncertainty an institution like the Scottish Parliament can determine the 
preferences and strategies of interest groups.  However, once a period of stability begins and 
groups are sure of how a new system will operate, the groups can begin to determine their 
own preferences (although any new preferences will have to fit in with the strategy that they 
have already adopted by this point).  This is where rational choice becomes the most 
applicable new institutionalist approach in explaining behaviour.  It is inevitable that once a 
political institution has become established, groups will look to maximise their own 
individual goals.  Therefore, those interest groups that had coalesced to successfully fight for 
devolution no longer had that common goal once the Scottish Parliament was set up, but re-
channelled energies in their own individual interests.  This period where rational choice 
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institutionalism is the most applicable approach in explaining behaviour will normally be a 
lengthy one until such time that change is once again desired. 
 
Sociological institutionalism is the most applicable new institutionalist approach in 
explaining behaviour during the bringing about of change, historical institutionalism is the 
most applicable when change is established as the new status quo and rational choice 
institutionalism is the most applicable approach during times of stability.   
 
9.3.4  Ideological/inexperienced/immune 
Having looked at how the three institutionalist approaches change in relevance according to 
three different sets of circumstances, it is time to apply this argument specifically to the six 
interest groups in this research.  This will involve outlining the relationship between the 
groups and the movement for a Scottish Parliament in order to explain in section 9.3.5 to 
explain why the groups were not all affected in the same way. 
 
The six groups can be split into three categories based on their original relationships with the 
Scottish Parliament: 
The Ideological – FSB, churches (SCPO) and CoSLA 
The Inexperienced - MS Society and the RSPB 
The Immune – The SPTC. 
 
The Ideological 
The FSB, the churches (who went on to set up the SCPO) and CoSLA were all devolution 
campaigners and participants in the Scottish Constitutional Convention.  These three groups 
were committed to the ideological cause of devolution which would give Scotland a measure 
of self-rule; although Westminster would remain sovereign.  Self-interest and historical 
context (years of Conservative rule) would have been factors in that commitment, but 
notwithstanding the presence of both rational choice and historical institutionalism, 
sociological institutionalism best explains their behaviour because they were part of a wider 
movement which wanted a system of governance that reflected the society they were working 
in.  This emotional attachment to the Scottish Parliament’s creation will have spilled over 
into the subsequent actions of these three groups.  
 
After the successful referendum, the three groups knew that the Scottish Parliament was 
going to be introduced and so they began to prepare for it, deciding on personnel, strategies 
and priorities and at this point of decision-making (after a change has been agreed to), 
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historical institutionalism becomes the most applicable approach in explaining their actions.  
Once the three groups learn the rules and procedures of the new institution (removing 
uncertainty), they can then concentrate on their own interests where rational choice 
institutionalism comes into its own.  However, during the first few years of the Scottish 
Parliament the approaches would be in a state of flux.  At the time of participant observation 
there were still some areas that the groups were unsure about, such as the effectiveness of the 
committees and MSPs and so whenever uncertainty creeped in, the groups would look to the 
Scottish Parliament or other groups to determine their actions, rather than simply their own 
interests.  
 
The Inexperienced  
Out of the six groups, only the MS Society and the RSPB were politically inactive before 
devolution (although both the UK national offices of those two charities were lobbying at 
Westminster).  Very occasionally the Scottish HQ of the MS Society would give their 
colleagues in London a Scottish view on specific pieces of legislation.  The RSPB in 
Scotland did work with civil servants but at a technocratic level, as the RSPB office was not a 
politically active one – they had a parliamentary team at their UK national headquarters that 
took care of lobbying activity.  As neither of the groups had any real history of working with 
politicians, it is no surprise that they did not have a stance on devolution, as it was outside 
their remit.  However, both groups at a Scottish level became politically involved as a result 
of the Scottish Parliament.  The RSPB enlarged its Scottish set up as soon as the referendum 
results were known, while the MS Society waited until the Scottish Parliament was up and 
running before they catapulted themselves into the world of political lobbying. 
 
The membership of the two groups had a large role to play in the decision to begin lobbying.  
The MS Society’s decision making body in Scotland, the Council, on which 44 
representatives sat, decided that the Society should carry out parliamentary work.  Again, this 
is an example of the applicability of sociological institutionalism as the Council members 
were part of wider Scottish society, of which the majority of the electorate were in favour of 
the Scottish Parliament. 
 
At the RSPB, the Head of Advocacy and Media explained that the RSPB ‘had become more 
Scottish over the years’.  It was an organic experience because as Scotland developed as a 
political entity so did the RSPB.  They had ‘already been moving to a process of 
accommodating devolution’ – the RSPB were simply responding to the societal pressures 
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around them and had slowly been working their way towards devolution at the behest of their 
membership. 
 
The uncertainty of this new area of work that they were going to operate in also played a 
significant role in determining their behaviour.  Sociological institutionalism was applicable 
to many UK wide groups that began to develop more autonomous Scottish offices as they 
responded to the effects of institutional isomorphism.  As other UK wide groups began to 
develop distinct Scottish offices (Jordan and Stevenson; 2000, p.172) others followed suit, 
driven either by the expectations of their members or because they were unsure if the best 
course of action to take and so decided to follow what other successful organisations were 
doing.   
 
The Immune 
The SPTC has had a consistent strategy throughout the upheaval of the Scottish political 
scene: the pursuit of issues rather than specific political actors (see section 5.8).  Although 
the SPTC did gear itself up to deal with the new political institution, it did not change 
significantly in any way as a result of the Scottish Parliament.  
 
The behaviour of the SPTC indicates that it markedly pursued its own interests and out of the 
six groups was the least affected by other influences.  The SPTC did not waste resources 
lobbying MSPs outwith the Education, Culture and Sport Committee.  If there was no 
evidence of actual benefits then the SPTC refrained from investing resources, preferring to 
stick to what it got returns on.  It did not act on the mere expectation of benefits, something 
that the other five groups did.  Therefore, there was no indication from the evidence that 
sociological or historical institutionalism was ever the most relevant approach in explaining 
the behaviour of the SPTC as the pursuit of its own goals remained its primary motivation. 
 
9.3.5  Isolationist or interactive  
Is it possible to say which approach is most applicable at any one time in explaining the 
behaviour of a group?  The circumstances when historical institutionalism will be the most 
relevant are perhaps the easiest to identify, as it will be at times when a period of change has 
occurred and the process of creating rules, procedures and strategies and so on is in motion.  
Those occasions are determined by the context at that time.  Why then was the SPTC the only 
group not to be strongly affected by devolution?   
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One possible explanation is that the SPTC was not so involved in the Scottish Parliament and 
was therefore affected less by it.  Out of the six groups the SPTC was the one with the most 
detached policy despite the fact it had been operating politically for years.  Precisely because 
of their history of political activity, the SPTC’s membership knew that such activity would 
automatically continue in the new political set up so there was no need for them to push for 
further involvement in the Scottish Parliament.  The SPTC did not generally work in co-
operation with other interest groups, preferring to take an independent approach.  It was also 
not as concerned as the other groups about building up sustained relationships with Ministers, 
civil servants or clerks.  Even with MSPs, it limited itself to those on one committee, whereas 
four of the other groups (CoSLA being the other exception) cast a wider net seeking out 
MSPs who may not have been on a relevant committee but still had a real interest in their 
cause.  This was the same pattern of behaviour that the SPTC had prior to the Scottish 
Parliament – it did not have a sustained strategy for building up relationships with those in 
power, instead it focused on particular issues rather than targeting specific individuals, parties 
or groups.  For sociological institutionalism to become the most applicable approach in 
explaining its behaviour, the SPTC would have had to become sufficiently involved in and 
influenced by surrounding society.  But because it limited its level of interaction with other 
interest groups and decision-makers, the SPTC did not became sufficiently persuaded that 
change would benefit its organisation.  And for a group to be persuaded that change would be 
the best course of action, it would have to be convinced by the arguments of others (and 
without proof, which was the case prior to the Scottish Parliament).  For these reasons the 
SPTC simply concentrated on its own goals and so rational choice institutionalism best 
explains its behaviour before, during and after the devolution process. 
 
Once the other five groups had made the decision to get involved with the Scottish 
Parliament, they were keen to have a much higher level of interaction with decision makers 
and/or other interest groups.  The SCPO, MS Society and the RSPB met up regularly with 
other voluntary sector groups to share information and ideas.  The Policy Officer at the MS 
Society sounded out various other interest groups for ideas on how the MS Society should go 
about lobbying.  Ideas and methods were passed along networks of interest groups with the 
result that groups structured the vision of other groups as they borrowed 'from the existing 
world of institutional templates' (Hall and Taylor; 1996, p.953).  The FSB and CoSLA were 
politically active prior to the Scottish Parliament and they interacted frequently with those in 
the political world including councillors, MPs and party activists.  All five of those groups 
through their relationships with various actors in the Scottish political world, shared in the 
same culture and ‘cognitive maps’ and so adopted similar patterns of behaviour. 
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A group will be motivated primarily by its own interests until times of change, but the 
movement for change has to directly affect the group, or the group has to be persuaded about 
the need for change.  During periods of stability or as long as a group is unaffected by 
change, rational choice institutionalism will be the most applicable approach in explaining 
the behaviour of a group which will tend to look to its own needs and goals.  If an institution 
becomes out of synchronisation with what surrounding society expects from it then a 
movement for change will spring up and at these times sociological institutionalism is best 
placed to explain the behaviour of those involved.  Once change has been achieved, then for a 
short while historical institutionalism will be the most relevant approach (although historical 
institutionalism may not be the most applicable factor for long, its consequences will be felt 
for years).  And so the cycle will continue. 
 
9.4  The aim: impact of the Parliament  
The overall aim of this research was to investigate the impact of a new political institution - 
the Scottish Parliament - upon the way in which outside interests in civil society engage with 
it.  This involves analysing whether the groups changed from being outsider groups to insider 
groups and studying their relationships with the Scottish Executive and/or the Parliament as 
‘[o]utsider groups, by definition do not have access to government or the civil service’ 
(Smith; 1995, p.14).  Parliaments generally have less influence over policy making so the 
perception is that interest groups get bigger rewards from targeting their resources at 
government, which formulate policy, although for many groups, particularly small ones, 
amending legislation is often the most important stage of the legislative process so 
parliaments are of significance to them. 
 
How then has this new political system, as perceived by the groups, impacted on their status?  
In section 4.2 four of the organisations were definite outsider groups.  The SPTC had at some 
point enjoyed insider status (allowing them access to policy networks and government 
funding) but its relationship with the civil service had cooled.  CoSLA continued to be an 
insider group, despite its ideological differences with the Conservative governments at 
Westminster and its inability to influence high profile issues in the 1980s and early 1990s.  
Given that most interest groups tend to eventually veer towards an insider strategy, how has 
the Scottish Parliament impacted on the strategy of the six groups?   
 
Federation of Small Businesses 
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Jordan and Halpin have previously written about the UK FSB office where they found that in 
many ways the FSB at a UK level had ‘undergone what is a reasonably orthodox 
transformation into an insider group’ with the exception that there was ‘a hostility to too 
much officer power’ and ‘that policy development is an activity for activists’ (2003, p.316).  
A similar situation was mirrored in the Scottish FSB where it clearly shifted its tactics to 
comply with the requirements of an insider strategy.  This was evident in several ways.  As 
already mentioned in Sections 4.2 and 4.4 the Scottish FSB took on extra paid staff and 
brought in secondees to increase its expertise.  The Policy Convener also envisaged ‘buying 
in more professionalism’ by hiring experts to carry out specific short-term projects.  But the 
FSB did not just take on more staff, it began to rely a lot more on its paid personnel.  In 
response to a question on how it selected someone to give evidence to the parliamentary 
committees and whether they chose members because of their expertise, the Press and 
Parliamentary Officer replied that it ‘depends’. Most of the time a paid member of staff 
would go on their own (either the Press and Parliamentary Officer, his deputy or the Policy 
Development Officer), or else they would accompany members.  Members on the other hand 
did not go alone because:  
‘the problem is the members have got their own areas of expertise but then in the 
committee they start asking “what would you think of this?”, a lot of it hypothetical... 
but you’ve got to know how to answer a question, then work it out, you have to give a 
political answer’ (personal interview, October 2000). 
 
The Policy Convener (the member in charge of the running of the Scottish FSB) stated that in 
the Press and Parliamentary Office ‘there was a lot more decisions made in here that 
shouldn’t have been made in here’ because a decision had to be made quickly.  The Policy 
Convener and the Press and Parliamentary Officer respond but sometimes ‘we get it wrong 
and some of the membership complain’.  As with the UK national office, policy development 
in the Scottish FSB is still largely developed by the members (although paid staff were also 
included in the process according to the Deputy Press and Parliamentary Officer), although 
the number of members on the Scottish FSB’s decision making body was cut from eighteen 
to seven.   
  
The Policy Convener commented that people knew that the FSB was ‘very strong on 
lobbying’ but when asked if this was what attracted new members he replied ‘to be honest the 
membership, they join for the benefits’.  The Policy Convener stated that the Press and 
Parliamentary Office was not ‘a members’ problems office but it’s very hard to get that 
message across to some of the members’.  Jordan and Halpin’s research found that members 
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joined the FSB for the material benefits at the UK national office too but that this was a 
deliberate strategy of the office because it left the staff free to pursue their own lobbying 
tactics, whereas members who joined in order to be political activists would not be so happy 
to give the ‘leadership autonomy to pursue an insider strategy’ (2003, p.320).   
 
There was some evidence to suggest that the Scottish FSB relied more on its paid staff than 
was the case in the UK national office where there was only a ‘sporadic use of paid staff’ 
(Jordan and Halpin; 2003, p.323).  Despite the fact that the Policy Convener stated that the 
FSB was ‘still a member led organisation, never will be anything else’, the Scottish FSB had 
a routine policy where the paid office staff would bargain with civil servants and Ministers 
and appear before parliamentary committees either on their own or in conjunction with 
members.  For lobbying and political work the paid staff had a predominant role.   
 
The FSB began to produce evidence based, accurate and well researched information with the 
introduction of the Scottish Parliament (see section 4.4).  In fact, the Scottish FSB produced a 
policy manifesto (for the 1999 Scottish Parliament elections) based on the results of a survey 
of its members – something that had not been done by the FSB before.  This was so 
successful that the UK national office subsequently copied the idea for the UK 2001 
elections.  The FSB was becoming more professional because ‘we have to be because if we 
look at all these documents and questions that come from the Parliament we have to 
know…’; the need for factual evidence became necessary with the arrival of the Scottish 
Parliament.  As a result of this move towards professionalism the FSB found that it had more 
influence according to the Deputy Press and Parliamentary Officer, as the Scottish Parliament 
was responsive to organisations that proved themselves with reliable information. 
 
The adoption of an insider strategy was also evident in the FSB’s willingness to compromise 
and to water down its demands.  The Press and Parliamentary Officer had brought forward a 
proposal on business rates but after the Local Government Committee criticised some aspects 
of it, the FSB went away and changed the proposal into ‘something that will manage to get 
through the system’ (Press and Parliamentary Officer).  The Press and Parliamentary Officer 
was also aware that when it came to the Scottish Executive they had ‘to compromise in terms 
of what they [the Scottish Executive] can afford’.  He added that the FSB was aiming to get 
the overall culture for small businesses in Scotland changed for the better, so while it would 
be great to get specific measures through the Scottish Parliament, it was realistic in its aims.  
The Policy Convener agreed, stating that they could not go into meetings looking to win the 
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war but looking to win some battles and in doing so ‘some of the points that we give might 
not suit all of the membership but we’ve got to look at the majority’. 
  
Further evidence of a shift in strategy was evident in its desire to be seen as trustworthy.  The 
Policy Convener stated that the FSB and their previous Press and Parliamentary Officer had 
‘a bad name because nobody trusted us’.  He gave an example of when they showed up at a 
meeting with Michael Forsyth (then the Secretary of State for Scotland) and ‘there was a 
television crew outside photographing us going in and waiting for us coming out, waiting for 
what the result was’ as a result of the (then) Press and Parliamentary Officer alerting the 
media.  The situation was so bad that ‘even the other associations wouldn’t have anything to 
do with us because if they spoke to us it was in the paper the next day’.  The FSB ditched that 
strategy and began to work on building up a new reputation (which has taken them some 
years to do), sticking to ‘Chatham House rules so if you have a discussion at dinner then that 
doesn’t go to the Press or anything like that’.   
 
The FSB at the time of participant observation was careful in its use of the media, although it 
did at times use it in the beginning in order to get a reaction from the Scottish Executive.  In 
1999 it felt ignored by the Scottish Executive, that it ‘didn’t want to know us, we weren’t on 
any boards or anything’.  Therefore the FSB felt that it had no other alternative but to go to 
the papers with a story that it knew would get some column inches - a call for Scottish 
Enterprise to be scrapped.  The coverage had the desired effect of getting them noticed and so 
‘[n]ow we’ve been appointed to their boards to make sure that we are involved in what 
happens’.  But since making some progress in their position vis-à-vis policy makers the FSB 
adopted a more cautious media approach and was only using it as a last resort, preferring to 
keep the decision makers on-side if possible.  For instance, the Press and Parliamentary 
Officer explained how the FSB was opposed to increased taxation and although they could 
have done a report on how ‘since Labour came to power there is more direct taxation, more 
indirect taxation and this is the effect on business…’, they chose not to because what would 
happen ‘is the Tories, SNP, Lib Dems will attack the Executive, so we’ll have the Executive 
going thanks very much!’  So instead of criticising Labour policies outright, the FSB decided 
to raise the issue in a more general debate on the effect of taxes on small businesses and leave 
it to the politicians to argue about who and what could best help small businesses.  On 
occasion though, the FSB have gone public with issues against Executive policy but it is not 
unusual for insider groups to occasionally use campaigning politics, as Jordan and 
Richardson point out, the key is ‘credibility and, carefully done, credibility can be maintained 
without total docility’ (1987, p.37). 
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The FSB had worked at building up relationships with Ministers and civil servants.  Prior to 
the Scottish Parliament it had already established good relationships with the Labour Party, 
demonstrated by the fact that its UK national colleagues would sometimes call on the Policy 
Convener to help them set up meetings with Labour MPs at Westminster.  At the time of 
participant observation the FSB had better relationships with Ministers than with civil 
servants, although it was beginning to work towards improving relations with civil servants, 
including the setting up of meetings with them before asking for a meeting with the 
appropriate Minister.  The FSB was careful in its dealings with civil servants not to offend 
them.   
 
The FSB in the first two years of the Scottish Parliament had worked hard to become an 
insider group and was well on the way to achieving that status, although it had not quite 
reached there.  It ticked the boxes of most insider qualities – it provided accurate and up-to-
date information, expertise, reliance on paid staff, a willingness to compromise, 
trustworthiness and was generally publicly supportive of the Scottish Executive.  It had won 
over the politicians but knew it had some work to do with civil servants in order to become a 
legitimate insider group.   
 
Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office 
As the SCPO only came into existence as a result of the Scottish Parliament, the group’s 
entire modus operandi was a reaction to it.  The churches, according to the Parliamentary 
Officer, did not see themselves as being able to play an on-going part in the political decision 
making process at Westminster but that they could at Holyrood, particularly as the churches 
had campaigned for the Scottish Parliament.  The Parliamentary Officer commented that 
‘until Parliament established its own ways of working it was difficult to know what our ways 
of working would be with it’.  The churches, having participated in the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention and the Consultative Steering Group, promoted the idea that the 
Scottish Parliament should be open, accountable and inclusive of civic Scotland and so ‘what 
led to the creation of this office was a sense of what we should do, which was something that 
would fit quite obviously with that ethos’. 
 
The SCPO adopted a strategy of being as professional as possible, which included setting up 
mechanisms that could enhance its response to policy proposals.  It set up working groups on 
issues such as family law and the Housing Bill, because smaller groups would have the 
ability to respond quickly and it could make decisions on behalf of the churches.  
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Professionalism was also displayed by putting forward ‘the right people’ as witnesses for oral 
evidence to ensure that the churches’ case was not undermined by less robust witnesses (see 
section 5.6). 
    
The SCPO used the media a lot less than the other five groups but again this was due to the 
fact that it had a facilitating rather than a lobbying role.  Although the SCPO did not deal 
with the media on a daily basis, the Parliamentary Officer still on occasion used the media to 
criticise, which he did on the issue of parliamentary committees meeting in private.  This had 
been a source of real irritation to the SCPO and prompted by a committee clerk’s advice that 
the only way to get something changed was to complain, the Parliamentary Officer raised the 
issue whenever an appropriate opportunity arose.  Knowing the value of applying pressure on 
politicians via the press he also wrote an article that was highly critical of the private 
committee meetings (published on the 13th May 2002 in the Seven Days section of The 
Sunday Herald).  In the article he attributed the tendency of committees to meet in private to 
the fact that ‘our politicians are afraid of what the media might make of them’ (taken from a 
personal copy of the text).  
 
Although the SCPO was a trustworthy, professional organisation with well researched 
information, at the time of participant observation the SCPO was an outsider group.  The 
office made the choice not to pursue an insider strategy because although it was not 
ideologically opposed to becoming an insider group, and the Parliamentary Officer did 
believe that the Scottish Executive should listen to what churches had to say and in an 
interview for this PhD he said that he felt that the way the political process was supposed to 
work meant that ‘the parliamentary committees are the area in which bodies like the churches 
should be having their key influence’.   
 
The SCPO was set up as a result of the Scottish Parliament, as a demonstration of the 
commitment the churches had to devolution and their enthusiasm for it, particularly in the 
context of the Parliament (rather than the Scottish Executive).  Perhaps the churches focused 
on the new elements brought in by devolution at the expense of overlooking the importance 
of the existing governance structures that continued post-devolution, particularly the civil 
service.  However, the SCPO was a small office and it may be that the costs involved in 
trying to become an insider group may have been considered too great, so the SPTC may 
have been convinced that it could be more effective at the parliamentary committee level. 
 
Multiple Sclerosis Society 
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Before the Scottish Parliament the MS Society carried out a negligible amount of policy work 
in Scotland, but as a result of their decision to participate in the new political system, its 
priorities changed.  In order to carry out this fresh area of activity the Director’s role was re-
prioritised and the post of a Policy Officer was created, both of which were supplemented by 
the services of a public affairs company which offered them advice and expertise on political 
matters (see Section 4.2 and 4.4).  Although the Society’s decision making Council was in 
favour of carrying out policy work, there was still some uncertainty about the importance of 
it amongst some of the Society’s grassroots members according to the Policy Officer, but: 
‘it will have an effect on the development of the branches in the Society, they will 
become more interested in public affairs, they’ll start to debate issues at a local level 
or to a much greater extent than they have up until now.  That’ll find its way onto the 
agenda of our Annual General Meeting and our Council meetings and so the Society 
will become from top to bottom more quote “politicised” unquote’ (personal 
interview, May 2001). 
 
The Director was also aware that in order for the Society to maximise its chances of success 
they had to conform to the requirements of the Scottish Parliament because ‘they are not 
going to work round us’.  The Policy Officer commented that ‘there’s a code of honour and 
you just adhere to it and the day you don’t adhere to it, nobody trusts you anymore’.  He also 
took pains to ensure that the information the Society gave out was accurate and could be 
substantiated and was ‘absolutely straight’ in order to establish a reputation where people 
trusted what they said.   
 
The Director thought that the media was ‘absolutely vital’ in their campaign to promote MS 
at Holyrood and they tried to use it as often as they could (a sign of the Society’s outsider 
status).  The Policy Officer gave a specific example of an occasion where the media reaped 
them results where other efforts had failed.  In 2001, there was a designated Multiple 
Sclerosis Week and in the months prior to it, the Society had written several times to Susan 
Deacon, the Health Minister, requesting that she meet up with them during MS Week but 
they had no success.  However, when JK Rowling, author of the Harry Potter books and 
patron of the MS Society Scotland, wrote an article in Scotland on Sunday at the start of MS 
Week, the Minister’s office phoned up the next day to arrange a meeting for that week.  The 
Society’s Policy Officer believed that if the article had not appeared the Minister would not 
have found space that week so ‘obviously she is influenced by what happens in the media’.  
The Director was convinced that criticising the Scottish Executive in the media did move 
things along.  Nonetheless, he stressed that the Society did not go out of its way to be critical 
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and only did so because the Scottish Executive’s ‘record of inaction is so lamentable’ and he 
would much rather be in the position of issuing positive press releases.  In the meantime, 
however, the Society was going to continue to try to use the media to achieve its ends. 
 
The Director said that he felt that the Society was on its way to becoming an insider group 
and that was the goal they were working towards, although he was also aware of what they 
still had to do to become an insider group.  The Society had already covered a lot of ground 
to reach the position that they were in after one year, considering that it had never been 
politically active before.   
 
Scottish Parent Teacher Council   
The SPTC was unusual in its choice of political strategies in that it did not want to be an 
insider group but it did want to keep its seats on relevant advisory committees and steering 
groups, which it was successfully appointed onto prior to devolution.  In order to keep those 
seats the SPTC exercised insider group qualities because they knew that civil servants:  
‘are more likely to support us when we want to put somebody forward to something 
like the Learning and Teaching advisory board so the pay-offs may be that we appear 
reasonable, we appear that we argue sensibly, we look like we’re okay, we pass their 
tests, therefore if there is a vacancy on a committee…’ (personal interview, 
November 2001). 
The SPTC continued to seek appointments on advisory committees after the Scottish 
Parliament opened, but it could not be said to have adopted an insider group strategy.  At 
least not in the traditional sense of targeting government as the Development Manager said 
that ‘we will probably continue to deal more with committees than Ministers hopefully’. 
 
The SPTC strategy appears to have been to pursue issues, rather than to have a sustained 
lobbying strategy.  She explained that: 
‘…when the agenda moves we will go to where the agenda is and who is the most 
important focus.  So when the committee was discussing the Bill, yes we go and 
lobby the committee but when it’s “Higher Still” which is being decided in a steering 
group or task group, then our focus goes to the steering group or task group…, we 
have a view of following issues which we have a concern in and then following those 
to the most appropriate location’ (personal interview, November 2001). 
 
The Development Manager described the SPTC as a peripheral player, which could not 
expect to be a big player on the education stage, so instead it decided that it could make a 
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bigger impact by picking up certain issues and pursuing them as best it could.  It was not 
looking to restore its insider group status but at the same time it wanted to safeguard the 
privileges that it had gained such as seats on steering groups.  As a result it maintained its 
political profile and levels of professionalism, continuing its longstanding practice of 
surveying its members and producing research.  For appointments to task groups and 
appearances before parliamentary committees, the SPTC made ‘sure that the strong ones get 
put forward without offending the others’.  The Development Manager had always held a 
strict confidentiality code, before and after the Scottish Parliament.  She said that although 
others on a task group might leak information to the press if things were not going their way, 
she had ‘never leaked anything that was confidential, never, but once it’s out, somebody else 
has leaked it, then I don’t feel any obligation not to comment’.   
 
The SPTC also used the media to achieve its goals as ‘publicity is definitely a weapon to get 
what you want’.  The Development Manager stated that:   
‘if you can’t win your argument by your committee then you go public in some way, 
shape or form and you also sometimes have to go public simply to establish there is 
an alternative view in there somewhere which people have to take account of’ 
(personal interview, November 2001).   
But she makes the point, again in line with the other groups, that you pursue the political 
channels before turning to the media: 
‘I never go to the papers first.  I mean, going to the papers is always a sign that 
somebody either has no direct contact or influence or has lost an argument 
somewhere, or thinks they’ve lost an argument.  Either that or else it’s because you 
are fighting some other interest’ (personal interview, November 2001). 
 
The SPTC did not change its strategy as a result of the Scottish Parliament; instead it simply 
applied the tactics that it had already honed prior to devolution.  The SPTC had accepted that 
it would remain a peripheral player and chose therefore to pursue issues where it felt it could 
have a measure of success, as well as lobbying for seats on advisory groups and the 
parliamentary Education Committee.  Given that the SPTC did not classify itself as an 
insider, it is interesting that it was still given positions on various Scottish Executive bodies – 
perhaps a legacy of its former privileged status and of civil service institutional inertia. 
 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities   
Until Labour came to power in 1997 CoSLA’s clear objective ‘was to oppose central 
government in every significant way.  At that time, lacking influence on government, the 
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organisational strategy was, largely speaking, one of opposition and resistance’ (Bennett et 
al; 2002, p.25).  This all changed when Labour won the 1997 UK general election and the 
subsequent initiation of devolution.  Bennett, Fairley and McAteer’s research found that 
CoSLA’s leadership ‘perceived the Scottish Executive as an ally and wanted to grasp the 
opportunities for influence and partnership offered by devolution’, in contrast to its 
grassroots membership which ‘perceived the Executive as threatening the traditional role of 
local government’ (2002, p.25).  However, CoSLA’s Acting Chief Executive outlined some 
of the opportunities that were available to it as a result of devolution and explained that part 
of CoSLA’s core activity had been: 
‘to try and get an input almost at the policy development stage before anybody has 
written regulations or developed a white paper or whatever else, so our intention is to 
make sure that we are in at the ground floor or even in the basement when the 
thinking is going on about what’s going to happen’ (personal interview, December 
2001).   
 
If new legislation was about to be introduced to Parliament, CoSLA’s first move was to 
create a team for a pre-discussion period.  Although there were occasions when CoSLA and 
the Scottish Executive disagreed to the extent that they could not settle on a solution, for the 
most part CoSLA would attempt to find a compromise.  The Convention Manager explained 
that they hoped their relationships were strong enough to accommodate differences of 
opinion.  She gave the example of an instance when they had ‘robust discussions’ with 
Malcolm Chisholm, then the Minister for Health, but she hoped that at the end of the day 
everyone would be able to walk away and come back with the relationship still intact.  The 
Head of Policy also said that there had been times when they had strongly criticised the 
Minister for Transport over the issue of trunk roads, where they questioned the advice the 
Minister had been given but: 
‘Even then at the height of that, we were able to distinguish that aspect of local 
government’s interest in transport from other areas where we were working quite 
constructively with the Executive and therefore with the Minister’ (personal 
interview, December 2001). 
 
The Public Affairs Officer remarked that CoSLA used the media as a weapon against the 
Scottish Executive but it did not need to use it against the Parliament.  Like the other groups, 
CoSLA tried to ride on the back of the Parliament in order to increase their impact on the 
Scottish Executive.  On one occasion the Scottish Executive refused to commission an 
independent inquiry into local government finance, but the parliamentary Finance Committee 
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decided to carry out an inquiry into the matter and as a result CoSLA issued a press release 
supporting the actions of the Finance Committee in order to pressurise the Scottish Executive 
further.  In another instance, due to their concern over the Scottish Executive’s proposal for 
trunk road contracts, CoSLA turned to the Parliament as the date for the award of the 
contracts approached, by ‘stirring up MSPs, we stirred up the Transport and Environment 
Committee, there was a debate on the floor of the house’.  The Public Affairs Officer 
described an incident where CoSLA had forwarded an advance copy of a highly critical press 
release on a central heating scheme to the Sunday Post, which it was going to send to all the 
newspapers in time for their Monday editions.  Within an hour of the Post receiving the press 
release the Scottish Executive had phoned up CoSLA asking that the press release be pulled 
and in return discussion channels would be opened up.  
 
CoSLA, by virtue of representing local government will always have privileged status, but it 
had also changed its tactics with CoSLA’s leadership ‘consciously trading their public 
campaigning edge to seek greater influence’ (Bennett et al; 2002, p.25).  This change might 
owe as much to Labour being in government as to devolution but the result had been that 
CoSLA had increased its influence, as it measures up to Maloney et al’s distinction of insider 
status where a group is able to sit down and bargain with those in power (Maloney et al; 
1994, p.25).   
 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds   
The Head of the RSPB’s Advocacy and Media Unit explained that ‘the scope of our 
operations has changed because of the Scottish Parliament’.  The RSPB had become a lot 
more political and media savvy with staff learning how to communicate with political actors 
and how to work the media angle of their individual workloads.   
 
The Head of the Advocacy and Media Unit explained that they had also tried to establish an 
‘RSPB brand’ which would command respect from politicians.  His mantra was that the 
RSPB should always be CRAP: calm, rational, authoritative and positive in providing 
evidence and information.  The Head of Policy Operations also agreed that the RSPB tried to 
be as constructive as possible (offering practical solutions to a piece of legislation it was 
unhappy with rather than simply criticising it) in order to increase their chances of getting 
something done about it.  He added that a lot depended on the issue that they were ‘trying to 
sell’.  If it was an issue that went against party policy, he knew they would not get the 
Minister to change it until they had ‘resolved the issue with the party as a whole’ (Head of 
Policy Operations).   
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The Head of Policy Operations said that his team of technical policy people worked in close 
contact with the Advocacy and Media Unit to learn how to operate politically, such as:  
‘trying to influence the higher profile decision-makers like Ministers and MSPs rather 
than the technocrats, so we needed to be more succinct, snappy briefings, documents 
and more smooching, ducking and diving in the bars round Holyrood or the 
Lawnmarket where it is at the moment, party conferences and the like’ (personal 
interview, January 2002).   
He added that his team had also begun to make their own personal contacts with various 
parliamentary actors and were no longer just relying on the Advocacy and Media Unit to set 
up meetings. 
 
Another tactic of the RSPB was to gain areas of consensus with groups that were often 
perceived as its opponents.  The Head of Policy Operations explained that they had 
discussions with landowners, shooters and farmers to establish areas that they agreed on so 
that they could then make a joint presentation to civil servants who hated such an approach 
(of opposing interests joining together), because it meant the status quo was in danger.  He 
said that this was in direct contrast to the parliamentary committees which were particularly 
interested when ‘opposing’ groups came to a consensus viewpoint.    
 
Once the Scottish Parliament opened, the RSPB decided that it could not afford to be any less 
professional than those it was up against so the RSPB’s quality of information improved all 
round according to the Senior Investigations Officer.  The Parliamentary Information Officer 
agreed adding that it was necessary ‘to have quality information, they don’t want you to be 
their friend because they like you, they want to get something out of you and it’s to get 
information’.  She also stated that the ‘whole culture’ of the RSPB had changed as a result of 
their new political activity. 
 
The RSPB had two targets for its media strategy - the public and the decision-makers (taken 
from an internal Scottish Advocacy and Media Strategy, 13th April 2000).  The Head of the 
Unit described the Society’s advocacy and media efforts as ‘the same side of the coin’.  He 
explained during an interview for the PhD that:  
‘It’s highly unusual for a press release not to have some element of a message that is 
advocacy.  Equally, advocacy work is rarely done without reference to something 
hand in hand you’ve been trying to place in the media so if it’s the decision-makers 
you are talking to, either in the civil service or the Scottish Parliament, if they haven’t 
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seen something in the media then your case is weakened.  But if you are going to talk 
on an issue and you have had that story running in the media then your hand is 
strengthened’ (personal interview, December 2001). 
The Senior Investigations Officer called the media the RSPB’s ‘best ally’ and recalled 
occasions when Ministers quoted to him pieces from articles they had read in the press.  
 
The Society had endeavoured to get the Scottish Executive to discuss the issue of licensing 
(for the killing of wild birds) but had failed to do so.  The Society, after discovering that the 
robin was one of the birds classified as a pest, decided that in the face of the Scottish 
Executive’s refusal they would go to the media.  “Scottish Executive issue licence to kill 
robins” was a very media friendly story that even made it into the tabloids, ‘which is very 
difficult for policy in environment to get a good tabloid story’ (Head of Policy Operations).  
The result of all the media coverage was that the Scottish Executive found itself more 
disposed to discuss the issue.  Again however, the Society only took the story to the media 
after it had tried alternative channels to get the Scottish Executive to open the issue up. 
 
The RSPB was an outsider group prior to the Scottish Parliament (as it carried out very little 
political activity in Scotland before devolution) and at the time of participant observation that 
was still the case, although it was working towards changing its status to that of an insider.  
The RSPB could thus be categorised as a potential insider, although obviously it still had its 
work cut out, as it was struggling to get access to Ministers and to civil servants.  The 
Parliamentary Information Officer explained that the RSPB’s membership preferred the 
organisation to carry out what is essentially an insider group strategy because they did not 
want confrontation: ‘…our members didn’t join us because we’re Greenpeace, they joined us 
because we are rational, sensible and all these things’.  So in the words of the Parliamentary 
Information Officer the RSPB was working on the premise that it was better to appear in a 
newspaper on page five saying something agreeable, rather than making headline news. 
 
9.4.1  Summary  
The six groups having made the decision to become involved in the work of the Scottish 
Parliament then had to weigh up the costs and benefits of trying to gain influence within each 
of the devolved institutions that make up the Scottish Parliament.  Traditionally, the most 
desirable institutions are the civil service and Ministers, as they formulate policy and the 
FSB, the MS Society, CoSLA and the RSPB all followed this path by targeting the Scottish 
Executive.  CoSLA was already an insider group, while the other three groups had 
engineered themselves to positions of potential insiders and were working on a strategy that 
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they hoped would eventually grant them acceptance by the civil service and Ministers.  
Although their primary focus was the Scottish Executive, this does not detract from their 
activity at a parliamentary level.  In fact, the concentration of political activity for the MS 
Society and the RSPB was decidedly in the parliamentary arena, although their longer term 
goal was to spend more time on government actors.  The FSB and CoSLA also spent a 
considerable amount of time on the parliamentary committees, demonstrating that regardless 
of insider/outsider status, active interest groups will maintain links with Parliament – an 
acknowledgement that decision making takes place throughout the parliamentary process and 
that the Parliament has an ability to amend legislation (as well as initiating it in the case of 
the parliamentary committees and Member’s Bills).  CoSLA and the FSB were particularly 
effective in receiving invites from parliamentary committees to give oral evidence (see 
section 7.7).  The RSPB and MS Society had made some headway in building up 
relationships with individual MSPs and the RSPB were also making some progress with 
committees, although they still found that they were struggling to be selected to give oral 
evidence.   
 
The SCPO and the SPTC differed from the other four groups in that they had decided not to 
aspire to insider group status, instead choosing to focus primarily on the Parliament, 
particularly the parliamentary committees.  This was an unusual decision as neither group 
were ideologically opposed to becoming insider groups and previous research at a UK level 
has found that ‘no type of organization placed Parliament above or even proportionately 
close to either ministers or civil servants’ (Rush; 1990, p.273).  While a commentator like 
Mitchell might argue that the churches failed to recognise in their enthusiasm for a Scottish 
Parliament that Ministers and civil servants and not the Parliament would continue to be the 
main source of policy initiation and making, it is difficult to level the same accusation at the 
SPTC as it had previous experience of being an insider group and could not have been 
described as being swept away by its enthusiasm for the Scottish Parliament.  However, the 
SPTC appeared to have been quite pragmatic about what influence it could realistically 
achieve and had decided that in terms of costs and rewards it would gain most from 
specifically targeting the Education, Culture and Sport Committee.  The SPTC’s strategy 
appears to have been quite effective.  Despite the SPTC’s small pool of resources it had 
already been chosen to give oral evidence five times to the Education, Culture and Sport 
Committee (and once to the Justice 2 Committee) by November 2002.  The SCPO did not 
have the same parliamentary exposure at that stage but the SCPO was a very new group and 
it provided more of a facilitating service rather than a lobbying service.  By virtue of being a 
facilitating office, it is highly improbable that the SCPO would ever become an insider group 
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anyway because more often than not it cannot speak on behalf of the churches but can pass 
people on to the appropriate people within each of the denominations it represents.  Rush 
observed that: ‘For some Parliament looms large, for others it is of little importance, but for 
most it is one of a number of points of access to the political system, not usually the most 
important’ (1990, p.276).  The decision of the SCPO and SPTC to make the Parliament their 
principal targets rather than the Scottish Executive may be atypical but it adds weight and 
authority to the Parliament that many, including the churches, hoped it would have.    
 
9.5  Conclusion 
Wilson points out that ‘[o]ne of the unique characteristics of the state is that it is both a 
battleground for contending interests and the structure which shapes those interests’ (1990, 
p.32).  After the Scottish Parliament opened interest groups set about trying to influence the 
very institution they had helped to design and which was in its turn now influencing how they 
behaved.   
 
There are a number of key points that can be made about how the Scottish Parliament 
affected the six interest groups: 
 
Mobilisation of interest groups   
Groups that had never carried out political work before, like the MS Society, made the 
decision to carry out policy work as a result of devolution; the churches, particularly the 
Church of Scotland decided to institutionalise their political activities by setting up a 
parliamentary office; while groups, like the FSB, which already had parliamentary offices, 
expanded their activities.   
 
The Scottish Parliament had this effect for a number of reasons: 
• for some of the groups, devolution was a cause they had campaigned for and they 
therefore had a commitment to the Scottish Parliament 
• geographical accessibility 
• accessibility of the politicians 
• the openness of procedures 
• increased primary legislation (there were 62 Acts of the Scottish Parliament in its first 
session and at the halfway stage of the second session there were 19 Acts, 18 bills in 
progress and 2 bills awaiting Royal Assent) 
• ‘special status’ awarded to the voluntary sector (Bonney; 2003, p.462) 
 
 254
Conformity of behaviour 
Regardless of the length of time that the groups had been politically active, they all adopted 
the qualities that the Scottish Parliament expected of them in relation to consultation 
submissions, oral evidence sessions, reliable information, distinct points of contact, joining of 
networks.  The rules of the Scottish Parliament, both formal and informal, meant that the 
behaviour of the groups followed a standardised pattern. 
 
Success of ‘new politics’ 
The six groups believed that the Scottish Parliament had lived up to its goals of openness, 
accessibility and participation.  As all six were actively involved in the Scottish Parliament it 
is no surprise that they were all very supportive of it, believing that it was better serving the 
needs of Scotland.  This was reflected in the comment of CoSLA’s Public Affairs Officer 
who said that it never needed to use the media against the Parliament, it only used it as a 
tactic against the Scottish Executive.   
 
Friction with civil service 
One element that was proving difficult for all of the groups, except for CoSLA, was the need 
to build up relationships with civil servants.  They knew that if they were to become insider 
groups, they would have to build up good relationships with the civil service but there was an 
initial reluctance to do so.  In the immediate aftermath of devolution, the newly elected 
institutions of the Scottish Parliament took up the focus of many of the groups.  As things 
settled down, it became apparent to all that the civil service would still have a key policy role 
to play.  No matter how participative the Parliament was going to be or how accessible 
Ministers were, interest groups were not going to be the only major sources of policy advice.  
There was a sense however that the balance of power between civil servants and Ministers 
had tipped in favour of Ministers after devolution, as Ministers were “on site” five days a 
week instead of the previous situation where the Scottish Office civil servants stayed in 
Scotland and Ministers went down to Westminster for most of the working week.   
 
The civil service was the one devolved institution of the Scottish Parliament which the 
interest groups felt had not lived up to the CSG principles and that it had simply carried over 
its Whitehall culture.  Although the groups did concede that the civil service was showing 
signs of change and was beginning to be more open and accessible. 
 
Significance of the committees 
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All six groups put a lot of stock in the committees and on being selected to give oral 
evidence.  They felt that the committees were indeed a conduit for civic society into the 
policy process and that they encouraged participation.  However, the committees were 
perceived to be weak in relation to the Scottish Executive, as there was a false expectation at 
the start that the committees would be capable of overturning proposed policy.  
Nothwithstanding those frustrations, the groups valued the changes that the committees had 
the capability to make. 
 
MSPs – the bottom rung 
The six groups considered the committees to be the most important part of the legislature, 
more valuable to them than the individual MSPs who made up the committees.  This differs 
from the findings of research from the 1980s on the UK Parliament which found that ‘outside 
organizations regard individual back-bench MPs as far and away the most important form of 
parliamentary contact’ (Rush; 1990, p.253).  This was because MPs acted as intermediaries 
between interest groups and Ministers, or committees and so on (Jones; 1990, p.129).  
Because the system is more open in the Scottish Parliament, the reliance on MSPs is not there 
to the same extent.  For the same reason, the Parliament’s Cross Party Groups were not seen 
as a main route of influence, whereas Jones, writing about the UK equivalent, said that that 
all-party groups had a lot to commend them to interest groups wanting to influence 
parliament, not least because it gave them access to MPs (1990, p.125).  Interest groups have 
very little problem in gaining access to MSPs.  Out of the six groups only the SCPO was 
regularly involved in Cross Party Groups (one on asylum and refugees – a reserved area - and 
one on debt, which straddles policy areas that both Holyrood and Westminster have powers 
over).  Although MSPs were the most accessible component in the Scottish Parliament, the 
groups also felt they were the least powerful and were only particularly valued in respect to 
their committee membership or by groups that were just beginning to be politically active. 
 
Henry McLeish in his introduction to the Consultative Steering Group report wrote that ‘the 
establishment of the Scottish Parliament offers the opportunity to put in place a new sort of 
democracy in Scotland, closer to the Scottish people and more in tune with Scottish needs’ 
(1998, p.v).  It would be fair to say that if the words ‘the Scottish people’ were replaced with 
‘interest groups’, Mr McLeish would be quite accurate in his statement.  The CSG report 
endeavoured to outline a Scottish Parliament that would allow civic society to play a much 
fuller part in the governance of Scotland and it has succeeded in mobilising many Scottish 
interest groups to take full advantage of the opportunities offered to them.  The first finding 
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of the Procedures Committee in its inquiry into the founding principles of the Scottish 
Parliament was that: 
‘we found a strong desire to participate in the life and work of the Parliament in the 
substance and the volume of the evidence given to us. Irrespective of whether the 
respondents criticised or praised the Parliament, the desire to contribute 
constructively to its work almost always came through strongly' (2003, para 23). 
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 APPENDIX 1: PATH TO THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT 
 
1: 1707 to the 1979 referendum 
In 1707 the Scottish Parliament was dissolved and Scotland was governed by the Houses of 
Parliament in London.  However, although the Scottish Parliament had been amalgamated, 
little else was, as Scotland retained its own separate legal, education and local government 
systems and its Presbyterian religion (Paterson; 1999, p.35).  A Scotch Education Department 
was formed in 1872 as Westminster's response to disquiet at legislation affecting Scotland 
not being given proper consideration, and following that a Secretary for Scotland was 
appointed and based in Whitehall in London (Taylor; 2002, p.25).  By 1926 there was a full 
Secretary of State and gradually the Scottish Office was developed and based in Edinburgh 
with the remit to work on policy that directly related to Scotland (Taylor; 2002, p.5: Paterson; 
1999, p.36).  The Scottish Office then became the focus for civic Scotland but there was 
unhappiness about how closed the consultation process was and in the 1960s the campaign 
for devolution became 'inextricably entwined with a campaign to open up' the system of 
consultation in Scotland (Paterson; 1999, p.37).  There was a demand for increased 
democracy in the Scottish political system and although that did not necessarily mean the 
creation of a Scottish Parliament it seemed the most obvious option.  The argument continued 
in the 1970s.  The Scottish National Party (SNP) performed well in the 1974 election and in 
order to quell the nationalist voice, Harold Wilson, the Labour Prime Minister at the time, 
gave Scotland a referendum on devolution in 1979, although without much enthusiasm from 
many within the ranks of his own party or indeed from the civil service.  Lord Crowther-
Hunt, Harold Wilson’s Constitutional Adviser in 1974, wrote that ‘most civil servants were 
fundamentally opposed to devolution, and so, for that matter, were most ministers’ (as quoted 
in Dowding; 1995, p.123).  Furthermore, 'it came at the fag-end of the 1974 parliament, when 
the government's popularity was very low' (Hutchinson; 2001, p.151).  The result of the 
referendum was 52% voted in favour of devolution but less than 40% of the total electorate 
turned out to vote and because of this the referendum failed.  Disgruntled Labour 
backbenchers had insisted on a 40% threshold of the electorate voting so although the 
majority of those who did vote were in favour of devolution, they only made up 33% of the 
total eligible population (Hutchinson; 2001, p.138). 
 
2: The Conservative Party 
From 1979 until 1997 the Conservative Party was in power but support for the Conservatives 
'went into free fall' and by '1987, the proportion of Scots voting Tory was one half that in 
England' and stayed like that in the two elections after that (Hutchinson; 2001, p.139).  
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Scotland's two national broadsheets The Herald and The Scotsman ended their sympathies 
with the Conservative Party after 1979.  The churches also continued to lean further towards 
the left (Hutchinson; 2001, p.143).  The Conservatives were perceived as an English party, 
which was exacerbated by their anti-home rule stance and this proved 'calamitous' at a time 
when the Scots increasingly identified themselves as Scottish more than British (Taylor; 
2002, p.85, 23/4).  The support for the Conservatives was in crisis in Scotland and there was 
the feeling that the Conservatives were governing Scotland without a mandate, but Taylor 
warns that the reasons for devolution should not 'rest solely or even principally upon any 
resentment engendered by the years when Scots were governed by a party, the Conservatives, 
they had palpably refused to support' (2002, p.25-26).    However, the continued 
Conservative rule: 
‘reinforced the view that any arrangements that entrenched some degree of Scottish 
autonomy were to be preferred to the possibility of repeating the experience whereby 
a government with low levels of support in Scotland was able to impose its domestic 
policies on Scotland from Westminster for such a long period’ (Bonney; 2002, p.135).  
 
At the 1997 general election Scotland did not return a single Conservative MP to 
Westminster. 
 
3: The Scottish Constitutional Convention  
Against this background the Scottish Constitutional Convention was launched in January 
1989.  The Convention was an extremely important milestone in the devolutionary path as it 
made plans for a future Scottish Parliament and kept the devolution issue at the forefront of 
Scottish politics.  One of the lessons from the failure of the 1979 referendum was that 
devolution would require a broad base of support so the Convention was made up of Labour 
and Liberal Democrat politicians, local authorities, trades unions, the churches, academics 
and various other interest groups.  The Conservatives did not participate in the Convention 
because of their unionist stance.  The SNP withdrew their membership early on and 
Hutchinson comments that the SNP may have miscalculated, because their:  
'decision to stay aloof from what was a remarkably broad coalition of civic society 
seemed a petty partisan stance, allowing the initiative to speak for the vast majority of 
Scots to pass into the hands of others' (2001, p.147).   
The Scottish Parliament owes a lot to the SNP because of the electoral pressure that they put 
on Labour but credit is also due to ‘a much more widespread civic revolt against the ethos 
and policies of the UK governments of the 1980s’ (McMillan; 2001, p.36). 
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4: The Labour Party 
It became clear that from the time after the 1979 referendum that the Labour Party in 
Scotland was gradually becoming much more in favour of devolution.  This was helped by 
the fact that devolution had dedicated and heavyweight support from people such as John 
Smith, Donald Dewar and Gordon Brown who were replacing the older Labour politicians 
who had been lukewarm about the issue (Hutchinson; 2001, p.149).  Another important factor 
in Labour's position on devolution was the fear of losing out to the SNP who had increased 
their support in the 1992 election, as Labour lost some of theirs in Scotland.  This had the 
effect of focusing Labour's attention on devolution (ibid.).  As Taylor puts it: 'Fearful that 
their Scottish support might ultimately slip to the SNP, they believed they needed to promise 
devolution to shore up their Scottish vote' (2002, p.56). 
 
Because the party had been fully involved in the Scottish Constitutional Convention and 
broadly accepted the Convention’s framework for devolution, Labour: 
'was not now seen, as had been the case in the 1970s, to be endorsing Home Rule 
merely as a response - made under pressure and with marked reluctance - to political 
exigencies' (Hutchinson; 2001, p.151). 
As a result of popular opinion and party support for it, the Labour Party included devolution 
in its manifesto for the 1997 general election.   
 
In the end Labour swept into power with a landslide victory over the Conservatives in the 
1997 general election.  The new Labour government acted quickly on its devolution promise 
and held a referendum in Scotland on 11th September 1997 when their support was still high.  
44.9% of the Scottish electorate turned out to vote in the referendum (although there was no 
turnout threshold this time) and out of those, 74.3% agreed that there should be a Scottish 
Parliament and 63.5% also agreed to the second question that the Scottish Parliament should 
have tax raising powers (Scottish Parliament (j), p.5).  The results were emphatically in 
favour of devolution and this time around all the Scottish regions supported it (in 1979 
outlying areas such as the Highlands and Islands, the north-east and south-west were hostile 
to the proposal of a Scottish Parliament because of a fear of Central Belt domination) 
(Hutchinson, 2001, p.152: Taylor; 2002, p.55/56).  Paterson argued that the referendum was 
won as a result by civic Scotland's desire for a responsive government (1999, p.38). 
 
5: The Consultative Steering Group 
Following the positive referendum result, the Secretary of State for Scotland, Donald Dewar 
(who went on to become the Scottish Parliament’s first First Minister) appointed a 
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Consultative Steering Group (the CSG) in November 1997 which was chaired by the 
Minister for Devolution, Henry McLeish (who was later to become Scotland's second First 
Minister).  The CSG, in the manner of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, was composed 
of civic groups and interests as well as including representatives from all the major political 
parties in Scotland.  The CSG undertook a public consultation exercise seeking the views of 
the Scottish people on what they expected from a Scottish Parliament.  The culmination of 
this exercise was its report which recommended that the Scottish Parliament be founded on 
the four key principles of power sharing, accountability, accessibility and equal opportunities 
(see Consultative Steering Group, 1998).  The report also provided the blueprint for the 
Scottish Parliament's rules of procedures and its initial set of Standing Orders. 
 
6: The Scottish Parliament 
While the CSG was going about its job the Scotland Bill was introduced in the UK 
Parliament in January 1998 and had a smooth passage due to the conclusive referendum 
results, before becoming law as the Scotland Act in November of that year.  The Scottish 
Parliament elections were then subsequently held in May 1999 with the Labour Party gaining 
the most seats (56 in total), although due to the PR system Labour did not have an overall 
majority so decided to form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats who had gained 17 seats.  
With the election the UK Parliament transferred some of its powers to the newly created 
Scottish Parliament (although Westminster still remains sovereign).  Westminster reserved 
powers in defence, foreign affairs, trade, employment and social security but otherwise the 
Scottish Parliament took over the governing of nearly everything else including education, 
health, the environment, economic development and so on.  The Scottish Parliament:  
'operates as a self-contained and fully functioning parliament in its own right.  
Legislation can be passed by the Scottish Parliament without going through the 
Westminster Parliament' (Scottish Parliament (k), p.5). 
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APPENDIX 2: THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
 
In 1995 the Scottish Constitutional Convention published its design for a proportional 
representation electoral system for a future Scottish Parliament.  The Labour Party (which 
had been part of the Scottish Constitutional Convention) adopted the electoral system in its 
entirety for the actual Scottish Parliament.  The PR system was the price Labour paid to keep 
the Liberal Democrats on board in the Convention.  Labour stood to lose the most from a PR 
system in Scotland but agreed to it because the Liberal Democrats who had long been in 
favour of PR (they tended to rack up good second places in UK general elections but under 
first-past-the-post, only first place gets a parliamentary seat), said that if there was no PR, 
then there was no deal (Taylor; 2002, p.54).  The Labour Party was mindful of the 1979 
referendum debacle and its subsequent consequences so in the end it agreed to the Lib Dems 
PR demands because of the need to have a broad base of support for devolution.  It was also 
felt that PR might diminish the worries of rural Scotland about the Central Belt dominating in 
the new political system (Taylor; 2002, p.54-56: Hutchinson; 2001, p.150).  Another reason 
for Labour to agree to PR, although this was kept quiet, was that it would help to prevent the 
SNP from governing with a minority vote at a future date and leading Scotland to 
independence which was something Labour did not want to happen (Taylor; 2002, p.56-57: 
Hutchinson; 2001, p.150).   
 
In designing the Scottish Parliament’s electoral system, other systems were studied so that it 
was possible to take advantage of the best practice in other parliaments.  In particular, small 
countries with parliaments were looked at, as well as devolved parliaments (e.g. Catalonia) 
and also federal governments such as those in Germany (Scottish Parliament (j), p.1).  The 
electoral system used for the Scottish Parliament is a variant of the Additional Member 
System (AMS) used in Germany and in New Zealand.  It is a mixture of first-past-the-post 
and a regional list system.  The Convention proposed that there should be 129 Members of 
the Scottish Parliament (it was a compromise number to satisfy the Labour and Lib Dem 
parties) made up of 73 of constituency members and the remaining 56 coming from party 
lists. 
 
At a Scottish Parliament general election a voter has two votes.  One vote is for their 
constituency MSP (Member of the Scottish Parliament) and the other vote is for a particular 
party or individual from a list as their regional MSP.  The constituency seats were identical to 
those used for the 72 Westminster seats (before the number of Westminster seats was reduced 
to 59 for the 2005 UK general election) with the exception of Orkney and Shetland which 
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was split into two constituencies for the Scottish Parliament giving the total of 73 MSPs.  
These MSPs are elected under first-past-the-post, which means that the candidate who has the 
most votes wins.  Candidates stand under their own name and usually represent a particular 
political party.  The other 56 MSPs come from the proportional part of the AMS system.  
When the Convention was drawing up the electoral system, Scotland was divided up into 
eight regions for the European Parliament elections (Highlands and Islands, North East 
Scotland, Mid-Scotland and Fife, West Scotland, Glasgow, Central Scotland, Lothians, South 
Scotland).  The Convention decided to use the convenience of these boundaries for the list 
MSPs and decided that each region would have seven list MSPs in addition to their 
constituency MSP.  For each of the eight regions political parties could submit a list from 
between one and twelve candidates for the election (individuals can also stand as regional 
MSPs) but for the list MSPs the political party candidates do not stand as individuals, instead 
the voter is voting for a particular party (unless he is voting for an individual standing as an 
Independent).  This means that the ranking on the regional lists is crucial, as the higher up the 
party list they are, the more chance candidates have of getting elected.  For regional seats the 
voter cannot signal his preference of candidate, he can only vote for the party, so even if it is 
the sixth candidate on the party list that he is really supporting his vote will simply be 
registered as a vote for the party.  Somebody placed sixth on the list will have little chance of 
being elected.  AMS may be more proportional than first-past-the-post but it puts a lot of 
power into the hands of the local political parties who choose which candidates go on their 
regional list and what ranking on the list they will be given.  This means that every regional 
MSP owes their seat to the local party activists in the first instance and to keep their seats 
they need to remain in favour with the local party and their parliamentary behaviour will 
probably reflect this.   
   
The allocation of seats is then worked out.  This involves first of all establishing which 73 
candidates won the constituency seats, then calculating how many votes were cast for each 
party from the lists in the eight regional seats.   The number of regional MSPs to be assigned 
to each party is then figured out by dividing their list votes by the number of constituency 
MSPs that they secured in each region then adding one and so whichever party (or 
individual) has the highest number gets the first Additional Member and this process is 
continued until all seven regional MSPs have been declared.  The end result is that the overall 
number of seats won by a party correlates approximately to the number of votes that the party 
has received in each region.  Although as Pilkington (2002, p.102) points out, the Scottish 
version of AMS was not fully proportional as the ratio of constituency to list MSPs is 57:43, 
unlike Germany which had a perfect ratio of 50:50.  Some commentators have expressed the 
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view that this electoral system risked creating a two tier status for MSPs, with the list MSPs 
the poor relative because they did not win their seat on their own merits but because of their 
party allegiance (Pilkington; 2002, p.103).  Labour fuelled this argument by arguing that list 
MSPs should be paid less than constituency MSPs because they would have less work to do 
as they did not have constituents to deal with.  It was no coincidence that Labour argued this 
point because they only had three list MSPs after the 1999 election so they would benefit the 
most from that pay arrangement.  
 
The main result of the Scottish Parliament electoral system is that a majority government (the 
norm at Westminster) will be improbable, with minority or coalition governments the most 
likely result.  This was intended, as it was meant ‘to encourage a new consensual type of 
politics with an element of power sharing’ (Burrows; 2000, p.34).  However, as Dyer points 
out many see PR as being a fairer system but fairness ‘should not be confused with a 
proportionate distribution of power’ (2003, p.150).  A larger party may need to take on a 
coalition partner to govern and in this way smaller parties can get into government.  As 
expected no party gained an overall majority after the first election in 1999.  The Labour 
Party gained the most seats, taking a total of 56 compared to its nearest rival the SNP which 
gained 35 seats but it still left Labour nine seats short of the 65 that they needed for an 
absolute majority.  The Labour Party decided not to go ahead as a minority government but 
instead opted to take on board a coalition partner - the Liberal Democrat Party - so the 
Scottish Parliament had a coalition executive, which in British politics is a very ‘rare 
creature’ (Pyper; 2000, p.78).   
 
The 1999 election results are listed in the table below.  Although after a by-election in Ayr in 
March 2000, the Conservatives gained their first constituency seat at Labour's expense.  The 
SNP also lost two MSPs but this was due to internal strife and two of their MSPs resigned 
from the party and continued as Independents. 
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1999 Scottish Parliament election results 
 
1999 
Political party Constituency List Total 
Labour 53 3 56 
Scottish National Party 7 28 35 
Conservatives 0 18 18 
Liberal Democrats 12 5 17 
Green 0 1 1 
Scottish Socialist 0 1 1 
Dennis Canavan 1 0 1 
Total 73 56 129 
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